This dissertation argues that: (1) deliberation (bouleusis) is distinguished from theoretical thought, in so far as the former is strictly about the particulars of a given situation, while the latter is about universal concepts; and that (2) deliberation is practical only in so far as it prescribes the best option for action, that is, it prescribes practical truth, but there is no element within the deliberative soul that can initiate an action directly. With these two points in mind, I will show in Chapter One that what lets us consistently cognize the moral ‘end’, the moral first principle, is a character or emotional disposition we acquire as a result of habituation (ethismos). Having explained how the conception of ends can be determined, I provide an argument for the first thesis mentioned above, and claim in Chapter Two that deliberation is not of the ends (ta telê), but is only of the means (ta pros to telos). My argument for the second thesis will lead me to claim in Chapter Three that prohairesis, the conclusion of deliberation, is not an action. I end my argument with an investigation showing that the interpretation of Aristotelian deliberation supported in this thesis secures its justification not only in those discussions that are directly related to the nature of deliberation, but also in the context of other important discussions in Aristotle’s ethics, namely, about the possibility of acrasia (in Chapter Four) and the definition of eudaimonia (in Chapter Five). My argument will provide a better treatment and solution, than existing attempts, of the puzzles surrounding the concepts of acrasia and eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics.

This compilation thesis, consisting of five articles, focuses on narrative explorations of vocational Bildung and wisdom in practice. It is an explicitly practical and empirical approach to what, for the most part, tends to be limited to philosophical discussions. This is motivated by the relative lack of systematic knowledge about how to enact wisdom in practice and afford vocational Bildung to those engaged in vocational education and training (VET). The absence of such knowledge makes it more difficult to develop VET practice and curricula and also leads to significant parts of the internal goods of practice to remain tacit, personal and local when they need to become articulated and shared. The aim of the five articles has been to explore how Bildung and practical wisdom can enrich our understanding of vocational practice and didactics on a theoretical, methodological and practical level. Conceptually the thesis draws extensively from narrative inquiry (Clandinin &amp; Connelly 1995, 2000), reflective practice (Schön 1983, 1987), Aristotelian philosophy regarding practical wisdom (Aristotle 2009, Nussbaum 1990), MacIntyre’s concept of a practice (2011) and the Bildung-tradition (Rittelmeyer 2012) to create a coherent framework for the inquiry termed vocational Bildung didactics (VBD). It is located in the phronetic social science paradigm articulated by Flyvbjerg (2001) where the main aim for research is to enrich practice rather than generate theory. The methodology for this kind of inquiry is the collection of narrative cases focusing on unusually rich/successful/wise cases of a practice, what Flyvbjerg (2001) terms extreme and paradigmatic cases. On a conceptual level the inquiry has resulted in the framework of VBD that provides the structure for engaging in this kind of research. It has also resulted in some further conceptualizations driven by the interpretation of cases, in particular a differentiation between vocational and cultural practices. On a methodological level it has resulted in a kind of double didactical method: the case narratives function as articulations of practical knowledge regarding vocational Bildung and practical wisdom but also as the didactical tools for teaching this. On a practical level the inquiry has resulted in suggestions for curriculum-development as well as ways in which the case narratives can be used to enrich the understanding of practitioners. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following paper was unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 5: Manuscript.</p>

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Luis do Nascimento.pdf: 891738 bytes, checksum: 5bea318c81add2883ccdc3c4096efdbc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This thesis intends to philosophically explore the concept of practical wisdom as proposed by Paul Ricoeur in his "Little Ethics". Practical wisdom is a core concept on the Aristotelian tradition that has been discussed and incorporated by several contemporary thinkers like H.G. Gadamer, A. MacIntyre, M. Nussbaum and P. Ricoeur. In order to promote a deeper analysis of the concept we propose an indirect approach via the person who is recognized as someone with practical wisdom, the phrónimos. Through this approach we suggest the concept of phronetical identity by using several categories of the ricoeurian reflection about narrativity in order to recognize phronimos's distinctive attributes. Among them emerges the phronetical plurality as a key concept to understand and further explore the possibilities of practical wisdom in the context of the contemporary ethical debate / O objetivo central desta tese é explorar o conceito de sabedoria prática a partir da proposta ética de Paul Ricoeur. A sabedoria prática é um conceito cardeal da tradição aristotélica que tem sido recuperado por vários pensadores contemporâneos como H. G. Gadamer, A. MacIntyre, M. Nussbaum e P. Ricoeur. Para a investigação mais profunda do conceito, é desenvolvida uma abordagem indireta através da pessoa que é reconhecida como alguém que possui a sabedoria prática, o phrónimos. Nessa abordagem, é sugerido o conceito de identidade phronética, que procura aplicar várias categorias das reflexões ricoeurianas sobre a narratividade para o reconhecimento dos atributos distintivos do phrónimos, entre os quais a pluralidade phronética, que emerge como um dos traços mais significativos

This research examines the perceptions of program alumni from Class Afloat – a particular tall ship sailing study school – with a view for perceived personal and social development during the experience and since, through an Aristotelian virtue lens. Set at the disciplinary intersection of Aristotelian virtue theory and experiential education, self-reporting through survey and interview are analyzed to understand how program alumni perceive the experience as catalyzing or accelerating personal growth (including self-determination, responsibility, attentional flexibility, discipline, courage, moderate self-awareness, perspective, and realistic optimism) and social growth (including friendship, care for the other, empathy, humility, and loyalty) in a deeper attempt to assess perceived growth in practical wisdom, or phronesis, the practice of which mediates over and is constituted by these personal and social virtues. Program alumni are drawn from a large chronological range of cohorts (1985-2012) to best appreciate Aristotle’s notion that a flourishing life (one with developed and active practical wisdom) must be measured across a full life. In the end, the data suggests participation was significant in paradigmatic ways, leading to personal and social growth which extends far beyond the experience itself, impacting participant value commitments, personal identity, and ability to make practical wise decisions.

The purpose of this study was to determine if practical wisdom can be recognized as one factor that may be attributed to the success of individuals sitting in the position of superintendent in a school district. Practical wisdom is defined as something developed over time through experiences and knowledge. It guides decision making on moral and practical issues. The changing political climate coupled with increased accountability and the increased rate at which superintendents have been retiring, have created the necessity to identify some factors that contribute to a superintendent’s success. This study provides an assessment of practical wisdom in a single case study analyzed through this research of a female superintendent in a medium sized school district.

The overall aim of this thesis is twofold: first, to develop and validate questionnaires that could be used for investigating relationships between perceptions of conscience, moral sensitivity and burnout and second, to describe patterns of self-comfort used to ease stress and illuminate meanings of living with a troubled conscience. The thesis comprises five studies and is based on both quantitative and qualitative data. In study I, a questionnaire was constructed to assess perceptions of conscience; the Perceptions of Conscience Questionnaire (PCQ). This 15 item-questionnaire was distributed to 444 care providers. Statistical analyses of responses showed sufficient distribution and a stable six factor solution congruent with reviewed literature. The six factors were labelled: ‘the voice of authority’, ‘warning signal’, ‘demanding sensitivity’, ‘asset’, ‘burden’ and ‘depending on culture’. The findings suggest that the PCQ is a valid questionnaire. The aim of study II was further development of an existing questionnaire assessing care providers’ moral sensitivity, enabling its use in various care contexts. The revised nine-item questionnaire, the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire Revised version (MSQ-R), was distributed to 278 care providers with various professional backgrounds. Statistical analyses of responses showed sufficient distribution and a three-factor solution congruent with reviewed literature. The three factors were labelled: ‘sense of moral burden’, ‘sense of moral strength,’ and ‘sense of moral responsibility.’ The findings suggest that MSQ-R is valid for use in various healthcare contexts. In study III, the PCQ, the MSQ-R and the Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) were distributed to a population of psychiatric care providers (n=101) to investigate relationships between perceptions of conscience and moral sensitivity and levels of burnout. The hierarchical cluster analysis shows two clusters with Pearson’s r &gt;.50. Cluster A comprising items such as: being sensitive, interpreting and following the voice of conscience that warns us against hurting other or ourselves and developing as human beings was labelled ‘experiencing a sense of moral integrity’. Cluster B comprising items such as: feeling inadequate, doing more than one has strengths for, feeling always responsible, having difficulties to deal with wearing feelings, perceiving that conscience gives wrong signals and express social values, having to deaden one’ conscience, were all related to scores of the MBI subscales emotional exhaustion (EE) and depersonalisation (DP). Cluster B was labelled ‘experiencing a burdening accountability’. The results show that levels of ‘experiencing a burdening accountability’ are closely related to levels of being at risk of burnout. The aim of study IV was to describe patterns of self-comforting measures used to ease stress. The written accounts of 168 care providers and healthcare students were analysed by means of qualitative content analysis. The findings disclose two dimensions: an ability to use early learned measures to take care of oneself (ingression) and an ability to feel intimately related to life, other human beings and universe or God (transcendence). The findings provide valuable knowledge about self-comfort as a coping strategy. The aim of study V was to illuminate meanings of living with a troubled conscience. Ten psychiatric care providers, respondents of study III with various perceptions of conscience were interviewed. The interviews were interpreted using a phenomenological - hermeneutical method. The findings show that one meaning of living with a troubled conscience is being confronted with inadequacy and struggling to view oneself as ‘good enough.’ The comprehensive understanding indicates that inadequacy, both one’s own and that of organization one represents, infuse feelings of shame rather than feelings of guilt. Shame concerns one’s identity and need of reconciliation. Conclusions: The results reveal two ways of encountering a troubled conscience. One is being unable to interpret the ethical demand from a troubled conscience. This is indicated by connections between levels of moral burden and levels of burnout. The other way is being able to interpret the ethical demand and using one’s troubled conscience to develop practical wisdom. This means facing shame of feeling inadequate, reconciling images of the ideal self and self-contempt, and becoming realistic about what one can do. In this process comfort seems to be a mediator of reconciliation.

The overall aim of this thesis is twofold: first, to develop and validate questionnaires that could be used for investigating relationships between perceptions of conscience, moral sensitivity and burnout and second, to describe patterns of self-comfort used to ease stress and illuminate meanings of living with a troubled conscience. The thesis comprises five studies and is based on both quantitative and qualitative data. In study I, a questionnaire was constructed to assess perceptions of conscience; the Perceptions of Conscience Questionnaire (PCQ). This 15 item-questionnaire was distributed to 444 care providers. Statistical analyses of responses showed sufficient distribution and a stable six factor solution congruent with reviewed literature. The six factors were labelled: ‘the voice of authority’, ‘warning signal’, ‘demanding sensitivity’, ‘asset’, ‘burden’ and ‘depending on culture’. The findings suggest that the PCQ is a valid questionnaire. The aim of study II was further development of an existing questionnaire assessing care providers’ moral sensitivity, enabling its use in various care contexts. The revised nine-item questionnaire, the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire Revised version (MSQ-R), was distributed to 278 care providers with various professional backgrounds. Statistical analyses of responses showed sufficient distribution and a three-factor solution congruent with reviewed literature. The three factors were labelled: ‘sense of moral burden’, ‘sense of moral strength,’ and ‘sense of moral responsibility.’ The findings suggest that MSQ-R is valid for use in various healthcare contexts. In study III, the PCQ, the MSQ-R and the Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) were distributed to a population of psychiatric care providers (n=101) to investigate relationships between perceptions of conscience and moral sensitivity and levels of burnout. The hierarchical cluster analysis shows two clusters with Pearson’s r &gt;.50. Cluster A comprising items such as: being sensitive, interpreting and following the voice of conscience that warns us against hurting other or ourselves and developing as human beings was labelled ‘experiencing a sense of moral integrity’. Cluster B comprising items such as: feeling inadequate, doing more than one has strengths for, feeling always responsible, having difficulties to deal with wearing feelings, perceiving that conscience gives wrong signals and express social values, having to deaden one’ conscience, were all related to scores of the MBI subscales emotional exhaustion (EE) and depersonalisation (DP). Cluster B was labelled ‘experiencing a burdening accountability’. The results show that levels of ‘experiencing a burdening accountability’ are closely related to levels of being at risk of burnout. The aim of study IV was to describe patterns of self-comforting measures used to ease stress. The written accounts of 168 care providers and healthcare students were analysed by means of qualitative content analysis. The findings disclose two dimensions: an ability to use early learned measures to take care of oneself (ingression) and an ability to feel intimately related to life, other human beings and universe or God (transcendence). The findings provide valuable knowledge about self-comfort as a coping strategy. The aim of study V was to illuminate meanings of living with a troubled conscience. Ten psychiatric care providers, respondents of study III with various perceptions of conscience were interviewed. The interviews were interpreted using a phenomenological - hermeneutical method. The findings show that one meaning of living with a troubled conscience is being confronted with inadequacy and struggling to view oneself as ‘good enough.’ The comprehensive understanding indicates that inadequacy, both one’s own and that of organization one represents, infuse feelings of shame rather than feelings of guilt. Shame concerns one’s identity and need of reconciliation. Conclusions: The results reveal two ways of encountering a troubled conscience. One is being unable to interpret the ethical demand from a troubled conscience. This is indicated by connections between levels of moral burden and levels of burnout. The other way is being able to interpret the ethical demand and using one’s troubled conscience to develop practical wisdom. This means facing shame of feeling inadequate, reconciling images of the ideal self and self-contempt, and becoming realistic about what one can do. In this process comfort seems to be a mediator of reconciliation.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Investigate the concepts of Solicitude and Respect in Paul Ricoeur supposes that we enter certainly in his writings on ethics and morals. Therefore, first it is necessary to bear in mind certain considerations such as the distinction made by the philosopher within the field of ethics through the concepts of ethics, referring to the good life and moral which is understood as mandatory. Along the same line we have the concept of care that is developed by Ricoeur from the fact that he did not find in the Aristotelian concept of friendship a sufficiently clear endorsement of otherness. That is the reason why he turns to the concept of solicitude as a possibility of opening and welcoming of another. Secondly we try to justify the thesis of the necessity of submission of ethical intent to proof of standard, since it is in this connection between obligation and formalism that this shock unfolds. The result achieved is that respect for oneself is the correlate of moral self-esteem, constituting itself from corresponding structures. The conclusion we draw is that the respect for oneself, which in the moral aspect corresponds to the respect for oneself of the ethical plane, is just full of meaning when your respect for the rule is expanded with respect to others. Finally, we understand that it is the idea of humanity in my person and the other person that makes us move from the ethical to the moral plane. This change then has resonance in the idea of justice. The problem of justice becomes to establish equitable procedures in order to ensure respect for all the people. At the individual level, justice is the guarantee of liberty, it is respect in interpersonal and in the collective level it translates as the standard which ensures the good coexistence. However, there are conflicts that arise from the application of the rules. And so the purpose of practical wisdom is to settle conflicts so that it is possible to achieve the good life, thinking in a fair way and acting well. / Investigar os conceitos de Solicitude e de Respeito em Paul Ricoeur supõe que nos adentremos certamente em seus escritos sobre a ética e a moral. Portanto em primeiro lugar se faz necessário que tenhamos em mente algumas considerações, tais como a distinção feita pelo filósofo dentro do próprio campo da ética mediante os conceitos, fazendo referência à vida boa e moral ao que se entende como obrigatório. Nesta mesma linha temos o conceito de solicitude que é elaborado por Ricoeur a partir do fato de ele não encontrar no conceito aristotélico de amizade um respaldo suficientemente claro de alteridade. Por isso recorre ao conceito de solicitude, enquanto uma possibilidade de abertura e de acolhida ao outro. Em segundo lugar tratamos de justificar a tese da necessidade da submissão da intenção ética à prova da norma, uma vez que é nesta ligação entre obrigação e formalismo que este embate se desenrola. O resultado alcançado é que o respeito de si é o correlato moral da estima de si, constituindo-se a partir de estruturas correspondentes. A conclusão que tiramos é que o respeito de si, que no plano moral corresponde à de si do plano ético, apenas é pleno de seu significado quando o respeito da norma estiver se expandido com respeito a outrem. Por último, temos que é a ideia de humanidade na minha pessoa e na pessoa do outro que nos faz passar do plano ético para o plano moral. Essa mudança então tem ressonância na ideia de justiça. O problema da justiça se torna o de estabelecer procedimentos equitativos, de modo a assegurar a todos o respeito para com as pessoas. No plano individual, a justiça é a garantia da liberdade, no interpessoal é o respeito e no plano coletivo, se traduz como norma que assegura o bem viver juntos. Porém há conflitos que nascem a partir da aplicação das normas. E, portanto o objetivo da sabedoria prática é dirimir conflitos para que seja possível alcançarmos a vida boa, pensando o justo e deliberando bem.

Contemporary Christian ethical decision making includes a move toward responsibility, that is, ways in which responsibility should qualify Christian ethics in general. Linking the ways in which responsibility should qualify Christian ethics with the process of ethical decision making itself as an ideal type, it clarifies the prejudices which make for responsible use of the Bible in Christian ethical decision making. When the prejudices influencing the hermeneutical task in Christian ethical decision making are conformable to the ways in which responsibility should qualify Christian ethics, the Bible is used in a responsible way in Christian ethical decision making. Responsible use of the Bible is linked with the hermeneutical notion that prejudices constitute the link between past text and current interpreter. This lead to the text being understood in new way(s) in each new historical situation. In this way it is able to undo the notion that the link between past text and current interpreter can be had from historical objectivism, with its prejudice against prejudices in Biblical interpretation, and which holds that the meaning of a text is restricted to what the original author intended. Once this original meaning has been uncovered it becomes valid for all times and under all circumstances, and can therefore be closed. This closure is then linked with an ethics of conviction, as opposed to the ways in which responsibility should qualify Christian ethics. In exegeting Romans 1: 26-27, as an example, within an ideal type of Christian ethical decision making, it is shown how the interpretation of the text is influenced by the ways in which responsibility should qualify Christian ethics in general. This makes for a new understanding of the text related to the context in which the interpretation happens. As an example it is thus able to show how prejudices can influence the hermeneutical task in Christian ethical decision making. It makes for a responsible reading of the text for the prejudices which are allowed to influence the hermeneutical task are conformable to the ways in which responsibility should qualify Christian ethical decision making. In this way the exegesis of the text is able to show that the understanding of a text, in an ideal type of Christian ethical decision making, is subject to prejudices as that which makes all understanding, also understanding for moral action possible. Copyright / Dissertation (MA(Theol))--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Dogmatics and Christian Ethics / unrestricted

Dans l’exercice de son office, le juge est en permanence aux prises avec la loi et sa conscience. Cette réalité n’est pas propre à notre temps. Elle est une donnée constante de l’histoire judiciaire. Et selon les époques, la conscience du juge n’a pas toujours occupé la même place. Cette oscillation de la place de la conscience dans l’acte de juger témoigne à la fois d’un souci de justice et d’un souci éthique. Malgré les tentatives des doctrines positivistes et légicentristes d’atténuer, voire d’évacuer la question de la conscience du juge de la sphère judiciaire, elle demeure entière, et bien plus encore aujourd’hui avec la complexité de plus en plus grande de certaines affaires judiciaires. Le droit et la conscience sont un couple viscéralement lié mais malheureusement un couple en « difficulté », où le droit ne triomphe pas toujours et où la conscience n’a pas toujours bonne presse au regard de la dimension subjective qui la caractérise et à laquelle elle est très souvent réduite. Si cette question a fait l’objet jusqu’ici d’une abondante littérature tant en droit français qu’en droit canonique, il nous semble qu’elle a été essentiellement abordée soit sous l’angle du droit séculier soit sous l’angle exclusivement du droit canonique. A notre connaissance aucune étude comparative n’a été faite sur ce sujet. D’où l’intérêt de notre étude. Nous proposons donc dans cette investigation une étude comparée de la conscience du juge en droit pénal français et en droit canonique à travers respectivement les concepts d’intime conviction et de certitude morale. En droit pénal français, les juges et les jurés conformément à l’art. 353 CPP, doivent juger en se référant à leur intime conviction tandis que dans la législation canonique le juge ne peut, quel que soit le litige, prononcer sa sentence qu’après avoir acquis conformément au c. 1608, CIC/83 la certitude morale sur la vérité des faits. L’« intime conviction » en droit français et la certitude morale en droit canonique sont deux formes de la manifestation de la conscience du juge. Nous nous interrogeons donc de savoir si la certitude morale est en droit canonique ce que l’intime conviction en droit pénal français. À travers cette étude comparée nous voulons soustraire le jugement selon la conscience des caricatures dont il fait l’objet et mettre en évidence la complexité de l’office du juge. Au cœur du débat sur la conscience du juge c’est l’office tout entier du juge qui est en jeu. Juger est un art qui mobilise toute la personne du juge et met en évidence son autorité à travers une perspicacité et une prudence ritualisées. La conscience du juge – dont la manifestation se décline sous les vocables d’intime conviction et de certitude morale respectivement dans les systèmes juridiques français et canonique et dont le risque d’arbitraire est si communément appréhendé par l’opinion – est un gage de justice et de vérité pour autant qu’elle soit soumise à l’épreuve du rituel judiciaire. Si notre société contemporaine se rebiffe à l’idée de conscience – renvoyée d’emblée à la sphère exclusivement morale et subjective – notre investigation a pour finalité de démontrer que la conscience du juge telle que comprise dans les législations canonique et française revêt un sens technique précis qui ne saurait être enfermé dans une quelconque normativité. / In the exercise of his office, the judge is constantly struggling with the law and his conscience. This reality is not peculiar to our time. It is a constant in judicial history. According to the times in history, the judge's conscience has not always occupied the same place. This oscillation of the place of consciousness in the act of judging shows both a concern for justice and an ethical concern. Despite the attempts of positivist and law-centrist doctrines to mitigate or even dispel the question of the judge's consciousness of the judicial sphere; it remains intact, even more so today with the increasing complexity of certain cases. The ‘righteous’ and the ‘conscientious’ are a viscerally linked couple but unfortunately it is a couple in "difficulty", where the law does not always triumph and where the conscience does not always have good press with regard to the subjective dimension which characterizes it and to which it is very often reduced. If this question has so far been the subject of an abundant literature in both French and Canon law, I believe that it has been essentially approached either from the angle of secular law or exclusively Canon law. To our knowledge, no comparative study has been made on this subject. Hence the interest of our study. We therefore propose in this investigation a comparative study of the judge's conscience in both French criminal law and Canon law through respectively the concepts of ‘intimate conviction’ and ‘moral certainty’. In French criminal law, judges and jurors, in accordance with art. 353 CPP must judge by referring to their intimate conviction whereas in the Canon law the judge cannot; whatever the litigation pronounce in his sentence that after having acquired according to c. 1608, CIC/83 "moral certainty" about the truth of the facts. "Intimate conviction" in French law and "moral certainty" in Canon law are two forms of manifestation of the judge's conscience. We therefore wonder whether "moral certainty" is in canon law what the "conviction" is in French criminal law. Through this comparative study we wish to subtract the judgment according to the consciousness of the caricatures of which it is the object, and to highlight the complexity of the office of the judge. At the heart of the debate about the conscience of the judge is the entire office of the judge that is at stake. Judging is an art that mobilizes the whole person of the judge and highlights his authority through a ritualized perspicacity and prudence. The conscience of the judge - whose manifestation is expressed under the terms of intimate conviction and moral certainty respectively in the French and canonical legal systems and whose risk of arbitrariness is so commonly apprehended by the public - is a pledge of justice and truth as much as it is subject to the test of judicial ritual. If our contemporary society rebels to the idea of consciousness – seen as an outset to the exclusively moral and subjective sphere -, our investigation aims to demonstrate that the conscience of the judge as understood in the canonical and French legislation has a precise technical meaning, which cannot be locked in any normativity.