Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Queensland, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

This research was conducted on model-based reasoning and its prevalence in CSCOPE curriculum. Communications with seven CSCOPE representatives out of twenty regions revealed that CSCOPE is simply a name, not an acronym. The primary focus of CSCOPE is to impact instructional practices in the classroom to improve student performance. This report discusses the history of CSCOPE, its framework, and its exemplar lessons. It also looks at model-based reasoning, taxonomy of models, and model-eliciting activities. The research also aims to determine if the exemplar lessons in CSCOPE can be classified as model-based. / text

Executive functioning abilities, including abstract reasoning, are often reported as weaknesses in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). The current study examines reasoning through a different approach by utilizing the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of intelligence, which is a widely accepted, research-based model that defines reasoning or fluid intelligence (Gf) and outlines those smaller skills of which it is composed. The Woodcock-Johnson, Third Edition (WJ III) is a test battery based on CHC theory, assessing the broad and narrow abilities of the model. Young men with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASDs) and neurotypical controls were given the WJ III tasks that assess the four narrow abilities of fluid intelligence - general sequential reasoning/deductive reasoning (RG), induction/inductive reasoning (I), speed of reasoning (RE), and quantitative reasoning/math reasoning (RQ). It was hypothesized that while deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, and reasoning speed would be lower for HFASD, math reasoning would be comparable between groups. This expectation was based on previous autism research, which has found reasoning and processing speed deficits but preserved math skills. The present study also sought to examine cerebellar volume, through structural brain imaging, and its relationship to reasoning abilities. The HFASD group was expected to have reduced cerebellar volume when compared to controls. The ASD literature contains many examples of this pattern of brain structure, with the cerebellum being the most commonly cited region of abnormality. Additionally, the cerebellum has been implicated in studies of executive functioning, and a relationship between size and performance on nonverbal reasoning tasks has been reported. Therefore, a positive correlation was hypothesized between cerebellar volume and scores on WJ III reasoning tasks. Twenty-one young adult male HFASD subjects and 21 neurotypical controls were included in the current study. The data was analyzed through the use of MANOVA/MANCOVA, t-tests, and Pearson correlations. Results supported fluid intelligence weaknesses in the HFASD sample, with significantly lower performance in speed of reasoning. Deductive and inductive reasoning abilities were also lower, though these findings did not reach significance. The data did not support decreased cerebellar volume in HFASD, nor was a relationship between fluid reasoning and volume of the cerebellum found. / text

Organizations routinely rely on work groups for creative solutions to the problems they face. This is because solving difficult problems is often assumed to require the talents and knowledge of multiple people working together. However, much research has shown over the years that groups frequently experience dysfunction when trying to collaborate and generate creative solutions. Organizational researchers have theorized that analogical reasoning may play an important role in promoting collective creativity, but these claims are for the most part untested in the literature. In this dissertation, I attempt to answer two questions. First, does analogical reasoning provide some functional benefits for groups solving creative problems? Second, does analogical reasoning give rise to synergistic effects when creative groups collaborate during ideation and problem-solving? I assessed these questions using a laboratory study designed to find the effects of analogical reasoning in interacting and non-interacting groups, and to test for potential synergistic effects of analogical reasoning as a group-level strategy for generating creative problem solutions. Findings of the study suggest that analogical reasoning may provide some benefits for creative group outputs, and it may also create synergistic effects for creative groups. / text

This thesis aims to provide a theory of human rationality which is consistent with, and supportive of, the naturalistic approach to philosophy of mind. I analyse why the common tendency not to furnish a systematic and rigorous account of rationality is philosophically inadequate - namely, because this overlooks the critical role which the concept of rationality plays in the 'principle of charity' (Quine 1960; Davidson 1984) in philosophy of mind, which is a central part of a unified naturalistic approach to philosophy of mind and rationality. I aim to contribute to the field by rectifying this omission. I identify the theoretical commitments of any naturalistic approach to the theory of rationality - in particular, I argue for the neglected fact that naturalism commits us to an instrumental theory of rationality. I defend the theory of instrumental rationality against its critics, by means of elaborating the implications of the notion - also frequently overlooked - that the concept of rationality is one which applies paradigmatically to agents, rather than to reasoning processes considered in isolation (for example). The resultant instrumental theory of personal rationality which I develop and defend is characterised by two main original (related) features: (1) Certain fundamental features of human rationality are identified as constitutive in nature and status - given that humans are agents, then it follows necessarily that our theory of rationality has these certain characteristics. (2) Full instrumental rationality demands rationality of the self, which introduces further rational constraints of consistency (for example). I build upon these two central features of my theory of rationality to demonstrate how this account can thereby rebut accusations of extreme relativism and inadequacy of scope. Thus I aim to show how my instrumental theory of personal rationality can provide a philosophically adequate account of the normative status of rationality within the remit of the naturalist approach, and thereby also furnish adequate philosophical support for a defensible naturalistic theory of the mind.

This work is concerned generally with the relationship between logic and psychology, and in particular with the psychophilosophical foundations of deductive reasoning. This is against the recurrent background of logicians and psychologists knowing of the existence of each other but ignoring each others' work. However, cognitive psychology needs logic, not only as all sciences do to ensure coherence and consistency, but as an essential element of a general theory of cognition. This is a substantive claim, yet in its narrower form it highlights the need to study the precise way in which logic enters the theory of cognition. The contention here is that a theory of mental logic may satisfy both requirements: namely, to be the best explanation for everyday deductive reasoning and to offer an insight into the cognitive architecture. The theory maintains that deductive, reasoning consists of operations on internal representations in accordance with logical rules implemented in procedures activated by the forms of mental representation. Thus, the foundations of the logic(s) at which logicians aim, viz. the logical precepts and ideals, must be psychologically real in the sense of being instantiated in some form in the mind. The discussion is organised into three parts. The first part deals with several issues: arguments for and against the centrality of deduction, desiderata for a theory of deductive competence, and taxonomy of reasoning theories and topics. The second part considers the mental logic hypothesis from its inception to its latest formations. It reconstructs the mental logic paradigm and its transition from a general philosophical commonplace to a psychological hypothesis. The third part looks at the philosophical connections and consequences of the mental logic theory. The first connection is with the language of thought: the hypothesis seems naturally to commit itself to a language of thought on whose formulas abstract rules apply. Another connection is with the syntactic theory of mind and the question is whether mental logic is committed to it or not. Among the consequences, the notion of rationality and the significance of deduction for discovery and justification in science are examined

This programme of research, involving seven experiments, investigates Evans' (1980a; 1980b) revised version of the Dual Process theory of reasoning (Wason and Evans, 1975). A Type 2 process is characterised as verbal-rational and a Type I process as non-verbal and non-logical. Evans links the processes to two statistical components of observed reasoning performance. The Type I process reflects non-logical response biases and the Type 2 process reflects attention to the logical nature of the task. Six experiments employ a concurrent articulation (with or without a short-term memory load) methodology devised by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) for investigating their Working Memory model. Four experiments apply this technique to conditional reasoning tasks in an attempt to disrupt the verbal Type 2 process. Some weak evidence for the revised Dual Process theory is found. There is a tendency, marked in only one experiment, for concurrent articulation to inhibit logical performance, whilst having little effect on response biases. Unexpectedly, articulation conditions (without memory load) are characterised by faster responding than silent conditions. The results are inconsistent with Hitch and Baddeley's (1976) data and several features of their Working Memory model. Two further experiments repeat and extend their work. A number of important theoretical implications are discussed in the light of recent revisions to their theory (eg. Baddeley, 1983). A possible connection is drawn between Type I and Type 2 processes and dual memory codes (Paivio, 1971; 1983) and thought systems (Paivio, 1975) of a verbal and visual nature. The hypothesis that Type I processes may be associated with visual mechanisms is tested by introducing a factor into three experiments to induce use of a visual code. This does not affect the Type 1 process but facilitates lo3ical performance. These results are discussed in relation to the revised Dual Process theory. An explanation in terms of a recent tricoding model for processing of pictures and words (Snodgrass, 1980; 1984) is suggested.

This programme of research investigates the effect of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Belief bias is conventionally characterised as a non-logical tendency to accept or reject deductive inferences on the basis of belief rather than logical argument. However, some theorists have argued that the effect is weak compared with that of logic and that it arises from misinterpretation of the premises or failure to accept the logical task. Despite the adoption of controls recommended in the recent literature, Experiments 1 to 3 found consistently strong belief bias effects on the syllogistic evaluation task. However, there were equally strong effects of logic and an interaction between the two factors. Verbal protocol analysis revealed some possible misinterpretation of premises. More strikingly, however, it suggested the presence of three different modes of reasoning which were forward, backward or conclusion based and associated respectively with increasing levels of belief bias. Belief bias was not observed in Experiments 4 and 5 which employed similar problem content on the syllogistic construction task. However, in view of findings recently published by other researchers, it appears that more salient beliefs are needed to produce the effect on this type of task. Experiments 6 to 9 investigated the cause of the logic times belief interaction observed here and in earlier published studies: in essence, the effect of belief is stronger on invalid than valid problems. This could be due to misinterpretation of the logical concept of necessity, but extended instruction on logical interpretation failed to eliminate the effect. The findings were more consistent with a selective scrutiny model of belief bias which claims that arguments supporting unbelievable conclusions are more thoroughly analysed than those supporting believable conclusions. This model is discussed with reference to contemporary theories and findings in the psychology of reasoning.

This research was designed to explore the nature of reasoning. In general, three categories of theories about reasoning (the inferential rule approach, the mental models approach, and the operational constructive approach) are used to explain reasoning. In this research, a simple transitivity of length task was selected as the experimental vehicle to explore these approaches for their veracity. Each approach was assessed for spatial and linguistic conditions which might influence reasoning about transitive length relations. The length difference under consideration in the reasoning task, the order in which the premise statements about the length differences were presented and the linguistic relational term used to describe the length difference were selected as the experimental variables. Three measures of reasoning about transitive length relations were assessed: judgements, judgements-plus-justifications, and necessity understanding. A between-within factorial, cross-sectional design was employed. The order of the premise statements (optimal/control) was manipulated as the experimental between-subjects factor. The two experimental within-subjects factors, length difference (large/small) and linguistic relational term (“longer”/”shorter”), were fully crossed and counterbalanced. Ninety-six preschool and school-age children, evenly divided by gender and age (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years), participated in the study. The developmental character of transitive reasoning in the age range studied was confirmed for two of the three measures of reasoning. More failures of judgement were observed when a large length difference was matched with the linguistic relational term “longer” and when a small length difference was matched with the linguistic relational term “shorter” than when the length differences and relational terms were mismatched. The arrangement of the premise figure did indirectly influence any measure of transitive reasoning but a large length difference in combination with the control premise figure was found to increase the frequency of transitive judgements-plus justifications. It is concluded from the analysis of the findings of this research that transitive reasoning about length is likely to result from constructive processes, rather then from application of logical rules. However, it is unclear whether the constructive processes in question are best explained in terms of cognitive operations or in terms of figurative mental models.

While there is much data in the experimental cognitive psychology literature reporting that subjects working on science-like tasks ignore findings inconsistent with their hypotheses, much cognitive science research has found that reasoners focus on unexpected findings. To study how real-world scientists deal with unexpected findings, data was collected from a prominent immunology laboratory. Four lab meetings were analyzed using a standardized coding procedure. The amount of reasoning, interactions, and new hypotheses about unexpected versus expected findings was analyzed. Presenters at the meetings reasoned more about unexpected than expected findings, and group members reasoned and interacted extensively about unexpected findings. Both presenter and group members formed more new hypotheses about unexpected than about expected findings. These results are consistent with the finding in cognitive science research that reasoners focus on unexpected data. It is proposed that several heuristics influence which unexpected findings scientists pay attention to.