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Not my fault: ministerial responsibility and the sponsorship scandal /McCleery, Shawn M. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 128-132). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.
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Civilians at war reexamining the status of civilians accompanying the armed forces /Heaton, John Ricou. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (LL. M.)--George Washington University, 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed Sept. 9, 2005). "May 23, 2004." "ADA425026"--URL. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in paper format.
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"Is adoption of Public Private Partnership (PPP) model in infrastructure contract an effective form of contract to minimize disputes?"Ko, Chun Wa Johnason. January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.A.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2007. / "Master of Art in arbitration and dispute resolution, LW6409 dissertation" Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on May 22, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.
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Les fonctions des principes fondamentaux de la commande publique / The functions of the fundamental principles of public law contractsBontron, Marie-Charlotte 07 November 2015 (has links)
Les principes de la commande publique souffrent d’une imprécision juridique dans la mesure où, aspirant à des finalités communes au moyen d’instruments juridiques identiques, aucun des objectifs généraux qu’ils poursuivent ensemble ne peut être spécifiquement rattaché à l’un d’eux. Afin de pallier cette insuffisance du droit positif, une nouvelle clé de lecture des principes doit être découverte. Une analyse détaillée du droit positif dévoile que le temps constitue le pivot d’une lisibilité certaine des fonctions des principes. Structurant le droit de la commande publique, cet élément permet d’identifier différents temps poursuivant des objectifs spécifiques, dont la concordance avec les principes permet de délimiter les finalités caractéristiques à chacun. À partir de cette application temporelle des principes, il est possible de définir leurs fonctions propres, en ce sens que chacune des règles spécifiques du droit de la commande publique peut être rattachée àl’un d’entre eux. Une confrontation de cette conceptualisation temporelle au droit positif dévoile que de cette définition des fonctions propres, découlent des implications positives sur le droit de la commande publique. D’une part, certaines zones d’ombres latentes de cette branche du droit sont clarifiées. D’autre part, l’office du juge des contentieux précontractuel et contractuel est précisé. Une lecture singulière des fonctions des principes permet ainsi de pallier en partie la complexité patente du droit de la commande publique. / The principles of the Public Commission suffer a legal indistinctness, inasmuch as, aspiring to common purposes by means of identical legal instruments, none of the general objectives that they pursue together cannot be specifically connected to one of them. To mitigate this insufficiency of the substantive law, a new key to the interpretation of principles must be discovered. A detailed analysis of the substantive law reveals that the time constitutes the pivot of a certain legibility of the fonctions of the principles. Structuring Public Commissions Law, this element allows to identify different time pursuing specific objectives, of which the concordance with the principles allows to delimit the characteristic purposes of each.From this temporal application of the principles, it is possible to define their own fonctions, in this sense that each of the rules specific of Public Commissions Law can be connected to one of them. A confrontation of this temporal conceptualisation reveals that of this definition of appropriate functions, ensue positives implications of the Public Commission Law. On one hand, some latent grey areas of this branch of the law are clarified. On the other hand, the office of the judge of pre-contractual and contractual disputes is specified. A singular reading of the fonctions of the principles allows thereby to mitigate partially to the obvious complexity of the Public Commission Law.
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Towards identifying how knowledge management concepts may be applied to enhance the tendering process in South African public sector institutionsKasi, Sizukisa Bridget January 2013 (has links)
The state of the Tendering Process in South African Government Institutions has become an area of concern in recent years with issues related to transparency, governance and rigid retrospective procedures being cited as impediments to efficiency. In tum, Knowledge Management (KM) and its ability to be applied to all types of organisations to increase efficiency has been popularised extensively. An analysis of KM literature suggested that the principles of KM may be used to increase efficiency and create competitive advantage. This study attempted to identify whether the benefits gained by other organisations through the application of Knowledge Management principles, could be applied to the Tendering Process in South African Government Institutions. The study sought to identify how Knowledge Value Chain by Wang and Ahmed (2005) may be leveraged to create an enhanced Tendering Process. The study then reviewed the Tendering Processes conducted in Australia, United States of America, Malaysia and South Africa and sought to identify the common steps in a tendering process in order to construct a standard tendering process. The Knowledge Value Chain was then applied to this process to create a standard tendering process enhanced by Knowledge Management Principles. The model was compared to the processes currently conducted in two Government institutions and two parastals. The findings indicated that the model is well suited for Government Organisations and would assist in the creation of greater transparency, however the practical implementation of the model is yet unlikely as the model suggest electronic access to information, and the process in South African Government Institutions is predominately paper-based.
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Las juntas de resolución de disputas reguladas en la Nueva Ley de Contrataciones con el Estado Peruano y su Reglamento: Ley 30225 y D.S N° 350-2015-EFRodríguez-Portal, Lizeth-Rosemary January 2017 (has links)
La presente investigación se abocará a analizar el nuevo mecanismo de solución de controversias para los contratos de obra que se ha incorporado por primera vez en la LCE y el RLCE denominado la Junta de Resolución de Disputas, en adelante JRD y conocido internacionalmente como Dispute Board. / Tesis
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Administratívne náklady zadávania verejných zákaziek na príklade Slovenskej republiky / Administrative costingness of public procurement in Slovak republic.Šveda, Martin January 2009 (has links)
Aim of this thesis is mainly focused on subject of public procurement in Slovak republic. First chapter deals with initial description of legislative with short characteristics of relevant terms, procedures and constructive elements in the process of public purchasing and its administrative costingness. The topic of administrative costs is deeply described in next two chap-ters. Second chapter is focused on identifying theoretical concept of these costs with respect to its attributes, measurement methods, structure and origin of these costs. Analysis of subjects that have participated in survey is subject of last chapter. It is aimed at providing a rea-der with real view into problematic of Slovak Public Purchasing during year 2009 along with specification of value of administrative costs incurred in several public sector organizations and theirs relation to amount of costs that have been incurred in public purchasing and to compare these types of costs. Ending chapter serves as conclusion in accordance with observed trends and its main part drafts specific proceedings in order to improve efficiency of pub-lic purchasing and its administrative costs.
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Hromadná extrakce dat veřejné správy do RDF / Bulk extraction of public administration data to RDFPomykacz, Michal January 2013 (has links)
The purpose of this work was to deal with data extraction from various formats (HTML, XML, XLS) and transformation for further processing. As the data sources were used Czech public contracts and related code lists and classifications. Main goal was to implement periodic data extraction, RDF transformation and publishing the output in form of Linked Data using SPARQL endpoint. It was necessary to design and implement extraction modules for UnifiedViews tool as it was used for periodic extractions. Theoretical section of this thesis explains the principles of linked data and key tools used for data extraction and manipulation. Practical section deals with extractors design and implementation. Part describing extractor implementation shows methods for parsing data in various dataset formats and its transformation to RDF. The success of each extractor implementation is presented at the conclusion along with thought of usability in a real world.
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Essays in contract theoryLiu, Qing 07 July 2020 (has links)
This dissertation focuses on understanding and modeling how contracts function in practice. The existing principal-agent literature usually involves two players: a principal (investors) provides capital to an agent (managers or entrepreneurs) on a project subject to asymmetric information. However, many real financing arrangements between firms and investors are intermediated by another agent - a bank, a venture capitalist, or a fund family, etc. In these three-tier settings, there are two contracts to deal with two conflicts of interest - a framework that simply hasn't been studied thoroughly in the principal-agent literature.
The first chapter is co-authored with my Ph.D. advisors Prof. Andrea M. Buffa and Prof. Lucy White. In this chapter, we consider a general economic setting in which a principal has all the bargaining power, and she has to hire two agents exerting complementary efforts on her project. The principal chooses from two contracting schemes - direct contracting and delegated contracting - whether to contract directly with both agents or instead to contract with one agent alone and delegate this agent to contract with the other agent. We find that delegated contracting can be optimal when contracts are private. With direct contracting, each agent fears that the principal will opportunistically reduce the other agents' bonus, muting incentives to exert effort. With delegated contracting, one agent observes the contract of the agent he hires, alleviating effort concerns, but allowing rent extraction. In delegating, the principal trades off the losses of control and rent extraction by the hiring agent against the gains from improved observability and effort. We find that it is optimal for the principal to delegate when the hiring agent is sufficiently skilled or the effort complementarity is sufficiently strong.
The second chapter considers an entrepreneurial finance setting in which an entrepreneur needs two things - expert advice and capital - in addition to her own idea and effort. The entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, and she chooses to finance her project from two sources: angels and venture capitalists. Venture capitalists are different from angels in two aspects. First, angels are individuals investing their own capital, while venture capitalists are intermediaries investing on behalf of limited partners (LPs). Second, venture capitalists provide expert advice while angels don't. With angel financing, the entrepreneur obtains expert advice from a consultant who is independent of the angels. With venture capital financing, the entrepreneur obtains expert advice bundled together with capital from a venture capitalist only. I show that when contracts are private, raising capital directly from angels is more expensive because the entrepreneur has the incentive to cut down on expert advice to save money. Angels optimally set a higher cost of capital to be compensated for the lack of verifiability. On the other hand, LPs are able to infer the amount of expert advice through the venture capitalist's shares in the venture. I show that venture capital financing is optimal for the entrepreneur in competitive labor and capital markets. Moreover, convertibles arise endogenously as the optimal security held by the venture capitalist. Convertible securities have features of both debt and equity, allowing the entrepreneur to provide enough incentives to the venture capitalist while minimizing the cost of capital from the LPs.
The third chapter further analyzes the entrepreneur's optimal financing problem in which venture capital is scarce relative to angel capital. Compared with competitive venture capital, the venture capitalist's compensation stays the same while the LPs demand a higher return. The entrepreneur and the venture capitalist share the extra cost of financing, and their expected payoffs and the project's profitability decrease in the scarcity level of venture capital. With venture capital financing, the entrepreneur trades off the loss due to the scarcity of venture capital against the gains from the improved transparency in contracting. I find that angel financing is optimal when venture capital is sufficiently scarce. Compared with angel financing, the investors as LPs demand a higher return than angels only when venture capital is scarcer than what it makes angel financing optimal.
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Návrh projektu a aplikace metodiky projektového managementu v podniku / Project Design and Project Management Methodology Application in a CompanyVrábelová, Jana January 2014 (has links)
The master’s thesis deals with project design of a web application development as a tool for electronic administration of public contracts in a selected company. It analyzes the environment and feasibility of the company. The thesis contains a practical application of recommended methods for specific project design solution.
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