For many, epistemology is a normative discipline in much the same sense as ethics. According to the analogy, just as ethics is about what we should do and how we should live our lives, epistemology is about what we should believe and how we should go about forming our beliefs. What complicates the analogy, however, is that believing things is also a part of living life. Our beliefs aren’t only evaluable with respect to whether they are credible, true, or amount to knowledge, but also with respect to whether they are useful, beneficial, or contribute to our happiness and wellbeing. The analogy implies that epistemic considerations (like evidence, truth, or knowledge) settle questions about what we should believe just as ethical considerations (like duty, goodness, or virtue) settle questions about what we should do and how we should live. The present work is an attempt to challenge this general picture of the subject matter of epistemology. Specifically, I argue that the normative assessment of belief cannot be understood in isolation from the broader social practices and human activities in virtue of which what we believe is ethically and practically significant. Chapter I introduces the central issues and raises a challenge to views that distinguish between epistemic and ethical assessment in terms of reasons for belief and reasons for action, respectively. The conclusion of this chapter is that there must be some conceptual link between the norms of belief and the norms of action. Chapter II builds upon this challenge by spelling out that conceptual link: reasons for belief entail reasons for action, and vice versa. The main conclusion of chapters I and II is that epistemology cannot settle questions about what we should believe without also settling questions about what we should do, and ethics cannot settle questions about what we should do without also settling questions about what we should believe. Chapters III and IV provide novel answers to two significant challenges to abandoning the analogy: providing plausible accounts of the relationship between reasons and rational motivation and the normative comparison of epistemic considerations and practical reasons for belief.

To interpret is to seek understanding. This formulation hides as much as it reveals and I propose to unpack it. I argue that interpreting is only a part of what legal theorists and practitioners do. In Part I, I attempt an ‘in vitro’ analysis and present the bare concept of interpretation: interpretation is an activity that needs an object; interpreting is reasoning about meaning when there is a possibility of mistake about that meaning. Part II focuses on two domains of interpretation: musical performance and adjudication. I rely on Joseph Raz’s account of interpretation as explanation or display and identify the former domain as a paradigm of display and the latter as a paradigm of explanation. Both are examples of interpretation for others and involve a claim to theoretical authority on the part of interpreters. But, unlike musicians- who interpret only works of music- judges interpret a great variety of objects. Musical interpretation is identified by its object, whereas legal interpretation is not. Legal interpretation is explanation of legal meaning. I then discuss the tenets of the minimalist view of legal interpretation: (i) legal rules are not interpretable and legal texts are not primary objects of legal interpretation; (ii) there is a difference between interpretative authority (a form of theoretical authority) and legal authority (a form of practical authority) and interpretative conclusions can be theoretically authoritative without being exclusionary reasons for action; (iii) Interpreting and adjudicating are different activities. Interpretation explains, adjudication resolves. Legal interpreters do not produce legal rules: they are required to be guided by them.

Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

Ce mémoire, qui appartient au domaine de l’éthique de la croyance, un champ d’enquête philosophique situé au confluent de la philosophie de l’esprit, de l’épistémologie et de l’éthique, cherche à évaluer la viabilité d’une certaine approche influente en faveur de l’anti-pragmatisme, qui est la thèse selon laquelle il n’existe aucune raison pratique normative de croire. Cette approche, que l’on peut qualifier de « constitutiviste », se fonde sur l’idée que certaines caractéristiques intrinsèques à la croyance feraient en sorte qu’il ne pourrait exister de raisons pratiques de croire. Les objectifs de ce mémoire sont : 1) sur le plan descriptif, de donner une topographie de l’approche constitutiviste 2) sur le plan normatif, d’évaluer si l’approche constitutiviste pour fonder l’anti-pragmatiste est une démarche viable ou si elle doit être rejetée. Je procède à cette évaluation par une analyse critique des arguments constitutivistes à la lumière de la littérature récente portant sur la cible de la croyance, les raisons de croire et les normes épistémiques. Je conclus que l’approche constitutiviste souffre de problèmes sérieux qui remettent en question sa viabilité. / This thesis, which pertains to the philosophical domain of inquiry called the ethics of belief, at the crossroads of philosophy of mind, epistemology and ethics, aims at assessing the viability of an influent argumentative strategy in favour of anti-pragmatism about reasons for belief. According to anti-pragmatism, there are no practical normative reasons for belief. The constitutivist strategy, as I call it, purports to show that anti-pragmatism is true by appealing to constitutive, intrinsic features of belief. The aim of this thesis is double: first, it is to give a portrait of the landscape of constitutivist arguments against practical reasons for belief. Second, it is to evaluate the merits of these arguments. In order to do so, I present a critical analysis of the two main constitutivist arguments that is grounded in recent works about the aim of belief, raisons for belief and epistemic norms. My conclusion is that the constitutivist strategy suffers from serious defects which threaten its viability.

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