Purpose - The authors propose that angry individuals are much more likely to consider the emotional state of their partner than are neutral individuals. They then apply a lay theory dictating that anger decreases cooperation and react accordingly by lowering their own level of cooperation. Design/methodology/approach - The authors report four experiments involving different samples, manipulations, payment schemes and interfaces. The methodological approach was to capitalize on the positives of experimental research (e.g. establishing causality) while also trying to conceptually replicate the findings in different settings. Findings - The authors found evidence for a lay theory (i.e. expectation) that anger decreases cooperation, but that actual cooperation was lowest when angry individuals were paired with other angry individuals, supporting the hypotheses. Research limitations/implications - Anger can spill over from unrelated contexts to affect cooperation, and incidental anger by itself is not enough to decrease cooperation. However, the findings are limited to anger and cannot necessarily be used to understand the effects of other emotions. Practical implications - Before entering into a context that requires cooperation, such as a negotiation, be wary of the emotional state of both yourself and of your partner. This paper suggests that only if both parties are angry, then the likelihood of cooperation is low. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, they are the first researchers to address the question of how incidental anger affects single-round cooperation. By going back to the basics, the authors believe that the findings fill a gap in existing research and offer a building block for future research on anger and cooperation.

付記する学位プログラム名: グローバル生存学大学院連携プログラム / 京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22111号 / 経博第604号 / 新制||経||291(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 依田 高典, 教授 岡 敏弘, 講師 五十川 大也 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

Punishment is the act of penalizing an individual as a response to a transgression. This thesis will deal with punishment in experimental game scenarios and in experimental criminal punishment scenarios, along with their different adaptations. The aim will be to provide an overview of both psychological and neurological underpinnings of punishment by reviewing existing literature. While punishment ought to deter transgressions and promote cooperative behavior, internal neural reward-related systems seem to be a driving factor of the desire to punish wrongdoings. Decisions on whether a transgressor is guilty and deserves punishment is mediated by the medial prefrontal cortex with an emphasis on the ventromedial parts. External influences affect the behavioral output and its underlying neural signatures of punishment. Social context such as peer pressure and in-group bias emphasize the importance of theory of mind related areas when conducting punishment.

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We approach the topic of provision of public goods in an experimental economic study using the Public Goods Game setting. We allow subjects to punish each other but vary the structure and amount of information they can base their decisions upon. We try to add to the current literature on reciprocity and study whether people are willing to punish under such incomplete information. Since punishment under uncertain conditions can be quite destructive in terms of welfare, this closely relates to whether people are able to provide public good themselves or whether they need some external assistance. In terms of public policy, this can add to the debate on when should government provide certain services and when it should be left to individuals. In terms of behaviour inside of an enterprise, our study could be well applied to problems that arise when teams work on a common project but some people free-ride on effort of others.

Several experimental studies show that ex post communication mitigates opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, is nonetheless still obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for two channels by which ex post communication may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves emotions induced by others' expressed disapproval. The presence of ex post communication strongly fosters pro-social behavior. The data do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring the emotion-based explanation instead. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

In this paper, we propose and develop a model for a prototype research tool based on a social dilemma game which use is widely spread in social psychology and experimental economics, the Public Goods Game. This tool generates from the necessity to expand the accessibility and versatility of this popular game as well as reach for newer audiences that might be otherwise deterred by the traditional Public Goods Game. Also, using this tool, we perform an experiment to try to find a possible preference towards either punishment or reward in the current population and find a possible correlation between said preference and three different cultural spheres (geographical, generational and gender).

<p dir="ltr">This thesis explores various dimensions of strategic communication, cooperation, and information design within economic and organizational contexts. </p><p><br></p><p dir="ltr">Chapter 2 investigates whether the Law Merchant system can enhance cooperation among agents in a repeated interaction setting and how the presence of bribery affects this dynamic. The study finds that the Honest Law Merchant system does not significantly improve cooperation compared to a baseline scenario without such an institution, while the introduction of bribery further diminishes cooperative behavior. These findings suggest that while judicial enforcement mechanisms hold promise for promoting cooperation, their effectiveness can be undermined by corrupt practices. </p><p><br></p><p dir="ltr">Chapter 3 experimentally investigates behavioral spillovers between two social dilemma type games. In our experiments, subjects play Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD) and Public Goods game (PGG) simultaneously, where the opponents of the two games do not overlap. I vary the level of strategic uncertainty in PD game and test how this affects subject's contributing behavior in PGG, which is held constant across treatments. I find that behavioral spillover exists in our setting and comes in an asymmetric form. When people are in an environment where cooperation is easy to sustain in the PD game, the PGG contributions do not increase much, compared to the baseline treatment when the PGG is played alone. However, when in the setting where cooperation is difficult to sustain in the PD game, PGG contributions decrease significantly.</p><p><br></p><p dir="ltr">Chapter 4, a joint work with Xinxin Lyu, chapter extends the work from Chapter 3 by exploring the differences in between individuals and teams. The study employs the Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) model and additional team experimental treatments. Initial results show that teams exhibit higher cooperation and contribution levels compared to individuals, but these advantages diminish over time, particularly in environments with lower strategic uncertainty. The findings provide insights into group dynamics and the challenges teams face in sustaining cooperation, with significant implications for economic and organizational contexts.</p>

Predicting the behavior of groups and how it emerges from the behaviours of individuals is a difficult task. Not only are individuals and their behaviors affected by the group and vice versa, but the way individuals are affected by and react to various conditions is difficult to predict due to the complex nature of human beings. However, if one could build models that sufficiently capture the behavior of individuals, it would be possible to simulate groups and make a prediction for the emergent behavior that way. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are a type of economic game that explores how individuals engage in cooperation and where different types of collective behaviors emerge. In group-based settings such as PGGs, there is a high level behavior pattern belonging to the group as a whole. In this work, we study how the group behavior emerges from the collection of behaviors belonging to individuals in the group. To this end, we create a model that predicts the emergent collective behavior in a PGG given a set of individual behaviors present within the group. We devise a classification scheme that groups individuals into a small set of phenotypes based on the behavior they exhibit in a PGG. We then create a model that simulates the long term behavior of groups playing a PGG based on the relative distribution of these phenotypes. Our simulation uses cognitive modeling with ACT-R to individually simulate each participant in a game. We find that our model is able to simulate group behavior that resembles what is seen with human participants given only the relative distribution of phenotypes. However, the model is not able to generalize to a PGG where the rules of the game are slightly changed. In modifying the distribution of phenotypes present in simulations, we found that increasing the number of cooperative individuals resulted in a stronger upward trend in group average contribution, while increasing the number of non-cooperative individuals had the opposite effect. Increasing the number of conditional cooperative individuals resulted in slowing the movement of group average contribution trend. / Att förutspå gruppers beteenden och hur dessa uppstår från individernas beteenden är svårt av flera skäl. Dels påverkar individernas beteende gruppen och vice versa, och dels är det svårt att förutspå hur individer påverkas av och reagerar på olika situationer och förhållanden på grund av människans komplexa natur. Om man kunde bygga modeller som fångar individers beteenden tillräckligt väl skulle det vara möjligt att genom simulering kunna ge förutsägelser på gruppens beteende. Public Goods Games (PGGs) är en typ av ekonomiskt spel som utforskar hur individer väljer att sammarbeta och där kollektiva beteenden kan uppstå. Inom gruppbaserade miljöer, som till exempel PGGs, finns det beteenden som tillhör gruppen i sig. I detta arbete studerar vi hur det gruppbeteendet härstammar från samlingen av individuella beteenden inom gruppen. För det skapar vi en modell som ger förutsägelser om det framväxande kollektiva beteendet i en PGG, givet kunskap om fördelningen av olika typer av individuella beteenden som finns i gruppen. För att göra detta utvecklar vi ett klassificeringssystem som grupperar individer i olika fenotyper baserat på deras uppvisade beteende i ett PGG. Vi skapar sedan en modell som simulerar detta PGG med en given grupp av individer. Våran simulering använder kognitiv modellering med ACT-R för att simulera varje enskild deltagare i ett PGG. Vi finner att vår modell simulerar gruppbeteenden som liknar det som syns med mänskliga deltagare, givet att man vet fördelningen av fenotyper i grupper. Modellen kan dock inte generalisera till ett PGG där reglerna är ändrade. När vi ändrade distributionen av fenotyper i simuleringen fann vi att ett ökat nummer av sammarbetsvilliga individer gjorde så att trenden av gruppen genomsnittliga bidrag rörde sig uppåt, medans ett ökat nummer av ej sammarbetsvilliga individer hade motsatt effekt. Då vi ökade antalet vilkorligt sammarbetsvilliga individer fann vi att det saktade ner förändringar av gruppen genomsnittliga bidrag.