Contexte : Les Systèmes d’Aide à la Décision (SAD) en antibiothérapie empirique présentent plusieurs limites : (i) leurs recommandations sont uniquement valables pour les profils patient décrits dans les Guides de Bonnes Pratiques cliniques (GBP) ; (ii) leur mise à jour est rare ; (iii) leur ergonomie défaillante gène leur adoption en pratique clinique courante. Pour pallier ces limites, nous proposons une approche conduisant à un SAD capable de générer automatiquement des recommandations, comme le font les experts qui écrivent les GBPs, et de les afficher dans une interface porteuse de connaissances, facile à utiliser. Méthodes : Notre démarche a consisté à (i) extraire des GBPs le raisonnement médical profond qu’utilisent les experts pour établir les recommandations ; (ii) utiliser le processus de décision en antibiothérapie empirique et les principes d’utilisabilité pour concevoir une interface agréable à utiliser. Résultats : L’implémentation du raisonnement médical des experts sous la forme d’un algorithme utilisant 12 propriétés des antibiotiques permet de retrouver automatiquement les antibiotiques recommandés quelle que soit la situation clinique, sans l’intervention des experts. Ces propriétés pourraient être mises à jour automatiquement via des ressources extérieures telles que les bases de données médicamenteuses. La création d’une interface porteuse de connaissances, selon le processus de décision en antibiothérapie et les principes d’utilisabilité, améliore significativement l’utilisabilité perçue et la confiance des médecins dans le système. Conclusion : L’extrapolation de notre approche à des pathologies chroniques mérite d’être étudiée. / Context: CDSS (Clinical Decision Support System) for the empiric prescription of antibiotics present many limits: (i) recommendations are only given for clinical situations that are described in CPGs (Clinical Practice Guidelines); (ii) updating is infrequent; (iii) poor ergonomics is an impediment to clinical adoption. To overcome these limits, we propose an approach leading to a CDSS that is able to generate ecommendations as in CPGs, and to display recommendations in an interface supporting knowledge. Methods: Our approach consists in (i) extracting from CPGs the deep medical reasoning used by experts to establish recommendations, (ii) using the decision process in empiric antibiotherapy and the usability principles to design a pleasant interface. Results: The implementation of the medical reasoning of the experts as an algorithm using 12 properties of antibiotics, allows to retrieve automatically the recommended antibiotics for all clinical situations, without the intervention of the experts. These properties could be updated automatically thanks to others resources like drugs data bases. The design of an interface supporting knowledge according to the decision process in empiric antibiotherapy and the usability principles, improve significantly the perceived usability and the confidence in the system. Conclusion: The extrapolation of our approach to the chronic diseases should be assessed.

The aim of this thesis is to examine what affect, if any, finding an argument both unanswerable yet unbelievable has on three purported first-person doxastic constraints. The three proposed constraints are the principle of truth, the principle of adequate reason and the principle of epistemic explanation. In Chapter 1, I lay out the claim of each of these constraints; differentiate them from one another, examine under what conditions they can be said to apply and provide what I take to be the strongest arguments for each of them. In Chapter 2, I explicate what I mean by finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I detail how it is that finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable could constitute a threat to each of these constraints. I conclude that while the principle of adequate reason is undermined in the face of this threat, both the principle of truth and the principle of epistemic explanation fail to be undermined by this challenge.

This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.

This research was designed to explore the nature of reasoning. In general, three categories of theories about reasoning (the inferential rule approach, the mental models approach, and the operational constructive approach) are used to explain reasoning. In this research, a simple transitivity of length task was selected as the experimental vehicle to explore these approaches for their veracity. Each approach was assessed for spatial and linguistic conditions which might influence reasoning about transitive length relations. The length difference under consideration in the reasoning task, the order in which the premise statements about the length differences were presented and the linguistic relational term used to describe the length difference were selected as the experimental variables. Three measures of reasoning about transitive length relations were assessed: judgements, judgements-plus-justifications, and necessity understanding. A between-within factorial, cross-sectional design was employed. The order of the premise statements (optimal/control) was manipulated as the experimental between-subjects factor. The two experimental within-subjects factors, length difference (large/small) and linguistic relational term (“longer”/”shorter”), were fully crossed and counterbalanced. Ninety-six preschool and school-age children, evenly divided by gender and age (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years), participated in the study. The developmental character of transitive reasoning in the age range studied was confirmed for two of the three measures of reasoning. More failures of judgement were observed when a large length difference was matched with the linguistic relational term “longer” and when a small length difference was matched with the linguistic relational term “shorter” than when the length differences and relational terms were mismatched. The arrangement of the premise figure did indirectly influence any measure of transitive reasoning but a large length difference in combination with the control premise figure was found to increase the frequency of transitive judgements-plus justifications. It is concluded from the analysis of the findings of this research that transitive reasoning about length is likely to result from constructive processes, rather then from application of logical rules. However, it is unclear whether the constructive processes in question are best explained in terms of cognitive operations or in terms of figurative mental models. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

Demonstrative geometry as a subject in secondary schools has been justified by many educational leaders on the basis that the critical thinking ability acquired in this subject would transfer to situations outside of mathematics. However, many of the research studies in this area indicate that very little of this critical thinking ability acquired in the usual course in demonstrative geometry transfers to life situations. The usual course in demonstrative geometry employs a text which includes as a very important type of exercise, problems in which the pupil is supplied with data either given or assumed and told precisely what conclusions he must derive from these data. That is, the pupil knows the conclusion before he attempts to solve the problem. This particular method of presentation is thought by some educational leaders to deprive the student of a very important learning process, namely, that of discovery. This study is an attempt to determine what the effect on critical thinking ability would be, if the students were not told precisely what conclusion they must derive, but were exposed to exercises in which there were many alternative conclusions of which some may or may not be valid with respect to the given or assumed data. That is, the onus for determining which alternative (if any) was valid, was the responsibility of the student. Two groups consisting of thirty pupils each at the grade ten level on the University Entrance Program were equated on the basis of the control variables of intelligence as determined by the "Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability Tests" and critical thinking as measured by the "Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal" test Form A. The control group followed the usual course in geometry in which the students were supplied with exercises in which they were told precisely what conclusions they must derive. The experimental group, however, were exposed to exercises in which it was the responsibility of the pupil to determine which (if any) of the many possible conclusions supplied could be proven valid in terms of the data given. This experiment was conducted for two months, after which Form B of the "Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal" test was given. As the groups were equated at the beginning of the study by the control variables, differences in means between the control and experimental group on this test were investigated for significance by means of "t" tests. Each of the paired groups was sub-divided into three sub-groups of ten each and classified as "superior", "average", and "inferior" on the basis of scores on the control variables. The analysis of the data from this study indicates that students of "superior", "average", and "inferior" ability who were exposed to the experimental type of exercise did not show larger gains in critical thinking than those who followed exercises outlined in a traditional text. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

The purpose of this study was: 1) to identify reading disability subtypes among a sample of reading-disabled students using two classification methods, 2) to discover the processes and strategies used in analogical reasoning by individual reading disabled and nonreading-disabled students through the method of componential analysis, and 3) to explore the relationship between the processes and strategies used by disabled readers in analogical reasoning and their membership in a reading disability subtype. In Phase 1 of the study, groups of normal and disabled readers were established using Grade 5 students attending elementary schools in a large urban area of Northwestern Ontario. The disabled sample of 77 students comprised 41 males and 36 females and the normal reader sample of 20 students comprised 7 males and 13 females. In Phase 2, the disabled and normal readers were individually administered the Boder Test of Reading-Spelling Patterns (Boder & Jarrico, 1982), the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981), and subtests taken from the Durrell Analysis of Reading Difficulty (Durrell & Catterson, 1980) . The Schematic Picture Analogies Test (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979) was administered to students in small groups. The first method of subtyping, the Boder test, failed to identify subtypes among the reading-disabled sample because the students were not as severely disabled as the clinic-referred sample for which the test was designed. The second method, which employed a hierarchical agglomerative technique of cluster analysis using students' scores obtained on 23 reading and related variables, differentiated the normal readers from the disabled readers. Three clusters emerged when the reading-disabled data were analyzed alone that were characterized by strengths and weaknesses in their reading skills. Componential analysis of students' analogical reasoning data used mean solution latency as the criterion or dependent variables. Independent or predictor variables were associated with the systematically varied level of difficulty of each of 24 analogy booklets. Seven models theorized by Sternberg (1977) were fitted to each individual's booklet scores through multiple regression analysis and the preferred model chosen according to five predetermined criteria (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). Disabled readers were grouped according to the processes and strategies they used in solving analogies. The normal reader group solved analogies as predicted but there was no relationship between membership in a reading disability cluster and membership in an analogy subgroup. None of the analogy subgroups could be characterized by their reading performance although the subgroup that used the most efficient model tended to have higher ability than the other subgroups. Correlations between solution latency and reading and related variables for the normal readers showed that the more proficient analogical reasoners were faster, more accurate readers and better comprehenders. Few significant correlations were detected between solution latency and reading variables for the disabled readers. The lack of relationship between the two systems is perhaps the most surprising and paradoxical finding of the study. It is suggested that this occurred because reading-disabled children, irrespective of the cluster to which they belong, may solve analogies in a unique way, or because the bottom-up, content-driven nature of the reading task is so fundamentally different from the top-down, content-free nature of the analogical reasoning task. Other explanations suggest that the use of measures at a macro level to form reading-disabled clusters masks any relationship with the analogical reasoning subgroups formed by measures at a micro level, or that component processing is so specific to the individual that differences are buried within the subtypes implying the existence of subtypes within subtypes. Some of the implications for education are discussed. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

In this thesis it is argued that the constituents of practical reasoning are necessary for good teaching; as such, the study of practical reasoning would be a valuable addition to teacher education programs. Practical reasoning is basically reasoning about what should be done. In Chapter II a conception of practical reasoning developed by Jerrold Coombs is outlined. This conception, which includes a variety of abilities, dispositions and sensitivities, as well as knowledge about a number of concepts and distinctions, is used throughout chapters III and IV to illustrate its value in typical teaching activities. These typical teaching activities are divided into two categories, using a distinction conceived by Thomas Green. Green has described teaching as a "practical activity" which consists of perhaps hundreds of single different activies. He divides these activities into three categories: 1) logical acts (for example, explaining, concluding, inferring, giving reasons); 2) strategic acts (motivating, planning, evaluating, disciplining); and 3) institutional acts (taking attendance, keeping reports, consulting parents). Institutional acts, he says, are not necessary to the activity of teaching. However, both logical and strategic acts are "...indispensable to the conduct of teaching wherever and whenever it is found (Green, 1975, p. 5). Furthermore, he argues that "Teaching can be improved by improving either kind of activity, but it cannot be excellent without attention to both (ibid., p. 8)." In Chapter III, I have illustrated how practical reasoning would improve the logical acts of teaching and in Chapter IV I have argued that practical reasoning would improve the strategic acts. Chapter V includes a summary of the major argument and concludes with some suggestions about how to develop teachers practical reasoning abilities and dispositions. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

Given the complexity of the domains for which we would like to use computers as reasoning engines, an automated reasoning process will often be required to perform under some state of uncertainty. Probability provides a normative theory with which uncertainty can be modelled. Without assumptions of independence from the domain, naive computations of probability are intractible. If probability theory is to be used effectively in AI applications, the independence assumptions from the domain should be represented explicitly, and used to greatest possible advantage. One such representation is a class of mathematical structures called Bayesian networks. This thesis presents a framework for dynamically constructing and evaluating Bayesian networks. In particular, this thesis investigates the issue of representing probabilistic knowledge which has been abstracted from particular individuals to which this knowledge may apply, resulting in a simple representation language. This language makes the independence assumptions for a domain explicit. A simple procedure is provided for building networks from knowledge expressed in this language. The mapping between the knowledge base and network created is precisely defined, so that the network always represents a consistent probability distribution. Finally, this thesis investigates the issue of modifying the network after some evaluation has taken place, and several techniques for correcting the state of the resulting model are derived. / Science, Faculty of / Computer Science, Department of / Graduate

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