Thesis (M. A. (Media Studies)) -- University of Limpopo, 2017 / This study examines how democracy is represented in Late Nite News with Loyiso Gola (LNN) using two qualitative content analysis methods: the social semiotic approach and thematic analysis. It is based on the assumption that representation in media serves to influence how viewers draw meaning from, and understand the political process and political issues in South Africa. Literature on what constitutes parody, the meaning of representation and democracy, and the functions of the media in a democracy was reviewed. Four media theories which are agenda-setting and priming; framing theory, social responsibility theory and democratic deliberative theory formed the theoretical framework for this study. The qualitative approach using a case study design as well as focus groups proved to be a useful tool for two reasons: it enabled the researcher to penetrate the deeper layers of the messages contained in the text in order to come to an understanding of how LNN represents democracy; and it enabled the researcher to understand how viewers engage with and understand democracy through watching LNN.

This dissertation proposes a normative theory of political representation grounded in popular sovereignty and positive law, rather than in democracy and efficient labour allocation. The first three chapters assess the contributions to the idea of representation of three early modern thinkers. Hobbes proposes a formal model of authorised action at a distance, but, contrary to a long-standing consensus in political thought, not an actual theory of representation. Rousseau, a well-known opponent of representation, proposes ideas about government, sovereignty, and positive law, which, despite his contrary intentions, form a foundation for a normative theory of representation. Sieyes refines concepts from both to create a more mature practical statement on representation which he attempts to implement in three revolutionary constitutions in France in the 1790's. The next three chapters make an argument connecting representation to law creation. First the concept of a decision is defined, and then abstracted through various levels of political authority and action. Law creation is distinguished from all other classes of authorised political decision making by four unique properties which tie in with problems initially raised by the early modern philosophers regarding popular sovereignty. Various numbers of authorised actors are considered as constituting political bodies credentialed to carry out the relevant decisions identified as meeting the minimal conditions of law, and ultimately only assembly — a body numbering in the hundreds, with a reserved place for making recognised decisions, and a formal connection to expressed popular preferences — meets the conceptual requirements of the class of decisions mooted. The thesis ends with an argument connecting law to representation as the solution to the problem of plurality.

No description available.

Né en le 1er février 1848 et mort le 20 juillet 1913, Adhémar Esmein fut l’un des juristes français les plus célèbres de la « Belle Époque ». Nommé à la Faculté de droit de Paris en 1879, le juriste enseignera dans les plus grands établissements d’enseignements français telles l’École pratique des hautes études ou l’École libre des sciences politiques.Historien du droit reconnu, Esmein produira au cours de sa carrière de nombreux travaux en droit romain, en droit canonique et publiera deux éminents ouvrages d’histoire du droit français tous deux destinés principalement aux étudiants.Toutefois, par sa formation, Esmein fut aussi l’un des plus grands constitutionnalistes de son temps. Chargé du cours de droit constitutionnel à la Faculté de droit dès 1890, il s’intéressera à cette discipline nouvelle tout au long de sa vie. Outre d’importants articles, il publiera en 1896 les Éléments de droit constitutionnel qui resteront l’un des « monuments » du droit constitutionnel français. L’ouvrage, réédité à sept reprises jusque dans les années 1920, est généralement présenté comme le premier ouvrage de droit constitutionnel républicain. Son auteur paraît ainsi aux yeux des juristes contemporains comme le promoteur infatigable du régime politique de la IIIe République.Mais à la lecture de l’ensemble de son œuvre constitutionnelle, il apparaît que la pensée de l’auteur se fonde essentiellement sur l’idéologie libérale française la plus typique de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle. Ainsi, on peut affirmer que le républicanisme d’Adhémar Esmein s’explique largement par son libéralisme.Cette étude se propose donc d’étudier la pensée constitutionnelle de l’auteur sous l’angle de la liberté et de montrer que l’ensemble de sa théorie juridique a pour seul objet la protection de la liberté de l’individu. / Born on February 1st, 1848, Adhémar Esmein died on July 20th, 1913. He was recognised as one of the most important French lawyers from the ‘Belle Epoque’. Appointed by the University of Law in Paris in 1879, he taught at the most prestigious French educational institutions such as the École des Hautes Études and the École Libre des Sciences Politiques.Esmein was, above all, a Legal historian, but throughout his career, he also published numerous studies on Roman Law, Canon law and he wrote two prominent books on French legal history.During his academic career, Esmein was also regarded as one of the most important constitutional experts of his epoch. He taught Constitutional Law in Paris from as early as 1890 and was involved in constitutional science throughout his life. In 1896 he published ‘Elements de Droit Constitutionnel’ which is still considered as a fundamental text in the field of French Constitutional Law. The book was re-edited seven times until the 1920s, is generally seen as the first published work on republican constitutional law and gained its author a reputation as a tireless instigator of the Third Republic political regime.An analysis of the full body of his constitutional work leads the reader to the conclusion that it seems that Esmein’s philosophy is mainly based on the French liberal ideology which was dominant in the second half of the 19th century: it can be argued that his republicanism can be exclusively explained by his liberalism.This research project intends to study the constitutional thought of the author in terms of liberty and to show that the sole purpose of his legal theories was the protection of the freedom of the individual.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 339-352).

Project (B.A.)--James Madison University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-170).

Diss.-Munich? / Bibliography: p. [211]-218.

Ao definir a democracia como um método de seleção de dirigentes políticos profissionais através da competição eleitoral, J. Schumpeter lança as bases de um modelo econômico de teoria democrática. A intuição schumpeteriana será desenvolvida por A. Downs em Uma Teoria Econômica da Democracia que termina por teorizar e dar o formato mais bem acabado a uma concepção de mercado político que reproduz isomorficamente a natureza do mercado econômico. Ambas as abordagens julgam-se meramente descritivas, sustentando uma separação radical entre construtos teóricos normativos e descritivos. Nesse contexto, a democracia é reduzida a um processo de seleção de dirigentes políticos e a um mecanismo que visa satisfazer, através do mercado político, os interesses individuais de políticos profissionais (empresários do voto) e eleitores-consumidores que desejam maximizar sua renda de utilidade oriunda da ação governamental. Segundo a perspectiva apresentada nesta pesquisa, essa leitura empobrece a teoria democrática e fracassa em seus próprios propósitos, pois tanto falha na tentativa de prever quanto explicar uma gama de fenômenos políticos. Nesse sentido, buscaremos traçar uma análise crítica dos fundamentos filosóficos de uma teoria econômica da democracia influenciados pela leitura da tradição deliberativa, por uma posição normativa forte quanto à irredutibilidade da natureza do fenômeno político ao fenômeno econômico e por uma compreensão da representação democrática, não só como mandato, mas, em especial, como figuração simbólica do povo soberano. / Defining democracy as a method of selection of professional political leaders through electoral competition, J. Schumpeter launches the bases of an economic model of democratic theory. The schumpeterian intuition will be developed by A. Downs in An economic theory of democracy which ends by theorizing and giving the best shaped format of a conception of political market which isomorphically reproduces the nature of the economic market. Both approaches believe they are merely descriptive, sustaining a radical separation between normative and descriptive theoretical constructs. In this context, democracy is reduced to a process of selection of political leaders and to a mechanism that aims satisfying, through the political market, the individual interests of professional politicians (vote entrepreneurs) and voters-consumers who want to maximize their utility income which comes from government action. According to the perspective presented on this research, this view impoverish the democratic theory and fails in its own purposes, as it fails in the attempt of foreseing as well as explaining a series of political phenomena. In this sense, we will try to draw a critical analysis of the philosophical foundations of an economic theory of democracy always under the pressure of the deliberative tradition view, for a strong normative position as to the irreducibility of the nature of the political phenomenon to the economic phenomenon and for an understanding of the democratic representation, not only as mandate, but, specially, as symbolic figuration of the sovereign people.

In representative democracy the chain of political legitimacy runs from voters to governments through votes cast at elections. In order for representation to occur, political parties must offer distinct policy platforms that citizens consider in their vote choices. This thesis examines whether citizens are adequately represented within the European Union. It finds that although representation on left-right issues occurs, it does not occur for European integration preferences. Over the course its history, European integration has changed from being primarily an economic issue to a social issue. This separation from the primary axis of political competition has increased the need for representation on EU issues directly. Political parties have polarised over European integration providing increased choice, but voters have not engaged with the issue. Examining how voters process party signals about policy positions shows that very few are affected by signals on the EU. Accounting for voters' cognitive biases suggests that the influence of EU issues in European Parliament elections has been overestimated and is non-existent in most member-states. As direct democracy might offer an alternative to inadequate representation this thesis examines why referendums have been held on the EU but finds that they are largely driven by governments' desire to contain the threat of EU issues at national elections, further undermining representation. However, as a result of institutional differences between national and European Parliament elections rather than the emergence of the EU as an electoral issue, the size of party systems at European Parliament elections has grown considerably over successive elections in many member-states, a change that has fed into national party systems. Although representation on EU issues is inadequate, the expansion of European party systems and the redrawing of the lines of political competition offers some hope that representation on EU issues might improve in the future.