<p>Under de senaste decennierna har rättsliga reformer ökat kraftigt. Idag satsas stora summor pengar och mycket tid på området. Ett stort antal organisationer och länder ser idag rättsreformer som något av det viktigaste i utvecklingssamarbeten med länder i tredje världen. Som grund för de flesta av reformerna finns principerna om rättsstaten. Organisationerna och ett stort antal av världens ledare ser rättsstaten som en lösning för olika problem, inte bara rättsliga utan även ekonomiska och politiska. Med rättsstaten menas bland annat att ett lands rättssystem skall vara rättssäkert och effektivt, att det skall råda likhet inför lagen och att ingen skall stå ovanför lagen. Det är dock inte så enkelt att definiera rättsstaten utan den har en mängd olika betydelser.</p><p>Det finns dock idag en skepticism mot hur rättsstatsbegreppet används. Kritiken mot biståndsaktörerna är omfattande och mycket allvarlig. Den riktar sig mot allt från problemen med att definiera rättsstaten, hur rättsstaten används av organisationerna, hur reformerna genomförs och resultaten av dem. Enligt kritikerna gör biståndssamfundet många fel och det är mycket som behöver förändras.</p><p>Redan på 1960-talet genomfördes rättsreformer, fast då i mindre skala än nu. De genomfördes av en rörelse kallad rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen. Den bestod främst av en grupp amerikanska akademiker och jurister, som ville övertala andra om vikten av rättsliga reformer. I mitten av 1970-talet dog dock rörelsen ut efter mycket kritik mot den. Bland annat kritiserades den för att vara etnocentrisk och för att den inte lyckats med vad den föresatts att göra. Om man ser på kritiken mot dagens rättsstatsrörelse liknar den på många sätt kritiken mot rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen. Flera forskare menar därför att dagens rörelse borde ha lärt sig mer av sin föregångares misstag och inte göra alla de fel den gör idag. De tror att det finns risk att rättsstatsrörelsen kommer att dö ut precis som rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen.</p>

<p>This thesis demonstrates that infants represent temporarily non-visible, or occluded, objects. From 4 months of age, infants could accurately predict the reappearance of a moving object after 660 ms of non visibility; indicating accurate spatiotemporal representations. At this age predictions were dominated by associations between specific events and outcomes (associative rules). Between 6 and 8 months of age predictions became dominated by extrapolations (Study III). From 6 months infants could represent occluded objects for up to 4 seconds. The number of successful predictions decreased, however, if the information contained in the occlusion event diminished (time of accretion and deletion). As infants grew older (up to 12 months) they produced more accurate predictions. (Study II). The similarities between adult and infant performances were numerous (Study I). These conclusion are based on one cross sectional (Study I) and two longitudinal studies (Study II & III) in which an object, a ‘happy face’, moved on circular (Study I, II, & III) and other complex trajectories (Study III). One portion of each trajectory was covered by a screen that blocked the object from sight. In each study participants gaze were recorded with an infrared eye tracking system (ASL 504) and a magnetic head tracker (Flock of Birds). This data was combined with data from the stimulus and stored for of line analysis.</p>

Over the past decades, many industries have heavily spent on computerizing their work environments with the intention to simplify and expedite access to information and its processing. Typical of real-world data are various types of imperfections, uncertainties, ambiguities, that have complicated attempts at automated knowledge discovery. Indeed, it soon became obvious that adequate methods to deal with these problems were critically needed. Simple methods such as "interpolating" or just ignoring data imperfections being found often to lead to inferences of dubious practical value, the search for appropriate modification of knowledge-induction techniques began. Sometimes, rather non-standard approaches turned out to be necessary. For instance, the probabilistic approaches by earlier works are not sufficiently capable of handling the wider range of data imperfections that appear in many new applications (e.g., medical data). Dempster-Shafer theory provides a much stronger framework, and this is why it has been chosen as the fundamental paradigm exploited in this dissertation. The task of association rule mining is to detect frequently co-occurring groups of items in transactional databases. The majority of the papers in this field concentrate on how to expedite the search. Less attention has been devoted to how to employ the identified frequent itemsets for prediction purposes; worse still, methods to tailor association-mining techniques so that they can handle data imperfections are virtually nonexistent. This dissertation proposes a technique referred to by the acronym DS-ARM (Dempster-Shafer based Association Rule Mining) where the DS-theoretic framework is used to enhance a more traditional association-mining mechanism. Of particular interest is here a method to employ the knowledge of partial contents of a "shopping cart" for the prediction of what else the customer is likely to add to it. This formalized problem has many applications in the analysis of medical databases. A recently-proposed data structure, an itemset tree (IT-tree), is used to extract association rules in a computationally efficient manner, thus addressing the scalability problem that has disqualified more traditional techniques from real-world applications. The proposed algorithm is based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence combination. Extensive experiments explore the algorithm's behavior; some of them use synthetically generated data, others relied on data obtained from a machine-learning repository, yet others use a movie ratings dataset or a HIV/AIDS patient dataset.

Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2007. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-84). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Résumé : La thèse s’intéresse aux sanctions prises par des exécutifs internationaux et qui ont pour cibles des personnes physiques ou morales : gels et confiscations d’avoirs, interdictions de voyager, amendes et même inscriptions sur des listes à caractère infâmant. La licéité de ces sanctions est examinée à l’aune des règles du droit international qui leur sont applicables : d’une part, les règles de procédure et, de l’autre, le droit international des droits de l’homme. L’analyse permet d’identifier deux types de sanctions illicites : 1°) Le premier type comprend les sanctions qui sont pénales et qui, par ailleurs, répriment de graves infractions. Ces sanctions devraient être imposées par des juges et non par des organes politiques ce que sont les exécutifs internationaux qui les infligent. 2°) Le second type de sanctions illicites regroupent les sanctions dépourvues de recours au sens du droit international des droits de l’homme. Les personnes affectées par ces sanctions devraient pouvoir en contester le bien-fondé devant un organe indépendant et impartial. Il n’existe, par ailleurs, aucune circonstance de nature à exclure l’illicéité de l’un ou l’autre de ces deux types de sanctions. Ces sanctions, dès lors, n’ont aucun caractère contraignant. Qui plus est, les Etats se trouvent mis dans l’obligation de ne pas y donner suite. Les sanctions qui n’appartiennent à aucun de ces deux types sont, en principe, licites. Abstract : The thesis concerns the sanctions taken by international executives and which targets individuals and legal entities: freeze and confiscation of assets, ban on travels, fine and even inscription on dishonourable lists. The legality of the sanctions is checked in relation to the international rules which are applicable to the sanctions: firstly, rules of procedure and, secondly, human rights. This work concludes to the existence of two types of wrongful sanctions: 1°) the first type groups together the sanctions which are penal and, moreover, punish serious offenses. These sanctions should be decided by judges and not by political organs like international executives. 2°) the second type of wrongful sanctions contains those without recourse complying with human rights. The persons targeted by these sanctions should be able to contest them before an independent and impartial organ. In addition, there are no circumstances precluding wrongfulness of these two types of sanctions. So, these sanctions are not binding and the States are under obligation not to apply them. The other sanctions which do not belong to one of these two types of sanctions are, in theory, legal.

This dissertation addresses the question: How did later Wittgenstein aim to achieve his goal of putting forward a way of dissolving philosophical problems which centered on asking ourselves what we mean by our words – yet which did not entail any claims about the essence of language and meaning? This question is discussed with reference to “resolute” readings of Wittgenstein. I discuss the readings of James Conant, Oskari Kuusela, and Martin Gustafsson. I follow Oskari Kuusela’s claim that in order to fully appreciate how later Wittgenstein meant to achieve his goal, we need to clearly see how he aimed to do away with hierarchies in philosophy: Not only is the dissolution of philosophical problems via the method of clarifying the grammar of expressions to be taken as independent from any theses about what meaning must be – but furthermore, it is to be taken as independent from the dissolution of any particular problem via this method. As Kuusela stresses, this also holds for the problems involving rule-following and meaning: the clarification of the grammar of “rule” and “meaning” has no foundational status – it is nothing on which the method of clarifying the grammar of expressions as such were meant to in any way rely on. The lead question of this dissertation then is: What does it mean to come to see that the method of dissolving philosophical problems by asking “How is this word actually used?” does not in any way rely on the results of our having investigated the grammar of the particular concepts “rule” and “meaning”? What is the relation of such results – results such as “To follow a rule, [...], to obey an order, [...] are customs (uses, institutions)” or “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” – to this method? From this vantage point, I concern myself with two aspects of the readings of Gustafsson and Kuusela. In Gustafsson, I concern myself with his idea that the dissolution of philosophical problems in general “relies on” the very agreement which – during the dissolution of the rule-following problem – comes out as a presupposition for our talk of “meaning” in terms of rules. In Kuusela, I concern myself with his idea that Wittgenstein, in adopting a way of philosophical clarification which investigates the actual use of expressions, is following the model of “meaning as use” – which model he had previously introduced in order to perspicuously present an aspect of the actual use of the word “meaning”. This dissertation aims to show how these two aspects of Gustafsson’s and Kuusela’s readings still fail to live up to the vision of Wittgenstein as a philosopher who aimed to do away with any hierarchies in philosophy. I base this conclusion on a detailed analysis of which of the occasions where Wittgenstein invokes the notions of “use” and “application” (as also “agreement”) have to do with the dissolution of a specific problem only, and which have to do with the dissolution of philosophical problems in general. I discuss Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, showing how in the dissolution of the rule-following paradox, notions such as “use”, “application”, and “practice” figure on two distinct logical levels. I then discuss an example of what happens when this distinction is not duly heeded: Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker’s idea that the rule-following remarks have a special significance for his project of dissolving philosophical problems as such. I furnish an argument to the effect that their idea that the clarification of the rules of grammar of the particular expression “following a rule” could answer a question about rules of grammar in general rests on a conflation of the two logical levels on which “use” occurs in the rule-following remarks, and that it leads into a regress. I then show that Gustafsson’s view – despite its decisive advance over Baker and Hacker – contains a version of that same idea, and that it likewise leads into a regress. Finally, I show that Kuusela’s idea of a special significance of the model “meaning as use” for the whole of the method of stating rules for the use of words is open to a regress argument of a similar kind as that he himself advances against Baker and Hacker. I conclude that in order to avoid such a regress, we need to reject the idea that the grammatical remark “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” – because of the occurrence of “use” in it – stood in any special relation to the method of dissolving philosophical problems by describing the use of words. Rather, we need to take this method as independent from this outcome of the investigation of the use of the particular word “meaning”. / Die Ausgangsfrage dieser Dissertation ist: Wie gedachte der späte Wittgenstein sein Ziel zu erreichen, eine Art und Weise der Auflösung philosophischer Probleme zu vorzulegen, die daran ansetzt, was wir mit unseren Worten meinen, jedoch keine Thesen über Sprache und Bedeutung mit sich zieht? Ich behandele diese Frage mit Bezug auf sogenannte „strenge“ Lesarten Wittgensteins. Ich befasse mich mit den Interpretationen von James Conant, Oskari Kuusela und Martin Gustafsson. Ich nehme Kuuselas Gedanken auf, daß zu einem vollen Verständnis davon, wie Wittgenstein sein philosophisches Ziel zu erreichen gedachte, gehört, die Abwesenheit von Hierarchien in seiner Spätphilosophie zu sehen: nicht nur sollte die Auflösung philosophischer Probleme mithilfe der Methode der Klärung der Grammatik von Ausdrücken von jeden Thesen darüber, wie sprachliche Bedeutung zustande kommt, unabhängig sein – sondern darüberhinaus auch unabhängig von der Auflösung bestimmter Einzelprobleme mittels dieser Methode. Dies, so Kuusela, gelte auch für die Probleme um Regelfolgen und um Bedeutung: „Regel“, „meinen“, und „Bedeutung“ seien keine Grundbegriffe, auf deren Klärung die Methode der Klärung der Grammatik von Ausdrücken in irgendeiner Weise aufbaue. Die Leitfrage dieser Dissertation ist: Was genau heißt es zu verstehen, daß die Auflösung philosophischer Probleme mittels der Frage „Wie wird dieses Wort tatsächlich gebraucht?“ nicht auf Ergebnissen der Untersuchung der Grammatik der Begriffe „Regel“ und „Bedeutung“ aufbaut? In welcher Beziehung stehen diese Ergebnisse – Ergebnisse wie „Einer Regel folgen, [...], einen Befehl geben, [...] sind Gepflogenheiten (Gebräuche, Institutionen)“ und „Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache“ – dann zu dieser Methode? Unter diesem Blickwinkel befasse ich mich mit zwei Aspekten der Lesarten von Gustafsson und Kuusela. Bei Gustafsson befasse ich mit der Auffassung, die Auflösung philosophischer Probleme an sich „beruhe auf“ genau der Art von Übereinstimmung, die sich – im Zuge der Auflösung des Regelfolgen-Problems – als eine Voraussetzung für unsere Rede von „meinen“ und „bedeuten“ herausstellt. Bei Kuusela befasse ich mich mit der Idee, daß Wittgenstein, indem er zur Auflösung philosophischer Probleme die Frage nach dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch von Wörtern einführt, dem Modell „Bedeutung als Gebrauch“ folgt – welches er vorher eingeführt hatte, um einen Aspekt des tatsächlichen Gebrauchs des Wortes „Bedeutung“ übersichtlich darzustellen. Ich versuche zu zeigen, warum diese beiden Aspekte der Lesarten von Gustafsson und Kuusela noch zurückfallen hinter die Vision von Wittgenstein als einem Philosophen, dem es darum geht, Hierarchien zu vermeiden. Zur Begründung lege ich eine detaillierte Analyse der Art und Weise des Auftretens der Begriffe „Gebrauch“, „Verwendung“ und „Anwendung“ (sowie „Übereinstimmung“) in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie vor. Wie ich zeige, läßt sich das Auftreten dieser Begriffe unterteilen in Fälle, wo es im Zusammenhang steht mit der Auflösung bestimmter Einzelprobleme, und Fälle, in denen es im Zusammenhang steht mit Auflösung philosophischer Probleme im Allgemeinen. Als Beispiel behandele ich Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über Regelfolgen. Ich zeige, wie in der Auflösung des Regelparadoxes Begriffe wie „Gebrauch“, „Verwendung“, „Anwendung“ auf zwei unterschiedlichen logischen Ebenen auftreten. Dann behandele ich Gordon Bakers und Peter Hackers Auffassung, Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Regelfolgen hätten eine besondere Bedeutung für sein Projekt der Auflösung philosophischer Probleme an sich. Ich lege ein Argument dafür vor, daß ihre Idee, die Klärung der Regeln der Grammatik des bestimmten einzelnen Ausdrucks „einer Regel folgen“ könne eine Frage über Regeln der Grammatik im Allgemeinen beantworten, auf einer Vermengung der beiden Ebenen basiert, auf denen der Begriff „Gebrauch“ in den Regelfolgen-Bemerkungen vorkommt, und daher in einen Regreß führt. Anschließend zeige ich, daß dies auch für Gustafssons Idee gilt. Schließlich zeige ich, daß Kuuselas Auffassung, das Modell „Bedeutung als Gebrauch“ – gewonnen im Rahmen der Untersuchung der tatsächlichen Verwendung des Wortes „Bedeutung“ – habe eine besondere Relevanz für die Methode der Untersuchung der tatsächlichen Verwendung von Wörtern an sich, ebenfalls in einen Regreß führt. Meine Schlußfolgerung ist, daß die grammatische Bemerkung „Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache“ in keinem besonderen Bezug zu Wittgensteins Methode der Untersuchung des tatsächlichen Gebrauchs von Ausdrücken stehen kann. Stattdessen muß diese Methode als unabhängig von diesem Ergebnis der Untersuchung des Gebrauchs des bestimmten Wortes „Bedeutung“ betrachtet werden.

Die vorliegende Studie geht der Frage nach, wie im Reichsstift Quedlinburg während der wettinischen Schutzherrschaft (1477/79–1698) die Herrschaft zwischen den fürstlichen Äbtissinnen, dem Stiftskapitel und den Schutzherren bzw. Erbvögten verteilt und organisiert war. Sie fragt danach, wie das Stift verfaßt war. Es wurde versucht, soweit es möglich ist, das Reichsstift Quedlinburg innerhalb eines Zeitraumes von gut 200 Jahren als politisches System zu analysieren. Um diese Frage beantworten zu können, werden in der Hauptsache zwei symbolische Handlungen untersucht: Introduktion und Huldigung. Im ersten Hauptteil werden die Herrschaftsrechte und -grundlagen aufgezeigt, um dann im folgenden Hauptteil Herrschaftsanspruch und -wirklichkeit dieser drei Herrschaftsträger anhand des Zeremonielles zu überprüfen. Zudem interessieren die Fragen, ob es im Untersuchungszeitraum zu Veränderungen der Stiftsverfassung kam, wenn ja, worin diese bestanden, von wem sie ausgegangen und wer davon wie betroffen war. Von Interesse ist ebenso der Zugriff der untersuchten Akteure auf die Stiftsuntertanen, deren Wahrnehmung von Herrschaft und wie sich diese ihnen präsentierte. / The thesis deals with the Imperial Abbey of Quedlinburg (Holy Roman Empire) during the protection of the dukes and electors of Saxony (1477–1698). Its constitution and political system are at the centre of attention: how was rulership split up among the Imperial abbess, the chapter and the Saxonian protectors? In order to answer that question two symbolic acts are analyzed: the introduction of a new abbess and the homage to her and her protector. Moreover it is of interest whether the abbey contitution was ever changend and if so, why. How did each of the rulers (abbes, chapter, protector) present power to their subjects? How did theese subjects perceive rulership?

<p>The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Commission) began its work in October 2004 and provided its final report only three months later on 25 January 2005.2 There, it concluded, inter alia, &ldquo / that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide&rdquo / and that at least the central Government authorities did not act with genocidal intent.3 However, these findings would not exclude the possibility that the atrocities committed by individuals against victims were carried out with the specific intent to destroy and therefore could possibly fulfil all necessary requirements of the crime of genocide.</p>

This thesis demonstrates that infants represent temporarily non-visible, or occluded, objects. From 4 months of age, infants could accurately predict the reappearance of a moving object after 660 ms of non visibility; indicating accurate spatiotemporal representations. At this age predictions were dominated by associations between specific events and outcomes (associative rules). Between 6 and 8 months of age predictions became dominated by extrapolations (Study III). From 6 months infants could represent occluded objects for up to 4 seconds. The number of successful predictions decreased, however, if the information contained in the occlusion event diminished (time of accretion and deletion). As infants grew older (up to 12 months) they produced more accurate predictions. (Study II). The similarities between adult and infant performances were numerous (Study I). These conclusion are based on one cross sectional (Study I) and two longitudinal studies (Study II &amp; III) in which an object, a ‘happy face’, moved on circular (Study I, II, &amp; III) and other complex trajectories (Study III). One portion of each trajectory was covered by a screen that blocked the object from sight. In each study participants gaze were recorded with an infrared eye tracking system (ASL 504) and a magnetic head tracker (Flock of Birds). This data was combined with data from the stimulus and stored for of line analysis.

Abstract This bachelor thesis deals with the close company rules in chapter 56-57 within the Swedish income tax law (IL). The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the outsider rule in 57:5 IL. If a shareholder or a family member works or have worked actively within the company within the fiscal year or the last five fiscal years then the partner has qualified shares and is to be taxed according to the special closed company rules. If an outsider, directly or indirectly, is a significant shareholder within the company, and directly or indirectly, are entitled to dividends then an active partner only has qualified shares if there is special reasons. When making the assessment regard must be made to conditions under the fiscal year or the last five fiscal years. There is special reason not to apply the rule if there are agreements regarding how the profit should be split or cross-ownerships between companies. If a taxpayer can show that an outsider own 30 percent of the closed company and has a right to dividends and there is no special reason to why the rule should not be applied then the outsider rule is applicable. If the rule is applicable it means that all the shareholders within the company will be taxed for dividends and capital gain with a 25 percent tax rate.