Definido em muitos estudos como uma tentativa frustrada de organização política na década de 1860 do Império do Brasil, nesta tese o Partido Progressista é interpretado como resultado de inovadoras práticas eleitorais e de articulação parlamentar. A pesquisa abrangeu a experiência de sua formação, entre a polêmica bancária de 1857 e a queda do primeiro gabinete de Zacarias de Góis e Vasconcelos, em maio de 1862. A análise dos discursos políticos desse período revela profundas transformações no debate partidário e na compreensão do funcionamento do sistema representativo brasileiro, um rearranjo que, a despeito de surpreender os coevos, foi capaz de manter a esfera do Parlamento distanciada daqueles que os haviam elegido. / In this dissertation contrary to most historiography, where the \"Liga Progressista\" is usually mentioned as a 1860s failured attempt of a new political organization we analyze the Partido Progressista as a direct result of innovative electoral practices and an important offspring of parliamentary reconfigurations. The research encompasses a period of five years, starting with the discussions regarding the new financial policy, in 1857, until the downfall of Zacarias de Goes e Vasconcelos first cabinet, in 1862. Discourses uttered in the period reveal the depth of disputes regarding not only transformations in the political-parties scenery at the time, but also parliamentary debates concerning the understanding of the Brazilian representative system itself. A discussion, with clear consequences, that despite astonishing many contemporaries, was, at the end, able to secure a sequestered sphere for the Legislative Power, maintaining its historical distance from those entitled to choose their representatives.

Definido em muitos estudos como uma tentativa frustrada de organização política na década de 1860 do Império do Brasil, nesta tese o Partido Progressista é interpretado como resultado de inovadoras práticas eleitorais e de articulação parlamentar. A pesquisa abrangeu a experiência de sua formação, entre a polêmica bancária de 1857 e a queda do primeiro gabinete de Zacarias de Góis e Vasconcelos, em maio de 1862. A análise dos discursos políticos desse período revela profundas transformações no debate partidário e na compreensão do funcionamento do sistema representativo brasileiro, um rearranjo que, a despeito de surpreender os coevos, foi capaz de manter a esfera do Parlamento distanciada daqueles que os haviam elegido. / In this dissertation contrary to most historiography, where the \"Liga Progressista\" is usually mentioned as a 1860s failured attempt of a new political organization we analyze the Partido Progressista as a direct result of innovative electoral practices and an important offspring of parliamentary reconfigurations. The research encompasses a period of five years, starting with the discussions regarding the new financial policy, in 1857, until the downfall of Zacarias de Goes e Vasconcelos first cabinet, in 1862. Discourses uttered in the period reveal the depth of disputes regarding not only transformations in the political-parties scenery at the time, but also parliamentary debates concerning the understanding of the Brazilian representative system itself. A discussion, with clear consequences, that despite astonishing many contemporaries, was, at the end, able to secure a sequestered sphere for the Legislative Power, maintaining its historical distance from those entitled to choose their representatives.

Submitted by Jamile Barbosa da Cruz (jamile.cruz@ucsal.br) on 2017-01-16T13:56:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 COELHO JS 2014.pdf: 1406305 bytes, checksum: ea019e3bafe4975562e7719188d16578 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rosemary Magalhães (rosemary.magalhaes@ucsal.br) on 2017-01-16T18:41:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Josafa.pdf: 1406305 bytes, checksum: ea019e3bafe4975562e7719188d16578 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-16T18:41:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Josafa.pdf: 1406305 bytes, checksum: ea019e3bafe4975562e7719188d16578 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-09 / Este trabalho analisa a influência do poder econômico sobre o resultado das eleições para cargos eletivos. Pretende-se expor ao debate as características e os desafios da democracia representativa brasileira, especialmente da democracia baiana. Discute-se precisamente a influência dos gastos de campanha sobre o resultado das eleições políticas de 2010 e 2012 na Bahia. A influência do poder econômico, como chaga a adoecer a democracia, apresenta-se como fato capaz de recrudescer as limitações e acirrar as contradições do sistema representativo, não obstante o aparato legal relacionado com o processo eleitoral procure mitigar tais efeitos. Eis uma contradição do sistema representativo que se reveste de hipótese neste trabalho: no exercício do poder econômico os candidatos a cargo público têm seduzido a massa de eleitores com propaganda eleitoral grandiosa e ilusória, promessas e até entrega de bens e vantagens pessoais, transformando as eleições numa arena de disputa econômica. Assim, o voto não tem sido o resultado de uma decisão consciente que avalia ideias e projetos políticos, mas tem decorrido da capacidade de gasto do candidato. Contudo, numa verdadeira democracia, a representação política será mais legítima quanto mais livres, iguais e conscientes forem os eleitores e os candidatos a cargo eletivo, a ponto de o gasto de campanha não se tornar o fator determinante para a eleição dos governantes. A falta de representação política dos interesses da maioria da população implica uma limitação do sistema e denuncia a ausência de legitimidade dos representantes, o que mantém a democracia como um ideal romântico que não se realiza, ou uma mera carta de intenções que o jogo de poder não permite que se torne realidade. / This paper analyzes the influence of economic power on the outcome of elections for elective office. It is intended to expose debate the characteristics and limits of the Brazilian representative democracy, especially in Bahia democracy. Precisely we discuss the influence of campaign spending on the outcome of the 2010 and 2012 general elections in Bahia. The influence of economic power, as a sore sick democracy, is presented as fact able to intensify the limitations and intensify the contradictions of the representative system, notwithstanding the electoral process related to law enforcement seek to mitigate such effects . Here is a contradiction of the representative system which is of argument in this paper: the exercise of economic power candidates for public office have seduced the great mass of voters with electoral propaganda and illusory, and promises to deliver goods and personal advantage, turning elections an arena of economic struggle. Therefore, the vote has not been the result of a conscious decision that assesses political ideas and projects, but has elapsed the spending capacity of the candidate. However , a true democracy, political representation will be more legitimate the more free, equal and are conscious voters and candidates for elected office, to the point of spending campaign does not become the determining factor in the election of the governing factor. The lack of political representation of the interests of the majority of the population implies a limitation of the system and reports the lack of legitimacy of representatives, which holds democracy as a romantic ideal that is not realized, or merely a letter of intent that the power game does not allow to become reality.

Dans un système constitutionnel fondé sur la souveraineté de la nation, le pouvoir constituant fait figure de phénomène ambivalent, difficilement analysable en termes juridiques. Par définition réfractaire à tout encadrement impératif, le pouvoir suprême au sein de l’Etat n’en doit pas moins revêtir une forme organisée pour exprimer une volonté normative. Les acteurs de la Révolution française agissent aux confins du droit, tirant profit des ressources de la philosophie politique et de l’histoire pour établir une constitution, principe fondamental du système juridique qu’ils cherchent à établir. Ils se dotent d’outils pour parvenir à leurs fins : le concept de « convention nationale » en est un, auréolé du succès des réalisations américaines. Plutôt qu’à une transposition institutionnelle, les révolutionnaires français procèdent à une adaptation. En devenant « extraordinaire », la représentation constituante qu’ils conceptualisent perd son caractère révolutionnaire pour devenir pleinement juridique. Elle offre une alternative à l’insurrection. Un tel processus présente cependant un revers. Ce pouvoir, en accédant à l’existence investi de l’exercice de la souveraineté, est dégagé de toutes contraintes juridiques autres que celles qui découlent de son organisation. Ces contraintes pèsent sur ses membres, exacerbant les tensions qui déchirent un corps collectif doté des pouvoirs les plus étendus. Les dérives sanglantes qui frappent la Convention nationale ne sont pas inéluctables ; elles découlent de l’exploitation politique des failles inhérentes au fonctionnement d’une représentation souveraine dont les membres ne doivent jouir d’aucun privilège. / In a constitutional system founded on the sovereignty of the nation, constituent power is an ambivalent phenomenon, difficult to analyse in juridical terms. By definition resistant to mandatory regulation, the supreme power in the state must necessarily take a form which enables it to express a normative will. The actors of the French Revolution push the confines of the law, taking advantage of the resources of political philosophy and history to establish a constitution, fundamental principle of the juridical system they seek to institute. They create tools to achieve their ends: the concept of “national convention” being one, taking inspiration from the success of American achievements. Rather than an institutionnal transposition, the French revolutionaries proceed with an adaptation. By becoming “extraordinary”, the constituent representation which they conceptualize losses its revolutionary character to become fully juridical. It offers an alternative to the insurrection. By coming into existence invested with the capacity to exercise sovereignty, this power is released from all legal constraints other than those arising as a result of its organization. The process, however, is two-sided, and internally produced constraints weigh on its members, exacerbating tensions thar tear a collective body endowed with the broadest powers. The bloody excesses that strike the National Convention are not inevitable. They arise from political exploitation of flaws inherent to the organization of a sovereign representation whose members must not have any privilege.