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Zhu Jing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-58). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Supply Chain Contracts --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Risk Aversion --- p.10 / Chapter 3 --- Rebate Scheme in a Risk-Neutral Supply Chain --- p.12 / Chapter 3.1 --- Market Demand is Perfectly Correlated with Temperature --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Integrated Supply Chain: the Benchmark --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- The Decentralized Supply Chain --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Supply Chain Coordination with a Rebate --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- Market Demand is Partially Correlated with Temperature --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Additive Random Variable --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Multiplicative Random Variable --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3 --- Discussion and Conclusion --- p.22 / Chapter 4 --- Rebate Scheme in a Risk-Averse Supply Chain --- p.24 / Chapter 4.1 --- Case of Perfectly Correlated Demand --- p.26 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Without a Shortage Cost --- p.26 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Shortage Cost s > 0 --- p.32 / Chapter 4.2 --- Case of Demand with an Additive Random Variable --- p.33 / Chapter 4.3 --- Discussion and Conclusion --- p.37 / Chapter 5 --- Numerical Analysis --- p.38 / Chapter 5.1 --- Risk-Neutral Supply Chain --- p.39 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Perfectly Correlated Demand Model --- p.39 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Partially Correlated Demand Model --- p.39 / Chapter 5.2 --- Risk-Averse Supply Chain --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3 --- Brief Summary --- p.47 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Chapter A --- Matlab Source Code --- p.51 / Bibliography --- p.54

My dissertation features three essays in industrial organization. The first two investigate aspects of potentially anticompetitive firm behavior in differentiated product markets. Contrary to previous analyses, requirements tying and bundled rebates by a firm with a monopoly in one market that competes in another may increase total surplus when product differentiation in the competitive market is endogenous. This result is stronger for tying than for bundled rebates, and holds for both horizontal and vertical differentiation (essays 1 and 2, respectively). Under requirements tying or bundled rebates, a multiproduct firm (horizontally) differentiates its product less from its rival's product than it would under independent pricing, suggesting a new efficiency consideration for requirements tying: a reduction in transport costs. A similar result prevails under vertical differentiation: when the tying firm controls either quality niche, it reduces the quality of its tied product; however, the rival may invest in the quality of its competing product. Hence, the effect on total surplus is ambiguous when tying or bundled rebates arrangements are permitted. The second essay employs an empirical model typically used to analyze differentiated product markets analyze a different economic environment: parents' decision to home school their children. Home schooling has grown in popularity as an alternative to public or private schools; some estimates place growth at 15 to 40% per year in the U.S. I empirically estimate the demand for home schooling as an alternative to these other modes of education, focusing on potential network effects in household decisions to home-school. I find support for the hypothesis that home schooling 'support groups' mitigate the cost of home schooling relative to the alternatives, but only occur in areas with a critical mass of home-schooling households. The data also suggest that as interest in home schooling grows, the local community's school district spending per child declines, increasing the probability that more parents will take their children out of public schools. Both phenomena suggest the existence of network effects in the market for primary and secondary education. / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2009. / Title from PDF title page (University of Texas Digital Repository, viewed on Sept. 14, 2009). Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 177-187).

The South African primary rebate is governed by Section 6 of the Income Tax Act (58 of 1962). This primary tax rebate entitles taxpayers to a tax-free income portion up to a certain level depending on the rebate amount (also referred to as the tax threshold). The concept of tax thresholds in a tax system in essence adhere to the first tax canon of Smith (1776:676), which suggests that individuals should pay taxes in proportion to each person’s ability to pay tax. The implication of this tax canon is that individuals who have a limited or no ability to pay tax should only be subject to pay tax in relation to their ability. Therefore, before tax can be levied, an amount for the necessities-of-life must be deducted from the taxpayer’s income (Vivian, 2006:85). The primary rebate system thus gives individuals a tax-free income portion which is supposed to first compensate for an individual’s necessities-of-life expenses or put differently the costs to survive. The main purpose of the present study is to critically analyse and compare the fairness of the primary rebates in South Africa in relation to other countries. To meet the main purpose a comparison was done between South Africa’s primary rebate and related government grant programs to that of Brazil and Australia. It was found that South Africa rebate system creates significant vertical and horizontal unfairness and that it compares poorly to the fairer multiple rebate and government grant systems of Brazil and Australia. Accordingly it was recommended that the unified primary rebate system of South Africa is reviewed and brought in line with the multiple rebate systems implemented in countries such as Brazil and Australia. / Dissertation (MCom)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Taxation / unrestricted

1 LOYALTY REBATES AS AN EXCLUSIONARY PRACTISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ABSTRACT This master thesis treats loyalty rebates in the light of European competition law when applied by dominant undertakings and analyses its consequences. It describes when such practise might be considered by European Union authorities as an abuse of a dominant position as it has negative impact on the competitors by inducing customer's loyalty to the dominant undertaking. It depicts its position in the European competition law system and compares it to other practises that influence the market in a similar way. Also, it classifies different types of loyalty and other types of rebates and explains how such rebates can force a customer to acquire increasing portions of his demand from the dominant undertaking and how they can damage its competitors. The thesis also offers a critical view on a very strict treatment of this practise by European institutions in the past and it arguments by several positive effects that loyalty and other types of rebates may have. Simultaneously it takes into consideration the newest decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Intel case from September 2017 which will hopefully affect EU institutions' approach to this practise as it broke well-established per se interdiction of...

A channel rebate is a payment from a manufacturer to a retailer based on retailer sales to end consumers. The widespread use of rebates by manufactures is being met with growing retailer and consumer acceptance. Channel rebates are especially significant in the consumer industries. This kind of sales force compensation method involves the agency relationship between manufactures and retailers. Manufactures often make a specified contract, which rewards retailers when retailing sales exceeds the specified level in a certain period, to minimize the agency cost effectively and align the interests of manufactures and retailers. Since the employ stock option (ESO) transaction involves the exchange of labor inputs for a contingent equity claim on the firm, the economic intuition of ESO and channel rebates is such similar. However, the accounting treatments of channel rebates are often not recorded exactly in the period in which they are incurred. It is important to employ reasonable and correct methods for estimating the value of channel rebates. This article suggests that manufacturers should expense the channel rebates at the grant date. In addition, adjustments for rebate expenses are necessary to recognize the different value of rebates between grant date and statement date. This article estimates channel rebates using the options model, which is a more flexible and useful method to value intangible assets, to make it possible to report on the balance sheet the appropriate assets, liabilities, and stockholders¡¦ equity at the statement date and to report on the income statement the proper net income for the period. Because the analytical solution of our model is unknown, the numerical solution can be obtained by Monte Carlo simulation to determine the value of channel rebates reasonably and correctly. Thus, the financial statements of both manufactures and retailers will provide the most useful information to various user groups.

This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of electric vehicle incentives and investigates their impact on the uptake of electric vehicles within and beyond the European Union over the period of 2010 to 2019. Depending on the kind of benefit they provide and their timing, the incentives are divided into one-time monetary, recurring monetary, and non-monetary incentives. To properly evaluate the effect of incentives, a fixed effects and difference-in-differences methods are employed, allowing us to control for unobserved factors affecting the electric vehicle market. A fixed effects analysis revealed a significant positive effect of one-time monetary incentives on battery electric vehicle sales, and a significant positive effect of both one-time and recurring monetary incentives on plug-in hybrid electric vehicle sales. Additionally, when considering the effect of individual incentives, the most important ones were found to be rebate and point-of-sale tax incentive. A difference-in-differences analysis confirmed a statistically significant effect of rebate on the sale of battery electric vehicles. JEL Classification C33, H71, L62, L98, O31, Q55 Keywords Electric vehicles, Incentives, Tax incentives, Rebates, Technology adoption Title The Impact of Incentives on Electric Vehicle Sales in the...

Agentes econômicos com posição dominante são capazes de se conduzir de maneira independente na sua atividade comercial. Da mesma forma, possuem todos os incentivos para manutenção desta posição, em detrimento de seus concorrentes, fornecedores e clientes. O presente trabalho visa, inicialmente, em estudo comparado da doutrina e jurisprudência no Brasil, União Europeia e Estados Unidos, identificar os elementos de cognição da teoria do abuso de posição dominante para cinco modalidades de conduta. A partir daí traçamos seus elementos de correlação com o propósito de sugerir uma teoria aplicada ao ordenamento jurídico pátrio, que passa pelo reconhecimento da concorrência como garantia institucional, de forma a estabelecer-se igualdade material segundo a teoria da função social dos meios de produção. A presença constante da concorrência nos mercados deve ser tratada como presunção de bem-estar social. E finalmente, valendo-se destes elementos de suporte, propomos uma teoria da responsabilidade especial para agentes econômicos em posição dominante, que implicaria o dever de autoaplicação dos limites permitidos para sua conduta comercial, cujo descumprimento ensejaria presunção relativa de efeitos deletérios ao mercado, segundo os parâmetros propostos. / Firms enjoying dominant position are able to conduct themselves independently in their commercial activities. Likewise, they hold all due incentives to maintain such position, in detriment of their competitors, suppliers and clients. The present work aims, initially, through a comparative study of the Brazilian, the European Union and the United States\' legal doctrine and jurisprudence, to identify cognitive elements of the abuse of dominance theory, for five different natures of conducts. Subsequently, we identify their elements of connection with the purpose of suggesting a theory applicable to the local legal system, which includes the recognition of competition as an institutional guarantee, so to establish a material equality according to the theory of social function of productive assets. The constant presence of competition on the markets shall be treated as a presumption of social welfare. And finally, based on such supportive elements, we propose a theory of special responsibility for dominant firms that implies in a duty of self-application of the permitted limits for their commercial conduct, and which infringement would entail a relative presumption of harmful effects to the market, pursuant to the proposed parameters.