La protection des droits fondamentaux par l’Union européenne et la problématique de la qualification juridique de l’Union ne sont pas isolées. Au contraire, elles sont profondément liées. Sous l’effet de la protection des droits fondamentaux, l’Union peut être classée dans la catégorie des fédéralismes. Cette nature fédérative exerce en retour une influence sur la protection des droits fondamentaux. La protection des droits fondamentaux et la nature de l’Union forment ensemble l’identité de l’Union. Cette identité pourrait-elle se concrétiser par une Fédération de droit ? Cette hypothèse de qualification, qui s’inspire du modèle de l’État de droit et repose sur les exigences du cosmopolitisme, vise une Fédération dont l’un des objectifs fondateurs est la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cette hypothèse offre certaines clés de compréhension sur l’articulation du processus de fédéralisation et de la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cependant, à bien des égards, l’articulation entre ce processus et cette protection est conflictuelle. Les obstacles à cette qualification sont nombreux. Les États membres souhaitent en effet préserver leur souveraineté. Les impératifs du fédéralisme économique ou les attentes d’une sécurité fédérative soulèvent également de multiples inquiétudes. Ces obstacles affectent tant le processus de fédéralisation que la protection des droits fondamentaux. En conclusion, ils empêchent de qualifier pleinement l’Union de Fédération de droit. / The protection of fundamental rights by the European Union and the issue of the Union's legal nature are not isolated. On the contrary, they are deeply linked. The Union can be classified in the category of federalism under the effect of the protection of fundamental rights. In return, this federative nature has an influence on the protection of fundamental rights. The protection of fundamental rights and the nature of the Union together form the identity of the Union. This identity could be a federal rule of law (Fédération de droit)? This hypothesis, which is based on the rule of law model and the requirements of cosmopolitanism, aims at a Federation whose founding objectives include the protection of fundamental rights. This hypothesis offers some keys to understanding how the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights are articulated. However, the relationship between this process and the protection of fundamental rights is often conflictual. There are many obstacles to this qualification. Indeed, Member States wish to preserve their sovereignty. The imperatives of economic federalism or the expectations of federal security also raise multiple concerns. These obstacles impact both the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights. In conclusion, they prevent this qualification of european federal rule of law.

The study makes a descriptive and analytical study of the development of the dynamic concept of the rule of law with special reference to the African contribution. First, the study shows that the Diceyan concept of the rule of law was narrow and peculiar to the Western liberal legal culture, and that more specifically, the substantive content of the concept of the rule of law was limited to the first generation of human rights. In its international and African context the concept was expanded to include all three generations of human rights and also identified with the concepts of democracy and the right of peoples and nations to self-determination. The expanded concept came to be known as the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law. Secondly, the study traces the origins and development of the principle of equal rights and self-determination and their extension to all peoples and nations and shows that these rights are universal, not relative, as they derive from the inherent worth and dignity of the individual. Also, the study shows that in the African context the three generations of human rights have been interlinked, made inter-dependent, and then identified with the rule of law, human rights and the right of self-determination (perceived as a right to democratic self-governance). Hence, the worth and dignity of the human personality has been made the fountainhead of human rights and have been elevated to the substantive elements of the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law and the basis of the modern African Constitutional State. Under the Colonial Rule both the Diceyan and the dynamic concept of the rule of law were not recognised. Instead, Colonial and racist regimes tried to create alternative institutions of government which denied the oppressed peoples the right to democratic self-governance and independence. However, Colonial and oppressed peoples relied on the dynamic concept of the rule of law in their freedom struggles and in the elaboration of their policies. Hence, the constitutions of all the former colonies in southern Africa under discussion were to different degrees informed by the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.D

Reducing firms’ financial constraints can be an important element for economic growth. Previous scholars have documented various factors that affect firms’ ability to access finance (e.g. Lambert et al., 2007, p. 385). In this study, we investigate the impact of financial reporting credibility in reducing firms’ financial constraints. In addition, we study the role that rule of law at a country level have on the above stated association. We hypothesize that financial reporting credibility decreases firms’ financial constraints. Then, we propose that the ability of financial reporting credibility to reduce financial constraints weakens when rule of law (at a country level) decreases. This is the first study to investigate how the association between financial reporting credibility and financial constraints are affected by rule of law on a country level, to the authors’ knowledge. The study uses 52,381 firms operating in 98 countries that responded to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys between the time period 2006 to 2015. Financial constraints are measured through a variable that takes into consideration the perceived amount of obstacles firms are facing in their current operations and the proxy for financial credibility is whether firms have been audited or not. Our moderating term is the World Bank’s rule of law index. By using both regression and matching analysis, we find a significant negative association between financial credibility and financial constraints. This indicates that increased financial reporting credibility leads to less financial constraints for firms. For the moderating effect of the rule of law, the results are insignificant. However, we observe that when the level of rule of law is high, increased financial credibility leads to minor improvements in access to external finance.

<p>This is a study of whether it is possible for the governmental form of democracy to be ap-plicable in states that have not had democracy as their governmental form earlier in their political history. In this thesis the concept of liberal democracy is the major theory used as well as the concepts of rule of law and civil society. After giving a description of the con-cepts the thesis continues with two chapters that respectively describe and explain the states of Belarus and Cuba. The two states are going to be used in the analysis at the end of this thesis.</p><p>The analysis includes several conditions to asses if democracy exists. These conditions are derived from the chapters on democracy and rule of law. In the analysis the states of Bela-rus and Cuba are analyzed based on the conditions derived from the chapters on democra-cy and rule of law. The results of the concluding discussion are that the probability for de-mocracy to survive in Cuba is higher than in Belarus because Cuba seems to be transition from an authoritarian form of regime to a form o f democracy. In contrast to Belarus, Cu-ba seems to be willing to open up from seclusion and isolation, as well as listen to its people than what the state of Belarus is willing to do.</p>

The judiciary in Kenya has been progressively viewed as subservient to the executive, an upholder of state power and a poor protector of citizens’ rights. The rejection of the judiciary as an independent and impartial arbiter of disputes was a major contributor to the post-election violence experienced in December 2007 which resulted in anarchy and massive loss of lives and property. This thesis contends that there is a contextually symbiotic link between separation of powers, judicial independence and the rule of law. While focusing on the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, the research highlights the dangers of failure to maintain the appropriate balance of power between the executive, judiciary and the legislature, its ramifications to judicial independence and the rule of law. By analysing secondary data and using Kenya as a case study, this relationship is chronologically traced from the pre-colonial, colonial, independence and post-independence periods. An examination of successive constitutions exposes gaps and weaknesses in constitutional provisions guaranteeing judicial independence. Instances of violation are discussed with examples as confirmation that such protection was minimal, weak and not respected in practice. A high degree of executive intrusion, influence and control was evident inter alia in appointments, removal, funding and administration. Cumulatively, these factors contributed to the erosion of personal and institutional independence leading to drastic loss of confidence. Opportunities in terms of implemented reforms, especially the newly promulgated Constitution of Kenya 2010 are scrutinised. The thesis concludes that even though complete independence from the executive cannot be achieved nor is it desirable, more robust constitutional protection of judicial independence, coupled with a high degree of autonomy can be a strong guardian against violation. New threats are discovered. Further research, constitutional amendments and use of non-legal initiatives are proposed as key for future judicial reform.

<p>The Laws is generally regarded as Plato’s attempt to engage with the practical realities of political life, as opposed to the more idealistic, or utopian, vision of the Republic. Yet modern scholars have often felt disquieted at the central role of religion in the Laws’ second-best city and regime. There are essentially the two dominant interpretations on offer today: either religion supports a repressive theocracy, which controls every aspect of the citizens’ lives to such an extent that even philosophy itself is discouraged, or religion is an example of the kind of noble lie, which the philosopher must deceive the citizens into believing—viz., that a god, not a man, is the author of the regime’s laws. I argue that neither of these interpretations do justice to the dialogue’s intricately dramatic structure, and therefore to Plato’s treatment of civil religion. What I propose is a third position in which Plato both takes seriously the social and political utility of religion, and views theology as a legitimate, and even necessary, subject of philosophical inquiry without going so far as to advocate theocracy as the second best form of regime. </p><p>I conclude that a proper focus on the dialogue form, combined with a careful historical analysis of Plato’s use of social and political institutions, reveals an innovative yet traditional form of civil religion, purified of the harmful influence of the poets, based on the authority of the oracle at Delphi, and grounded on a philosophical conception of god as the eternal source of order, wisdom, and all that is good. Through a union of traditional Delphic theology and Platonic natural theology, Plato gives the city of the Laws a common cult acceptable to philosopher and non-philosopher alike, and thus, not only bridges the gap between religion and philosophy, but also creates a sense of community, political identity, and social harmony—the prerequisites for political order and stability. The political theology of the Laws, therefore, provides a rational defense of the rule of law (νόμος) re-conceived as the application of divine Reason (νοῦς) to human affairs.</p> / Dissertation

Sunset clauses are a commonly used statutory provision related to the temporary duration of various laws. Such clauses are scattered throughout the statute books. This thesis aims to shed light on the constitutional value of such clauses, in order to value them from the perspective of the separation of powers and the rule of law. We have an extant amount of literature on sunset clauses, especially regarding their utility in the United States. In the United Kingdom, we have a limited analysis with respect to specific fields, including emergency legislation. However, we lack a comprehensive analysis with regard to their constitutional value. This thesis’s analysis is conducted in three parts, separated into the historical, the positive, and the normative. All three parts of this thesis are interdependent, and the analysis of each subsequent part builds on the conclusion of its antecedent. The first part investigates the historical development of sunset clauses since the first Parliament in England. The positive analysis examines the contemporary utility of sunset clauses. Finally, the normative evaluation examines their interaction with several models of separation of powers as it values their impact on the rule of law. Depending on the separation of power model, such clauses play a role in the system of checks and balances. On the one hand, they impact the institutional relationship between the executive and legislative branches. On the other hand, they influence the interaction between the legislature and the courts. Although I acknowledge that their legislative use in limiting human rights diminishes the rule of law, they might have the exact opposite effect: on several occasions in the past, they were used to advance the rule of law, including the adoption of innovative legislation and the annulment of the death penalty. Indeed, this thesis attests to the constitutional value of sunset clauses.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

A democratic rule of law state combines two legal principles: the principle of democracy and the principle of rule of law. The democratic principle requires rule of the people and therefore implicitly the protection of political rights (in particular the right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association) that allow an individual to actively participate in the political community. The formal conception of rule of law, which is defined by the exercise of state power based on law, requires in particular the right of access to a court and the right of due process, which guarantee genuine enforceability of the law. The material conception of rule of law requires a much wider range of rights: according to Czech jurisprudence essentially all that are included in the Charter. This does not mean that any interference with the abovementioned rights means that a state is no longer a democratic rule of law state; if it did, there would not be a single democratic rule of law state in the world. However, any interference with fundamental rights must be carried out according to statute, must be proportionate to a legitimate aim and not interfere with the unbreachable core of human rights. The unbreachable core of a fundamental rights is a limit for the proportionality test; it is the core of...

Na última década emergiu na academia brasileira um movimento doutrinário denominado Neoconstitucionalismo, que advoga a adoção de uma série de posturas interpretativas que conferem maior liberdade aos juízes ao decidirem os casos constitucionais no intuito de promover transformação social pelo Direito. A partir de uma reconstrução interpretativa do ideal político Estado de Direito, procura-se avaliar o impacto das teses defendidas pelo modelo decisório neoconstitucionalista, concluindo-se que nas sociedades democráticas contemporâneas, em que há profundos desacordos morais, a sua adoção é inadequada por implicar violações à dignidade humana. / In the last decade, a legal movement known as neoconstitutionalism has emerged in the Brazilian legal academy. It advocates the adoption of a series of interpretative attitudes which confer a wide margin of discretion to judges when deciding constitutional cases with the aim of achieving social transformation through law. Relying on a reconstructive interpretation of the Rule of Law political ideal, this work aims to assess the impacts of the thesis defended by the neoconstitutionalist adjudicative model. It concludes, at the end, that in contemporary democratic societies, where people deeply disagree on moral regards, the adoption of neoconstitucionalism is inadequate in virtue of the violations it infringes upon human dignity.