As social creatures, our social encounters matter. They matter for how we experience the world, as well as ourselves. The role of psycho-social experiences has recently been recognized in the neurocognitive literature on the sense of agency. Defined as the experience of control over one’s actions and outcomes, researchers have begun exploring how social interactions and contextual cues modulate this experience, using an implicit task known as intentional binding. This task claims to capture the sense of agency by assessing differences in perception of time across conditions that are theoretically considered to be higher in sense of agency as compared to those that are lower. Drawing inspiration from this new literature, this thesis explores, across five studies, the impact of different psycho-social experiences, particularly those related to stigmatized racial minority groups, on the sense of agency. Our first two studies (n= 36, n=123) indicate that reflection on both negative and positive psycho-social experiences, including racial stigma, bias, and acceptance, reduces the sense of agency, as indexed by lower action-effect interval estimates. Further, our latter three studies (n=45, n=44, n=44), which focus on North American and international samples, suggest that expectations of racial bias reduce the sense of agency and that this reduction is greatest amongst people who experience a threat to their identity because of the event, as well as people who are low-self monitors. Insights from these studies are used to advance neurocognitive and social cognitive work, including psycho-social modulates of intentional binding and psychological mechanisms that affect racial minorities. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc) / One of the most fascinating aspects of human consciousness is our ability to feel in control of our actions and their outcomes. This experience, better known as a sense of agency, allows us to distinguish our own actions from others and feel responsible for the events we cause in the world. As an important psychological phenomenon, many researchers have taken an interest in understanding how this experience is shaped within our subjective minds. This work has revealed that individual characteristics, as well as social/environmental processes, can affect the sense of agency, at times, even disrupting/impairing the experience. Extending these early findings, this thesis aims to explore the role of psycho-social factors, namely, racial stigma, on the sense of agency. Across five experiments, we reveal that race-based experiences, including perceived and expected racial bias as well as racial acceptance, decrease the sense of agency. With replication and further inquiry, these studies have important implications for the neurocognitive and social-cognitive literature, as well as society at large.

Do all conscious states structurally necessitate self-consciousness? For many, the answer is affirmative: self-consciousness is an inherent property of phenomenal consciousness. I refer to this family of theses under the denomination of Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). However, reports of DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) and MIED (Meditation-InducedEgo Dissolution) seem to suggest otherwise: there are at least some extraordinary circumstances under which no sense of self contributes to the resulting phenomenology. Similarly, subjectivity is altered in depersonalisation, a condition whereby the subject feels detached from oneself. I argue that different varieties of self-consciousness are altered or missing in concomitance with ego dissolution and depersonalisation. Nonetheless, I speculate that depersonalisation per se does not involve a lack of basic self-consciousness — while some reports of ego dissolution indicate that even the most minimal formulation of phenomenal self-consciousness is not adequately present. I identify two modalities —boundlessness and centrelessness — whose implication seems to be crucial in experiences of total lack of self-consciousness. All things considered, I conclude that, while self-consciousness could be a frequent feature of our ordinary experience, SSC is not plausible. In the absence of phenomenal self-consciousness, what remains is the epistemic observation that experiences are self-bounded: no one can have access to each other’s experiences in a first-personal manner. This ontological fact, however, need not be accompanied by a corresponding “sense of self”. Finally, I propose an account explaining the conceivableness of selfless self-reports resting on the premise of the subject being conscious and on her dispositional ability for self-consciousness. / Kräver alla medvetna tillstånd strukturellt självmedvetenhet? För många är svaret jakande: självmedvetenhet är en inneboende egenskap hos fenomenalt medvetande. Jag hänvisar till denna familj av avhandlingar under benämningen Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). Rapporter om DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) och MIED (Meditation-Induced Ego Dissolution) verkar dock antyda något annat: det finns åtminstone några extraordinära omständigheter när en brist av känsla av jaget bidrar till den resulterande fenomenologin. På liknande sätt förändrar depersonalisation subjektiviteten, ett tillstånd där subjektet känner sig fristående från sig själv. Jag hävdar att olika varianter av självmedvetande förändras ellersaknas i samband med ego upplösning och depersonalisering. Icke desto mindre spekulerar jag att depersonalisation i sig inte innebär brist på grundläggande självmedvetenhet – medan vissa rapporter om egoupplösning indikerar att även den mest minimala formuleringen av fenomenal självmedvetenhet inte är tillräckligt närvarande. Jag identifierar två modaliteter -gränslöshet och centerlöshet - vars implikation verkar vara avgörande i upplevelser av total avsaknad av självmedvetenhet. Sammantaget drar jag slutsatsen att även om självmedvetenhet kan vara ett vanligt inslag i vår vanliga upplevelse, är SSC inte rimligt. I frånvaro av fenomenal självmedvetenhet, kvarstår den epistemiska observationen att upplevelser är självbundna: ingen kan ha tillgång till varandras upplevelser på ett förstapersonligt sätt. Detta ontologiska faktum behöver dock inte åtföljas av en motsvarande "känsla av jaget". Slutligen föreslår jag en redogörelse som förklarar tänkbarheten av osjälviska självrapporter som vilar på premissen att subjektet är medvetet och på hennes dispositionsförmåga till självmedvetenhet.