This thesis focuses on the industry wage differentials, rent-sharing and the gender wage gap. I empirically investigate: i) the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, ii) how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector and iii) the existence of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, through the unobserved ability hypothesis. The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. To do so, we have relied on a unique harmonised matched employer-employee data set, the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey. As far as we know, this paper is the first to analyse with recent techniques, on a comparable basis, and from a European perspective: i) inter-industry wage differentials by gender, ii) gender wage gaps by industry, and iii) the contribution of industry effects to the overall gender wage gap. It is also one of the few, besides Kahn (1998), to analyse for both sexes the relationship between collective bargaining characteristics and the dispersion of industry wage differentials. Empirical findings show that, in all countries and for both sexes, wage differentials exist between workers employed in different sectors, even when controlling for working conditions, individual and firm characteristics. We also find that the hierarchy of sectors in terms of wages is quite similar for male and female workers and across countries. Yet, the apparent similarity between male and female industry wage differentials is challenged by standard statistical tests. Indeed, simple t-tests show that between 43 and 71% of the industry wage disparities are significantly different for women and men. Moreover, Chow tests indicate that sectoral wage differentials are significantly different as a group for both sexes in all countries. Regarding the dispersion of the industry wage differentials, we find that results vary for men and women, although not systematically nor substantially. Yet, the dispersion of industry wage differentials fluctuates considerably across countries. It is quite large in Ireland, Italy and the U.K., and relatively moderate in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. For both sexes, results point to the existence of a negative and significant relationship between the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining and the dispersion of industry wage differentials. Furthermore, independently of the country considered, results show that more than 80% of the gender wage gaps within industries are statistically significant. The average industry gender wage gap ranges between -.18 in the U.K. and -.11 in Belgium. This means that on average women have an inter-industry wage differential of between 18 and 11% below that for men. Yet, correlation coefficients between the industry gender wage gaps across countries are relatively small and often statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that industries with the highest and the lowest gender wage gaps vary substantially across Europe. Finally, results indicate that the overall gender wage gap, measured as the difference between the mean log wages of male and female workers, fluctuates between .18 in Denmark and .39 in the U.K. In all countries a significant (at the .01 level) part of this gap can be explained by the segregation of women in lower paying industries. Yet, the relative contribution of this factor to the gender wage gap varies substantially among European countries. It is close to zero in Belgium and Denmark, between 7 and 8% in Ireland, Spain and the U.K., and around 16% in Italy. Differences in industry wage premia for male and female workers significantly (at the .05 level) affect the gender wage gap in Denmark and Ireland only. In these countries, gender differences in industry wage differentials account for respectively 14 and 20% of the gender wage gap. To sum up, findings show that combined industry effects explain around 29% of the gender wage gap in Ireland, respectively 14 and 16% in Denmark and Italy, around 7% in the U.K. and almost nothing in Belgium and Spain. In conclusion, our results emphasize that the magnitude of the gender wage gap as well as its causes vary substantially among the European countries. This suggests that no single policy instrument will be sufficient to tackle gender pay inequalities in Europe. Our findings indicate that policies need to be tailored to the very specific context of the labour market in each country. The second chapter examines investigates how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. Empirical findings show that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee even when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Our instrumented wage-profit elasticity is of the magnitude 0.06 and it is not significantly different for men and women. Of the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 23.7% less than men), results show that around 14% can be explained by the fact that on average women are employed in firms where profits-per-employee are lower. Thus, findings suggest that a substantial part of the gender wage gap is attributable to the segregation of women is less profitable firms. The third and final chapter contributes to the understanding of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, taking advantage of access to a unique matched employer-employee data set covering the period 1995-2002. Findings show the existence of large and persistent wage differentials among workers with the same observed characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors. The unobserved ability hypothesis may not be rejected on the basis of Martins’ (2004) methodology. However, its contribution to the observed industry wage differentials appears to be limited. Further results show that ceteris paribus workers earn significantly higher wages when employed in more profitable firms. The instrumented wage-profit elasticity stands at 0.063. This rent-sharing phenomenon accounts for a large fraction of the industry wage differentials. We find indeed that the magnitude, dispersion and significance of industry wage differentials decreases sharply when controlling for profits.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-09-27T13:40:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinamoraessarmentodeassis.pdf: 1036311 bytes, checksum: 483fffca9ef9bc9e0b5c555f68e7b621 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Diamantino Mayra (mayra.diamantino@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-09-27T15:15:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinamoraessarmentodeassis.pdf: 1036311 bytes, checksum: 483fffca9ef9bc9e0b5c555f68e7b621 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-27T15:15:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinamoraessarmentodeassis.pdf: 1036311 bytes, checksum: 483fffca9ef9bc9e0b5c555f68e7b621 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-30 / FAPEMIG - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais / Esta dissertação teve por objetivo investigar os efeitos da participação de mercado das firmas sobre os salários que pagam por ocupação, para os setores extrativista e de transformação da economia brasileira, no período de 2007 a 2013. A base de dados utilizada foi um painel de microdados conectáveis ocupação-firma, construída a partir de dados do Relatório Anual de Informações Sociais Identificada (RAIS) e da Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA-Empresa). O controle das heterogeneidades não-observadas da firma e dos choques ocupacionais foi realizado em duas etapas: a primeira etapa consistiu em eliminar os efeitos não observados das firmas; com as variáveis em diferença, a segunda etapa consistiu em estimar um modelo de efeitos-fixos, por meio do qual eliminou-se os choques ocupacionais. Os resultados apontam haver relação positiva e significativa entre a participação de mercado das firmas e os salários que pagam por ocupação. Os coeficientes encontrados, contudo, são inferiores àqueles reportados para os países desenvolvidos, indicando este fator como menos relevante para os diferenciais salariais no país. Ademais, o Lester range foi de 9% após o controle para os efeitos não observados, valor aquém daqueles reportados na literatura internacional. A agregação dos dados por ocupação-firma, considerando a maior desagregação disponível para a ocupação, bem como a especificação de um modelo de efeitos-fixos capaz de controlar dois tipos de heterogeneidade não observada, contribuiu para a literatura ao apresentar uma nova possibilidade de estimação dos modelos que tratam esse tema, posto que estimam um modelo sem incorrer em prejuízos amostrais. Ademais, a existência de uma escassa literatura acerca desse tema para o Brasil, como também para os países em desenvolvimento, reforça a relevância deste estudo. / This work aimed to investigate the effects of firm’s product market market-power on occupational wages on Brazilian manufacturing firms, between 2007 and 2013. This study used detailed occupation and firm-level matched data, based on our merging of two different data sets: the Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS) and the Annual Industrial Survey (PIA-Enterprise). The control of unobserved heterogeneity of the firms and the occupations was performed in two stages: the first stage eliminates unobserved effects of firms; with the variables in difference, in a second stage, one could estimate a model of fixed effects, by which the occupational shock is eliminated. The results shows a positive and significant relationship between the firm’s market-share and occupational wages. The coefficients found, however, are lower than those reported for developed countries. Moreover, after controlling for both fixed effects, Lester Range was 9%, value below those reported in the literature. The aggregation of data by cell of occupation-firm, considering the further breakdown available for occupation, as well as the specification of a fixed effects model able to control two types of unobserved heterogeneity, contributed to the literature by presenting a new possibility for the estimation of models that address this issue, since they estimate a model without incurring sample losses. Moreover, the existence of a limited literature on this subject for Brazil, and also for developing countries, reinforces the relevance of this study.

[pt] A desigualdade salarial de gênero tem sido amplamente estudada e há muitas explicações. Há evidências crescentes de que as empresas desempenham um papel importante na explicação dessa desigualdade. Neste artigo, utilizo um ambiente único onde firmas sofrem choques de demanda exógenos, a fim de identificar se há evidência de rent-sharing pelas empresas e se o efeito difere entre trabalhadores homens e mulheres. Controlando pela qualidade dos trabalhadores, encontro que um aumento no valor do choque de demanda não leva a aumentos salariais. Os choques de demanda não afetam os salários de homens nem de mulheres e portanto, tampouco afeta a desigualdade salarial de gênero. Além disso, uso um novo conjunto de dados que contém informações sobre o gênero do dono da empresa e examino se as empresas lideradas por mulheres e por homens se comportam de maneira diferente em relação a seus empregados. Não encontro nenhuma evidência de que firmas lideradas por homens ou mulheres diferem com relação a rent-sharing. / [en] Gender wage inequality has been widely studied and many explanations have been advanced in the literature. There is growing evidence that firms play an important role in explaining this inequality. In this paper, I make use of a unique setting with exogenous demand shocks to firms to identify if there is evidence of rent-sharing by firms and whether it differs between male and female workers. Controlling for worker quality, I find that increases in the value of the demand shock per worker do not lead to increases in wages. Demand shocks do not have effects on neither male nor female wages. Furthermore, I use a new dataset containing information on gender of firm s owner and I examine if female and male-led firms behave differently towards their employees. I find no evidence of differential rent-sharing through the structure of the firms ownership.

Submitted by Aline Saules Decarli (linedecarli@gmail.com) on 2016-03-08T03:06:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rent-Sharing no setor Produtivo Brasileiro_Aline Saules Decarli.pdf: 659525 bytes, checksum: 76bee9319385099d11adcf30885fe3a5 (MD5) / Rejected by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br), reason: Aline, boa tarde Para que possamos aceitar seu trabalho por gentileza realizar os seguintes ajustes, de acordo com as normas da ABNT: - Seu nome e título devem estar em letras maiúsculas. - Alterar SÃO PAULO 2015 para SÃO PAULO 2016 - A ficha catalográfica deve estar na parte inferior da página - As páginas anteriores à introdução não podem estar numeradas. Após alterações, realizar nova submissão. Att on 2016-03-08T17:07:06Z (GMT) / Submitted by Aline Saules Decarli (linedecarli@gmail.com) on 2016-03-09T03:54:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rent-Sharing no setor Produtivo Brasileiro_Aline Saules Decarli_v2.pdf: 765719 bytes, checksum: 61cd6eb58462c0c91bbe754951554416 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2016-03-10T16:14:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Rent-Sharing no setor Produtivo Brasileiro_Aline Saules Decarli_v2.pdf: 765719 bytes, checksum: 61cd6eb58462c0c91bbe754951554416 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-10T16:22:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rent-Sharing no setor Produtivo Brasileiro_Aline Saules Decarli_v2.pdf: 765719 bytes, checksum: 61cd6eb58462c0c91bbe754951554416 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-12 / This work analyzes the existence of rent-sharing in the Brazilian industrial sector between the years of 2002 and 2012. This subject has been widely discussed by the international literature, where it is possible to identify evidence supporting the existence of rent-sharing in developed economies. However, considering the Brazilian economy this subject has been little explored and the last empirical studies are limited to the early days of the 90s and 2000s, a period represented by high volatility in the Brazilian economy and also in the labor market. Furthermore, we are not aware of the existence of empirical studies on the subject in the most recent years. In order to empirically examine the relationship between firms' profits and the remuneration of their employees two models were estimated. First, a model in cross section using a detailed individual-level matched data from RAIS and PIA. We also examined whether this correlation occurs evenly between the many level skill from workers. Then the estimate in dynamic panel was held, where the level of aggregation is the industrial sector, we also provided for the correction to the classical endogeneity problem between profits and wages through the use of instrumental variables. The result indicates that an increase in firms' profitability level results in the long run, a rise in wages paid by that sector, but the magnitude of this effect is negligible. / Este trabalho visa analisar a existência de rent-sharing no setor industrial brasileiro entre os anos de 2002 e 2012. Este tema já foi amplamente abordado pela literatura internacional, onde é possível identificar evidências que corroboram a existência de rent-sharing nas economias desenvolvidas. Porém, para a economia brasileira este tema ainda foi pouco explorado e não temos conhecimento de estudos empíricos realizados para os anos mais recentes. A fim de examinar empiricamente a relação entre os lucros das firmas e a remuneração de seus trabalhadores, foram estimados dois modelos. Primeiramente, um modelo em cross section, que tem como unidade de observação o trabalhador, utilizando uma base de dados estruturada através do cruzamento da RAIS e da PIA. Também foi analisado se esta correlação ocorre de forma homogênea entre os níveis de qualificação dos trabalhadores. Em seguida, foi realizada a estimativa em painel dinâmico, cujo nível de agregação é o setor industrial, prevendo também a correção para o clássico problema de endogeneidade entre os lucros das firmas e os salários dos trabalhadores por meio de variáveis instrumentais. Os resultados indicam que um aumento no nível de rentabilidade das firmas gera, no longo prazo, uma elevação dos salários pagos naquele setor, porém este efeito é de baixa magnitude.

This thesis examines inter-industry wage differentials in the Czech Republic, using the European Union - Statistics on Income and Living (EU-SILC 2009) survey as our primary data source. Findings show that even after controlling for large number of workers and jobs characteristics wage differences based on industry affiliation still persist. The variation of the inter-industry wage differentials amounts to approximately 5 percent with the maximum wage level difference of 25 percent between the financial sector and agriculture. By applying two distinct methodologies we tested the hypothesis that the inter-industry wage differentials are actually caused by higher concentration of workers with better unmeasured abilities in higher-paying industries. Neither of the two methods rejected the unobserved ability hypothesis. Finally, our analysis also shows that the inter-industry wage differentials can be to a certain extent attributed to rent-sharing and different labour turnover costs across sectors.

This thesis consists of four self-contained studies in empirical labor economics. Micro data on both employers and workers are used to analyze the questions asked in the essays. By using disaggregated information, issues related to firm and individual heterogeneity can be studied.The first essay, The Impact of Temporary Contracts on Gross Job and Worker Flows (with Mahmood Arai), examines job and worker flow dynamics for temporary and permanent contracts. The micro approach to job flows concerns changes in employment at the plant or firm level. Data used in earlier research on gross labor flows do not allow for a distinction between different types of employment contracts (an exception is Abowd et al. (1999). This distinction is especially important in Europe since several European countries discriminate between permanent and temporary contracts in their employment legislation.The data contain quarterly information on the stock of permanent and temporary contracts, as well as direct information on hires and separations for permanent and temporary workers. The information is from a representative sample of around 10,000 Swedish private establishments.The results indicate that temporary contracts, covering only around 10 percent of all contracts, stand for half of all gross job (and worker) flows. This means that gross job (and worker) flow rates for temporary contracts are around 10 times larger than job (and worker) flows for permanent contracts. Our results imply that job reallocation associated with temporary contracts is acyclical in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. For permanent contracts, job reallocation only exhibits a countercyclical pattern in manufacturing, characterized by a low fraction of temporary contracts. Services employing a higher fraction of temporary contracts exhibit no cyclical pattern in job reallocation, implying that establishments in services use temporary contracts as an adjustment buffer and can adjust its labor input more smoothly.The share of temporary contracts varies with the industry structure and changes as a result of sectoral shifts. This implies that cross-country comparisons, as well as studies of the dynamics of job and worker flows, based on aggregated time-series data, can be distorted by the impact of the fraction of temporary labor on gross labor flows. This, in turn, makes the distinction between permanent and temporary contracts crucial in analyzing job and worker flows, especially when labor protection laws discriminate between short-and long-term employment contracts. The second essay, Wage Dispersion and Allocation of Jobs, investigates the relationship between job turnover and the distribution of wages. One possible explanation for similar labor reallocation rates across labor markets with very different employment-protection legislations is related to differences in wage setting institutions. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) argue that although job-security laws lead to lower job flows, their impact might be reduced if differences in wage-setting institutions have opposite effects. Bertola and Rogerson’s conclusion is that when labor protection laws and wages are jointly considered, the result might very well be that job flows in countries with high adjustment costs and a compressed wage structure mimic those in countries with low adjustment costs and decentralized wages.Using establishment data on job turnover and wages for a panel of around 10,000 establishments in the Swedish private sector, the relationship between wage compression and job reallocation is studied at the industry level.Estimating industry fixed-effects models for 14 two-digit industries yield results indicating large sector differences regarding the effect of the degree of wage dispersion on job reallocation. In accordance with the Bertola and Rogerson hypothesis, this effect is positive in the manufacturing sector. Running separate regressions for job creation and job destruction shows a negative and significant effect of wage dispersion on job destruction, whereas it is insignificant in the job-creation equation. These results are in accordance with wages being more rigid downwards than upwards. The quantitative effect of the impact of wage dispersion on job turnover is limited, however. A one standard deviation increase in wage dispersion reduces the total job reallocation by around 10 percent. Turning to the non-manufacturing sector, the Bertola and Rogerson hypothesis is not supported.Further results include (i) a strong positive effect of the industry-share of temporary employees on job reallocation and (ii) a negative relationship between the use of overtime and job turnover.In the third essay, Wages, Profits and Individual Unemployment Risk: Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data (with Mahmood Arai), the impact of firm performance on individual wages is studied. Several studies have found a positive and significant effect of profits on wages. The most widely suggested interpretation for this phenomenon is that employers and employees engage in rent-sharing, thereby splitting the profits created between themselves.The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of rent-sharing and the impact of individual and aggregated unemployment risk on wages of individual workers. We use a sample of over 170,000 Swedish employees for 1991 and 1995 matched with their employing firm’s profits and the unemployment registers. The matched data contain detailed information on individual characteristics, including their unemployment experience during 1992-1995 as well as annual profits as reported in the firms’ balance-sheet reports.The contribution of this paper is that it provides evidence on the wage determination, based on disaggregated individual and firm data dealing with the problems of firm and worker heterogeneity, and the endogeneity of profits. Our results imply positive effects of profits on wages, both in 1991 and 1995. The reported elasticities imply that the wage inequality in Sweden due to the spread in profits is as high as 13% of the mean wages in 1991, according to Lester’s range of pay. These correlations are robust for controlling for time-invariant unobserved individual- and firm characteristics.Using firm-reported short-term product market elasticity and the number of competitors as instruments for profits suggest Lester’s measure of wage inequality due to profits to be as high as 50% of the mean wages.Finally, we investigate the impact of individual heterogeneity with respect to unemployment risk that might also affect wages. We include the individuals’ unemployment event record in our regressions, and our results confirm that individuals with a higher unemployment risk also have lower wages. Including aggregated measures along with individual unemployment risk in our estimations show results suggesting that there exists a robust negative correlation between unemployment risk and wages at various aggregation levels.The final essay, Pay Inequality and Firm Performance: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data, tests several implications from tournament models on the same matched employer-employee data set as in essay 3.According to a variety of theories, the wage distribution both within and between firms can have important effects on individual productivity and firm performance. One argument for high wage differentials, based on incentive effects, is found in Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) tournament theory. Higher wage differentials lead to higher individual effort, and are therefore productivity enhancing. This, in turn, suggests that there is a positive relationship between wage dispersion and productivity. The opposite relationship is found in theories stressing fairness and cooperation between co-workers.For white-collar workers, the results show a positive effect of intra-firm pay spread on firm performance for 1991 and 1995. This applies to different measures of wage dispersion, capturing both raw differences and differences corrected for the fact that part of the wage spread is due to differences in human capital accumulation. To take firm heterogeneity into account, difference equations are estimated on a panel of firms. Once more, consistent with tournament theory, a positive and significant effect of wage dispersion on profits is found. The results for managers are based on information on about 10,000 managers. For various measures of wage dispersion and specifications, a positive and significant association between managerial pay and profits is found. No support is found for the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the number of managers (contestants) and wage spread. Instead, the results show a negative and significant effect of the number of executives and pay spread among managers.Finally, consistent with tournament theory, higher wage dispersion is found in firms operating in volatile product markets characterized by a high degree of output uncertainty. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2002

This thesis focuses on the industry wage differentials, rent-sharing and the gender wage gap. I empirically investigate: i) the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, ii) how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector and iii) the existence of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, through the unobserved ability hypothesis.<p><p>The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. To do so, we have relied on a unique harmonised matched employer-employee data set, the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey. As far as we know, this paper is the first to analyse with recent techniques, on a comparable basis, and from a European perspective: i) inter-industry wage differentials by gender, ii) gender wage gaps by industry, and iii) the contribution of industry effects to the overall gender wage gap. It is also one of the few, besides Kahn (1998), to analyse for both sexes the relationship between collective bargaining characteristics and the dispersion of industry wage differentials. <p>Empirical findings show that, in all countries and for both sexes, wage differentials exist between workers employed in different sectors, even when controlling for working conditions, individual and firm characteristics. We also find that the hierarchy of sectors in terms of wages is quite similar for male and female workers and across countries. Yet, the apparent similarity between male and female industry wage differentials is challenged by standard statistical tests. Indeed, simple t-tests show that between 43 and 71% of the industry wage disparities are significantly different for women and men. Moreover, Chow tests indicate that sectoral wage differentials are significantly different as a group for both sexes in all countries. Regarding the dispersion of the industry wage differentials, we find that results vary for men and women, although not systematically nor substantially. Yet, the dispersion of industry wage differentials fluctuates considerably across countries. It is quite large in Ireland, Italy and the U.K. and relatively moderate in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. For both sexes, results point to the existence of a negative and significant relationship between the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining and the dispersion of industry wage differentials.<p>Furthermore, independently of the country considered, results show that more than 80% of the gender wage gaps within industries are statistically significant. The average industry gender wage gap ranges between -.18 in the U.K. and -.11 in Belgium. This means that on average women have an inter-industry wage differential of between 18 and 11% below that for men. Yet, correlation coefficients between the industry gender wage gaps across countries are relatively small and often statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that industries with the highest and the lowest gender wage gaps vary substantially across Europe.<p>Finally, results indicate that the overall gender wage gap, measured as the difference between the mean log wages of male and female workers, fluctuates between .18 in Denmark and .39 in the U.K. In all countries a significant (at the .01 level) part of this gap can be explained by the segregation of women in lower paying industries. Yet, the relative contribution of this factor to the gender wage gap varies substantially among European countries. It is close to zero in Belgium and Denmark, between 7 and 8% in Ireland, Spain and the U.K. and around 16% in Italy. Differences in industry wage premia for male and female workers significantly (at the .05 level) affect the gender wage gap in Denmark and Ireland only. In these countries, gender differences in industry wage differentials account for respectively 14 and 20% of the gender wage gap. To sum up, findings show that combined industry effects explain around 29% of the gender wage gap in Ireland, respectively 14 and 16% in Denmark and Italy, around 7% in the U.K. and almost nothing in Belgium and Spain. <p>In conclusion, our results emphasize that the magnitude of the gender wage gap as well as its causes vary substantially among the European countries. This suggests that no single policy instrument will be sufficient to tackle gender pay inequalities in Europe. Our findings indicate that policies need to be tailored to the very specific context of the labour market in each country.<p><p>The second chapter examines investigates how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. Empirical findings show that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee even when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Our instrumented wage-profit elasticity is of the magnitude 0.06 and it is not significantly different for men and women. Of the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 23.7% less than men), results show that around 14% can be explained by the fact that on average women are employed in firms where profits-per-employee are lower. Thus, findings suggest that a substantial part of the gender wage gap is attributable to the segregation of women is less profitable firms. <p><p>The third and final chapter contributes to the understanding of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, taking advantage of access to a unique matched employer-employee data set covering the period 1995-2002. Findings show the existence of large and persistent wage differentials among workers with the same observed characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors. The unobserved ability hypothesis may not be rejected on the basis of Martins’ (2004) methodology. However, its contribution to the observed industry wage differentials appears to be limited. Further results show that ceteris paribus workers earn significantly higher wages when employed in more profitable firms. The instrumented wage-profit elasticity stands at 0.063. This rent-sharing phenomenon accounts for a large fraction of the industry wage differentials. We find indeed that the magnitude, dispersion and significance of industry wage differentials decreases sharply when controlling for profits.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished