Includes bibliographical references / In the last three decades, there has been a phenomenon, akin to a revolution sweeping through the world, leaving in its wake major consequences of economic, political, legal and constitutional dimensions. The role of the state as we know it has been reconstructed beyond recognition. From an all-encompassing monolith that owns, manages, and provides various infrastructures, goods and services directly to the public and also serves as a regulator, it has now been reduced to a mere bystander or an enabler. Its footprints in the sands of economic and political times have diminished. In its place has arisen the regulatory state, characterised by a thinning out of the state; and the emergence of an institutional innovation: the Independent Regulatory Agency. Its rise, growth and diffusion across jurisdictions and sectors, and most recently in developing countries including Nigeria have been unprecedented. This thesis centres on the question whether the Independent Regulatory Agency can function in Nigeria in a manner analogous to its counterparts in the developed economies and be able to ensure the provision of safe, affordable and efficient infrastructures and services. The thesis finds institutional fragility, limited capacity, information asymmetry, corruption and insecurity within critical political, economic and supporting institutions that ideally gives life and legitimacy to the IRA; while essential democratic concepts are adhered to more in the breach. These challenges present a difficult climate in which the Independent Regulatory Agency can thrive. As an alternative, the thesis advocates the adoption of two transitory regulatory models: regulatory contracts and contracting out or outsourcing of functions. Their utilisation would achieve the desired regulatory outcomes until maturity is attained in the political economy of Nigeria, while simultaneously mitigating its contextual limitations.

A competition agency represents an independent regulatory institution, which takes the form of an administrative body. A competition authority enables the development of markets and displays to market operators and new players a dedication to the principles of free markets and fair competition. In other words, a competition authority should intervene in a timely manner to correct any anti-competitive behaviour and implement the necessary remedies; it should be equipped with an adequate knowledge of the market in order to make its decisions. Moreover, its involvement should be predictable, that is, it should have a positive influence on markets. Furthermore, a competition agency should continuously evaluate its role as public institution and law enforcer by following the economic and legal evolution of the jurisdiction in which it operates. Until recently, the debate has predominantly revolved around the substance of competition law. However, in recent years, the evaluation of the performance of competition agencies has been embraced by numerous countries, including developing ones. This is because most emerging countries around the world have progressively been opening their domestic markets to competition, which led to giving more power to competition agencies to monitor markets. As this perspective has not been explored in the context of Maghreb countries, which also represent developing economies, this research endeavours to do so. Therefore, the aim of this research is to analyse the extent to which the performance of competition agencies in Maghreb countries influences the enforcement of competition law.

In order to facilitate trade between EU members, the European Committee has created regulations that will govern supervision of organic products. Every regulatory agency shall, according to the European Committees regulations, carry out a risk classification of each organic producer they regulate. This study for The National Food Administration compares regulation of Swedish organic products with other countries, and aims to produce a simplified model based on risk that can be the beginning of the risk classification model that Sweden in the current situation don’t have. The thesis is based on three questions: 1) What criteria should we use for assigning organic food producers? 2) How do selected European countries and frontrunners rate organic producers and what can Sweden learn from them? 3) How might a national classification model of organic production look in order to ensure an equivalent level of regulation and prevent competition among private inspection bodies? A review of information gathered from the different countries gave differing results. Few real classification models were provided, and instead only guidance and manuals were received. The simplified classification model that has been recommended as a model for the Swedish risk classification is largely taken from the Norwegian control body Debio, which in the current situation seems to have one of the most developed risk classification models in Europe. The conclusion of this study is that

Magister Pharmaceuticae - MPharm / In Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama) and Dominican Republic (DR) the approval timelines for major changes are described ranging from 12 to 18 months, these timelines are considerably extensive. Other countries or regions applying FDA post-approval change and EMA post-approval variation guidelines have timelines of 6 months or less (Hoath et al, 2016, Murray, 2016). The research aims to identify opportunities for alignment of the post-approval changes categories of Central America (CA) and Dominican Republic (DR) National Regulatory Agencies (NRA) with the riskbased categories of FDA and EMA as encouraged by the ICH. The FDA and EMA are considered reference authorities for many countries, as they are Stringent Authorities.

Este trabalho analisa as relações existentes entre a autonomia das agências reguladoras, seus sistemas de controle e a qualidade dos serviços prestados pelas concessionárias de distribuição de energia elétrica, após a implantação das agências reguladoras federal e estaduais, no Brasil. A proposta é contribuir para o entendimento do sistema regulatório instaurado no setor de distribuição de energia elétrica brasileiro, sobretudo, analisando indicadores, cujas variações possam explicar os resultados da atuação das agências reguladoras na busca da qualidade dos serviços públicos concedidos. O presente trabalho procura contextualizar a reforma do Estado e a reestruturação do setor de distribuição de energia elétrica brasileiro. Discute, ainda, a adoção de novos paradigmas que norteiam a busca da eficiência dos serviços públicos. O estudo de caso, apresentado neste trabalho, tem a população composta pelas agências reguladoras estaduais de seis estados brasileiros (Bahia, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul e São Paulo), ligadas à Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) por convênio firmado entre 1998 e 2000, e suas respectivas concessionárias de distribuição de energia elétrica. Os dados coletados referem-se aos anos entre 1995 e 2000, pois refletem a situação da qualidade dos serviços antes da criação e após a implantação das agências reguladoras federal e estaduais. Os principais resultados evidenciam a existência de uma correlação entre alguns indicadores das variáveis independentes e dependente, ou seja, à medida que as agências incrementam suas atividades operacionais de controle, os indicadores de qualidade na prestação de serviços variam positivamente. O estudo de caso apresentado foi interpretado utilizando-se modelos de análise organizacional e institucional, para elucidar os motivos pelos quais a qualidade dos serviços das concessionárias dependeu da autonomia financeira das agências reguladoras e dos seus tipos de sistemas de controle. Embora as agências estaduais tenham apresentado diferentes formas de atuação, de controle e de organização, percebeu-se que aquelas que possuem sistemas de controle mais descentralizados, conquistaram melhores resultados na qualidade dos serviços prestados pelas concessionárias. A eficiência do sistema regulatório da distribuição do setor elétrico é traduzida pelo cumprimento dos contratos estabelecidos entre reguladores e regulados, pela qualidade dos serviços prestados pelos reguladores e pelo atendimento dos agentes regulados às determinações e recomendações propostas pelas agências. / This work analyzed the relationship among the regulatory agency's autonomy and systems of control related to the quality of services rendered by electric energy distribution utility companies after the implementation of Brazil’s federal and states’ regulatory agencies. It is intended to contribute to the understanding of the regulatory system started in Brazilian’s electric energy distribution sector in 1998. Furthermore, it attempted to analyse indicators and their variations that could explain the results of the regulatories agencies performance that guided the services rendered by the utilities companies towards efficiency. This thesis was focused on Brazilian’s state reform and restructuring of electric energy distribution sector. It also discussed about an adoption of new paradigms towards efficiency in the public services. The case study presented in this work was constituted by regulatory agencies of six Brazilian’s states (Bahia, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo) concorded to the National Agency of Electric Energy (ANEEL), from 1998 to 2000, and their respective electric energy utility companies. The data gathered between 1995 and 2000 reflected the service quality before and after the creation and implementation of federal and states’ regulatories agencies. The main results revealed the existence of a correlation between the indicators of the variables independents and dependent. Once the agencies developed their activities of operational control, the indicators of quality service varied positively. The case study was analyzed using organizational and institutional analysis models. This made it possible to elucidate the reasons which the quality of the services depended on the financial autonomy of the regulatory agencies and their types of the control systems. Even though the state’s agencies got different performances into their methods of control and organization, it was noticed that the ones with their control systems more decentralized obtained better results regarding the quality of the services rendered by the utility companies. The efficiency of the distribution regulatory system of the electric sector is translated by the execution of contracts established between rule makers and utility companies, by the quality of the rule makers, and also by the utility companies to attend of the determinations and recommendations proposed by agencies.

Este trabalho analisa as relações existentes entre a autonomia das agências reguladoras, seus sistemas de controle e a qualidade dos serviços prestados pelas concessionárias de distribuição de energia elétrica, após a implantação das agências reguladoras federal e estaduais, no Brasil. A proposta é contribuir para o entendimento do sistema regulatório instaurado no setor de distribuição de energia elétrica brasileiro, sobretudo, analisando indicadores, cujas variações possam explicar os resultados da atuação das agências reguladoras na busca da qualidade dos serviços públicos concedidos. O presente trabalho procura contextualizar a reforma do Estado e a reestruturação do setor de distribuição de energia elétrica brasileiro. Discute, ainda, a adoção de novos paradigmas que norteiam a busca da eficiência dos serviços públicos. O estudo de caso, apresentado neste trabalho, tem a população composta pelas agências reguladoras estaduais de seis estados brasileiros (Bahia, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul e São Paulo), ligadas à Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) por convênio firmado entre 1998 e 2000, e suas respectivas concessionárias de distribuição de energia elétrica. Os dados coletados referem-se aos anos entre 1995 e 2000, pois refletem a situação da qualidade dos serviços antes da criação e após a implantação das agências reguladoras federal e estaduais. Os principais resultados evidenciam a existência de uma correlação entre alguns indicadores das variáveis independentes e dependente, ou seja, à medida que as agências incrementam suas atividades operacionais de controle, os indicadores de qualidade na prestação de serviços variam positivamente. O estudo de caso apresentado foi interpretado utilizando-se modelos de análise organizacional e institucional, para elucidar os motivos pelos quais a qualidade dos serviços das concessionárias dependeu da autonomia financeira das agências reguladoras e dos seus tipos de sistemas de controle. Embora as agências estaduais tenham apresentado diferentes formas de atuação, de controle e de organização, percebeu-se que aquelas que possuem sistemas de controle mais descentralizados, conquistaram melhores resultados na qualidade dos serviços prestados pelas concessionárias. A eficiência do sistema regulatório da distribuição do setor elétrico é traduzida pelo cumprimento dos contratos estabelecidos entre reguladores e regulados, pela qualidade dos serviços prestados pelos reguladores e pelo atendimento dos agentes regulados às determinações e recomendações propostas pelas agências. / This work analyzed the relationship among the regulatory agency's autonomy and systems of control related to the quality of services rendered by electric energy distribution utility companies after the implementation of Brazil’s federal and states’ regulatory agencies. It is intended to contribute to the understanding of the regulatory system started in Brazilian’s electric energy distribution sector in 1998. Furthermore, it attempted to analyse indicators and their variations that could explain the results of the regulatories agencies performance that guided the services rendered by the utilities companies towards efficiency. This thesis was focused on Brazilian’s state reform and restructuring of electric energy distribution sector. It also discussed about an adoption of new paradigms towards efficiency in the public services. The case study presented in this work was constituted by regulatory agencies of six Brazilian’s states (Bahia, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo) concorded to the National Agency of Electric Energy (ANEEL), from 1998 to 2000, and their respective electric energy utility companies. The data gathered between 1995 and 2000 reflected the service quality before and after the creation and implementation of federal and states’ regulatories agencies. The main results revealed the existence of a correlation between the indicators of the variables independents and dependent. Once the agencies developed their activities of operational control, the indicators of quality service varied positively. The case study was analyzed using organizational and institutional analysis models. This made it possible to elucidate the reasons which the quality of the services depended on the financial autonomy of the regulatory agencies and their types of the control systems. Even though the state’s agencies got different performances into their methods of control and organization, it was noticed that the ones with their control systems more decentralized obtained better results regarding the quality of the services rendered by the utility companies. The efficiency of the distribution regulatory system of the electric sector is translated by the execution of contracts established between rule makers and utility companies, by the quality of the rule makers, and also by the utility companies to attend of the determinations and recommendations proposed by agencies.

Este trabalho analisa as relações existentes entre a autonomia das agências reguladoras, seus sistemas de controle e a qualidade dos serviços prestados pelas concessionárias de distribuição de energia elétrica, após a implantação das agências reguladoras federal e estaduais, no Brasil. A proposta é contribuir para o entendimento do sistema regulatório instaurado no setor de distribuição de energia elétrica brasileiro, sobretudo, analisando indicadores, cujas variações possam explicar os resultados da atuação das agências reguladoras na busca da qualidade dos serviços públicos concedidos. O presente trabalho procura contextualizar a reforma do Estado e a reestruturação do setor de distribuição de energia elétrica brasileiro. Discute, ainda, a adoção de novos paradigmas que norteiam a busca da eficiência dos serviços públicos. O estudo de caso, apresentado neste trabalho, tem a população composta pelas agências reguladoras estaduais de seis estados brasileiros (Bahia, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul e São Paulo), ligadas à Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) por convênio firmado entre 1998 e 2000, e suas respectivas concessionárias de distribuição de energia elétrica. Os dados coletados referem-se aos anos entre 1995 e 2000, pois refletem a situação da qualidade dos serviços antes da criação e após a implantação das agências reguladoras federal e estaduais. Os principais resultados evidenciam a existência de uma correlação entre alguns indicadores das variáveis independentes e dependente, ou seja, à medida que as agências incrementam suas atividades operacionais de controle, os indicadores de qualidade na prestação de serviços variam positivamente. O estudo de caso apresentado foi interpretado utilizando-se modelos de análise organizacional e institucional, para elucidar os motivos pelos quais a qualidade dos serviços das concessionárias dependeu da autonomia financeira das agências reguladoras e dos seus tipos de sistemas de controle. Embora as agências estaduais tenham apresentado diferentes formas de atuação, de controle e de organização, percebeu-se que aquelas que possuem sistemas de controle mais descentralizados, conquistaram melhores resultados na qualidade dos serviços prestados pelas concessionárias. A eficiência do sistema regulatório da distribuição do setor elétrico é traduzida pelo cumprimento dos contratos estabelecidos entre reguladores e regulados, pela qualidade dos serviços prestados pelos reguladores e pelo atendimento dos agentes regulados às determinações e recomendações propostas pelas agências. / This work analyzed the relationship among the regulatory agency's autonomy and systems of control related to the quality of services rendered by electric energy distribution utility companies after the implementation of Brazil’s federal and states’ regulatory agencies. It is intended to contribute to the understanding of the regulatory system started in Brazilian’s electric energy distribution sector in 1998. Furthermore, it attempted to analyse indicators and their variations that could explain the results of the regulatories agencies performance that guided the services rendered by the utilities companies towards efficiency. This thesis was focused on Brazilian’s state reform and restructuring of electric energy distribution sector. It also discussed about an adoption of new paradigms towards efficiency in the public services. The case study presented in this work was constituted by regulatory agencies of six Brazilian’s states (Bahia, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo) concorded to the National Agency of Electric Energy (ANEEL), from 1998 to 2000, and their respective electric energy utility companies. The data gathered between 1995 and 2000 reflected the service quality before and after the creation and implementation of federal and states’ regulatories agencies. The main results revealed the existence of a correlation between the indicators of the variables independents and dependent. Once the agencies developed their activities of operational control, the indicators of quality service varied positively. The case study was analyzed using organizational and institutional analysis models. This made it possible to elucidate the reasons which the quality of the services depended on the financial autonomy of the regulatory agencies and their types of the control systems. Even though the state’s agencies got different performances into their methods of control and organization, it was noticed that the ones with their control systems more decentralized obtained better results regarding the quality of the services rendered by the utility companies. The efficiency of the distribution regulatory system of the electric sector is translated by the execution of contracts established between rule makers and utility companies, by the quality of the rule makers, and also by the utility companies to attend of the determinations and recommendations proposed by agencies.

It is conventional to argue that the autonomy and reputation of regulatory agencies depend on their expertise. Yet the studies on how independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) create and deploy their knowledge capacity are few and far apart. Normatively, the justification for delegating decision-making powers to IRAs is that they operate by using technical analysis and expertise rather than political considerations. But yet again, although delegation has been discussed as a design principle, systematic evidence on the conditions under which IRAs make use of knowledge and how is still scarce. The literature on knowledge utilization portrays a rather complex link between expertise and policy, where relevant knowledge is not always reflected in policy outcomes and plays several functions besides facilitating the solution of policy problems. Unfortunately, scholars of IRAs have not exploited the insights of this literature yet. This dissertation addresses the under-explored question of the usage of economic knowledge by IRAs. We identify four possible uses of expertise: instrumental (i.e., to solve problems); strategic (e.g. to advocate a position); symbolic (e.g., to gain legitimacy), and non-use. Our aim is to explain under which conditions a certain usage is more likely to occur. To do so, we draw on the methodological device of explanatory typologies (Elman 2005). Specifically, we select two explanatory dimensions that reflect both the context and the content of policy: the level of conflict in the policy arena, and the degree problem tractability. We use different combinations of these two dimensions to derive four hypotheses on the possible uses of expertise mentioned above. The elusive nature of knowledge utilization makes the identification and measurement of these different usages highly dependent on an in-depth understanding of the institutional, organisational, and political context in which a regulatory decision is taken. We have thus opted for a qualitative approach based on case studies and process tracing (Bennett 2010; Brady 2010; Freedman 2010) to appraise the four hypotheses. Empirically, we performed three case studies on regulatory policy decisions taken by the UK Office of Communications (Ofcom) between 2005 and 2010. We find that, given certain scope conditions, the prevalent use of economic analysis is instrumental - a finding that contradicts previous research that labelled instrumental learning as extremely rare, if not a sort of technocratic utopia. Other uses still exist however, and given other scope conditions regulators can be strategic and symbolic in their approach to knowledge and expertise. This is not surprising if we accept the notion that regulators operate in a policy environment that is eminently but not exclusively technical: to survive in a (at least partially) political environment, regulators have to deploy usages of knowledge that deviate from the instrumental type.

This thesis contributes to the research literature by reporting the results of an investigation that explores whether regulatory governance practices in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector are fit for purpose. The rationale for the study originated from issues relating to the management of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector that were identified in the extant literature. These issues were of such significance that their resolution could impact positively and materially on Nigeria’s economy and at the same time the research would fill a gap in the relevant literature. The data for this empirical research were collected using questionnaire and interview instruments and the findings were analysed against a backdrop of the Public Interest Theory of Regulation. The results obtained revealed perceptions of major weaknesses in the regulatory governance practices adopted by Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies namely: the regulatory independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulators has declined over time; there are flaws in the accountability practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulators; and there are other related factors such as the absence of openness, poor consultation and a lack of public sensitisation that affect the transparency practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulators. Interestingly, the results also revealed that although Nigeria’s downstream regulators appear to possess the required skills to regulate the sector, their talents are not being fully utilised. Recommendations to resolve the weaknesses identified are made which, if properly and effectively implemented, should have a significant positive impact on the Nigerian economy. Such recommendations may also be applicable to those countries with similar regulatory governance challenges.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar os possíveis reflexos da política de nomeações para o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) sobre sua autonomia, entendida aqui como a tomada de decisões que o órgão, livre de interferências do governo, julga como tecnicamente corretas. Para tanto, analisamos as características institucionais do CADE que fazem da política de nomeações o principal mecanismo de controle à disposição do Poder Executivo para manter algum grau de controle sobre as decisões tomadas pelo órgão. Constatamos que, no CADE, ao contrário do que ocorre nas agências reguladoras setoriais, os mandatos são demasiado curtos. Somada à possibilidade de recondução, essa característica institucional permite ao Executivo substituir rapidamente reguladores que se mostrem pouco dispostos a cooperar com ele. Indo além, analisamos também o perfil profissional das indicações governamentais realizadas desde o início da década de 1990 até 2010. A análise dos perfis dos reguladores é útil à compreensão de suas preferências e dos incentivos que possuem para atender, ou não, a reivindicações políticas. A análise desses perfis sugere que, para manter as decisões do CADE minimamente alinhadas às suas preferências, o Executivo tem contado principalmente com o apoio de atores estatais, isso é, de conselheiros do CADE recrutados das fileiras do próprio Estado. A conjugação da análise das características institucionais do CADE com o perfil profissional dos indicados indica que, no período coberto pelo estudo, as condições para o funcionamento autônomo do órgão não estiveram plenamente garantidas. / The research analyzes the impacts of political appointments on the autonomy of Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), the Brazilian antitrust agency. Autonomy makes reference to CADEs decisions that are taken without government interference. In this context, we analyze why CADEs decisions are vulnerable to political appointments. Our assessment reveals that short mandates that can be renewed are the main reason for that. Once the mandates are short, government is able to change the entire composition of CADEs floor in order to build a majority made of allies. Going further, we analyze the professional profile of CADEs counselors between the beginning of 1990s and 2010. The analysis is useful to understand which kind of counselor is willing to attend government demands. Our findings suggest that state actors have strong incentives to cooperate with government. In the end, we state that the combination between short mandates that can be renewed and the nomination of state actors to CADEs floor has been putting CADEs autonomy in danger.