Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2005. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-68).

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--München--Universität, 1990.

Este trabajo intenta caracterizar el tipo de discurso liberal desarrollado tanto en la obra del filósofo norteamericano John Rawls así como en el trabajo de Ronald Dworkin y Will Kymlicka. Esto, teniendo como centro de discusión las concepciones de individuo, comunidad y su relación, que subyacen a la teoría liberal; discusión articulada desde dos perspectivas: primero, a partir del contraste entre la Teoría de la Justicia de Rawls con los antecedentes que han configurado la matriz de la filosofía política liberal y segundo, a partir de la reconstrucción de las críticas realizadas por autores como Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre y Michael Walzer que dieron origen al denominado debate-liberal comunitario. En este sentido, el primer capítulo pone en cuestión la consistencia del liberalismo como tradición concreta y son abordadas las obras de John Locke, Benjamín Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, Immanuel Kant como ejes del pensamiento filosófico liberal. En el capítulo segundo, en base a estos elementos es reconstruida y contrastada la teoría de la justicia de Rawls, prestando central atención al argumento de la “posición original”. El capítulo tercero, caracteriza el debate liberal-comunitario; esto es, reconstruye las diversas críticas presentadas por los autores comunitarios desarticulando sus diferentes tópicos. Frente a lo cual, se articula un tipo de respuesta liberal desde la óptica del mismo Rawls, con su obra Liberalismo político, como de Dworkin y Kymlicka. Finalmente, el capítulo cuarto a modo de conclusión sugiere que si el liberalismo puede hacer frente al mayor número de críticas comunitarias resulta cuestionable si puede dar cabida a un pluralismo real, como es su pretensión, o sólo uno que se acomode al terreno por el demarcado, lo que trazaría sus límites políticos.

A dissertação tem como pretensão investigar especificamente a ideia rawlsiana da primazia do justo sobre o bem, explicitando, a partir desse conceito, a crítica de Rawls dirigida ao utilitarismo enquanto uma teoria moral abrangente. Buscamos mostrar que o pressuposto de Rawls é de que o utilitarismo se apresenta como uma teoria moral abrangente que tem como finalidade apresentar um critério geral (o princípio da maior felicidade, bemestar, prazer...) que se aplica a um amplo espectro de questões (senão a quase todas as questões). Do ponto de vista rawlsiano, em uma sociedade marcada por um pluralismo de concepções abrangentes de bem, as quais, na maioria das vezes, têm divergências profundas e irreconciliáveis, a teoria utilitarista não se presta como critério para a resolução de impasses morais e políticos. É preciso encontrar um conjunto de princípios capaz de fornecer um ponto de vista comum a partir do qual seja possível mediar às controvérsias provenientes das disputas entre estas diversas concepções. Nesse caso, a primazia do justo sobre o bem na teoria de Rawls tem o sentido de que os princípios de justiça não pressupõem nenhuma concepção específica de bem e de que eles colocam os limites às formas de vida pelas quais os cidadãos podem se empenhar em realizar as concepções do bem que julgam ser verdadeiras. / Submitted by Marcelo Teixeira (mvteixeira@ucs.br) on 2014-07-09T13:58:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Lucas Mateus Dalsotto.pdf: 1738021 bytes, checksum: a5ef09bda40571355eb2091299df9c16 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-09T13:58:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Lucas Mateus Dalsotto.pdf: 1738021 bytes, checksum: a5ef09bda40571355eb2091299df9c16 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The dissertation is to investigate claims specifically Rawlsian idea of the primacy of the right over the good, explaining, the basis of this concept, the critique of Rawls addressed to utilitarianism as a moral theory comprehensively. We seek to show that Rawls's assumption that utilitarianism is presented as a comprehensive moral theory which aims to present a general criterion (the principle of the greatest happiness, well- being, pleasure...) that applies to a broad spectrum issues (if not almost all issues). The Rawlsian view, in a society marked by a pluralism of comprehensive conceptions of the good, which, in most cases, have profound and irreconcilable differences, the utilitarian theory does not lend itself as a criterion for resolving moral dilemmas and political. It needs to find a set of principles capable of providing a common point of view from which it is possible to mediate contentious disputes arising from these different conceptions. In this case, the primacy of the right over the good in Rawls' theory has the sense that the principles of justice does not presuppose any particular conception of the good and that they put limits to the ways of life in which citizens can engage in conduct conceptions of the good they believe to be true.

Este trabajo pretende realizar un recorrido brevemente concentrado en torno a la idea de sujeto liberal que es posible descubrir en la teoría rawlsiana de la justicia. Para ello se realizará primero una contextualización general en torno a la idea de la primacía de la justicia; luego, una descripción de la polémica siempre permanente entre liberales versus comunitaristas, y finalmente una descripción de los aspectos que configuran la posición original, contemplando tanto aspectos fundacionales en los que se hace presente la herencia del constructivismo y la moral kantiana, como también otras precisiones descriptivas que el mismo Rawls hace de su teoría. En una segunda parte se propone una relectura crítica de algunos aspectos que merecen la pena ser destacados nuevamente, ya sea por su importancia al interior de la teoría, ya sea por su carácter controvertido o susceptiblemente polémico. Finalmente, en la tercera parte se propondrá una lectura enfáticamente comunitaria, destacando los aspectos más importantes, que al parecer no estarían contemplados por Rawls al momento de establecer o suponer una cierta antropología filosófica que se desprendería en torno a las restricciones y descripciones de los sujetos idóneos para el “acuerdo” original y responsables a su vez, de escoger los principios de la justicia.

A dissertação tem como pretensão investigar especificamente a ideia rawlsiana da primazia do justo sobre o bem, explicitando, a partir desse conceito, a crítica de Rawls dirigida ao utilitarismo enquanto uma teoria moral abrangente. Buscamos mostrar que o pressuposto de Rawls é de que o utilitarismo se apresenta como uma teoria moral abrangente que tem como finalidade apresentar um critério geral (o princípio da maior felicidade, bemestar, prazer...) que se aplica a um amplo espectro de questões (senão a quase todas as questões). Do ponto de vista rawlsiano, em uma sociedade marcada por um pluralismo de concepções abrangentes de bem, as quais, na maioria das vezes, têm divergências profundas e irreconciliáveis, a teoria utilitarista não se presta como critério para a resolução de impasses morais e políticos. É preciso encontrar um conjunto de princípios capaz de fornecer um ponto de vista comum a partir do qual seja possível mediar às controvérsias provenientes das disputas entre estas diversas concepções. Nesse caso, a primazia do justo sobre o bem na teoria de Rawls tem o sentido de que os princípios de justiça não pressupõem nenhuma concepção específica de bem e de que eles colocam os limites às formas de vida pelas quais os cidadãos podem se empenhar em realizar as concepções do bem que julgam ser verdadeiras. / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The dissertation is to investigate claims specifically Rawlsian idea of the primacy of the right over the good, explaining, the basis of this concept, the critique of Rawls addressed to utilitarianism as a moral theory comprehensively. We seek to show that Rawls's assumption that utilitarianism is presented as a comprehensive moral theory which aims to present a general criterion (the principle of the greatest happiness, well- being, pleasure...) that applies to a broad spectrum issues (if not almost all issues). The Rawlsian view, in a society marked by a pluralism of comprehensive conceptions of the good, which, in most cases, have profound and irreconcilable differences, the utilitarian theory does not lend itself as a criterion for resolving moral dilemmas and political. It needs to find a set of principles capable of providing a common point of view from which it is possible to mediate contentious disputes arising from these different conceptions. In this case, the primacy of the right over the good in Rawls' theory has the sense that the principles of justice does not presuppose any particular conception of the good and that they put limits to the ways of life in which citizens can engage in conduct conceptions of the good they believe to be true.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Imagine a hypothetical couple, Jane and John Smith. The Smiths have been together for a couple of years, and they both have good jobs with a solid income. They are both physically healthy and happy, and have a good relationship built on mutual trust. The Smiths feel ready to take, what so many call, 'the next step' - they want a child. This sounds like a commonplace scenario in any middle-class society around the world. But let me add to their considerations the one about the existence of orphans - almost 145 million of them worldwide (UNICEF 2009). A dilemma now occurs for the Smiths: Should they have their own, biological child, or should they adopt an orphan? Like most people, they would like to have their own child, but realise that there are so many children already in existence who need a home. They consider that, instead of having a biological child for no other real reason than their own desires, they can really change one (or more) child's life by adopting her. There simultaneously exists an inherent dilemma for any state: Should the state interfere in people like the Smiths' option to reproduce naturally in order to increase the adoption of orphans? There are millions of orphans who will never be adopted, and yet every year millions of babies are born. The existence of orphans is therefore a socio-economic problem for any country, especially third world countries that cannot provide the orphan with adequate care and education. In this thesis, I examine how the existence of orphans in the world should influence anybody's decision to reproduce and what the state's role should be therein. The millions of orphans in the world raise serious moral questions for those people planning to have a biological child. Difficult questions arise like, if there are so many children already in the world who are in dire need of parents, is it ethical to bring another human being into the world? What duties, if any, do prospective parents have towards orphans? Do orphans deserve moral consideration above people's yet unborn 'flesh and blood'? Additionally, questions arise about the role of the state: Can it be just for a state to interfere in people's decision to reproduce? Will it be permissible to punish people if they do not adopt? Is the existence of orphans ultimately the responsibility of the state or also of the citizens within the state?

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This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.