This dissertation offers an account of the different ways in which putatively idealist and transcendental models of sociality, which grounded the subject’s relation to other human beings in the subject’s own cognition, were rejected and replaced. Scrapping this account led to a variety of models of sociality which departed from the subject as the ground of sociality, positing grounds outside of the subject. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, Franz Rosenzweig, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer represent alternative positions along a spectrum of models of sociality which reject the idealist concept of sociality. The central argument of this dissertation claims that the responses to idealism and transcendental models of sociality ultimately find fault with an inadequate ontology, one which grounds sociality (as well as all of reality) in the cognition of the subject. The ontology of the transcendental model locates the subject as initially unconnected to other subjects such that the first move in relating them together must be epistemological. The social relation is grounded in the subject’s cognitive grasp. Each of the thinkers I examine identifies this as the key problem with idealism; however, their solutions to this problem differ. The differing solutions of Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer can be identified as occupying different representative positions along a continuum, call it the “scale of social grounding.” What I offer here is a topography of responses to the idealist model of sociality. The ontological ground of sociality, instead of being the subject, is posited as situation of dialogue (Gadamer), the face of the other (Levinas), or divine revelation (Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer). In each of these alternative models, we see that the subject is conditioned rather than autonomous, that sociality is enacted through temporality and language, and that sociality is principally a normative relation rather than an epistemological one. The story that emerges from my analysis, then, is a richer topography of responses to idealism than has hitherto been mapped out. The responses, represented by Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer each provide an alternative ontology on which any adequate model of sociality must rest. While my account of the spectrum of ontological responses to idealist sociality does not claim to be exhaustive, it does give a better topography of the field of responses than has hitherto been offered in studies of models of sociality in the 20th century. Finally, this dissertation shows the centrality of providing an alternative ontology to idealism in these projects. Far from rejecting ontology wholesale or merely offering moral revisions to the existing social order, each of the figures I examine in this study radically revise the ground of sociality by articulating a fresh ontological vision which can support social life.

This project will track and explain the development of the Doctrine of Divine Immutability from early mythological and scriptural source material that seems to indicate that divine entities are changeable into metaphysical systems that demand a perfectly consistent deity. The Doctrine of Divine Immutability is a philosophical and theological postulate that has long been a staple of systematic metaphysics and theology, but its function in robust and fully formed systems is different than its function when it is first generated in Ancient Greece and Judah. Methodologically mostly primary sources are studied and compared with interpretive help from relevant secondary sources. Once the generation and evolution of this doctrine is understood, a more holistic understanding of the relationship between religion and philosophy will be evident. Additionally a more robust understanding of Middle Platonism and 1st and 2nd century Christianity and their relationship to Roman Stoicism will be achieved. Of particular importance to contemporary scholarship this work will allow us to understand the doctrine in its context and will shield us from anachronistic readings of the arguments that are bound to cause fundamental errors in scholarship.

This dissertation’s guiding question is: What was the impact of Martin Heidegger’s early philosophy on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology? I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, his technical term for human existence, provides Bonhoeffer with important conceptual tools for developing his Christology, from which the rest of his theology follows. Part of recognizing Heidegger’s importance to Bonhoeffer involves understanding the latter’s critiques of previous notable philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler. As Bonhoeffer evaluates these philosophers, they lead to theologically unacceptable positions. Heidegger, in contrast, has come to a theologically profitable understanding of human existence and epistemology. Though there are theologically useful elements in Heidegger’s philosophy, there are elements that require significant alteration, and even rejection. Heidegger recognizes that epistemology must be based on actual human existence, and he can account for the historical continuity of human existence; however, because of Heidegger’s anthropocentric philosophy, he cannot account for God’s transcendence necessary for proper theology. Bonhoeffer then applies the conceptual tools he has appropriated from Heidegger to revelation, Christology, and the church. This eliminates the anthropocentrism that made transcendence impossible, while maintaining the benefits of Heidegger’s philosophy in order to account for Christian existence. Understanding Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of Heidegger is additionally important for understanding Heidegger’s potential relation to theology. This dissertation concludes by placing Bonhoeffer in the context of other theological appropriations of Heidegger. In light of this context and Heidegger’s own understanding of philosophy’s relation to theology, I argue that Bonhoeffer represents one, viable theological use of Heidegger.

The book of Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes) is perhaps the most intriguing book in the Old Testament. Readers of every age can appreciate its theme, dealing with the futility of seeking to uncover life’s mystery. Yet Qoheleth has been interpreted in many different ways. The interpretations have ranged from tragic pessimism to a triumph of piety over skepticism. It is the contention of this thesis that a proper perspective on Qoheleth’s intention can best be gained in terms of the author’s use of tradition. Qoheleth displays an awareness of such Hebrew traditions as Wisdom, the Pentateuch, Israelite history and the prophets. Though Qoheleth does not refer specifically to the Law or to Yahweh, the God of Israel, he does not deny them. Moreover, he seems familiar with both the Pentateuch (e.g. the creation account) and the historical writings in the prophets (e.g. the account of Solomon). Qoheleth is also consistent with Old Testament theology in holding that God’s ways cannot be comprehended by man, and that it is good for man to enjoy the life that God has given him. It is also likely that Qoheleth was familiar with the traditions of Greece and the Near East. There are many parallels between Qoheleth and these cultures, but all that these seem to represent is parallel development. For Qoheleth does not reveal any dependence on the traditions of these cultures. Rather Qoheleth differs sharply in that he refutes both the Hellenistic belief in an after life (3:21) and the tragic pessimism of Ancient Near Eastern documents. When Qoheleth is understood in terms of the author’s use of tradition, this book is found to be true to Hebrew tradition. In this way readers are afforded a proper perspective as to how Qoheleth is best interpreted. The book is found to be practical, advising the reader to enjoy life rather than despair of it.

This decolonizing interpretive analysis serves to provide bicultural researchers the opportunity to engage and challenge the dominant literature on pedagogy, curriculum, methodology, and schooling. Bicultural researchers have been forced to navigate the dialectical social terrain of dominant/subordinate tensions and contradictions, as part of their process of survival, as subaltern or subordinate cultural citizens and critical scholars. This study seeks to deconstruct Eurocentric epistemicides that compartmentalize knowledge, particularly within the fields of theology and education. Western Christianity tends to separate God from humanity. This is an epistemological problem. The nature of this study necessitates a process by which critical theory, critical pedagogy, and liberation theology serve to reconstruct traditional Westernized notions of the interrelatedness of theology and education. This study seeks to determine what can be learned from a critical pedagogy of Jesus Christ by examining His integration of theology and pedagogy as presented in His praxis detailed in the New Testament. Jesus is positioned as the literal embodiment of both theology and pedagogy, where both are procured through praxis for liberation, resulting in an emancipatory pedagogy that reconciles humanity back to God and God to humanity.

The genre of apocalypse has an irresistible draw. The concepts of beginning and end to humankind as well as the cosmos situate themselves in our daily stories, microcosmic narratives that repeat through time, placing the footprint of humankind a little more firmly into the earth, a place we have called our home from beginning and, naturally, to the end. In a world that constantly pushes forward to the next piece of technological equipment, reducing mass pandemics to mere over the counter solutions, and extending its hand into the abyss of the unknown universe, humanity craves the elusive next chapter in the novel of the world. But what is to be attained when we reach the climax? When we are situated in the denouement? And finally, what happens when all is at an end? There is a universal truth of birth, and a universal truth of death (despite our advances to elude it). By that logic there must exist a macrocosmic version, a global scale birth, termed creation by many, and thus a large scale death. But since death of the individual remains a complete mystery, many diverse factions exist. This extends to the global picture then, not only seeking inquiry into what happens after we (as in the individual) but when the entire world ceases to exist. This thesis is an attempt to explore the genre of apocalypse for a deeper understanding of these questions and notions. With various systems in place, such as those put forth by John J. Collins and other apocalypse scholars, there exists a possibility to examine various iterations of apocalypses. By examining paradigm traits and tiers and the complications that arise with systemization, this thesis develops a methodology in which to include the functional take on various case studies of apocalypse. Generally reserved for examinations of sacred text, the expanded methodology presented here will seek to not only look at an example of said text, but also a secular text, two examples of ‘sacred function’, and one ideological example of a secular function. This study is not about changing the makeup of the paradigm, nor is it an effort to disprove criteria, nor tack on additional items. The goal is to use the paradigm to identify a more well-rounded view of the genre, and then see what can be gleaned from those categories and their prototypes. In doing so, the definition of the apocalypse genre will be more comprehensive, and thus beneficial for any avenue of study to which it is applied.

The pastoral problem being addressed has to do with the culture of consumerism and individualism that have influenced the culture of the Church. Within Western society, the “ism” culture, consisting of factors such as: hedonism, consumerism, materialism, secularism, relativism and individualism, has become very prominent. Christians often operate no differently than non-Christians, and this is problematic since Christians are called to be salt for the earth and light for the world (Matthew 5:13-16), a people set apart. In John 15:19, we are told that we were not made to be of this world, so we need to stop being influenced by the culture and instead allow the beauty of the Christian faith to influence the world. What is presented here is not just a hope to overcome consumerism and individualism, but an entire revamping of what it means to be Christian. It suggests the need for a culture change, which if Christians and church leadership focus on, has the power to solve other pastoral and ethical issues as well. Such a cultural change will lead to vibrancy among believers and will attract more people to the faith, as well.

This thesis examines the twenty-two passages in the Gospels in which God’s forgiveness of human sin is explicitly addressed. Using modern textual, literary, form, redaction, and historical criticisms as exegetical tools, the examination maps out the development of these biblical vignettes so as to extract from the process an understanding of what the Gospel writers wanted to convey to Jesus’ followers about God’s forgiveness. Four distinct forgiveness modes were discovered: repentance leads to forgiveness (e.g. proclaim repentance and forgiveness to all nations in Lk 24:47), faith acts as a conduit to forgiveness (e.g. sinful woman kissing Jesus’ feet in Lk 7:48b-50), one must forgive in order to be forgiven (e.g. the Lord’s Prayer in Lk 11:4 and Mt 6:12), and forgiveness is a free gift based solely on God’s mercy (e.g. on the cross, “Father, forgive them” in Lk 23:34). None of these views represents a majority Gospel vision of forgiveness, with each of the four viewpoints having four to seven episodes occurring in the Gospel cannon. Seldom are any of these pathways to forgiveness mentioned together. Despite a plethora of information about forgiveness, nowhere do the Gospels present a wholistic explanation of divine forgiveness. The Gospel writers, like their Hebraic ancestors, were comfortable with a multivariant view of God’s forgiveness and showed no propensity to develop a wholistic theology of forgiveness. However, underlying this untidy approach was an emphasis on God’s mercy and compassion that had roots in the Old Testament understanding of Yahweh as gracious and merciful and abounding in steadfast love. In addition, the seedling concepts of sin as an unpayable debt or of the importance of faith in Jesus appeared in the background of multiple Scripture passages from each of the four forgiveness themes.

The COVID-19 is still causing many deaths globally. Thus authorities have implemented strict public measures designed to reduce and limit the interactions between people. Such measures have impacted the pastoral ministry in many ways. There has never been such a great crisis for the pastoral ministry, especially the pastoral cares to the grievers. The grief in the bereaved has challenged the pastoral care in parish in numerous ways with regard to how to deal with them. In this circumstance, the pastoral care to the grievers comes to the surface with a totally different paradigm. Pastoral care to the grievers is best when rendered by and within a particular religious tradition such as religious rituals, faith ideology and cultural patterns. Therefore the local parish and staff have to try all means possible to connect with the grievers, while exercising discretion and creativity to minimize physical contact during the pandemic times. Now is the high time for the pastoral care service to the grievers to stand up for it. Now is the opportunity for the pastoral ministry to the grievers to provide a compassionate leadership.

Loving God is our highest perfection for Leibniz. It secures our belief and trust in the Creator, which is integral to the sciences as well as faith. Those who love God have justification for reasoning, that is, they can rationally expect to arrive at truth. This is because love is a receptivity to the perfection all of things; loving God, then, is a disposition and tendency toward the most perfect being, the ens perfectissimum. Individuals who perceive the divine nature “do not merely fear the power of the supreme and all-seeing monarch,” Leibniz writes, “but are assured of his beneficence, and lastly—and what brings everything together—burn with a love of God above all else.”1 In my dissertation, I argue that Leibniz’s qualification should be taken seriously: love of God “brings everything together.” The subject of my dissertation can be stated schematically. It consists of two pairs of claims, one pair philosophical, the other theological: A moral quality is required to secure our reason. From a most perfect unity, a moral quality follows. Love of God is our highest perfection. Love of God secures our reasoning. Both concern the security of reason, by which I mean the rational motivation for reasoning itself. They are reasons we ought to expect reasoning to lead to truth. Yet they do not form a tight demonstration: while an inference is clearly at work in the first pair, there are no inferences in the second. Also, there is a distinction between a moral quality and love for God. Unless they are identified, Leibniz’s philosophy and theology secure reasoning apart from one another. In 1686, Leibniz wrote his well-known “Discourse on Metaphysics.” A few months after, he composed a theological treatise, Examination of the Christian Religion. These texts, I argue, should be read side by side, and the first chapter compares how divine perfection secures our reasoning in both texts. Some Moderns’ notion of perfection—namely, Descartes’, Spinoza’s, and Malebranche’s—fail to secure our reasoning because their views entail arbitrariness in the world and the divine nature. But a proper sense of perfection, one that includes a moral quality, secures our reasoning by ensuring that everything is amenable to reason. Descartes also sought to secure our reasoning, and for the second and third chapters I compare his account with Leibniz’s own, then draw out the latter’s criticisms. For Descartes, the deity’s moral quality is characterized by an indifferent will, which is eminently and formally revealed throughout creation. Although recognizing the infinite source of all things directs our attention appropriate in the Cartesian system, Leibniz criticizes Descartes’ detached and indifferent God. When our disposition toward God is not characterized by love, we are less rational than otherwise. Leibniz finds intolerable moral implications in the Cartesian system, and I work out these implications in chapter three. Descartes’ criteria of true and false ideas does not settle dispute, but relies on “interior testimony.” Proper reasoning, then, does not tend toward unity among persons, and this is especially problematic in religious debate. Descartes’ method is Stoic, which also leads to trouble when it comes to church unity: one remains in the church by a sheer act of will, which can violate reason. Leibniz views such a detachment of faith and reasoning as dangerous, besides impoverishing the concept of reason altogether. Leibniz’s notions of God and perfection secure our reason by engendering love for God. “Discourse” and Examen begin with a moral disposition and tendency. In the last chapter, I argue that this is the case by considering two criteria Leibniz adopts—his test for perfection and the kinds of knowledge—as well as the foundation of his logic at the time. Leibniz can tolerate provisional beginnings, hypothetical truths, and original sin because of his robust conception of love. He distinguishes two ways we love God: spes, or hope, is a disposition or tendency to natural perfection, and caritas, or esteem, affection, or love, regards divine perfection. These states orient us according to the divine plan. Miracles are within the world as an effect of the deity’s moral quality: they are a means God personally relates to rational beings. Miracles reveal the moral effects of our perception of phenomena generally, included the regularity observed and classified by science. So, to conclude, I compare Leibniz’s discussion of revelation in Examen with his discussion of miracles in “Discourse” to draw out the significance of miracles for him. Besides much debate on the implications of miracles for his conception of substance, I argue that there is a moral motivation for retaining miracles, even those of the second rank.