The Rule of Law is one of the European Union’s founding values and is not only a Treaty obligation under Article 2 Treaty on European Union but also a part of the accession criteria for potential Member States of the Union. Therefore, the Rule of Law is part of the foundation of the European Union’s institutional order, and fundamental to European integration. During the past several years concerns have been raised regarding the Rule of Law in the Union and especially regarding Poland and Hungary. The European Union has established a comprehensive response function to breaches of the Rule of Law which both Member States have been subject to. However, there are differences in the procedure and different mechanisms have been used in relation to the two Member States, and while neither the Rule of Law nor the response mechanisms available are unstudied subjects neither for social sciences nor the legal community there is a lack of research combining the two fields and comparing the Member States. This study has been conducted with the goal to fill this gap by conducting a comparative study on the Rule of Law responses at the European Union’s disposal and using Poland and Hungary as the cases addressed. The study attempts to find a correlation between the breaches within the Rule of Law committed by the Member States and the responses used by the European Union to find motivations for why it is justified to approach the Member States differently. To accomplish this the study compares first the breaches found by the European Commission in the respective Member States and then the response mechanisms used to address the concerns. By conducting this comparative analysis, the study has found significant motivations behind the different approaches used by the European Union which shows a correlation between the concerns raised and the European Union’s approach to address the concerns. The result of the study shows that it is motivated to use different approaches despite the two Member States breaching the same value.

Im Idealfall bilden die Kopenhagener Kriterien zusammen mit dem Art.-7-Verfahren EUV einen lückenlosen Schutzmechanismus der EU-Werte. Die Verfassungskrisen in Ungarn und Polen haben allerdings nicht nur die Schwächen des Art.-7-Verfahren aufgedeckt, sondern auch die Frage aufgeworfen, ob die gegenwärtige Anwendungsweise des Kopenhagener Mechanismus ausreichend ist. Da das Beitrittsverfahren an sich Regierung-zentrisch ist, ist es offenkundig, dass dieses Verfahren nicht viel dazu beiträgt, die Bürger in den politischen Prozess ihres Landes einzubinden und die Zivilgesellschaft zu stärken. Es dauert eine gewisse Zeit, bis die konstitutionelle Grundwerte in die Herzen der Bürger eines neulich demokratisierten Landes gebracht werden. Die EU wurde allerdings dadurch unter Zeitdruck gesetzt, dass sie die Osterweiterung in einem relativ kurzen Zeitraum vollenden musste, um die Gunst der Stunde für ein vereintes Europa nutzen können. Der aktuellen Zustand der EU entspricht dem echten Bund im Schmittschen Sinn. Die Substanz der Homogenität in einem echten Bund ist das Produkt des Zusammenspiels der Verfassungsordnung des Bundes und seiner Mitglieder. Daraus ergibt sich, dass mit jedem Beitritt eines neuen Mitgliedstaats die Verfassungsidentität der EU mit einer neuen Verfassungsidentität angereichert und wesentlich geändert wird. Wenn man die Eingriffskapazität der EU in die innerstaatlichen Verfassungsordnungen über die heutige Intensität hinaus noch verstärken will, darf man die politische Natur der Werte-Frage in einem echten Bund nicht außer Acht lassen. Der Priorisierung der politischen Kriterien vor den wirtschaftlichen Kriterien, mit der die EU die Beitrittsverhandlungen durchgeführt hat, ist für Taiwans China-Politik ebenso wichtig. Eine entscheidende Aufgabe für Taiwan ist, klar zu machen, dass Taiwan politische Verhandlungen nur mit einem Ansprechpartner führen wird, der die gleichen politischen Werte einhält. / In the course of developing a general theory aiming at reversing and preventing the deterioration of political values in the European and East-Asian context, this study answered two sets of questions. First, on the empirical level, how reasonable and effective are the current pre-accession evaluations? Regarding the existing deterioration in the post-accession context, does it reflect any short coming in the way the EU implements the Copenhagen Criteria? Since Taiwan has not established such monitoring mechanism yet, what are the damages already done to Taiwan’s constitutional values? Second, on the normative level, this study followed two very different approaches. On the one hand, it clarified where the limits of judicial solution to this problem are. The fact that the sanction procedures prescribed in the current Art. 7 TEU take the form of collective actions revealed that what is at stake here is a shared value system. On the other hand, this study took into account the interaction between law and politics. The accession of new member states, as well the sanction against member states which failed to respect the political values of the Union, are in essence political decisions of the European Union. Since Taiwan needs to set up political conditions for it negotiations with China, the task is highly political, too. By identifying elements that caused or prevented the deterioration of political values, this study proposed suggestions for correcting and preventing deterioration by understanding its operation. A protective mechanism for Taiwan’s political values can create a reverse “lock-in effect.” By enunciating stringent negotiation guidelines and a code of conduct for Taiwanese government that requires cautiousness and vigilance, this mechanism will place the cross-strait negotiations under a legal framework which ensures that any given Taiwanese government could not sacrifice Taiwan’s constitutional values in exchange for advancing its political agenda.