A tese defende a ideia de que uma compreensão adequada da suspensão cética de juízo (epokhé) pressupõe o estudo dos textos de Sexto Empírico que, direta ou indiretamente, abordam o problema da concepção pirrônica da linguagem ou discurso (lógos), e também daqueles que fornecem elementos para a compreensão da posição sextiana acerca da linguagem cotidiana das pessoas comuns. Os primeiros capítulos lidam com a conhecida distinção entre as assim chamadas interpretações rústica e urbana da filosofia pirrônica. A seguir, o texto discute o problema do lógos quando considerado a partir de uma perspectiva pirrônica, onde uma nova argumentação em favor da interpretação rústica é desenvolvida, baseada na ideia de um percurso cético. No quarto capítulo, é examinada a noção de phainómenon e sua relação com o lógos cético, através da formulação de uma interpretação mais geral do ceticismo antigo e do seu discurso fenomênico. O quinto e último capítulo procede então a uma avaliação da força filosófica tanto da filosofia pirrônica como da neopirrônica / The dissertation defends the idea that an adequate understanding of the sceptical suspension of judgement (epoché) presupposes the study of the Sextus Empiricus texts which, either directly or indirectly, address the problem of the pyrrhonian conception of language or discourse (lógos), and also the study of those texts that provide elements for the understanding of the Sextian position about the everyday language of common people. The first chapters deal with the well-known distinction between the so-called rustic and urbane interpretations of the pyrrhonian philosophy. In the sequence, the dissertation discusses the problem of the lógos, as viewed from a pyrrhonian perspective, also by developing a new argument in favor of the rustic interpretation, based upon the idea of a sceptic path. Subsequently, the notion of phainómenon and its relation to the sceptic lógos are analyzed through a general approach to ancient scepticism. The fith and last chapter proceeds to an avaluation of the philosophical strength of both the pyrrhonian and neopyrrhonian philosophies

Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T23:24:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_LailaT.Correae_M.pdf: 649829 bytes, checksum: bf737501bf46eebb811b3721472034fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: David Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, livro 1, parte 4, seção 2, "Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos", pretende explicar a causa de nossa crença na existência do mundo exterior, isto é, a crença em existências contínuas e distintas da mente e da percepção. Ele inicia a seção com a seguinte afirmação: devemos dar nosso assentimento ao princípio referente à existência dos corpos, embora não possamos ter a pretensão de sustentar a sua veracidade por meio de argumentos filosóficos (T 1.4.2.1). Mas, ao final da seção, sua postura diante da crença na existência do mundo exterior muda totalmente, como Hume mesmo diz, em T 1.4.2.56, penúltimo parágrafo: "iniciei este tema com a premissa de que deveria ter uma fé implícita em nossos sentidos, e que essa é a conclusão que extrairia da totalidade de meu raciocínio", contudo, argumenta ele, "sinto-me neste momento possuído pelo sentimento contrário", ou seja, Hume não deposita mais nenhuma confiança nos sentidos, ou antes, imaginação. Por que Hume chega a tal conclusão? Hume argumenta que essas existências contínuas e distintas são ficções da imaginação e, como tais, não merecem nosso assentimento e confiança. Essa situação embaraçosa conduz Hume a um ceticismo radical que, segundo o próprio filósofo, somente pode ser curado por meio do "descuido e desatenção". Mas, como poderíamos interpretar essa declaração de Hume? Minha proposta de interpretação defende que através do conceito humeano de ceticismo mitigado presente no Tratado, livro 1, parte 4, seção 7, "Conclusão deste livro", e na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, seção 12, "Da filosofia acadêmica ou cética", somos capazes de compreendê-la. Nas duas obras mencionadas Hume apresenta o modo de investigação filosófica que é, para ele, o mais adequado, a saber: o método cético. Contudo, o ceticismo de Hume não é o ceticismo radical que impede toda a ação, mas sim um ceticismo mais mitigado que combina consigo uma parcela da "mistura bruta e terrena" (T 1.4.7.14), constituinte da vida comum e afazeres cotidianos / Abstract: David Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", wants to explain the cause of our belief in the existence of external world, i.e., the belief in existence continued and distinct of the mind and perception. He begins the section with the following affirmation: we might give our assentiment to the principle regarding the existence of external world, even though we cannot pretend to sustain its veracity through philosophical arguments (T 1.4.2.1). But, at the end of section, Hume's position as regards of the belief of external world changes completely, as Hume says, in T 1.4.2.56: "I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning", however, he says, "I feel myself at present of quite contrary sentiment", i.e., Hume didn't deposit any more trust in the senses, or first, imagination. Why Hume concluded that? Hume says that these continued and distinct existences are fictions of imagination, and in this way, don't diserve our trust and assentiment. This complicated situation brings Hume to the radical scepticism that, according to himself, can only be cured by "carelessness and in-attention". But how can we interpret Hume's declaration? My proposal is that by means of the humean concept of mitigate scepticism present in the Treatise, book 1, part 4, section 7, and in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, we can comprehended Hume's situation. In both books, he presented for us a way of philosophical investigation that is, for him, more adequate: the sceptical method. However, humean scepticism is not the radical one that obstructed all action, instead, more mitigated humean scepticism brings with itself one part of the "gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient" (T 1.4.7.14), that constitutes common life / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-20T13:46:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo_Sergio_Mansija_Pinto.pdf: 3110197 bytes, checksum: e1a824c92ebfef14b01bd2dcce9964b9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-17 / The Culture politics according to Almond and Verba (1963) is to the orientations specifically politics, the attitudes with respect to the system politician, its diverse parts and the paper of the citizen in the public life. To the measure that if explicit the standards of distribution of orientation for the action politics, the Culture Politics helps to bind individual trends to the characteristics of a system. In this scope it was objectified to investigate the culture politics of the riograndino citizen, breaking of the hypothesis of the culture politics of the riograndino citizen to show personalist and pragmatic, marked for phenomena as the discredit and the diffidence in relation to the politics and the politicians, beyond a strong feeling of inefficacy politics. Such phenomena would disclose to a culture fragmented and skeptical politics. It will be used as the quantitative research arrives in a set methodological, constituted of a sample of conglomerates (tax sector) of 400 voters of the urban area. Randomly it was defined, in a universe of (xnº) sectors of the city, (xnº) of sectors to search. Stipulating 10 questionnaires to the minimum sector, 15 to intermediary and 20 to the maximum. Survey composes in 24 questions for instrument form, searched to investigate 0 variable related to the partner-demographic characteristics, interest for politics, partisan preference, decision of the vote, and factors in the electoral choice, vote for mayor and councilmen, confidence in the institutions politics and participation politics of the citizens. The data harvested for the empirical research had corroborated the hypothesis; however, the research displayed peculiarities of the system local politician not foreseen. The biggest obstacle to the research is the complexity of if apprehending the reality, demanding research in times thus alternated to prove the regularity of the behavior politician, therefore the sounding of a moment. / A Cultura Política, segundo Almond e Verba (1963), são as orientações especificamente políticas, as atitudes com respeito ao sistema político, suas diversas partes e o papel do cidadão na vida pública. À medida que se explicita os padrões de distribuição de orientação para a ação política, a Cultura Política ajuda a ligar tendências individuais às características de um sistema. Nesse âmbito, objetivou-se sondar a cultura política do cidadão riograndino, partindo-se da hipótese da cultura política do cidadão riograndino revelar-se personalista e pragmática, marcada por fenômenos como o descrédito e a desconfiança em relação à política e aos políticos, além de um forte sentimento de ineficácia política. Tais fenômenos revelariam uma cultura política fragmentada e cética. Utilizou-se como aporte metodológico a pesquisa quantitativa, constituída de uma amostra por conglomerados (setor censitário) de 400 eleitores da área urbana. Aleatoriamente definiu-se, em um universo de (xnº) setores da cidade, (xnº) de setores a pesquisar. Estipulando-se 10 questionários ao setor mínimo, 15 ao intermediário e 20 ao máximo. O survey compõe-se de 24 questões por instrumento formulário, buscou sondar variáveis relacionadas às características sócio-demográficas, interesse por política, preferência partidária, decisão do voto, fatores na escolha eleitoral, voto para prefeito e para vereadores, confiança nas instituições políticas e participação política dos cidadãos. Os dados colhidos pela pesquisa empírica corroboraram a hipótese, no entanto, a pesquisa expôs peculiaridades do sistema político local não previstas. O maior óbice à pesquisa é a omplexidade de se apreender a realidade, assim demandando pesquisas em tempos alternados para comprovar a regularidade do comportamento político, por isso a sondagem de um momento.

La trace peut être définie comme le vestige sensible qui provoque, chez qui l’observe, le trouble d’une présence-absence. Les récits d’Antonio Tabucchi, Peter Handke et Pierre Péju,trois écrivains nés dans les années 1940 dans des pays – l’Italie, l’Autriche et la France – ayant collaboré avec l’Allemagne nazie, sont habités d’une inquiétude aussi bien historique qu’ontologique et déclinent les modalités d’une représentation de la présence spectrale. Le caractère spectral du réel n’implique pas seulement le sentiment d’une douloureuse dépossession, mais aussi l’ouverture à un monde vécu dans le mouvement même de son apparition. Celui-ci se manifeste tour à tour comme une épiphanie, révélation d’un avènement originel, et comme un retour des spectres du passé, et plus particulièrement de ceux de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. L’œuvre-trace transmet ainsi – par ses thèmes, sa diégèse et ses choix stylistiques – une injonction éthique. Elle se fait l’écho d’une double responsabilité :celle, historique, des cendres du XXe siècle et celle, ontologique, de la fidélité à un présents cindé, qui ne peut être appréhendé qu’à travers la faille qui le constitue. L’oeuvre-trace se fait représentation littéraire d’un jeu interstitiel : blessure qui ne peut cicatriser et condition même de l’à venir ; et la quête heuristique, en refusant toute assertion, rejoint la démarche de la philosophie sceptique. La connaissance ne se laisse approcher que de façon asymptotique, trace de ce qui a été et esquisse de ce qui sera. / The trace can be defined as the tangible relic which provokes confusion in theobserver’s mind by revealing a form of absent presence. The narratives of Antonio Tabucchi,Peter Handke and Pierre Péju, three writers born in the 1940s in countries – Italy, Austria and France – that collaborated with Nazi Germany, are filled with an anxiety which is historical aswell as it is ontological, and display the various forms of the spectral presence of the trace. Butthis spectral presence, which classically entails a distressing feeling of dispossession, also manifests the emergence of a new world which is physically perceived as it reveals itself. It is successively an epiphany, the revelation of an original advent, and the return of past spectres,and more particularly those of the Second World War. Through its themes, diegesis and stylisticchoices, the narrative as trace thus conveys an ethical injunction. It discloses the importance of atwofold responsibility: the historical legacy of the 20thcentury’s ashes, and the ontologicalrequest of accepting a present without certainty, that can only be apprehended through the verybreach that constitutes it. The narrative as trace thereby becomes the literary representation of asplit state of being, everlastingly wounded and ultimate condition of the coming future; and the heuristic pursuit, by rejecting any possibilities of assertion, concurs with the reasoning ofsceptical philosophy. Understanding can only be approached in an asymptotic way, trace ofwhat has been and sketched glimmer of what will be.

Ce travail étudie la relation entre scepticisme et politesse dans l’œuvre de David Hume afin de contribuer à la compréhension philosophique de l’art d’écrire de Hume et de son évolution. Du Traité de la nature humaine (1739-1740) aux œuvres suivantes (les Essais, les deux Enquêtes, les Four Dissertations et les Dialogues sur la religion naturelle), on observe un incontestable changement dans la manière de communiquer la science de l’homme au public du XVIIIe siècle. Inspiré en partie du journalisme philosophique d’Addison et de Steele et destiné à rendre la philosophie abstraite accessible au public de la conversation, l’art d’écrire de Hume témoigne d’une intégration progressive de la culture de la politesse au scepticisme mitigé et à son expression. Mais cela signifie tout sauf un renoncement aux ambitions spéculatives du Traité, que Hume aurait abandonnées pour la recherche d’une gloire mondaine. Au contraire, comme expression de la bonne humeur caractéristique du « vrai sceptique » et comme préparation littéraire de la réception critique de la philosophie au sein de la République des Lettres, l’art d’écrire de Hume cherche à donner à cette science sceptique – et science nouvelle – qu’est la science de l’homme le public dont elle a besoin pour assurer sa fondation. Le scepticisme mitigé apparaît alors comme étant essentiellement un scepticisme policé, c’est-à-dire comme la meilleure manière de faire entrer la « métaphysique » dans la voie sûre de la civilisation. / This study deals with the relationship between scepticism and politeness in the works of David Hume, in order to contribute to the understanding of Hume’s art of writing from a philosophical point of view. From the Treatise of human nature (1739-1740) to the later works (the Essays, the two Enquiries, the Four dissertations and the Dialogues concerning natural religion), one can observe an obvious change in the manner of communicating the science of man to the public of the eighteenth century. Partly inspired by the philosophical journalism of Addison and Steele and designed to make abstract philosophy accessible to the public of conversation, Hume’s art of writing shows a progressive integration of the culture of politeness with scepticism and its expression. But this certainly does not mean that Hume would have left the speculative ambitions of the Treatise for worldly success. On the contrary, as an expression of the good humour which characterizes the « true sceptic » as well as a literary preparation of the critical reception of philosophy in the Republic of Letters, Hume’s art of writing tries to give to the science of man, considered as a sceptical – and new – science, the public that it needs for its foundation. Hence mitigated scepticism appears essentially as a polite scepticism, the best way for « metaphysics » to enter upon the secure path of civilization.

This Diploma project deals with motivation of unemployed people who are forced to search for a new job. The key problems are described here, together with their solution that should contribute to increased motivation to find a job. The ultimate effect of these proposals is total saving of state finance funds.

ABSTRACT   Date:                                  2020-06-06   Level:                                 Bachelor Thesis in Business Administration, 15 cr   Institution:   School of Business, Society and Engineering, Mälardalen University   Authors:         Elina Nurmi                         Julia Darnéus Ekeroth   Natasha Milner             (1993-01-08)                              (1996-07-24)                                  (1998-05-05)   Title:                                  Investigating the ‘Greenness’ of Young Consumers   Tutor:                                David Freund   Keywords:  Environmental concern, green marketing, green consumer, green scepticism, green purchase decision. Research Question: How can environmental concern, exposure to green marketing and green scepticism influence young consumers’ green purchase decisions?   Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how young consumers’ green purchase decisions can be influenced by their environmental concern, exposure to green marketing and lastly, green scepticism. It will be analysed if consumers are now overexposed to green marketing, whether there is an action/awareness gap, and lastly, the number of green consumers in the sample will be established.   Method: Primary data was collected through a quantitative research method, via a self-completion online questionnaire. The chosen sample was Swedes, aged 18-30 and consisted of 140 respondents. IBM SPSS Statistics was used for the statistical tests undertaken such as Cronbach’s Alpha, Chi-square, Pearson’s correlation and Regression analysis.   Conclusion: Environmental concern and green scepticism were found to have a significant influence on the young Swedish consumers’ green purchase decision. A great deal of the sample possessed environmental concern, and it was found to influence their green purchase decision positively. The participants were not sceptical of green marketing, and green scepticism was found to significantly and negatively influence their green purchases. Finally, the young Swedes were minimally underexposed to green marketing with a slight negative, but insignificant, influence on green purchase decisions.

Magister Artium - MA / Our secular age is a period of scepticism and ubiquitous doubt. The epistemology of a paradigmatic figure like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) is central to Islamic intellectual thought, but also speaks to our modern world. In this research dissertation we embark on a critical study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaqīn) in Ghazālī’s epistemology. We ask, what is the nature and function of doubt, and how do we best acquire truth and certainty according to Ghazālī? In our evaluation of scepticism in Ghazālī’s epistemology, we analyse the notion of existential doubt and his methodological doubt. In the latter, we look at his scepticism of the methods of knowing as a means to establish the foundations of knowledge. Also, we look at his scepticism as an instrument to cast doubt upon heterodox doctrines and show the limitations of philosophical logic. In this study we assess Ghazālī’s attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghazālī, it was assumed that he was a vehement adversary to philosophy. On the other hand, in much of contemporary scholarship, Ghazālī has been understood to give preference to philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, undermining the place of Sufism. In this study we evaluate these claims; we argue that he was not antagonistic to philosophy and regarded it as a legitimate approach to certainty, but recognised Sufism as a superior approach. Much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghazālī as a Sufi or a philosopher; we attempt to embark on a parallel approach in which we acknowledge each discipline in its right place within Ghazālī’s epistemology. Thus, in analysing Ghazālī’s approach to acquiring certainty, we evaluate his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (taʿlim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism.

<p>Autumn 2021</p>

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Currently, the predominant view in research ethics maintains that physicians can morally justify offering randomized clinical trial enrollment to their patients only if some form of equipoise is present. Thus, the physician must experience (either individually or communally) a state of reasoned uncertainty concerning the relative merits of two or more competing treatments for a given disease before she may recommend that her patient participate in a clinical trial. Increasingly, however, this position has been subject to critical attention and considerable negative scrutiny. My argument engages this trend by turning to the history of philosophy; here I claim that the use of the term “equipoise” in the medical research context is extremely similar to terms and concepts from the philosophical tradition of skepticism, and as a result of this similarity it is possible to understand the principle of equipoise’s vulnerability to already published criticisms. A comparison of the criticisms of equipoise within the medical research literature to criticisms of philosophical skepticism reveals a potentially grim future for equipoise as a legitimate guiding principle for the ethical conduct of clinical research.