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This thesis considers the problem of finitely iterated rational secret sharing. We describe how to evaluate this problem using game theory and finitely iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The players each have a private horizon that the other player does not know. The only thing that a player knows about their opponent’s private horizon is a common upper bound. The description of a synchronous and asynchronous finitely iterated secret sharing protocol with private information is followed by a game theoretic proof of the viability of such protocols. / Graduate

人們如何在重覆的囚犯困境賽局選擇策略是本文探討的議題，其中的賽局學習理論就是預測賽局的參與者(player)會選擇何種策略。本文使用的資料包括3個囚犯困境的實驗，各自有不同的實驗設定及配對程序，參加者都是政治大學的大學部學生，我們將使用這些資料比較不同的學習模型。除了常見的3個學習模型：增強學習模型(Reinforcement Learning model)、信念學習模型(Belief Learning model)及加權經驗吸引模型(Experience-Weighted Attraction model)，本文也提出一個延伸的增強學習模型(Extended reinforcement learning model)。接著將分析劃為Training (in-sample)及Testing (out-sample)，並比較各實驗間或模型間的結果。 　　雖然延伸增強學習模型(Extended reinforcement learning model)較原始的增強學習模型(Reinforcement learning model)多了一個參數，該模型(Extended reinforcement learning model)在Training(in-sample)及Testing(out-sample)表現多較之前的模型來得些許的好。 / How people choose strategies in a finite repeated prisoners’ dilemma game is of interest in Game Theory. The way to predict which strategies the people choose in a game is so-called game learning theory. The objective of this study is to find a proper learning model for the prisoners’ dilemma game data collected in National Cheng-Chi University. The game data consist of three experiments with different game and matching rules. Four learning models are considered, including Reinforcement learning model, Belief learning model, Experience Weighted Attraction learning model and a proposed model modified from reinforcement learning model. The data analysis was divided into 2 parts: training (in-sample) and testing (out-sample). The proposed learning model is slightly better than the original reinforcement learning model no matter when in training or testing prediction although one more parameter is added. The performances of prediction by model fitting are all better than guessing the decisions with equal chance.

No description available.

The purpose of this thesis is to counterargue Simon Dalby’s claim that the national security perspective should be replaced by a global security perspective. Dalby argues that the national security is inappropriate to capture the current issues regarding the environmental security. To counterargue Dalby’s claim, I represent the national security perspective by using the perspective of states’ energy security, and compare current trends and issues regarding states’ energy security and the environmental security. This is done to argue that states can either chose to enhance their own energy security or the environmental security. Prisoners' Dilemma is then used as a theoretical framework on an explanatory example to provide insights about a dilemma, called the Energy- Environment Dilemma in this thesis, that curbs states’ ability to commit themselves to the cause of protecting the environmental security. The explanatory example used is the strategic importance of the Northwest passage for the U.S. and Canada. The results of this thesis suggests that the national security perspective, in combination with Prisoners’ Dilemma, is useful to provide insights about the Energy-Environmental Dilemma. Replacing it with a global security perspective would be to ignore a perspective which can provide insights about a challenge for states to commit to the cause of protecting the environmental security.

The founding premise of this paper is simple; that urban density has positive externalities and that these are unaccounted for in the developers’ density choice. This paper looks at the incentive structure of individual developers though a theoretical perspective and shows that the density choice is a suboptimal product of a prisoner’s dilemma game. Two mechanisms are proposed to achieve the optimal level of density. The first is an Inverse Density Tax which fixes the incentive structure at the agent level by internalizing the positive externalities of density. The second is the Supply Buffer which solves the regulation problem. The disconnect between what is good for a city and what policies are actually practiced by planners is addressed by suggesting a new approach to urbanism called the Surplus Cities approach which suggests a more positive approach to urbanism instead of the multitude of normative approaches that encompass the existing urban planning profession. The significance of the model in the paper is that it shows that the optimum density a developer should build is not the commonly accepted quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, but greater due to positive externalities of density. In addition this paper presents the tools to a) achieve the optimal level of density and b) introduce a separation of powers in municipal government between planning the city and controlling real estate supply which restrains the growth of cities; as has been a prominent subject of contemporary urban economics discourse.

O dilema do prisioneiro (DP) é um dos principais jogos da teoria dos jogos. No dilema do prisioneiro discreto (DPD), dois prisioneiros têm as opções de cooperar ou desertar. Um jogador cooperador não delata seu comparsa, já um desertor delata. Se um cooperar e o outro desertar, o cooperador fica preso por cinco anos e o desertor fica livre. Se ambos cooperarem, ficam presos por um ano e, se ambos desertarem, ficam presos por três anos. Quando o DP é repetido, a cooperação pode emergir entre agentes egoístas. Realizamos um estudo analítico para o DPD, que produziu uma formulação da evolução do nível médio de cooperação e da tentação crítica (valor de tentação que causa mudança abrupta do nível de cooperação). No dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC), cada jogador apresenta um nível de cooperação que define o grau de cooperação. Utilizamos o DPC para estudar o efeito da personalidade dos jogadores sobre a emergência da cooperação. Para isso, propusemos novas estratégias: uma baseada na personalidade dos jogadores e outras duas baseadas na comparação entre o ganho obtido e a aspiração do jogador. Todas as estratégias apresentavam algum mecanismo de cópia do estado do vizinho com maior ganho na vizinhança, mecanismo este, herdado da estratégia darwiniana. Os resultados mostraram que o DPC aumenta o nível médio de cooperação do sistema, quando comparado ao DPD. No entanto, as diferentes estratégias não aumentaram a cooperação comparado à cooperação obtida com a estratégia darwiniana. Então propusemos o uso do coeficiente de agrupamentos, coeficiente de Gini e entropias de Shannon, Tsallis e Kullback-Leibler para classificar os sistemas, em que os agentes jogam o DPD com a estratégia darwiniana, quanto ao nível de cooperação. Como analisamos valores de médias configuracionais, tais classificadores não foram eficientes ao classificar os sistemas. Isso é consequência da existência de distribuições de extremos nos resultados que compõem as médias. As distribuições de extremos suscitaram uma discussão acerca da definição do regime de cooperação no dilema do prisioneiro. Discutimos também as consequências de utilizar apenas valores médios nos resultados ignorando seus desvios e as distribuições. / Prisoner\'s dilemma (PD) is one of the main games of game theory. In discrete prisoner\'s dilemma (DPD), two prisoners have the options to cooperate or to defect. A cooperator player does not defect his accomplice, while a defector does. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets jailed for five years and the defector goes free. If both cooperate, they get jailed during one year and if both defect, they get jailed during three years. When this game is repeated, cooperation may emerge among selfish individuals. We perform an analytical study for the DPD, that produced a formulation for the evolution of the mean cooperation level and for the critical temptation values (temptation values that promote abrupt modifications in the cooperation level). In continuous prisoner\'s dilemma (CPD), each player has a level of cooperation that defines his/her degree of cooperation. We used the CPD to study the effect of the players\' personality on the emergence of cooperation. For this, we propose new strategies: one based on the players\' personality and two others based on the comparison between the player\'s obtained payoff and the desire one. All strategies present some mechanism that copies the state of the neighbor with the highest payoff in the neighborhood, mechanism inherited from the Darwinian strategy. The results showed that the CPD increases the average cooperation level of the system when compared to DPD. However, different strategies do not increased the cooperation compared to cooperation obtained with the Darwinian strategy. So, we propose the use of cluster coefficient, Gini coefficient and entropy of Shannon, Tsallis and Kullback-Leibler as classifiers to classify systems, in which the individuals play DPD with Darwinian strategy, by the cooperation level. As configurational averages were analyzed, such classifiers were not efficient in classifying the systems. This is due to the existence of distributions with extreme values of the results that compose the means. Distributions with extremes values emerged a discussion about the definition of the cooperation state in the prisoner\'s dilemma. We also discussed the consequences of using only average results in the analysis ignoring their deviations and distributions.

O dilema do prisioneiro (DP) é um dos principais jogos da teoria dos jogos. No dilema do prisioneiro discreto (DPD), dois prisioneiros têm as opções de cooperar ou desertar. Um jogador cooperador não delata seu comparsa, já um desertor delata. Se um cooperar e o outro desertar, o cooperador fica preso por cinco anos e o desertor fica livre. Se ambos cooperarem, ficam presos por um ano e, se ambos desertarem, ficam presos por três anos. Quando o DP é repetido, a cooperação pode emergir entre agentes egoístas. Realizamos um estudo analítico para o DPD, que produziu uma formulação da evolução do nível médio de cooperação e da tentação crítica (valor de tentação que causa mudança abrupta do nível de cooperação). No dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC), cada jogador apresenta um nível de cooperação que define o grau de cooperação. Utilizamos o DPC para estudar o efeito da personalidade dos jogadores sobre a emergência da cooperação. Para isso, propusemos novas estratégias: uma baseada na personalidade dos jogadores e outras duas baseadas na comparação entre o ganho obtido e a aspiração do jogador. Todas as estratégias apresentavam algum mecanismo de cópia do estado do vizinho com maior ganho na vizinhança, mecanismo este, herdado da estratégia darwiniana. Os resultados mostraram que o DPC aumenta o nível médio de cooperação do sistema, quando comparado ao DPD. No entanto, as diferentes estratégias não aumentaram a cooperação comparado à cooperação obtida com a estratégia darwiniana. Então propusemos o uso do coeficiente de agrupamentos, coeficiente de Gini e entropias de Shannon, Tsallis e Kullback-Leibler para classificar os sistemas, em que os agentes jogam o DPD com a estratégia darwiniana, quanto ao nível de cooperação. Como analisamos valores de médias configuracionais, tais classificadores não foram eficientes ao classificar os sistemas. Isso é consequência da existência de distribuições de extremos nos resultados que compõem as médias. As distribuições de extremos suscitaram uma discussão acerca da definição do regime de cooperação no dilema do prisioneiro. Discutimos também as consequências de utilizar apenas valores médios nos resultados ignorando seus desvios e as distribuições. / Prisoner\'s dilemma (PD) is one of the main games of game theory. In discrete prisoner\'s dilemma (DPD), two prisoners have the options to cooperate or to defect. A cooperator player does not defect his accomplice, while a defector does. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets jailed for five years and the defector goes free. If both cooperate, they get jailed during one year and if both defect, they get jailed during three years. When this game is repeated, cooperation may emerge among selfish individuals. We perform an analytical study for the DPD, that produced a formulation for the evolution of the mean cooperation level and for the critical temptation values (temptation values that promote abrupt modifications in the cooperation level). In continuous prisoner\'s dilemma (CPD), each player has a level of cooperation that defines his/her degree of cooperation. We used the CPD to study the effect of the players\' personality on the emergence of cooperation. For this, we propose new strategies: one based on the players\' personality and two others based on the comparison between the player\'s obtained payoff and the desire one. All strategies present some mechanism that copies the state of the neighbor with the highest payoff in the neighborhood, mechanism inherited from the Darwinian strategy. The results showed that the CPD increases the average cooperation level of the system when compared to DPD. However, different strategies do not increased the cooperation compared to cooperation obtained with the Darwinian strategy. So, we propose the use of cluster coefficient, Gini coefficient and entropy of Shannon, Tsallis and Kullback-Leibler as classifiers to classify systems, in which the individuals play DPD with Darwinian strategy, by the cooperation level. As configurational averages were analyzed, such classifiers were not efficient in classifying the systems. This is due to the existence of distributions with extreme values of the results that compose the means. Distributions with extremes values emerged a discussion about the definition of the cooperation state in the prisoner\'s dilemma. We also discussed the consequences of using only average results in the analysis ignoring their deviations and distributions.

When a project work was performed at DHL Express in Borås in spring 2007 the time of theprocesses at the terminal was measured. DHL Express in Borås is working with tworecruitment companies and the employees could therefore be divided into two groups; thepermanent employees and the hired employees. There were a slight difference in performancebetween these two groups of employees and it was then questioned if DHL Express in Boråsreally was working in the best way with the recruitment companies.The theories that were used in this thesis work was; complexity theories by Murray Gell-Mann, Game theory by John Forbes Nash and Lean. These three theories were used at thesame time to get the best outcome.The methods that were used was investigating the contracts between DHL Express and therecruitment companies, interviews with the employees at the tactical level that are in contactwith the recruitment companies in their daily work with base from the contracts,conversations and discussions with employees, pictures was also taken to document parts ofthe terminal at DHL Express in Borås.The result of the thesis work was that a “best-way-package” how DHL Express in Boråsshould work with the recruitment companies was set up. This “best-way-package” could beapplied on any terminal at DHL Express if wanted. / Uppsatsnivå: D

<p>After Sweden became a member of the European Union, EU, the debate regarding the Swedish participation in the EU’s currency co-operation, the European Monetary Union, EMU, has been intense. One of the biggest issues has been how our national economic politics will work within such a monetary union. What instrument will remain for the national economic politics within the EMU are highly uncertain. The question whether we will be able to affect our own economy or not has long been the essence in the Swedish debate. At the same time that Sweden got membership in the EU, Austria became a member as well. Austria is just like Sweden a small open economy with many similarities to Sweden with regard to politics and economics. One big difference between the countries though, is that Austria at once became a member of the currency co-operation and joined the EMU from the start of it. The debates regarding the EMU has been very much alike in the two countries, though it differs in one important question. One big question that has been raised in Austria is the potential of a wider co-operation within the EMU than at present. This discussion has led to suggestions of a wider co-operation through discussions between the EMU-countries, larger possibilities for sanctions against countries which are not following the common economic plan or even suggestions about a politic union. There is very much a discussion in the spirit of collectivism. In Sweden non of this is even an issue. Here the whole debate is focused on the national possibilities and losses in a monetary union. How the country will be able to optimise its own good within the EMU is the only thing of interest in the Swedish debate. The point of view is always the national good and has never the collectivism in mind.</p>