No Brasil, o ponto de vista de que a competição tributária (sempre retratada como "guerra fiscal") é algo conflituoso faz com que seja difundida uma visão negativa sobre um fenômeno que nem sempre é visto como tal na literatura econômica internacional. Muitos economistas veem essa competição como algo que, sendo capaz de coibir o comportamento rent-seeking por parte dos governantes, seria benéfico para a sociedade. Com base nessa ideia, usando o modelo de Eggert e Sorensen (2008), foi testado se variáveis proxy relativas à intensidade da competição tributária e ao comportamento rent-seeking de políticos no poder eram correlacionadas. Usou-se dados dos 26 estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal para os anos de 2001 a 2009. Os resultados mostraram que, embora essas variáveis proxy não fossem correlacionadas para os níveis de escolaridade mais baixos, no nível mais alto, havia correlação entre essas duas variáveis, embora ela fosse positiva, o que rejeitava a hipótese de que uma maior competição tributária seria capaz de diminuir o comportamento rent-seeking dos políticos. / In Brazil, the point of view that tax competition (commonly referred to as a “fiscal war”) is something conflictive spreads a negative perspective on a phenomenon that is not always seen as such in the international economic literature. Many economists see this competition as something that, in being able to reduce rent-seeking behavior by politicians, would be beneficial to society. Stemming from this idea, and using the model from Eggert and Sorensen (2008), it was tested if proxy variables relating to the intensity of tax competition and to the rent-seeking behavior of politicians in office were correlated. Data from all the 26 Brazilian states and also Distrito Federal, from 2001 to 2009, were used. The results showed that, although the proxy variables were not correlated for the less skilled groups of workers considered, at the high skilled group, there was correlation between the two variables, but it was positive, which rejected the hypothesis that a more intense tax competition would be able to repress rent-seeking behavior by politicians.

In the economic development of Taiwan, the privatization of state-run enterprise has a very important mission in government policy. In the process of Taiwan¡¦s privatization of state-run enterprise, China Steel Corporation (CSC) has plays an essential role among the privatized institutions, and shapes the way and view of the privatization. Past researches were restricted to the enterprise evaluation happened before and after privatization, and stressed the use of the abstract modeling and mathematics, however, the relation between theory and practice has been touched very little in terms of the institutional change of privatization. This study is to explore the privatization of CSC from the perspective of new institutional economics. The methodology used is qualitative approach, which differes from the qualitative approach. The primary approach is document analysis, and supplemented by Gadamer¡uQ&A logic¡v. Under the self-adjustment to the change of internal institution and the adaptation to the change of external environment, the present analysis of CSC privatization, from the perspective of the change of property right and institution, will result in comparative prices change and new transaction profit, and new institution will create some arrangements, inspiration effect, etc. The result of this research can be summarized as two points, which we hope may offer some contributions. 1. From the perspective of property right, the behavior of rent-seeking resulting from the involvement of interest groups during the CSC privatization process may easily cause the phenomenon of increasing transaction cost. Therefore, in the future plan for institutional change, we must consider the institutional environment and strategy to reduce the possibility of that phenomenon. 2. From the perspective of institutional change, the present study analyzed from the imposed institutional change of state-run CSC to the induced institutional change of privatization, and it can give a clear understanding in that the cultural change of enterprise has a critical influence to the institutional change.

No Brasil, o ponto de vista de que a competição tributária (sempre retratada como "guerra fiscal") é algo conflituoso faz com que seja difundida uma visão negativa sobre um fenômeno que nem sempre é visto como tal na literatura econômica internacional. Muitos economistas veem essa competição como algo que, sendo capaz de coibir o comportamento rent-seeking por parte dos governantes, seria benéfico para a sociedade. Com base nessa ideia, usando o modelo de Eggert e Sorensen (2008), foi testado se variáveis proxy relativas à intensidade da competição tributária e ao comportamento rent-seeking de políticos no poder eram correlacionadas. Usou-se dados dos 26 estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal para os anos de 2001 a 2009. Os resultados mostraram que, embora essas variáveis proxy não fossem correlacionadas para os níveis de escolaridade mais baixos, no nível mais alto, havia correlação entre essas duas variáveis, embora ela fosse positiva, o que rejeitava a hipótese de que uma maior competição tributária seria capaz de diminuir o comportamento rent-seeking dos políticos. / In Brazil, the point of view that tax competition (commonly referred to as a “fiscal war”) is something conflictive spreads a negative perspective on a phenomenon that is not always seen as such in the international economic literature. Many economists see this competition as something that, in being able to reduce rent-seeking behavior by politicians, would be beneficial to society. Stemming from this idea, and using the model from Eggert and Sorensen (2008), it was tested if proxy variables relating to the intensity of tax competition and to the rent-seeking behavior of politicians in office were correlated. Data from all the 26 Brazilian states and also Distrito Federal, from 2001 to 2009, were used. The results showed that, although the proxy variables were not correlated for the less skilled groups of workers considered, at the high skilled group, there was correlation between the two variables, but it was positive, which rejected the hypothesis that a more intense tax competition would be able to repress rent-seeking behavior by politicians.

No Brasil, o ponto de vista de que a competição tributária (sempre retratada como "guerra fiscal") é algo conflituoso faz com que seja difundida uma visão negativa sobre um fenômeno que nem sempre é visto como tal na literatura econômica internacional. Muitos economistas veem essa competição como algo que, sendo capaz de coibir o comportamento rent-seeking por parte dos governantes, seria benéfico para a sociedade. Com base nessa ideia, usando o modelo de Eggert e Sorensen (2008), foi testado se variáveis proxy relativas à intensidade da competição tributária e ao comportamento rent-seeking de políticos no poder eram correlacionadas. Usou-se dados dos 26 estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal para os anos de 2001 a 2009. Os resultados mostraram que, embora essas variáveis proxy não fossem correlacionadas para os níveis de escolaridade mais baixos, no nível mais alto, havia correlação entre essas duas variáveis, embora ela fosse positiva, o que rejeitava a hipótese de que uma maior competição tributária seria capaz de diminuir o comportamento rent-seeking dos políticos. / In Brazil, the point of view that tax competition (commonly referred to as a “fiscal war”) is something conflictive spreads a negative perspective on a phenomenon that is not always seen as such in the international economic literature. Many economists see this competition as something that, in being able to reduce rent-seeking behavior by politicians, would be beneficial to society. Stemming from this idea, and using the model from Eggert and Sorensen (2008), it was tested if proxy variables relating to the intensity of tax competition and to the rent-seeking behavior of politicians in office were correlated. Data from all the 26 Brazilian states and also Distrito Federal, from 2001 to 2009, were used. The results showed that, although the proxy variables were not correlated for the less skilled groups of workers considered, at the high skilled group, there was correlation between the two variables, but it was positive, which rejected the hypothesis that a more intense tax competition would be able to repress rent-seeking behavior by politicians.

財產權的發展，具有將外部成本內部化，以及減輕租值消散的功能，同時也會影響誘因機制與市場行為，因此，建立可執行的財產權或契約系統，有助於降低交易成本，促進市場交易的效率。土地使用分區管制是政府用以界定財產權的一項重要工具，但在執行的過程中，會受到資訊不完全的因素所限制，而產生許多社會經濟衝突的問題，所以，在財產權界定不完全的情形下，分區管制制度的執行可能是一種負和、零和或正和的賽局。 在台灣的都市規劃管制制度下，土地使用分區管制一直被視為政府執行都市公共政策的重要工具，但是土地使用分區管制制度變遷的原因及對財產權配置的影響，很少被深入的探討，亦少有相關的實證研究予以論述說明。由於分區管制決策直接影響人民的土地財產權範圍，因此，以財產權為研究的焦點，連結制度及執行層面的動態分析，可以更深入地了解政策運作的過程，檢視分區管制制度設計的問題，藉以提供更佳的制度環境。本研究嘗試以新制度經濟學的基礎，基於財產權的觀點，連結制度變遷及執行層面的分析，研究所有權人及利益團體如何透過與政府的協商，改變土地使用分區管制制度，進而影響財產權配置的問題。在方法上，則透過賽局理論及個案研究，建立參與者行為互動模式及進行實證分析，以剖析制度變遷的原因及問題。 本研究除了進行以上所述的議題，亦同時關注制度選擇、容積移轉的問題，以及違規使用的行為，並將從一系列的行為分析中，進一步探究尋租行為對分區管制制度及經濟發展的影響。研究的結果，除了對分區管制制度提出具體的建議外，亦對制度變遷的行為及政府角色，提供更多的認知面向，值得作為都市研究的參考。 / Zoning institution is regarded as an important instrument for enforcing urban policy in Taiwan. Zoning not only control the quality of urban environment, but affect the price of real estate. However, the reasons of zoning institution changed and the factors influenced the assignment of property rights are very rarely investigated. The decision of zoning will directly influence the scope of landowners’ property rights. Thus, based upon the viewpoint of property rights, incorporated with institutional and enforcing dimension to conduct a dynamic analysis can deeply investigate the process of policy operation and the problems of institutional design so as to provide better institutional environment for zoning. This research, based on the property rights perspective and the approach of property rights analysis of New Institutional Economics, intend to investigate the change of zoning institution and its enforcement. The study pays special attention to the bargaining among private landowners, interest groups and government authority. In order to improve the institutional environment, this paper will also try to find the institutional problems in the process of enforcement through cases study. Cases study is used for further analysis the interaction among the actors participated so as to understand the processes of bargaining, re-assignment of property rights and the reasons of zoning institution changed. After the cases study, the research will address some suggestions of institutional design of zoning and try to review the policy of urban development and land use control in Taipei city. A promise suggestion on the institutional design of zoning will be provided for the reference of understanding and research on zoning institution and behaviors. In addition, the impact of the rent-seeking patterns and the production paths on the zoning behaviors resulting in the change of zoning institution are explored. The results of the research will make further suggestions to the issues of institutional design of zoning, and to the avoidance of the negative effects of rent-seeking behavior. Moreover, the source and process of institutional change of zoning related to rent-seeking behavior, and the ways government responds to the rent-seeking behaviors are provided for the reference of further study of urban planning.