När man inom filosofihistorien diskuterat frågan om djuret, har utgångspunkten ofta varit en negativ kontrast till det mänskliga. Medan människan tillskrivits förmågor som medvetenhet, rationalitet och förmåga till tal och språk, har djuret framställts som något som brister i dessa egenskaper. Dock har det uppkommit nya teorier om djuret som skiljer sig från en sådan metafysisk tradition . Peter Singer lyfter i sin bok, Praktisk Etik, att medvetande och självmedvetandeargument som syftat till att tillskriva människan en särställning gentemot djuret inte längre kan vidmakthållas. Vi har snarare skäl att tro det omvända. Jacques Derrida är likt Singer intresserad av att ändra synen på djuret som en brist i relation till det mänskliga men Derrida föreslår en radikalare lösning. Vi måste enligt Derrida dekonstruera (”bryta ner”) det antropocentriska, metafysiska subjektet - och de strukturer som inbegrips i det - för att se hur dess innehåll har fått människan att bruka våld mot djuret. Även om Derrida och Singer skiljer sig när det gäller att problematisera den metafysiska distinktionen mellan människa och djur. tar man avstamp från samma punkt, nämligen från Jeremy Benthams lidandebegrepp. / When discussing the issue of the animal within the history of philosophy, the aspect has often been somewhat of a negative contrast to what is humane. Whilst the human race has been attributed with abilities such as consciousness, rationality and the ability to speak, the animal has been described as something that lacks these abilities. However, new theories concerning the animal have arisen, theories that differentiate from such metaphysical tradition. In Praktisk Etik, Peter Singer raises an argument claiming that consciousness and self-consciousness concerning the matter of attributing humans with an exceptional position towards the animals, no longer can be admitted as valid. We more likely have the reason to believe the opposite. Jacques Derrida is like Singer interested in changing the attitude towards the animal as a flaw in relation to what is humane, but Derrida proposes a more radical solution. According to Derrida, we have to deconstruct the anthropocentric, metaphysical subject – and the structures that embodies this – to be able to see how its content has made the human being maltreat the animal. Although Derrida and Singer separate in their opinions concerning the problematizing of the metaphysical distinction between the human being and the animal, they take off from the same point of view, namely from Jeremy Bentham’s concept of suffering. / Nicklas Lindgren

Self-awareness is a complex of abilities where empathy, theory of mind (ToM) and episodic memory are attributed to a higher level. Developed for demonstrating mirror self-recognition (MSR) in chimpanzees, mirror mark test has later been commonly used to demonstrate self-awareness in animals. Self-awareness is vital in issues about animal welfare, therefore examining methods of measurement for self-awareness is relevant for improving our understanding of this welfare. Pigs make suitable candidates by representing a species of great economic importance and because knowledge about how animals experience their life and their welfare has great ethical relevance. Consequently, the aim of this study is to illustrate self-awareness in animals and methods of measurement for this, using pigs as an illustrative example. To accomplish this research was conducted using Web of Science. When mirror mark test was applied on cleaner wrasse it was concluded that it passed the test but its relation to self-awareness and ToM was denied. In Pigs knowledge about the MSR is lacking, however they have showed more complex abilities like episodic-like memory and tactical deception, the latter being related to ToM. Cleaner wrasse here represents a species possessing a morphological disability in the mirror mark test, contributing to interpretation difficulties of its demonstrated behavior. Consequently, using the test as a standardized test for self-awareness is being questioned. A gradual perspective on self-awareness can entail better knowledge about which cognitive abilities are shared among species and possibly contribute to more justifiable assessments concerning the welfare of pigs and other farm animals.

This work seeks to trace the influence of G.W. Leibniz on G.W.F. Hegel and the chapter called ‘Force and the Understanding’ in his Phänomenologie des Geistes. Using Leibniz’s theory of forces developed in texts such as Specimen Dynamicum, in which Leibniz argues against the Cartesians in favour of a ‘dynamic’ view on substances, it is here argued that the notion of biological life is of crucial importance for understanding Hegel’s transition from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness at the end of ‘Force and the Understanding’. For Leibniz, force is posited as that which gives unity to the monad, and this by functioning as their inner source of activity. This infusion of activity into the monad gives rise both to the physical world of bodies, as well as to the mental world of consciousnesses. Leibniz also sees force in direct analogy with biological life, as they share one characteristic feature, namely the capacity for ‘perception’ and ‘desire’. Consequently, organic life is for Leibniz what is most real in the world, uniting all bodies with a conscious soul. This move, I argue, is essential for understanding Hegel in ‘Force and the Understanding. More specifically, when Hegel’s consciousness discovers that, through the dialectic of force and law, organic life has become its new object, it also realizes that its faculty of the Understanding [Verstand] is related to its very own biological nature. The outer world of appearance, consciousness realizes, is thereby intimately connected to the inner of things, the so called supersensible world. Hegel thus regards consciousness of biological life as a sort of bridge that unites the Understanding with the concept, or rather, unites internal thinking with the outside world. This gives rise to Consciousness’ awareness of its own thinking, which is equivalent to it becoming a Self-consciousness.

Baserat på tidigare studier kan man konstatera att det råder delade meningar om hur negativa självmedvetande-emotioner ses som distinkta separata emotioner och även om emotioner. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka om skam, skuld och förödmjukelse kan ses som distinkta separata emotioner genom två forskningsfrågor, om de negativa självmedvetande-emotionerna tydligt skiljer sig från varandra genom sin association till andra emotioner, associerat undvikandebeteende samt upplevelser och om de uppstår i olika distinkta sociala kontexter. De två första forskningsfrågorna framstod endast delvis besvarade eftersom att vi inte fann skillnader mellan de tre emotionerna på samtliga punkter. Syftet anses ändå uppfyllt, resultaten i studien mer för att skillnader finns än att de kan ses som olika termer för samma emotionsupplevelse. Skillnader mellan skam och skuld kunde inte statistiskt fastställas men förödmjukelse framstår tydligare skilja sig från skam och skuld. De viktigaste resultat som hittades genom studien är att förödmjukelse har ett negativt samband till inåtriktad ilska samt att skam endast framstår ha ett positivt samband till utåtriktad ilska genom förödmjukelse (när de upplevs tillsammans). Ytterligare framstod inte externalisering av ansvar kunna förklara sambandet mellan skam och utåtriktad ilska, vilket talar emot att ansvarsexternalisering som försvarsmekanism är en relevant förklaring av skammens association till utåtriktad ilska, något som strider mot tidigare studier. Genom uppsatsen söker vi även att undersöka om tydliga kulturella skillnader framstår i en svensk kontext. Studien gjordes genom en kvantitativ webbenkätstudie med 120 respondenter som till största del bestod av högutbildade och studenter mellan 18 och 35 år, urvalet gjordes genom bekvämlighetsurval. I studien undersöks respondenternas levda erfarenheter av emotionerna skam, skuld och förödmjukelse med fokus på olika aspekter. Studien behandlar analysmetoder som binär logistisk regression, spearmans korrelationstest samt korstabellsanalys med chi2-test. Inga tidigare studier har undersökt emotionerna i en svensk kulturkontext tidigare förödmjukelsens samband till inåtriktad ilska genom levda erfarenheter.

The aim of this study was to examine the definition and meaning of a relationship-based social work, and what conditions are required for the professional to manage such. Based on seven qualitative interviews with professional social workers who work with children and adolescents, a thematic analysis was conducted based on the theoretical frameworks of Symbolic Interactionism and the organisational theories of Human Service Organisations and Street-Level Bureaucracy. The main results confirm the importance of the relationship between the client and the professional according to the respondents. Role clarity and empathy through self-awareness were seen as important qualities of the professional to maintain a good relationship with the child, for whom this might lead to a sense of security through the relationship continuity. Mentioned conditions that facilitated the possibility of relationship based client work were mostly organisational variables such as time and discretion. These were variables that varied depending on the organisation that the professionals worked within, leading to a comparative discussion between the organisational conditions of social services and schools. Another theme identified was experience which seemed to matter as a personal skill. These conditions affect the professional’s ability to create and maintain relationships with the children.

The aim of this study was to examine the definition and meaning of a relationship-based social work, and what conditions are required for the professional to manage such. Based on seven qualitative interviews with professional social workers who work with children and adolescents, a thematic analysis was conducted based on the theoretical frameworks of Symbolic Interactionism and the organisational theories of Human Service Organisations and Street-Level Bureaucracy. The main results confirm the importance of the relationship between the client and the professional according to the respondents. Role clarity and empathy through self-awareness were seen as important qualities of the professional to maintain a good relationship with the child, for whom this might lead to a sense of security through the relationship continuity. Mentioned conditions that facilitated the possibility of relationship based client work were mostly organisational variables such as time and discretion. These were variables that varied depending on the organisation that the professionals worked within, leading to a comparative discussion between the organisational conditions of social services and schools. Another theme identified was experience which seemed to matter as a personal skill. These conditions affect the professional’s ability to create and maintain relationships with the children.

Do all conscious states structurally necessitate self-consciousness? For many, the answer is affirmative: self-consciousness is an inherent property of phenomenal consciousness. I refer to this family of theses under the denomination of Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). However, reports of DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) and MIED (Meditation-InducedEgo Dissolution) seem to suggest otherwise: there are at least some extraordinary circumstances under which no sense of self contributes to the resulting phenomenology. Similarly, subjectivity is altered in depersonalisation, a condition whereby the subject feels detached from oneself. I argue that different varieties of self-consciousness are altered or missing in concomitance with ego dissolution and depersonalisation. Nonetheless, I speculate that depersonalisation per se does not involve a lack of basic self-consciousness — while some reports of ego dissolution indicate that even the most minimal formulation of phenomenal self-consciousness is not adequately present. I identify two modalities —boundlessness and centrelessness — whose implication seems to be crucial in experiences of total lack of self-consciousness. All things considered, I conclude that, while self-consciousness could be a frequent feature of our ordinary experience, SSC is not plausible. In the absence of phenomenal self-consciousness, what remains is the epistemic observation that experiences are self-bounded: no one can have access to each other’s experiences in a first-personal manner. This ontological fact, however, need not be accompanied by a corresponding “sense of self”. Finally, I propose an account explaining the conceivableness of selfless self-reports resting on the premise of the subject being conscious and on her dispositional ability for self-consciousness. / Kräver alla medvetna tillstånd strukturellt självmedvetenhet? För många är svaret jakande: självmedvetenhet är en inneboende egenskap hos fenomenalt medvetande. Jag hänvisar till denna familj av avhandlingar under benämningen Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). Rapporter om DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) och MIED (Meditation-Induced Ego Dissolution) verkar dock antyda något annat: det finns åtminstone några extraordinära omständigheter när en brist av känsla av jaget bidrar till den resulterande fenomenologin. På liknande sätt förändrar depersonalisation subjektiviteten, ett tillstånd där subjektet känner sig fristående från sig själv. Jag hävdar att olika varianter av självmedvetande förändras ellersaknas i samband med ego upplösning och depersonalisering. Icke desto mindre spekulerar jag att depersonalisation i sig inte innebär brist på grundläggande självmedvetenhet – medan vissa rapporter om egoupplösning indikerar att även den mest minimala formuleringen av fenomenal självmedvetenhet inte är tillräckligt närvarande. Jag identifierar två modaliteter -gränslöshet och centerlöshet - vars implikation verkar vara avgörande i upplevelser av total avsaknad av självmedvetenhet. Sammantaget drar jag slutsatsen att även om självmedvetenhet kan vara ett vanligt inslag i vår vanliga upplevelse, är SSC inte rimligt. I frånvaro av fenomenal självmedvetenhet, kvarstår den epistemiska observationen att upplevelser är självbundna: ingen kan ha tillgång till varandras upplevelser på ett förstapersonligt sätt. Detta ontologiska faktum behöver dock inte åtföljas av en motsvarande "känsla av jaget". Slutligen föreslår jag en redogörelse som förklarar tänkbarheten av osjälviska självrapporter som vilar på premissen att subjektet är medvetet och på hennes dispositionsförmåga till självmedvetenhet.