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Deflationary Approaches to ScepticismBuchanan, Reid 06 1900 (has links)
This dissertation examines a traditional philosophical problem within a novel framework. The so-called "problem of the external world" is a problem about how knowledge, and even reasonable belief, about the world are possible, and it is best characterized as the challenge to show how and why scepticism about the external world -the absurd view that such knowledge is impossible -is incorrect. My framework for the examination of this problem involves two major elements.
The first element involves a general characterization of the nature of "perennial" philosophical problems, like the problem of the external world, that attempts to isolate the specific features that render them problematic, which, in turn, isolates what is required for their solutions. Applying this characterization to the problem of the external world, the second element of the framework involves distinguishing between two approaches for the solving of the problem, which I label "constructive" and "deflationary," and establishing why the latter approach is preferable. I further distinguish between two general types of deflationary approaches -"therapeutic diagnosis," and "theoretical diagnosis''' -and examine in detail what I take to be the major representatives of each strategy. In the process I offer novel critical interpretations of the work of G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as some of the first detailed critical discussions of recent responses to scepticism by Hilary Putnam and Michael Williams. My general aim is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of both deflationary approaches as responses to scepticism. I argue that all of these attempts to solve the problem are unsatisfactory, and that the challenge to show why scepticism about the external world is incorrect has not yet been met. However, and this is perhaps the most important contribution of the dissertation, I hope to have shown where we should and should not look to meet the challenge. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
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Scepticism and MetaphilosophySmith, Derek Danny 06 1900 (has links)
Scepticism, taken as a challenge to the possibility of justifying knowledge claims in general, has a history perhaps as long and varied as attempts to construct positive theories of knowledge. The relation that holds between scepticism and the rest of epistemology is often assumed to be straightforwardly adversarial. However, in light of the widespread "end or transformation" debate within epistemology in recent decades, the proliferation of sophisticated scholarship concerning scepticism and justification may be taken as a prima facie endorsement of the continuing vitality of traditional epistemology.
The publication in 1984 of Barry Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, focused interest in the epistemological community on the burden of specifically modem (global, post-Cartesian, external world) scepticism. However, during the overlapping two decades since Significance, the influence of Richard Rorty's work (particularly Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature published in 1979) has led to a growing suspicion that epistemology has neither a stable nor defensible mandate. In this thesis, I try to connect the two discussions in a novel way, by arguing that the metaphilosophical problems arising from the stalemate I diagnose in the vibrant contemporary scepticism debate does not suggest that epistemology as a discipline is robustly healthy. I characterize metaphilosophical issues as a cluster of concerns involving the methodology, nature, aim, self image and criteria of satisfaction of doing philosophy. Most generally, metaphilosophy is a philosophical exploration of the nature of philosophy; more specifically, it deals with the expectations and aspirations of inquiry.
David Hume is rightly remembered as a thoughtful exponent of the power of sceptical reasoning. More recently, he has been recognized for his influential attempt to develop a naturalistic theory of belief that serves to explain how we form and tenaciously cling to our most deeply held beliefs-despite our inability to rationally justify them. I contend that there are metaphilosophical lessons to be learned from Hume's struggle to maintain and defend the theoretical invulnerability of scepticism, despite his evident discomfort adjusting to the potential consequences of such a position. Michael Williams has been an insightful critic of the "pessimism" that he detects in the work of Stroud and "the New Humeans." I outline the major issues in his exchange with Stroud, and evaluate the strengths of each position. I also argue that Williams' "contextualism" fails to rescue epistemology in any substantial way from the fundamental sceptical challenges that can be raised. For each of the central philosophers under consideration (David Hume, Barry Stroud, and Michael Williams), I construct an account of what I call their criteria of satisfaction. The specific classification of particular criteria is much less important here than the metaphilosophical lesson that I extract from the nature of the frequent clashes between different epistemologist's favoured criteria.
Into the contemporary debate about modem scepticism, I introduce ancient
sceptical concerns like the "problem of the criterion" and the Five Modes of Agrippa,
which serve to illustrate the importance of long-standing sceptical metaphilosophical
considerations for this discussion. I contend that these ancient problems can help clarify the nature of the contemporary stalement in the debate about modem scepticism. Even if epistemologists become dissatisfied with what they take to be the criteria of satisfaction of the traditional project, motivating the adoption of revised criteria of satisfaction will still encounter grave difficulties.
Finally, I discuss possible morals to be drawn from the wider metaphilosophical concerns. I ultimately argue that the remarkably active state of contemporary literature about scepticism should not be mistaken as a straightforward positive indicator of the continued health of philosophical theories of knowledge. To the contrary, an examination of the metaphilosophical issues surrounding scepticism reveals even more urgent problems with the inherent variability and instability of epistemic criteria of satisfaction. An exploration of these issues threatens to lead if not to metaphilosophical scepticism, then at least to a thorough reevaluation of the nature and self-image of the epistemological project. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)
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Investigating ontological talkSacks, M. D. January 1985 (has links)
No description available.
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The evidential force of religious experienceFranks Davis, C. E. S. January 1986 (has links)
No description available.
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Memory, rules and private languageHudson, J. January 1987 (has links)
No description available.
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Meta-epistemological scepticism : criticisms and a defenceRanalli, Christopher January 2016 (has links)
The epistemological problem of the external world asks: (1) “How is knowledge of the world possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible?” This is a “how-possible?” question: it asks how something is possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible (cf. Cassam 2007; Nozick 1981; Stroud 1984). Now consider the following question, which asks: (2) “How is a philosophically satisfying answer to (1) possible?” Scepticism is the thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the first question. Meta-epistemological scepticism is the thesis that a satisfying philosophical explanation of how our knowledge of the world is possible is itself not possible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the second question. In this thesis, I explore the prospects of meta-epistemological scepticism. In particular, I structure the thesis around two master arguments from Stroud (1984, 2000, 2004, and 2009) for meta-epistemological scepticism. The first argument is what I call “Stroud’s puzzle”, and the second argument is “Stroud’s dilemma” (cf. Cassam 2009). I argue that Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. However, I also argue that Stroud’s dilemma withstands serious objections (e.g., from Sosa 1994, Williams 1996, and Cassam 2009). In short, while Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism, Stroud’s dilemma does seem to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. This thesis therefore represents a partial defence of meta-epistemological scepticism. Meta-epistemological scepticism is therefore a live option in epistemology. In Chapter 1, I explain what meta-epistemological is, present Stroud’s puzzle and Stroud’s dilemma for meta-epistemological scepticism, and argue that meta-epistemological sceptics are not committed to first-order scepticism. In Chapter 2, I examine what I call the “anti-revisionist” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 3, I examine the “conditional scepticism” premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 4, I look at Williams’s (1996) master argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and argue that it fails. In Chapter 5, I look at externalist responses to Stroud’s dilemma, and in particular, Sosa (1994). I argue that Sosa’s objection fails, and therefore Stroud’s dilemma survives serious externalist objections. In Chapter 6, I explain Cassam’s (2009) argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and I argue that it fails. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, summarising the main results.
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Why the ascriber contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox is unnecessaryMacDonald, Ian James 13 September 2010
A widely discussed philosophical puzzle in contemporary epistemology is the so-called sceptical paradox. Ascriber contextualism has taken centre stage as the anti-sceptical theory that purportedly offers the best solution to the sceptical paradox. Ascriber contextualists Stewart Cohen (1988, 1999) and Keith DeRose (1995) advertise their anti-sceptical theory as the one that exclusively explains and solves it. This is false advertising, however. My thesis, which has been greatly influenced by the critical work of Michael Williams (1991) and Duncan Pritchard (2005), is that the generation of the sceptical paradox depends on whether the epistemologist is an internalist or externalist about knowledge, and that the ascriber contextualist attempt to solve the sceptical paradox rests on a long history of mistakes concerning internalist assumptions made by externalists Fred Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981). By applying the semantic thesis of ascriber contextualism to epistemology, ascriber contextualists seek to emend the rejection of the closure principle made by these externalists. This rejection came from these externalists mistakenly making internalist assumptions when facing sceptical hypotheses. Unfortunately, ascriber contextualists leave much unfixed, and end up inheriting and suffering from the serious mistake about internalist assumptions that had plagued the epistemologies of these externalists and now infects the ascriber contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox. With the help of hindsight to examine this history and an appreciation of how the adoption of one of these respective views about knowledge makes all the difference for whether the sceptical paradox arises, we come to see that the contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox is unnecessary.
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Why the ascriber contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox is unnecessaryMacDonald, Ian James 13 September 2010 (has links)
A widely discussed philosophical puzzle in contemporary epistemology is the so-called sceptical paradox. Ascriber contextualism has taken centre stage as the anti-sceptical theory that purportedly offers the best solution to the sceptical paradox. Ascriber contextualists Stewart Cohen (1988, 1999) and Keith DeRose (1995) advertise their anti-sceptical theory as the one that exclusively explains and solves it. This is false advertising, however. My thesis, which has been greatly influenced by the critical work of Michael Williams (1991) and Duncan Pritchard (2005), is that the generation of the sceptical paradox depends on whether the epistemologist is an internalist or externalist about knowledge, and that the ascriber contextualist attempt to solve the sceptical paradox rests on a long history of mistakes concerning internalist assumptions made by externalists Fred Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981). By applying the semantic thesis of ascriber contextualism to epistemology, ascriber contextualists seek to emend the rejection of the closure principle made by these externalists. This rejection came from these externalists mistakenly making internalist assumptions when facing sceptical hypotheses. Unfortunately, ascriber contextualists leave much unfixed, and end up inheriting and suffering from the serious mistake about internalist assumptions that had plagued the epistemologies of these externalists and now infects the ascriber contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox. With the help of hindsight to examine this history and an appreciation of how the adoption of one of these respective views about knowledge makes all the difference for whether the sceptical paradox arises, we come to see that the contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox is unnecessary.
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Naturalising the subjectGascoigne, Neil January 1995 (has links)
No description available.
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Epistemic responsibility and radical scepticismBoult, Cameron Jeffrey January 2014 (has links)
This thesis has two aims. One is to motivate the claim that challenging what I call a “sameness of evidence thesis” is a particularly promising approach to external world scepticism. The other is to sharpen an underexplored issue that arises when challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. The second aim is the primary aim of the thesis. Pursuing the first aim, I start by examining a predominant formulation of external world scepticism known as the “closure argument” for knowledge. I examine three main strategies for responding to external world scepticism and highlight their major challenges (DeRose 1995; Dretske 1979; Nozick 1981; Sosa 1999). The goal is not to demonstrate that these challenges cannot be met, but rather to highlight a deeper issue that arises when responding to the closure problem for knowledge. In particular, I take the discussion to motivate looking at what I will call “scepticism about evidential justification” (Feldman 2000; Kornblith 2001; Pritchard forthcoming). The general argument in favour of a shift to scepticism about evidential justification is based on considerations about what an adequate response to external world scepticism should hope to achieve. I argue that one condition of adequacy is being able to account for radical forms of scepticism that challenge not only that our beliefs enjoy the epistemic status of knowledge (however that status is conceived) but also that our ordinary empirical beliefs are justified, or that we are reasonable in holding them. There are different varieties of scepticism about evidential justification. I focus in some detail on the anti-sceptical strategies of Pryor (2000; 2004) and Wright (2004) as examples of strategies that engage with scepticism about evidential justification. But I argue that one form of evidential scepticism known as the “underdetermination argument”—which Pryor and Wright do not directly engage with—is of particular importance. The main assumption in the underdetermination argument I focus on is about the nature of evidence. More specifically, the underdetermination argument presupposes that one’s evidence is the same in so-called “bad” and “good” cases in which an agent forms an empirical belief. This is the “sameness of evidence thesis.” Pursuing the main aim of the thesis, I introduce two forms an anti-sceptical strategy that involves challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. The two forms I consider differ in their commitments concerning a condition of accessibility on our evidence. Pritchard (2006; 2007; 2012; forthcoming) maintains that one’s evidence is “reflectively accessible.” Williamson (2000; 2009) rejects this claim. The central issue I aim to sharpen is that while accepting the condition of accessibility leads to serious challenges in rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, rejecting it leads to counterintuitive consequences if we grant that there is a normative principle that requires us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. A central part of the thesis involves examining these counterintuitive consequences and showing what accounting for them requires. This is an underexplored project in the context of external world scepticism. I look at three different approaches to spelling out the counterintuitive consequences. My preferred account turns on a distinction between three different kinds of responsibility (Shoemaker 2011). I claim that there is a notion of responsibility – “attributability” – that is centrally connected to normative judgments. I argue for a “condition of accessibility” on attributability. Taken together, these two claims comprise an account of what is problematic about rejecting an access condition on our evidence. I then claim that there are two ways forward. One is to accept the condition of accessibility on our evidence that my account implies; the other is to challenge my claims about the connection between attributability and normative judgments, or the accessibility condition on attributability, or both. Although I claim that the prospects look better for taking the second option when it comes to rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, drawing on recent work from Gibbons (2006; 2013) and Daniel Greco (2013), I argue that the first option is still a live possibility. The main aim in this part of the thesis is not to decide what the best way of rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis is, but rather to examine the challenges that arise when we reject it in one way or another. The question of what sort of access we have to our normative requirements is the focus of an increasingly sophisticated discussion in contemporary epistemology. An important upshot of this thesis is that it brings the problem of external world scepticism directly within the scope of that debate.
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