Why does the extreme right grow in some parts of Europe while the radical left rises in others? In studies about both party groups, the hypothesis that economic distress provides them with opportunity is frequently tested. Yet, little effort has been employed in comparing their performances under different economic conditions. This article fills this gap through panel data analysis, with disaggregated data from eight countries in election years between 2002 and 2011. It finds that voting for extreme right parties increases significantly after the financial crisis outbreak of 2008, with no corresponding evidence for radical left parties. Also, extreme right support has a positive link to regional GDP per capita and a negative link to unemployment rates. In contrast, radical left parties perform better where unemployment is higher. The results suggest that economic downturns are mostly beneficial to extreme right parties, but this effect is increasingly neutralized in regions of high unemployment. / Por que a extrema direita cresce em alguns países europeus, ao passo que a esquerda radical cresce em outros? Em estudos sobre ambas as categorias de partido, testa-se frequentemente a hipótese segundo a qual eles têm janelas de oportunidade em crises. Ainda assim, pouco esforço vem sendo feito para comparar como eles se saem sob diferentes contextos econômicos. Este artigo preenche tal lacuna através de análise de dados em painel, com dados desagregados de oito países, em eleições entre 2002 e 2011. O artigo aponta que a votação da extrema direita aumenta significativamente com o desenrolar da crise de 2008, ao passo que não se encontram evidências correspondentes para a esquerda radical. Ademais, o apoio eleitoral à extrema direita é positivamente ligado a índices regionais de PIB per capita, e negativamente ligado a taxas de desemprego. Por contraste, partidos de esquerda radical se saem melhores onde o desemprego é alto. Os resultados sugerem que quedas na atividade econômica são majoritariamente benéficas à extrema direta, mas que tal efeito é crescentemente neutralizado em regiões de alto desemprego.

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Folk music is one of the most popular forms of music today; artists such as Mumford and Sons and the Carolina Chocolate Drops are giving new life to an age-old music. It was not until the 1950s that new popular interest in folk music began. Earlier, folk music was used by leftist organizations as a means to reach the masses. It assumed because of this history that many folk artists are sympathetic to the Left. By looking at the years from 1905-1975 with the end of the Vietnam War, this study hopes to present the notion that even though these artists produced music that promoted leftist ideals, they were not always supportive of the Communist Party and other leftist organizations. Specific artists will be examined, paying close attention to artists who not only produced revolutionary music, but who were also employed by leftist organizations to perform at rallies and meetings.

Why does the extreme right grow in some parts of Europe while the radical left rises in others? In studies about both party groups, the hypothesis that economic distress provides them with opportunity is frequently tested. Yet, little effort has been employed in comparing their performances under different economic conditions. This article fills this gap through panel data analysis, with disaggregated data from eight countries in election years between 2002 and 2011. It finds that voting for extreme right parties increases significantly after the financial crisis outbreak of 2008, with no corresponding evidence for radical left parties. Also, extreme right support has a positive link to regional GDP per capita and a negative link to unemployment rates. In contrast, radical left parties perform better where unemployment is higher. The results suggest that economic downturns are mostly beneficial to extreme right parties, but this effect is increasingly neutralized in regions of high unemployment. / Por que a extrema direita cresce em alguns países europeus, ao passo que a esquerda radical cresce em outros? Em estudos sobre ambas as categorias de partido, testa-se frequentemente a hipótese segundo a qual eles têm janelas de oportunidade em crises. Ainda assim, pouco esforço vem sendo feito para comparar como eles se saem sob diferentes contextos econômicos. Este artigo preenche tal lacuna através de análise de dados em painel, com dados desagregados de oito países, em eleições entre 2002 e 2011. O artigo aponta que a votação da extrema direita aumenta significativamente com o desenrolar da crise de 2008, ao passo que não se encontram evidências correspondentes para a esquerda radical. Ademais, o apoio eleitoral à extrema direita é positivamente ligado a índices regionais de PIB per capita, e negativamente ligado a taxas de desemprego. Por contraste, partidos de esquerda radical se saem melhores onde o desemprego é alto. Os resultados sugerem que quedas na atividade econômica são majoritariamente benéficas à extrema direta, mas que tal efeito é crescentemente neutralizado em regiões de alto desemprego.

This thesis forms a report including human security and economic aspect experienced by three groups that are Radical right, Radical left, and the refugees. The examined theory is based on the securitisation of the EU sphere since the 2014/2015 refugee crisis and the Eurozone crisis. Economic perspective has a place in the public discourse inside the EU sphere, presenting moral dilemmas and political obligations of aiding the refugees in ethical scrutiny of human rights and human security.However, the de-radicalisation of the EU sphere deserves pointing attention to radicalised individuals and the reasons supporting both radicalisation and isolation. Therefore, human security assessment is made in three different groups to prioritise all the groups in the research: The refugees have participated with the presentatives of Radical right and Radical left ideology in the interviews. Data collected from the interviews and literature review include background information on the causes of the refugee movement, the EU-sphere migration process, and the organisations related to administrating and supporting the refugees and asylum-seeking process. The data of the research could be used by report makers, educators, and scholars.

Au cours des années 1970, l’Italie fut confrontée à une violence politique et sociale d’intensité particulière. Pendant cette période, le monde de la justice fut exposé à plus d’un titre. Non seulement magistrats et avocats furent impliqués dans les procédures judiciaires visant les protagonistes de la violence mais leur action fut également au cœur de controverses, les uns étant accusés d’être au service d’un État autoritaire ou répressif quand les autres étaient mis en cause pour d’éventuelles complicités avec les militants incriminés. Dans le même temps, de nombreux groupes de la gauche révolutionnaire décidèrent d'occuper le soutien de l'anti-répression et du soutien aux prisonniers politiques. Parmi ces organismes politiques, le Soccorso Rosso s'est imposé comme le principal, de par sa longévité, sa présence diffuse sur le territoire italien et l'implication de différents univers et couches sociales en son sein. De l'engagement d'intellectuels et de nombreux "avocats-militants" à la politisation des procès, en passant par les problématiques d'une lutte contre la prison ou d'une solidarité avec les détenus issus de la lutte armée, la trajectoire du Soccorso Rosso nous permet de traverser cette décennie d'une histoire encore en chantier afin de relire la période à travers la question de la répression pour comprendre la nature et la signification de la crise que connut l’Italie au cours de ces années. / During the '70s, Italy was confronted by a particulary intense violent politics. In this period, the justice system was severly exposed. Not only magistrates and lawyers were implicated in the law processes aiming violent protagonists but also their actions were deeply controversial. One part of the magistrates and the lawyers were accused of serving an autoritarian and repressive state, while the others were incriminated for having possible complicities with the militants. At the same time, numerous groups of the revolutionary left decided to occupy the ground of the anti-repression and the support to the political prisoners. Among these political groups, Soccorso Rosso stood out as the main thing, due to its longevity, its presence spreads on the Italian territory and the implication of various universes and sectors of society within it. The commitment of intellectuals and numerous "militant-lawyer" in the politicization of the trials, including the problems of a fight against the prison or a solidarity with the prisoners stemming from the armed struggle, the trajectory of Soccorso Rosso allows us to cross this decade of a still under construction history to reread the period through the question of the repression to understand a nature of the crisis which shook Italy during this years.

This thesis explores how economic performance, measured as real GDP-growth per capita, affects the vote share of parties which relies on radical ideological platforms. Using a fixed effect model with panel data, based on real electoral outcomes of 18 western European democracies, the result reveals an ambiguous reality. The overall conclusion implies that low growth rates benefit the electoral success of radical-right parties and holds for robustness checks. No solid evidence of the relationship is found on the radical-left side.The result further reveals that the individuals decision to vote radical is relative more affected by the ongoing business cycle trend between the elections rather than sudden changes close to the election day. The relationship also appears to be stronger among nations of southern Europe.

Les années 1970, en Argentine, sont marquées, jusqu’au coup d’Etat de mars 1976, par une intense montée de la conflictualité sociale en général et de la conflictualité ouvrière en particulier. Cette situation, ouverte par le Cordobazo de mai 1969, taraude les bases du régime militaire de la Révolution argentine. En 1973, le retour du péronisme au pouvoir après dix-huit années de proscription ne permet pas de juguler cette poussée. Après la mort de Juan Domingo Perón, cette dernière se poursuit sous la présidence d’Isabel Perón. Elle débouche ainsi en juillet 1975 sur la première grève générale de l’histoire argentine tournée contre un gouvernement justicialiste : c’est le Rodrigazo. Parallèlement, au sein des secteurs les plus radicalisés du mouvement ouvrier, des structures de coordination et d’auto-organisation, les Coordinadoras, font leur apparition. Ce travail, qui englobe la période constitutionnelle allant de mai 1973 à mars 1976, se centre sur les tendances à la rupture entre la base ouvrière et populaire péroniste et « son » gouvernement. A la jonction de l’histoire sociale et de l’histoire du mouvement ouvrier, puisant dans la presse de l’époque, commerciale autant que militante, ainsi que dans l’histoire orale, cette étude se veut comme une contribution à un « cinquième récit » des années 1970 en Argentine. A la différence des quatre lectures historiographiques ou « récits » qui ont prévalu depuis 1976, (« récit des militaires », « théorie des deux démons », « récit du renouveau », « récit kirchnériste »), ce travail a pour objet d’analyser les conditions d’émergence de cette conflictualité sociale, ses différentes modalités d’expression, sa cristallisation à travers diverses formes d’organisation et d’auto-organisation, mais également la façon dont la gauche radicale des années 1970 intervient en son sein. / Until the coup of March 1976, the 1970s were characterised in Argentina by a dramatic increase of social conflict in general, and of worker conflict in particular. This situation, which was initiated by the Cordobazo of May 1969, goaded the military regime of the Argentinian Revolution. The return to power of the Peronists in 1973, after 18 years of proscription, could not stop the deepening conflict. It continued after Juan Domingo Perón’s death, and throughout Isabel Perón’s period in power. In 1975 it led to the first ever general strike in Argentinian history, which was orchestrated against a justicialist government: the Rodrigazo. Simultaneously, in the most radical sectors of the workers’ movement, coordination and self-organisation structures (the Coodinadoras) began to appear. This work covers the constitutional period from May 1973 to March 1976, and focuses on the widening rift between Perón and the workers and the population at large. It aims to contribute to a “fifth” reading of the 1970s in Argentina by positioning itself at the crossroads between social history and labour history, and basing itself on mainstream and militant press coverage of the time and oral history. Unlike the four historiographical readings which have predominated since 1976 (the “military reading”, the “two demons theory”, the “renewal reading”, and the “kirchnerist reading”) this work aims to analyses the conditions from which the social conflict emerged, the different ways in which it expressed itself, its crystallisation through various forms of organisation and self-organisation, and also the role played by the radical left in the process.

1990 wurden linksradikale Akteure aus West- und Ostdeutschland Teil des gleichen Staates und somit gleichsam Teil eines selben Ganzen: der deutschen radikalen Linken. Die große Vielfalt der ideologischen Strömungen in einer höchst heterogenen Szene wie der radikalen Linken machte die Entstehung einer gemeinsamen kollektiven Identität ohnehin schwierig. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht herauszufinden, wie Akteure aus Ost und West, die sich selbst als „linksradikal“ bezeichneten, im Laufe der 1990er Jahre versucht haben, sich in der neuen, de facto gemeinsamen politischen Szene selbst und gegenseitig zu verorten. Wie wurden die neuen Verhältnisse nach dem Zusammenbruch des Realsozialismus und somit dem Wegfall vieler Bezugsrahmen und Paradigmen des Kalten Krieges neu definiert? Wie sah die deutsche radikale Linke ihre Rolle in diesem neuen Kontext? Gab es spezifische ost- bzw. westdeutsche Antworten auf die neue Situation? Nicht zuletzt wird gefragt, ob ost- und westdeutsche Akteure gemeinsame Kampfinhalte entwickeln konnten. Die Nationsfrage wird in der vorliegenden Studie unter zwei Aspekten verhandelt: Erstens als Erfahrungsgeschichte einer sich neu zu bildenden „deutsch-deutschen Linken“ in Ost und West nach 1990. Zweitens ist es eine Geschichte der expliziten Auseinandersetzung mit den neuen Themen „deutsche Nation“ und „deutsche Geschichte“, wie sie vor allem von Seiten der antideutschen bzw. antinationalen Linken diskutiert wurden. Diese Auseinandersetzung hatte sowohl Auswirkungen auf das linksradikale Selbstverständnis der berücksichtigten Szene als auch auf den Verlauf der Neuvereinigung der ost- und westdeutschen Komponenten dieser Szene. / In 1990, East and West German actors who viewed themselves as members of the “radical left” suddenly became part of the same collective: the German radical left. Yet the contexts in which these actors had been politicized and socialized had been quite distinct prior to the fall of the Wall. The purpose of this study is to examine the modalities by which these actors – East and West – were unified in the course of the 1990’s. On what bases did they – in an environment which remained highly heterogeneous – define the shared reality which is a precondition of any rapprochement? What was the influence of the legacy of the East German leftist opposition’s political experience in the GDR? The position known as antideutsch or antinational particularly attracted our attention. It developed among the West German left in the wake of reunification. It also contributed considerably to redefining the structure of the scene in the East and the West in the second half of the 1990’s. The dissertation throws light on German political culture following reunification, on the one hand, and on the disorientation of the German left after the collapse of Real socialism, on the other. Furthermore, it introduces the East German dimension, which is often neglected by research, in the history of the Western European left.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Ivan Filipe de Almeida Lopes Fernandes / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Políticas Públicas, São Bernardo do Campo, 2018. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relação existente entre a deterioração do contexto econômico e a ascensão eleitoral de partidos radicais (PRs) de direita (PRDs) e de esquerda (PREs) entre 2003 e 2016 na Europa. Partimos da hipótese de que a situação da economia não só gerou um sentimento anti-establishment na população dos países europeus, mas também realçou ressentimentos preexistentes, decorrentes de mudanças na estrutura produtiva e na composição étnica da população desde a década de 1980, com o aprofundamento da globalização produtiva. Estudamos 94 eleições para os Legislativos nacionais de 26 países das Europas ocidental e oriental, o que permite analisar a relação entre indicadores socioeconômicos, variações do sentimento anti-establishment e o desempenho de partidos radicais de ambos espectros políticos. Com o uso de dados em painel, encontramos evidências de que o desemprego constitui a principal variável econômica a afetar o sentimento anti-establishment da população no curto prazo, enquanto a modernização da economia o faz no longo prazo. Além disso, nossos dados mostram que o aumento do sentimento anti-establishment favorece mais os PREs do que os PRDs. Concluímos, assim, que a Grande Recessão trouxe consequências não só econômicas, mas, também, políticas para as democracias europeias, que terão que se adaptar ao novo status alcançado pelos partidos radicais. / This work aims at analyzing the existing relation between the economic deterioration and the ascension of radical right (RR) and left (RL) parties in the period 2003 to 2016 in Europe. We test the hypothesis that the economic situation not only has generated an anti-establishment sentiment in the population of European countries, but also reinforced previous resentments, caused by changes in the productive structure and ethnic composition since the 80s, as a result of the deepening of the productive globalization. We study 94 national legislative elections from 26 Western and Eastern European countries, which enables us to observe the relation between socioeconomic indicators, variations in the anti-establishment and the performance of radical parties from both ends of the political spectrum. Through the use of panel data, we find evidences that the unemployment constitutes the main economic variable affecting the anti-establishment sentiment of the population in the short-term, whereas the modernization of the economy does it in the long-term. Besides, our data show that the increase in the anti-establishment sentiment favors more the RLPs than it does the RRPs. Therefore, we conclude that the Great Recession has brought about not only economic but also political consequences to the European democracies, which will have to adapt to the new status achieved by the radical parties.