Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-06-27T17:05:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Godolphim Feijó_.pdf: 1835499 bytes, checksum: 9b7410f8b42d5a741ecbd275052ab216 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-27T17:05:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Godolphim Feijó_.pdf: 1835499 bytes, checksum: 9b7410f8b42d5a741ecbd275052ab216 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-31 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / FAPERGS - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul / A filosofia kantiana da matemática é fundamentada sobre uma estrutura epistemológica intuicionista. As categorias do espaço e do tempo constituem as formas da sensibilidade, formas estas manifestadas por meio de uma intuição pura a priori. O presente trabalho busca realizar uma defesa razoável de tal intuição frente aos críticos contemporâneos, os quais propõem um programa logicista desprovido de estrutura epistêmica no que tange ao raciocínio matemático. Tais críticos afirmam que a aritmética não necessita da intuição pura do tempo para que as operações numéricas possam ser realizadas. Buscaremos demonstrar que a lógica quantificacional constitui um expediente meramente formalista que deixa de lado os problemas epistemológicos da cognição matemática e, por esse motivo, pode ambicionar desconsiderar a intuição pura kantiana. Portanto, buscaremos demonstrar que a intuição pura kantiana ainda pode lançar luz sobre a natureza dos cálculos da matemática. / The Kantian philosophy of mathematics is based on an intuitionist epistemological structure. The categories of space and time are the forms of sensibility, these forms manifested through a pure intuition a priori. The present work seeks to make a reasonable defense of such intuition in the face of contemporary critics, who propose a logicist program devoid of epistemic structure regarding mathematical reasoning. Such critics claim that arithmetic does not need the pure intuition of time for numerical operations to be performed. We will try to demonstrate that the quantificational logic constitutes a merely formalistic expedient that leaves aside the epistemological problems of the mathematical cognition and, for this reason, it can ambition to disregard the pure Kantian intuition. Therefore, we shall try to demonstrate that pure Kantian intuition can still shed light on the nature of mathematical calculations.

康德主張，空間的「先驗的觀念性」，並且此一觀念性是可以與「經驗的實在性」相容。對於「先驗的觀念性」，處於空間的事物被限定於感性的對象上，即是顯象，因此並不適用在那些「當它們得以透過理性其自身，即是毫無顧及我們感性的狀態」的內容。同樣地，「經驗的實在性」所刻劃的是外在顯象，如同康德在上述引文所指，乃是「在考慮一切可能的外在經驗」。據此，所謂空間的「先驗的觀念性」，從「觀念性」而言，空間是先天的直覺形式，故不屬於對象或事物自身的任何屬性。不過此一空間的觀念性，即先天的直覺形式，乃是任何外在顯象得以可能的條件，所以空間的觀念性，雖是感性主體的認知條件，卻不能等同於僅僅是主觀的觀念性，而是具有先驗條件的觀念性，也就是其是一種先天可能的認知模式，因此，空間的觀念性，乃是「先驗的」，這是康德稱空間為「先驗的觀念性」所持的立場。與此同時，對康德來說，空間的「先驗的觀念性」，則蘊含空間的「經驗的實在性」。從康德看來，我們要意識到任何外在經驗，皆必定在空間秩序關係中被呈現或給與出來，如此一來，空間具有「實在性」。不過，空間的「實在性」其效力僅對於我們外感官的經驗對象才能有效，並無法對事物自身產生任何約束，所以空間的「實在性」，就祇能是屬於經驗的，我們不能將空間的「實在性」歸屬在事物自身。 / Kant advocates the view that space is transcendental ideality and empirical realtiy. This article aims at interpretation of Kant’s space thesis. Kant attempts to offer argument transcendental ideality of space mean that space is subjective and limiting condition to which human intuition. This implication that kant asserts transcendental ideality thesis is that space has limited to appearance, and when applied to the things in themselves, space is merely an idea,or equivalently that is transcendental. However transcendental ideality of space does not mean that objects within of space is nothing, only ideas of our mind. In contrast to this, transcendental ideality thesis as equivalent to empirical reality of space ,that is said to regard space is real, but which is objective validity limited by applicable to outer appearances.