Thesis (M.A.)--Zheng zhi da xue. / Cover title. Reproduced from ms. copy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-85).

Texte remanié de: Tesis Dr.--Derecho--Madrid--Facultad de derecho, Universidad Complutense, 1986. / Notes bibliogr.

This dissertation examines, both theoretically and empirically, the effects of international policies, especially of sanctions, on conflicts. In theoretical analysis, we consider conflicts (both civil and inter-state) related to natural resources and examine how sanctions on natural resource exports affect the intensity of conflicts. However, for the empirical analysis, we consider only the civil conflicts and examine how international sanctions affect the duration of civil conflicts. In chapter 1, we develop a two-period general equilibrium model on the relationship between natural resources and civil conflicts. Contrary to the most of the existing literature, we assume that resource extraction and wage rate are endogenous during the conflict. We find that the effects of current international sanctions on civil conflict depend critically on whether the budget constraints of the warring groups are binding or non-binding, and whether wage rate is exogenous or endogenous. Under both binding and non-binding budgets, the current sanction can be counter-productive. However, a threat of future sanction reduces conflict intensity, when the budget constraint is non-binding. An improvement in agricultural productivity may also limit the conflict. Our results also suggest that the most effective policy for conflict resolution would be bilateral piece-meal reduction in war efforts. Chapter 2 develops a two-period general equilibrium model linking natural resources to inter-state conflict, treating resource extraction and wage rate are endogenous. First, we characterize the war equilibrium and derive a number of properties of it. Second, we examine the effects of different types of trade sanctions imposed by the international community on war efforts of the two countries. We find that a temporary current sanction on both countries, or even on one of the countries, will be counter-productive, and an anticipated future sanction on both countries will unambiguously reduce war intensity. Whether an anticipated future sanction on one of countries will reduce war intensity will depend on the level of resource stock; the effect of a permanent sanction on both countries is ambiguous: war intensities will fall only if the resource stocks of the countries are sufficiently high. Finally, in chapter 3, we examine empirically the effects of international sanctions on the expected duration of civil conflicts. Contrary to the most of the previous findings, we find that sanctions reduce the expected duration of civil conflicts. Our finding is robust for different controls, different parametric models, and with consideration of endogeneity of sanctions. However, not all types of sanction are equally successful in shortening conflicts. Total economic embargoes and arms sanctions are effective, but trade sanctions, aid suspension, and other sanctions do not work. We also find that both multi-lateral and unilateral sanctions (mainly US sanctions) can reduce duration of civil wars.

From Introduction: There are few more emotive and contentious contemporary issues of enduring nature than the subject of economic sanctions and South Africa. The controversy surrounding this issue has implications for the structure of international social, political and economic order. The threads of the debate are woven into the historical fabric of the past two decades, during which the acrimony of arguments both for and against sanctions on South Africa has increased. Indeed, for each argument in the debate can be found a counter-argument and "lies, damned lies and statistics" abound. The complex and widespread nature of the question has elevated a practical issue into the realm of theoretical analysis. This thesis is neither purely descriptive nor purely theoretical. It has essentially two focal points, firstly, an attempt at a systematic and reasoned investigation of the many claims and counter-claims, designed to put these arguments into a broad economic framework. There is generally a greater volume of pro-sanctions literature than anti-sanctions literature, some of which is freely available in South Africa, while some is restricted and some not available at all. However, this partial lack of accessibility would seem to pose no material problem of omission: as much of the literature is repetitive, the unavailable material is usually adequately "represented" by material which is available. Also a great part of the literature contains little or no economic analysis since it focuses more on political issues. In this respect the thesis tries to represent the main points of the broad arguments concerned rather than individual nuances and personal viewpoints. It is concerned with sanctions of an economic nature rather than wider sanctions that may affect South African citizens more generally, for example, sport and diplomatic boycotts, bans and restrictions on international travel, etc.

The subject of my thesis is the following: “Economic sanctions and international conflicts: the case of Russia in comparative perspective.” I will demonstrate the impact the economic sanctions have had on a state’s foreign policy; whether they have succeeded in persuading or forcing an embargoed country to change its geopolitical actions. I believe there is a case that argues that economic sanctions can work provided that they are applied in a right manner against properly defined targets with a clear purpose. My thesis will pursue a practical aim of providing direct and proven data based on empirical analysis to reinforce the theoretical base of the tool of economic sanctions. Apart from the research conducted on past case studies, the empirical research will concentrate on the Russian case. It will make use of think-tank reports, official documents and journalists’ investigations, in which the case for sanctions with regard to Russia is well-documented. In order to understand the development of the tool of economic sanctions, this paper will also outline their main characteristics. A historical and comparative approach is best suited for this purpose, as it offers solid theoretical data to reinforce the main arguments of the study. This information provides a useful tool for building this research project in a conclusive and definitive way.

Le statut des dirigeants sociaux en droit de l’OHADA présente une physionomie homogène. Il est rigide dans l’exercice de la direction sociale mais souple dans l’organisation de la direction sociale. La rigidité garantit à la société une direction responsable. En cela, les dirigeants sont dotés de pouvoirs légaux dans le cadre des actes courants pour qu’ils disposent d’une liberté d’action dans la réalisation des buts de la société. Ces pouvoirs connaissent un accroissement sans précédent à cause du déclin des contre-pouvoirs classiquement destinés à les modérer dans le cadre des actes graves. Les dirigeants peuvent donc accomplir valablement des actes graves au mépris des prescriptions qui les encadrent. Face à cet accroissement inquiétant de la souveraineté des dirigeants, les sanctions ont ravi la légitimité aux contre-pouvoirs classiques pour postuler en véritable contre-pouvoir. Les sanctions s’appliquent aux dirigeants chaque fois qu’ils portent atteinte à un intérêt protégé. Leur application s’impose qu’il s’agisse d’actes courants ou graves, qu’il s’agisse de dirigeant associé unique ou non, que la société soit in bonis ou en difficulté, ou encore que le dirigeant soit de droit ou de fait. Mais, la rigidité de la direction ne garantit pas toujours son efficacité. De plus, trop de rigidité tue la rigidité. L’introduction d’une dose de souplesse dans la direction des sociétés peut contribuer à la rendre plus dynamique. Le cadre approprié de cette souplesse est l’organisation de la direction. Ce cadre offre des ressources pour rendre la direction plus performante et très bien structurée. La performance peut être atteinte à travers le renforcement de la direction en la dotant de ressources humaines suffisantes, compétentes et stables. Elle se reflète par le succès de la politique managériale voire les résultats sociaux positifs. Sans doute, une meilleure structuration de la direction contribuerait au même résultat. Certes, la liberté d’organiser la direction est réduite lorsqu’elle porte sur ses structures. Mais cette liberté peut s’exprimer dans le respect de l’ordre public sociétaire. Ainsi, mis à part la nécessité de redéfinir le rapport des structures de l’exécutif des sociétés, il importe de consolider le contrôle des actes des dirigeants en facilitant l’implication d’organes externes à la direction pour aboutir à une gouvernance sociale dynamique. / The manager statute in OHADA law presents a homogeneous face. On the one hand, the statute is rigid in the practice of organization’s manager. This rigidity bases on two fundamental elements : the legal powers of the managers and the judicial sanctions which are applied against the faults of the managers. The powers are increasing because of the saving of their inflexible powers in the ordinary operations and the decline of the classic’s force of opposition witch are making out of protecting the organizations against the serious operations. In front of increasing omnipotence of the managers, the judicial sanctions appear as veritable force of opposition to dissuade and punish the faults of the managers. The sanctions are applying to any faults which are committed in ordinary or grave operations. On the other hand, the statute is flexible in the management’s organization. Generally, this flexibility is real when it is necessary to reinforce or stabilize the management. But, the liberty of the management’s organization is limited when it concerns the structures. The liberty is limited by the necessity to respect the organization’s law. A part of the necessity to review the collaboration between the executive structures, it is important to reinforce the control on the managers operations by facilitating the implication of the extern structures in the organization’s direction to get dynamic governance.

The SEC relies heavily on ‘no-fault’ settlements in its enforcement, where targets avoid costly litigation by accepting sanctions without admitting or denying fault. This policy is argued to enable the agency to pursue greater numbers of violators. However, opponents argue that no-fault sanctions may be less effective, reducing fines to a ‘cost of business’. In an experiment, I examine the effects of fault assignment on managers’ cost perceptions, ethical framing and compliance. I manipulate the presence of fault assignment in prospective sanctions, and additionally manipulate sanction strength and sanction target - attributes that commonly vary in sanctions and which may interact with fault assignment. I find that all manipulated sanction attributes increase managers’ cost perceptions, and that managers’ cost perceptions are associated with greater compliance frequency and compliance quality. I also find that managers facing fault assignment in manager-targeted sanction conditions perceive their compliance differently – as an ethical, rather than economic choice. Consequently, these managers comply more frequently with costly regulations and select higher quality compliance than do managers in manager-targeted no-fault conditions. Targeting firms with sanctions also increases managers’ ethical perceptions, but adding fault to firm-targeted sanctions does not further increase ethical perceptions or compliance. My findings are consistent with sanctions facilitating greater ethical awareness and compliance when fault targets managers or when sanctions target firms, and with ethical awareness facilitating greater compliance. Supplementary analysis suggests that results are stronger among individuals high in ‘dark triad’ personality traits (narcissism, machiavellianism, and psychopathy), suggesting that findings generalize to subpopulations thought to be high in dark triad traits such as firm managers (O’Reilly et al. 2014).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-40). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-40). Also available on the Internet.

De nombreuses obligations d'information sont édictées en droit des contrats de consommation sous l'impulsion du législateur de l'Union européenne et sont donc communes aux droits français et luxembourgeois. Dans ce contexte, l'obligation d'information possède un double objectif de protection du consommateur en éclairant son consentement, et de régulation du marché en favorisant une concurrence loyale. Le manquement par le professionnel à son obligation légale d'information doit être sanctionné afin d'en assurer l'effectivité. La sanction de l'obligation légale d'information en droit des contrats de consommation doit être analysée sous l'angle de son efficacité, autrement dit de la capacité des effets qu’elle produit à atteindre les objectifs qui lui ont été assignés. L'analyse des droits des contrats de consommation français et luxembourgeois, droits similaires mais qui présentent des spécificités, permet de mettre en perspective les choix effectués par chaque législateur en terme de sanction de l'obligation légale d'information, et d'en déduire les propositions visant à améliorer ces systèmes de sanction actuels / Numerous legal duties to disclose information are promulgated in consumer contract law by the legislational body of the European Union and are thus common to French and Luxembourgish laws. In this context, the legal duty to disclose information possesses a double objective to protect the consumer by enlightening their consent, and regulating the market by favoring loyal competition. A breach of obligatory information disclosures by a professional must be sanctioned to ensure the effectiveness of the obligation. The penalty for breaching the legal obligation to disclose information in consumer contract law must be analyzed using its angle of efficiency within the capacity of its effects to reach the assigned goals. Analyzing French and Luxembourgish consumer contract laws, both similar but with specificities, surmounts a perspective of legislatory choices in terms of sanctioning the legal duties to disclose information, and also aids by informing proposals to improve these current systems of sanction