During the past two decades, community-based hazard mitigation (CBHM) has been newly proposed and implemented as an alternative conceptual model for emergency management to deal with disasters comprehensively in order to curtail skyrocketing disaster losses. Local community members have been growingly required to share information and responsibilities for reducing community vulnerabilities to natural and technological hazards and building a safer community. Consequently they are encouraged to join local mitigation programs and volunteer for collective mitigation action, but their contributions vary. This research examined factors associated with Tulsa Project Impact partners?? contributions to collective mitigation action. In the literature review, self-interest and social norms were identified and briefly discussed as two determinants to guide partners?? behavior by reviewing game theoretic frameworks and individual decision-making models. Partners?? collective interest in building a safer community and feelings of obligation to participate in collective mitigation action were also considered for this study. Thus, the major factors considered are: (1) collective interests, (2) selective benefits, (3) participation costs, (4) norms of cooperation, and (5) internalized norms of participation. Research findings showed that selective benefits and internalized norms of participation were the two best predictors for partners?? contributions to collective mitigation action. However, collective interests, participation costs, and norms of cooperation did not significantly influence partners?? contributions.

This thesis analyzes the timing issue related to informed trades under two different market frameworks. Firstly, the issue under the competitive market framework is analyzed. In financial market, a widely accepted assumption that competitive informed traders elect to trade immediately upon receiving their private information is now questioned. We propose a competitive rational expectations model to demonstrate that under some situations informed traders tend to trade late on their information because of the fear of adverse effect on prices from their informed trades. This phenomenon from delayed informed trades leads to the following: Price volatility will increase and adjacent price changes may exhibit positive serial correlation. Secondly, we turn to the alternative framework, i.e., a market microstructure framework. A large number of market microstructure models had already investigated the timing issue of informed trades. Most of them found that the competition among informed traders will make the informed traders incline to trade early than late on their information and the market therefore becomes more efficient. We develop a market microstructure model with competitive, risk averse informed traders and uninformed market makers. It is found that when the mass of informed traders is larger or the precision of private information is higher, the market becomes less efficient, that is, prices will delay revealing the private information and the market will postpone becoming liquid. Our results stand in contrast to those of other market microstructure models simply because informed traders in our model choose to trade late on their information. In conclusion, the thesis has proved that the timing to trade on their information is an important consideration for informed traders to determine their trading strategy maximizing their expected utility. Since this issue is seldom discussed in the previous literature, I deeply believe that there are many works to be done followed this work.

In standard models of informed trading, they implicitly assume that all informed traders receive their information at the same time and then trade on their private information immediately, whether competitive or imperfect competitive¡]strategic¡^rational expectations model, differing on the speed of information revelation. In reality, the informed traders may quietly and skillfully perform noninformational trading to accumulate their ¡§line¡¨ cheaply. In this paper, we develop the multiperiod competitive rational expectations model with asymmetric information to show, under some conditions, delaying their informed trades is in the interests of informed traders; then we explore the implications of our model for the behavior of stock price, especially we find that, delaying the informed trades may increase price volatility and display the momentum effect, consistent with the empirical results.

Intermittent Mechanisms are widely used in automation equipment, including delivery, assembly, and indexing systems. The aim of this research is to set up a systematic design and analysis procedure of a conjugate intermittent gear cam mechanism. The output of a conjugate intermittent gear cam mechanism is the intermittent motion of sun gear, which has a dwell function in a working period. The intermittent of sun gear is the combination of carrier constant rotation and planet gear variable rotation that is influenced by the conjugate cam profiles. This research first is to set up the design and analysis procedure including applications of rational B-splines to synthesis of output intermittent motion curve and the ALM optimization method for motion tuning to meet specific demands. Secondly, for kinematic analysis, the rigid body transformation methos is used to determinate the conjugate cam profiles so that the geometric analysis can be performed. Then, the rigid body dynamic behavior of the mechanism is analyzed. Finally, to verify the usefulness and effectiveness of the developed procedure, it is conducted to design and analyze a real paper conveyor system of a die cutting and creasing machine. The research results obtained in this study have been applied in the industry due to its validation.

<p>Litteratur inom systemutvecklingsområdet visar behov av nya snabbare systemutvecklingsmetoder. Orsaken är komplexiteten både i systemutvecklings</p><p>projekten och i organisationer, där systemutveckling sker. Nu föredras små projekt, som omfattar färre än tio deltagare och genomförs på mindre än ett år. De traditionella systemutvecklingsmetoder anses vara lämpliga för stora projekt. Det finns nya systemutvecklingsmetoder, som får benämningen dynamiska metoder, för små projekt. I detta examensarbete studeras faktorer för två dynamiska metoder som gör dem lämpliga för små projekt. De två dynamiska metoderna som kommer att studeras är Extreme Programming och en specifik dokumenterad anpassning av RUP.</p><p>Syftet med detta examensarbete är att studera metoddokumentationen för två dynamiska metoder för att reda ut i vilken utsträckning de passar för små projekt. Ett ytterligare syfte är att genom analys av andras erfarenheter om tillämpningar av de två metoderna redogöra för det som styrker argumenten om deras lämplighet för små projekt.</p><p>För att besvara frågeställningen studerades litteratur och ett antal artiklar. Två telefonintervjuer genomfördes också för att besvara en av de två delfrågorna, som tillsammans utgör frågeställningen för denna studie. Resultatet visar att den specifikt dokumenterade anpassade RUP inte följer alla aspekter för små projekt. Däremot följer Extreme Programming alla de aspekterna.</p>

<p>This essay takes the three models from Allison and Zelikow book Essence of decision and applies them on the Swedish defense system. After the cold war the Swedish defense system had to undergo changes to be a more modern defense and be able to defend Sweden against threats. To also be able to cooperate with other countries in peacekeeping operations the Swedish defense had to be reorganized. The solution was to change direction from a defense system that was organized for invasion to instead be a movable defense ready for any challenge in Sweden or abroad. This reorganization will be analyzed according to the three different models.</p>

<p>The purpose of this study is to illustrate why Norway is not a member of the EU from a rational choice perspective. In order to fulfil this purpose, two questions will constitute the framework of the study. These are:</p><p>1. What are the arguments of the EU-opposers in the Norwegian EU-debate?</p><p>2. Is it rational for Norway to stand outside the EU?</p><p>The first question was answered by analyzing and mapping out the arguments of the Norweigan EU-opponents and then using a critical literature study to analyse them. To demarcate the study, only the arguments of the parliamentary parties that are opposing a Norwegian EU-membership, and the official organisation Nei til EU (No to the EU) were included. The second question was tested by using a rational choice theory and a number of keywords from the classical rational actor model; objectives, alternatives, consequences and choice. These keywords constituted the main analyzing instrument of the study and was applied on the empirical material.</p><p>The main arguments of the opposers of a Norweigan EU-membership, are widely spoken democracy, freedom of action, environment and solidarity. The debate is hard to map out because of its general character but is very homogeneous. The second question is answered partly in the light of the first one and the result shows that it is rational for Norway to stay outside the EU today, but the question may have to be reassessed in the future, and probably will be since the debate is still so fervent.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed November 17, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-142). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 335-348). Also available on the Internet.