Ce texte cherche à déterminer si à un niveau de productivité identique un écart salarial entre les hommes et les femmes immigrants québécois fortement scolarisés s’observe. À cette fin, un modèle de discrimination statistique est utilisé qui postule qu’il est plus coûteux pour un employeur d’évaluer la productivité d’une femme et que le signal de productivité se précise plus rapidement chez les hommes. Ces deux hypothèses permettent de formuler plusieurs prédictions théoriques portant sur l’écart salarial entre les sexes. Celles-ci sont vérifiées à l’aide de données obtenues par l’Enquête sur les immigrants de la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés. Les résultats suggèrent que la situation des immigrants occidentaux corrobore partiellement les prédictions théoriques, tandis que celle des immigrants provenant des pays en développement les rejette.

The thesis investigates the role of structural rigidities in recent labour market performances in Europe through various and complementary angles in five essays. By structural rigidities, we mean a lasting feature caused by a set of institutions, which prevents a market from operating efficiently. The approach is essentially empirical and macro-economic, while the scope of the analysis is definitely European, which is technically reflected in the use of either euro area aggregates or panels and cross-sections of European countries. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis focuses on the industry wage differentials, rent-sharing and the gender wage gap. I empirically investigate: i) the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, ii) how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector and iii) the existence of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, through the unobserved ability hypothesis.<p><p>The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. To do so, we have relied on a unique harmonised matched employer-employee data set, the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey. As far as we know, this paper is the first to analyse with recent techniques, on a comparable basis, and from a European perspective: i) inter-industry wage differentials by gender, ii) gender wage gaps by industry, and iii) the contribution of industry effects to the overall gender wage gap. It is also one of the few, besides Kahn (1998), to analyse for both sexes the relationship between collective bargaining characteristics and the dispersion of industry wage differentials. <p>Empirical findings show that, in all countries and for both sexes, wage differentials exist between workers employed in different sectors, even when controlling for working conditions, individual and firm characteristics. We also find that the hierarchy of sectors in terms of wages is quite similar for male and female workers and across countries. Yet, the apparent similarity between male and female industry wage differentials is challenged by standard statistical tests. Indeed, simple t-tests show that between 43 and 71% of the industry wage disparities are significantly different for women and men. Moreover, Chow tests indicate that sectoral wage differentials are significantly different as a group for both sexes in all countries. Regarding the dispersion of the industry wage differentials, we find that results vary for men and women, although not systematically nor substantially. Yet, the dispersion of industry wage differentials fluctuates considerably across countries. It is quite large in Ireland, Italy and the U.K. and relatively moderate in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. For both sexes, results point to the existence of a negative and significant relationship between the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining and the dispersion of industry wage differentials.<p>Furthermore, independently of the country considered, results show that more than 80% of the gender wage gaps within industries are statistically significant. The average industry gender wage gap ranges between -.18 in the U.K. and -.11 in Belgium. This means that on average women have an inter-industry wage differential of between 18 and 11% below that for men. Yet, correlation coefficients between the industry gender wage gaps across countries are relatively small and often statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that industries with the highest and the lowest gender wage gaps vary substantially across Europe.<p>Finally, results indicate that the overall gender wage gap, measured as the difference between the mean log wages of male and female workers, fluctuates between .18 in Denmark and .39 in the U.K. In all countries a significant (at the .01 level) part of this gap can be explained by the segregation of women in lower paying industries. Yet, the relative contribution of this factor to the gender wage gap varies substantially among European countries. It is close to zero in Belgium and Denmark, between 7 and 8% in Ireland, Spain and the U.K. and around 16% in Italy. Differences in industry wage premia for male and female workers significantly (at the .05 level) affect the gender wage gap in Denmark and Ireland only. In these countries, gender differences in industry wage differentials account for respectively 14 and 20% of the gender wage gap. To sum up, findings show that combined industry effects explain around 29% of the gender wage gap in Ireland, respectively 14 and 16% in Denmark and Italy, around 7% in the U.K. and almost nothing in Belgium and Spain. <p>In conclusion, our results emphasize that the magnitude of the gender wage gap as well as its causes vary substantially among the European countries. This suggests that no single policy instrument will be sufficient to tackle gender pay inequalities in Europe. Our findings indicate that policies need to be tailored to the very specific context of the labour market in each country.<p><p>The second chapter examines investigates how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. Empirical findings show that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee even when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Our instrumented wage-profit elasticity is of the magnitude 0.06 and it is not significantly different for men and women. Of the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 23.7% less than men), results show that around 14% can be explained by the fact that on average women are employed in firms where profits-per-employee are lower. Thus, findings suggest that a substantial part of the gender wage gap is attributable to the segregation of women is less profitable firms. <p><p>The third and final chapter contributes to the understanding of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, taking advantage of access to a unique matched employer-employee data set covering the period 1995-2002. Findings show the existence of large and persistent wage differentials among workers with the same observed characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors. The unobserved ability hypothesis may not be rejected on the basis of Martins’ (2004) methodology. However, its contribution to the observed industry wage differentials appears to be limited. Further results show that ceteris paribus workers earn significantly higher wages when employed in more profitable firms. The instrumented wage-profit elasticity stands at 0.063. This rent-sharing phenomenon accounts for a large fraction of the industry wage differentials. We find indeed that the magnitude, dispersion and significance of industry wage differentials decreases sharply when controlling for profits.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

In the first chapter of this thesis, we investigate the impact of human capital and wage structure on the gender pay in a panel of European countries using a newly available and appropriate database for cross-country comparisons and a comparable methodology for each country. <p><p>Our first question is :What role do certain individual characteristics and choices of working men and women play in shaping the cross-country differences in the gender pay gap? What is the exact size of the gender pay gap using the “more appropriate” database available for our purpose? Giving that there are mainly only two harmonized data-sets for comparing gender pay gap throughout Europe: the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the European Structure of Earning Survey (ESES). Each database having its shortages: the main weakness of the ECHP is the lack of perfect reliability of the data in general and of wages in particular. However the main advantage of this database is the panel-data dimension and the information on both households and individuals. The data of the ESES is, on the contrary, of a very high standard but it only covers the private sector and has a cross-sectional dimension. Furthermore only few countries are currently available :Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland and Italy. <p>We use the European Structure of Earning Survey (ESES) to analyse international differences in gender pay gaps in the private sector based on a sample of five European economies: Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Using different methods, we examine how wage structures, differences in the distribution of measured characteristics and occupational segregation contribute to and explain the pattern of international differences. Furthermore, we take account of the fact that indirect discrimination may influence female occupational distributions. We find these latter factors to have a significant impact on gender wage differentials. However, the magnitude of their effect varies across countries.<p><p>In the second chapter, we analyse the persistence of the gender pay differentials over time in Europe and better test the productivity hypothesis by taking into account unobserved heterogeneity. <p><p>Our second question is :What is the evolution of the pay differential between men and women over a period of time in Europe? And what is the impact of unobserved heterogeneity? <p>The researcher here provides evidence on the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity on estimated gender pay differentials. Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), we present a cross-country comparison of the evolution of unadjusted and adjusted gender pay gaps using both cross-section and panel-data estimation techniques. The analysed countries differ greatly with respect to labour market legislation, bargaining practices structure of earnings and female employment rates. On adjusting for unobserved heterogeneity, we find a narrowed male-female pay differential, as well as significantly different rates of return on individual characteristics. In particularly, the adjusted wage differential decreases by 7 per cent in Belgium, 14 per cent in Ireland, between 20-30 per cent Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain and of 41 per cent and 54 per cent in the UK and in Denmark respectively. <p><p>In the third chapter, we investigate causes of the gender pay gap beyond the gender differences in observed and unobserved productive characteristics or simply the sex. Explanations of the gender pay gap may be the penalty women face for having children. Obviously, the motherhood wage penalty is relevant to larger issues of gender inequality given that most women are mothers and that childrearing remains a women’s affair. Thus, any penalty associated with motherhood but not with fatherhood affects many women and as such contributes to gender inequalities as the gender pay gap. Furthermore, the motherhood wage effect may be different along the wage distribution as women with different earnings may not be equal in recognising opportunities to reconcile their mother’s and earner’s role. This brings us to our third question. <p><p>Our third question is :What is the wage effect for mothers of young children in the household? And does it vary along the wage distribution of women?<p>This chapter provides more insight into the effect of the presence of young children on women’s wages. We use individual data from the ECHP (1996-2001) and both a generalised linear model (GLM) and quantile regression (QR) techniques to estimate the wage penalty/bonus associated with the presence of children under the age of sixteen for mothers in ten EU Member States. We also correct for potential selection bias using the Heckman (1979) correction term in the GLM (at the mean) and a selectivity correction term in the quantile regressions. To distinguish between mothers according to their age at the time of their first birth, wage estimations are carried out, separately, for mothers who had their first child before the age of 25 (‘young mothers’) and mothers who had their first child after the age of 25 (‘old mothers’). Our results suggest that on average young mothers earn less than non-mothers while old mothers obtain a gross wage bonus in all countries. These wage differentials are mainly due to differences in human capital, occupational segregation and, to a lesser extent, sectoral segregation between mothers and non-mothers. This overall impact of labour market segregation, suggests a “crowding” explanation of the family pay gap – pay differential between mothers and non-mothers. Nevertheless, the fact that we still find significant family pay gaps in some countries after we control for all variables of our model suggests that we cannot reject the “taste-based” explanation of the family gap in these countries. Our analysis of the impact of family policies on the family pay gap across countries has shown that parental leave and childcare policies tend to decrease the pay differential between non-mothers and mothers. Cash and tax benefits, on the contrary, tend to widen this pay differential. Sample selection also affects the level of the mother pay gap at the mean and throughout the wage distribution in most countries. Furthermore, we find that in most countries inter-quantile differences in pay between mothers and non-mothers are mainly due to differences in human-capital. Differences in their occupational and sectoral segregation further shape these wage differentials along the wage distribution in the UK, Germany and Portugal in our sample of young mothers and in Spain in the sample of old mothers.<p><p>In the fourth chapter, we analyse the combined effect of motherhood and the family status on women’s wage.<p> <p>Our fourth question is :Is there a lone motherhood pay gap in Europe? And does it vary along the wage distribution of mothers?<p>Substantial research has been devoted to the analysis of poverty and income gaps between households of different types. The effects of family status on wages have been studied to a lesser extent. In this chapter, we present a selectivity corrected quantile regression model for the lone motherhood pay gap – the differential in hourly wage between lone mothers and those with partners. We used harmonized data from the European Community Household Panel and present results for a panel of European countries. We found evidence of lone motherhood penalties and bonuses. In our analysis, most countries presented higher wage disparities at the top of the wage distribution rather than at the bottom or at the mean. Our results suggest that cross-country differences in the lone motherhood pay gap are mainly due to differences in observed and unobserved characteristics between partnered mothers and lone mothers, differences in sample selection and presence of young children in the household. We also investigated other explanations for these differences such as the availability and level of childcare arrangements, the provision of gender-balanced leave and the level of child benefits and tax incentives. As expected, we have found significant positive relationship between the pay gap between lone and partnered mothers and the childcare, take-up and cash and tax benefits policies. Therefore improving these family policies would reduce the raw pay gap observed. <p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

La présente étude porte sur l'évolution du rapport salarial entre ses travailleurs et l'Union minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) de 1925 à 1927. Nous voulons saisir les mécanismes mis en place par cette entreprise en vue de constituer une main-d'oeuvre stable et qualifiée. Dans ce but, nous analysons la politique sociale de l'entreprise, son impact sur le processus de formation de la classe ouvrière et les réactions des travailleurs. Dans la mesure où les sources nous le permettent, nous examinons les stratégies et les moyens de leur application mis en place par l'UMHK pour mettre en place dans ses camps une société ouvrière qui lui serait dévouée. La thèse analyse également la part des ouvriers dans ce processus de formation de classe ouvrière qui a été parfois accéléré, parfois bloqué par les décisions prises par l'UMHK et par d'autres institutions coloniales. Elaborée sur la base des documents d'archives et des sources orales (interviews et récits de vie d'anciens travailleurs et de leurs enfants ), l'étude montre que la pénétration du capitalisme industriel dans le Haut-Katanga a créé les conditions de formation d'une classe ouvrière. L'UMHK a géré sa main-d'oeuvre d'une manière originale. Le rapport salarial paternaliste a permis d'inculquer aux ouvriers une conscience sociale différentielle, en partie le résultat d'une vie en vase clos. En effet, c'est la rémunération qui réglait le niveau de vie du travailleur de l'UMHK. La nourriture, les vêtements de travail, le logement, l'enseignement et les soins médicaux tous offerts en nature au travailleur et à sa famille ont permis à l'entreprise de contrôler la reproduction de la force du travail. De ce fait, le trait le plus saillant de l'évolution de la conscience de la classe ouvrière à l'UMHK a été la reconnaissance de former un monde des privilégiés distincts des autres couches de la société u: aine qui ne bénéficiait pas de mêmes conditions matérielles de vie et de travail. L'étude montre qu'au début la réaction des Africains a été caractérisée par la résistance aux recrutements et par la désertion au travail. Ensuite, la politique de stabilisation, instaurée par l'Union minière en 1928, a permis aux Africains de constituer un élément actif et dynamique du processus de formation de la classe ouvrière. Les travailleurs ont progressivement pris conscience de leur condition ouvrière et nous pouvons même parler de la naissance d'une culture ouvrière dans les camps de l'UMHK. / Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2013

La présente étude porte sur l'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (actuellement la Générale des carrières et des mines). Nous y analysons les facteurs de formation d'une élite professionnelle. La thèse examine le rapport entre les politiques salariales et les schèmes de perceptions et de représentations des catégories sociales. Nous soutenons que ces politiques ont conduit à l'émergence d'une catégorie sociale incapable de s'assumer puisqu’en ville coloniale, seule l'UMHK contrôlait les ressources économiques et symboliques de la modernité. C'est l'entreprise qui détenait le secret de la formation professionnelle et définissait les exigences de cotation et de classification des emplois. Ces politiques se sont avérées des mécanismes générateurs de l'inégalité sociale au sein de l'entreprise. Pour vérifier nos hypothèses de travail, nous avons recouru aux approches longitudinales qui recommandent l'analyse des variables contextuelles: origine sociale, niveau d'instruction, classe d'emploi, niveau de salaire, rapports sur le chantier et hors du milieu de travail. Après une confrontation de ces données avec le vécu ouvrier, l'étude a montré que les modes d’ajustements des ouvriers spécialisés à la culture d'entreprise ont été des signes incontestables d'évolution des mentalités des travailleurs allant de pair avec une certaine permanence des caractéristiques de mode de vie propre à ce milieu. Pour l'entreprise qui engage et qui forme sa main-d'oeuvre, la rémunération a été la condition nécessaire (mais non suffisante) de la participation du travailleur à la réalisation d'une oeuvre commune. L'expérience du travail n'est alors pas seulement vécue comme une réalité professionnelle et économique mais plus largement comme signe d'une inégalité sociale. L'étude a relevé que l'absence d'une élite responsable a aussi été liée à l'absence d'une base économique et sociale. Dans ces conditions, la reproduction de la conscience de classe n'a pas pu se faire aisément. Les politiques salariales sont faites des multiples stratégies de division sociale en vue d'obtenir une paix sociale aussi durable que possible. L'étude suggère d'étudier à l'avenir les autres systèmes de différenciations sociales et économiques au sein de l'UMHK. Elle propose une approche pro-active qui encouragerait les services de qualification professionnelle (QPR) à contribuer simultanément à la satisfaction des objectifs des individus et ceux de l'entreprise. La clé de croissance est dans la plus grande participation des travailleurs à l'organisation du travail. C'est grâce à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des travailleurs que l'entreprise pourrait devenir moins paternaliste, moins individualisante, mais plus objectivante. / Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2013

Le but de ce mémoire est d’établir le profil de rémunération des diplômés de maîtrise en économique de l’université Laval et de calculer les rendements associés à l’obtention de ce diplôme. La méthodologie utilisée est identique à celle adoptée par Vaillancourt et Ebrahimi (2010) et Stark (2007). Elle combine l’analyse coût-bénéfice de Becker (1960) et l’analyse par l’estimation du modèle économétrique de Mincer (1974). Nous avons ainsi calculé le rendement de la maîtrise par rapport au baccalauréat en économique d’abord pour l’individu et ensuite pour la société. Le calcul a été fait d’abord de façon générale puis suivant le sexe et le secteur d’activité des diplômés. La base de données que nous utilisons provient de l’enquête réalisée en 2014 par le service de placement de l’université Laval(SPLA) en collaboration avec le département d’économique auprès des diplômés. Nos résultats montrent que le principal employeur des diplômés du département est le secteur public incluant la fonction publique fédérale, la fonction publique provinciale, la fonction publique municipale et l’enseignement. La majorité des diplômés sont de sexe masculin. Le revenu des hommes reste plus élevé que celui des femmes et le revenu des travailleurs du secteur privé plus élevé que celui des travailleurs du public. Par ailleurs, les résultats suggèrent que l’investissement permettant le passage du baccalauréat à la maîtrise est rentable à la fois pour l’individu et pour la société. En effet, le rendement privé moyen est de 5:3% et le rendement social moyen est de 3:7%. Le rendement privé des hommes est de 5:3% et celui des femmes est de 5:4%. Le rendement privé des travailleurs du secteur privé est de 5:3% et celui des travailleurs du secteur public est de 5:4%. Les résultats correspondants, au niveau du rendement social, sont de 3:8%, 3:5%, 3:8% et 3:6% respectivement pour les hommes, les femmes, les travailleurs du privé et les travailleurs du public. On remarque ainsi que le rendement social est généralement inférieur au rendement privé, le rendement privé des femmes supérieur à celui des hommes et le rendement privé dans le secteur public est plus grand qu’au privé. Mais les différences observées à la fois entre les sexes et entre le type d’employeur sont de faible magnitude. Les conclusions qualitatives que nous tirons vont dans le même sens que celles de Vaillancourt et Ebrahimi (2010) et Stark (2007) même si les chiffres sont sensiblement différents. / The purpose of this paper is to establish the Laval University Master graduates in economic’s earnings profile and calculate the returns associated with this diploma. The methodology used is identical to that used by Vaillancourt et Ebrahimi (2010) and Stark (2007). It combines the cost-benefit analysis of Becker (1960) and analysis by estimating the Mincer (1974) econometric model . We have calculated the return of master over the Bachelor in Economic firstly for the individual and then for the society. The calculation was first made generally and then by gender and type of employer of graduates. The database we use comes from the survey conducted in 2014 among graduates of the Economics Department by the Laval University placement service(SPLA) in collaboration with the department of economics. Our results show that the major employer of graduates of the department is the public sector including the federal public service, the provincial public service, the municipal public service, teaching. The majority of the graduates is male. The income of men is still higher than that of women and income of private sector workers are higher than those in public workers. Furthermore, the results suggest that the investment for the passage from bachelor to master is profitable both for the individual and for society. Indeed, the average private return is 5:3% and the average social return is 3:7%. The private return for males is 5:3% and women is 5:4%. The private return of private sector workers is 5:3% and that of public sector workers is 5:4%. The results corresponding to social performance are 3:7%, 3:5%, 3:8% and 3:6%, respectively, for men, women, workers in the private and public workers. We note as well as the social return is usually less than the private return, the private return of women exceeds that of men and the private performance in the public sector is larger than private. But the differences both between the sexes and the type of employer are of low magnitude. The qualitative conclusions we draw are going in the same direction as those of Vaillancourt et Ebrahimi (2010) and Stark (2007).

L’étude de la protection sociale de l’agriculteur victime d’accidents fait le constatd’inégalités manifestes entre les victimes elles-mêmes et entre le régime des accidents dutravail et celui du droit commun. Ces inégalités sont inhérentes à la qualité d’agriculteur ;qu’il soit salarié ou non, ce dernier ne bénéficie pas des mêmes droits. En outre, l’agriculteurblessé dans le cadre de son activité professionnelle n’aura qu’une réparation forfaitaire. Cettedernière tend à compenser la perte de revenu et l’incidence professionnelle de l’accident.L’indemnisation des préjudices personnels est exclue, sauf dans l’hypothèse d’une fauteinexcusable de l’employeur. Quant aux victimes d’accidents de droit commun, leur protectionsociale n’est optimisée que si elles possèdent une complémentaire prévoyance qui va parfaireles remboursements en espèces et en nature du régime agricole. En dehors de la prise encharge du régime légal de base, la réparation des accidents de droit commun tend à êtreintégrale. Afin que toutes les victimes d’accidents soient traitées de manière égale par le droitet qu’une réparation de tous leurs préjudices puisse être réalisée, nous préconisons dessolutions pour tenter de faire disparaître les inégalités entre les agriculteurs victimesd’accidents. / The study of the social welfare of the farmer victim of accidents reveals theexistence of disparities between the victims themselves and between the industrial accidentsand the common law. These disparities are inherent to farmer’s quality; whether he isemployed or not, the latter does not benefit from the same rights. In addition, the injuredfarmer in the course of his professional activity will have only a fixed compensation. Thelatter tends to compensate the loss of income and the professional incidence of the accident.Compensation for personal injury is excluded except in the hypothesis of unforgivablemisconduct of the employer. As for the victims of accidents of common law, their socialwelfare is only optimized if they possess a top up insurance plan that will completerepayments in cash and in kind of the agricultural system. Except the coverage of the basiclegal system, the compensation of accidents of common law tends to be complete. In order toensure that all accident victims are treated with equal manner by law and that compensationfor all their injuries can be achieved, we recommend solutions so that the disparities betweenthe farmers victims of accidents can disappear.

The main contribution of my thesis is the analysis of substantial empirical material that I have collected from Community trade union actors. My analysis focuses on the institutional strategies of the sectoral European trade union federations and their implications for the Europeanisation of wages policy. I have demonstrated that the development of European coordination processes of national collective bargaining, particularly at sectoral level, has contributed to reviving the concept of collective bargaining and professional relations in the European Area, which until then had been covered in the literature by the social dialogue. I have identified three obstacles to collective negociations at a European level: the “depoliticised” wage in the economic partnership, employers identified as the “lobby partner” in the sectoral social dialogue, and the difficulties encountered in the Europeanisation of trade unions.<p><p>L’apport majeur de notre thèse est l’analyse d’un matériel empirique conséquent que nous avons collecté auprès des acteurs syndicaux communautaires. Notre analyse se concentre sur les stratégies institutionnelles des fédérations syndicales sectorielles européennes et sur leurs implications en matière d’européanisation de la politique salariale. Nous avons démontré que le développement des processus de coordination européenne des négociations collectives nationales, en particulier au niveau sectoriel, peut contribuer à renouveler la conception de la négociation collective et des relations professionnelles dans l’espace européen jusqu’alors appréhendée dans la littérature par le dialogue social. Nous avons identifié trois obstacles à la négociation collective européenne :le salaire « dépolitisé » dans le partenariat économique, le patronat devenu « partenaire-lobby » dans le dialogue social sectoriel, et la difficile européanisation syndicale.<p><p><p> / Doctorat en sciences sociales, Orientation sociologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished