Corporal punishment is a worldwide problem. The purpose withthis thesis is to promote a constructive discussion about the problem andconnect this to children’s rights. This gives the possibility to start adiscussion about suggestions and measures to reduce the problem. Thetheory is that corporal punishment is used as a disciplinary method tochange behavior. Children’s rights is regulated by conventions and nationallaws. The method is to conduct an analysis with interpretations andcommentaries of the research materials from South Africa and Sweden.The conclusion is that those who are positive to corporal punishment thinksit is an efficient working method, and it is about children’s safety. Thosewho are negative have experienced that alternative methods works. Asuggestion is to involve children in the work with children’s rights andeducate them in human and children’s rights with focus on obligations andresponsibility.

The increasing frequency and/or severity of climate-related disasters has pushed “environmental refugees” onto center stage, capturing headlines the world over. Although the urgency implied by the “refugee” terminology is apt, the legal reality is that few “environmental refugees” can enjoy the protections of refugee law—a system of law that was created in the post-World War II era to respond to the ongoing needs of Jews displaced during the War and whose stringent requirements reflect the particular historical moment of its creation. Despite evolutions in other areas, refugee law does not typically provide recourse for environmental harms. By contrast, human rights law, at both the international and domestic levels, has continued to evolve to recognize environmental and social environmental rights; for example, the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2010 recognized a human right to water. Issues related to water scarcity or water (mis)management may already be causing affected individuals to leave their homes, and concerns about water availability in the near future necessitate the development of legal tools for protecting these populations. This paper draws on human rights law, as it exists in the international system and as applied in Colombia, to create a framework that may provide greater protection for so-called “water refugees,” given the increasing salience of displacements related to water, the lack of movement in refugee law regarding environmental displacements, and the promise of social and economic rights discourse. / text

What is the fundamental justification of the idea of human rights? In this dissertation I argue that human rights are justified in virtue of the special role they play in practical thought: they function as the constitutive conditions of the relationship of right. This answer has two distinctive features: it justifies human rights non-instrumentally and relationally, as those claim rights universally necessary for relating to each other as juridical equals, as lacking authority over one another. This constitutive argument for human rights contrasts with the predominant theories of human rights, which tend to justify human rights instrumentally as means for the protection of an independently intelligible (and non-relational) purpose (e.g., basic needs, urgent interests, autonomy, capacity-development). A strong reason for endorsing the account proposed here is that it explains better than its instrumentalist competitors the universal validity of human rights while offering a more robust response against the human rights skeptic. Furthermore, this constitutive argument gives us the resources for seeing how human rights form an indivisible whole comprising civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and how human rights structure an international order of peace. My account thus promises to offer a much-needed defense of the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The present dissertation is a multi-disciplinary project that examines the relationship between human rights and development in Africa, with specific focus on Ghana. The proposition, which is expressed in a theory of community emancipation, is that human rights hold the key to the attainment of sustainable holistic development. The theory of community emancipation represents the Akan notion of rights which speak to the lived experiences (traditional, colonial and post-colonial) of Akan peoples. It is offered as a contribution to the evolution of distinct African notions of rights. The Akan perspective on rights aims at making human rights a more accessible concept that people can relate to and to use as an effective tool to attain development. The theory is used in a general context to analyse Western development foreign policies implemented in post-colonial Africa with the active collaboration of African leaders. It concludes that these policies "failed" due to the lack of attention to human rights. Consequent to this is the creation of a culture of rights abuse in Africa and the unfounded claim propagated by African leaders that human rights does not matter for Africans, and is not part of the African culture. The work also examines Western development policies in the post-Cold War era and concludes that in general the development NGO concept is not conducive to the promotion of sustainable holistic development in Africa. The solution, among others, lies in local human rights NGOs collaborating in a new relationship with their foreign counterparts; and both given a more prominent role to play in the political, as well as the economic liberalisation processes. / The significant contribution of the work, inter alia, is linking the discourses in African philosophy and African notions of rights, which had hitherto gone their separate ways, through the theory of community emancipation. This results in the construction of new paradigm for examining rights in Africa from a developmental context. It is expected that this contribution could help enrich the international human rights discourse, contribute to plugging the loopholes and make the implementation of human rights more relevant and effective in Africa.

Despite being a strong advocate for children’s rights in the international community, Sweden has received critique from the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding the high number of children who have been removed from their families and that are currently living in foster homes. Previous research has not dealt with the issue of children’s rights in foster care placement processes in Sweden, nor has it included Sweden in discourse analyses on children’s rights, or sufficiently explored the relationship between discourse and implementation of the UNCRC. I use theories on discourse and translation in order to provide a comparative analysis of the articulations of children’s rights relevant for foster care placement processes in the UNCRC, and on the national and local level in Sweden. The analysis points to both similarities and differences in the discourses and identifies six aspects of the Swedish discourse that make certain activities in foster care placement processes possible, desirable and inevitable.

What is the fundamental justification of the idea of human rights? In this dissertation I argue that human rights are justified in virtue of the special role they play in practical thought: they function as the constitutive conditions of the relationship of right. This answer has two distinctive features: it justifies human rights non-instrumentally and relationally, as those claim rights universally necessary for relating to each other as juridical equals, as lacking authority over one another. This constitutive argument for human rights contrasts with the predominant theories of human rights, which tend to justify human rights instrumentally as means for the protection of an independently intelligible (and non-relational) purpose (e.g., basic needs, urgent interests, autonomy, capacity-development). A strong reason for endorsing the account proposed here is that it explains better than its instrumentalist competitors the universal validity of human rights while offering a more robust response against the human rights skeptic. Furthermore, this constitutive argument gives us the resources for seeing how human rights form an indivisible whole comprising civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and how human rights structure an international order of peace. My account thus promises to offer a much-needed defense of the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This essay is an attempt to explain and assess the liberal nationalists’ view on the problems of the legitimacy of nationalism and cultural rights. I want to look at some theories over the past fifteen years that normatively evaluate ‘nationalism’ according to the liberal principles. The main focus of the first part will be on three questions, which are: the question of legitimacy (is nationalism permissible?), the question of justice (is nationalism required?), and the question of appropriate format (what forms of nationalism and nationalistic policies are considered as legitimate and just?). In the second part, by considering the alleged conflict between the ‘minority nation-building’ and the ‘majority nation-building’ in multination countries, I will examine two models for resolving this conflict: ‘Multinational Federalism’ and ‘Transnational Federalism’. I will argue that, though most liberal nationalists support the former model, they fail to provide a convincing normative ground for justifying Multinational Federalism and stopping national minorities from secession. The liberal nationalists’ arguments for necessity of nationalism, ironically, undermine their own claim about normative importance of Multinational Federalism in comparison to Transnational Federalism. This is what I call ‘the paradox of liberal nationalism’. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-10-09 00:53:12.467

ABORIGINALITY, EXISTING ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND STATE ACCOMMODATION IN CANADA: ABSTRACT The central focus of this dissertation is the relationship between aboriginality, aboriginal rights and state accommodation in Canada. The work considers how the existence of a plurality of conceptions of aboriginality impacts the capacity of aboriginal rights to protect and accommodate this collective identity. This dissertation takes the position that aboriginal rights, as they are currently constructed in Canada, cannot account for the existence of this definitional multiplicity, and so impose serious limits on the degree to which aboriginality is accommodated and protected by the state. This case is built by looking at Supreme Court cases that deal with Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The investigation contained herein examines the written legal submissions of the aboriginal and non-aboriginal participants in these cases, as well as the Court’s decisions, in an effort to trace the various articulations of aboriginality put forward by the parties. The dissertation demonstrates that, even though there is a multiplicity of conceptions of aboriginality – in other words, the aboriginal litigants, the provinces, the federal government and the Supreme Court justices advance different and often competing conceptions of aboriginality – aboriginal rights are constructed to protect and accommodate a single, particular vision of this collective identity. Moreover, this version of aboriginality does not coincide with the version of this collective identity advanced by the aboriginal litigants themselves. Consequently, the work in this dissertation argues that aboriginal rights fail to accommodate and protect aboriginal peoples’ collective identities and pose a substantial threat to these identities. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2008-07-09 23:23:43.659

<p>The aim of this research is to ask questions as to why child right laws for the protection of child soldiers have failed to protect children in the Darfur region of Sudan despite the<br /> fact that Sudan is a member to many of these children&rsquo / s rights instruments. Can conflict transformation therefore be of any help? This is research seeks to address the question posed above.</p>

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of America, there has been a shift in the policies of many countries to combat terrorism. Terrorism has had a devastating effect on many citizens of the world. These include „the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilise Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardise peace and security, and threaten social and economic development.‟1 All of these also had a real impact on the enjoyment of human rights. Therefore the fight to curb further terrorist attacks is paramount. States are charged with the responsibility of curbing terrorism by their citizens. But with responsibility comes obligations to the citizenry.2 States should therefore not engage in policies or actions that further deprive others of their enjoyment of human rights. This is well put by Hoffman when he says „history shows that when societies trade human rights for security, most often they get neither.