[pt] O objetivo geral deste trabalho é propor uma interpretação das teorias causal e dos valores (moral e estético) de David Hume, que designo por quasi-realismo cético. Neste sentido, procuro justificar um confronto das análises elaboradas na literatura secundário sobre o filósofo – que têm estado sistemática e declaradamente apartadas. Para cumprir este objetivo, começo por apresentar de forma introdutória algumas pressuposições importantes para este trabalho (capítulo 1). Depois, procuro destacar e desenvolver algumas componentes das teorias causal e dos valores (moral e estético) de Hume que são determinantes para a discussão, subdividindo-as em componentes que designo por metafísica, epistémica e semântica (capítulos 2 e 3). Por último, procuro justificar a posição que assumo em relação a cada um destes aspetos considerados, compondo, assim, o conjunto de componentes do designado quasi-realismo cético – essencialmente inspirado na contribuição de Angela Coventry (por sua vez, inspirada no quasirealismo de Simon Blackburn), ao mesmo tempo que lhe acrescenta um elemento cético (capítulo 4). / [en] The general aim of this work is to propose an interpretation of David Hume s theories of causality and values (moral and aesthetic), which I call sceptical quasi-realism. In this respect, I try to confront several analysis developed in secondary litterature about the philosopher – which have been sistematically and openly separated. To achieve this aim, I begin by introducing some presuppositions which are important for the purposes of this work (chapter 1). Then, I try to identify and develop some determinant features of Hume s theory of causality and values (moral and aesthetic) for the discussion, subdivided in features which I call metaphysic, epistemic and semantic (chapters 2 and 3). Finally, I attempt to justify the interpretation regarding each of this considered features, composing the set of features of what I call sceptical quasi-realism – mainly inspired in Angela Coventrys contributions (which, in turn, is inspired in Simon Blackburns quasi-realism), adding a sceptical element to it (chapter 4).

Although much is known about the conscious consumer, very little is known about green advertising. Given the growing attention placed on environmental issues and the heavy reliance of the consuming public on mass media, the dire lack of credibility in green advertising is in a shocking state. In fact, there has been a pronounced increase in green messages in advertising since the 1960s. This increase in green messages does not inherentlymean that there is a favorable consumer brand attitude formation. Instead, consumers have become increasingly skeptical of the environmental claims made by some of these organizations. The existence of consumer skepticism, together with perceived deception, hashad a negative impact on credibility. The purpose of this essay is to understand how marketing efforts on product labels thathighlight environmental, social and ethical problems (known as green product labels) might increase the customers' skepticism. The chosen method to conduct the data collection was a survey. The survey was distributed through online forms through facebook and other socialmedia platforms and thus limited to focus on the consumers of a more connected kind, mainly those who partake in social media on a daily basis. Results show that the consumers are skeptical towards green efforts and green product labeling, but the perception of green labels are not directly influencing the amount of skepticism as these notions seem to come from outside sources. While not directly influenced by product labels the increase in skepticism towards these kinds of ads displaying green efforts implicates both practical and theoretical relevance. Consumers are becoming more aware of false claims and companies need to be aware of what influences consumer skepticism to be able to better match their ads with the target audiences.

Cette thèse vise à mettre en lumière, dans les Essais de Montaigne, un aspect peu connu du débat sur la constance à la fin du 16ème s. Alors que la vertu de constance devient un enjeu philosophique et moral d’importance, servant à la fois des idéaux stoïciens, chrétiens et civils, nous constatons une insistance des Essais à souligner le phénomène contraire, l’inconstance. Il s’agit dans un premier temps de montrer le dialogue que construit Montaigne face à la vertu de constance, puis d’établir le statut argumentatif de l’inconstance dans les Essais. Dans le but de situer le débat constance - inconstance, nous nous rapportons d’abord aux écoles de philosophies hellénistiques que pillent les Essais. Le scepticisme de Montaigne s’en trouve déstabilisé, le stoïcisme à la fois débattu et repoussé, l’épicurisme instrumentalisé. L’inconstance prend un visage universel qui rend présomptueuse et même dangereuse toute aspiration à la constance. Nous montrons ensuite la prise en charge méthodologique de l’inconstance dans les Essais, à travers le Distingo. Nous constatons alors que l’inconstance a le statut d’une condition pré éthique poussant les Essais à déconsidérer toute entreprise humaine dans la sphère publique. Mais les Essais n’encouragent pas simplement à se laisser porter par la fortune ou la coutume. Dans la sphère privée, Ils construisent plusieurs règles éthiques hétérodoxes : non repentir, diversion, vanité, expérience…qui reposent sur le possible (selon qu’on peut) et contribuent à redéfinir la grandeur d’âme, en présentant un nouvel ordre ou une nouvelle conformité de l’action, ce que nous appellerons « l’éthique de l’inconstance » ou « éthique de l’indirection » . / This thesis aims to emphasize in Montaigne’s Essays a little known aspect concerning the debate of constancy towards the end of the 16th. c. While the virtue of constancy becomes a philosophical issue of importance, favouring at the same time the stoic, Christian and civil ideals, we observe in Montaigne’s Essays, an insistence to underline a contradictory phenomenon; inconstancy. First, it is essential to demonstrate the dialogue that builds Montaigne’s work concerning the virtue of constancy, to finally establish the proper argumentation on inconstancy. With the intent to situate this debate concerning the virtue of constancy, we will refer primarily to the Hellenistic philosophies plundered by the Essays. We will present in the first part the origin and in the second part, the transfer of the debate. Montaigne’s scepticism happens to be destabilized, his stoicism is at the same time debated and rejected, his Epicureanism becoming a tool determining their truth. The second section of the thesis demonstrates that methodology of the Essays takes over the notion of inconstancy, notably through the “Distingo”, and its effects on the historical knowledge relating to prudential activities. We claim that the nature of the essay is to correct this error and thus give the right place to human inconstancy. We acknowledge the fact that inconstancy has a status of a pre-ethic condition which pushes the Essays to disrepute any human enterprise in the public sphere. However, this denial cast upon the public sphere does not lead us to reject any kind of ethical reflection. In the private sphere, the Essays construct ethical regulations: non repentance, diversion, vanity, experience...These aspects are all grounded in the ethical mode of the possible, (« Selon qu’on peut ») and at the same time contribute in redefining the magnitude of the soul by presenting a new order or a new conformity of action. We name the project ethic of inconstancy or ethic of indirection

Blind's autonomous cosmopolitanism is in four distinct layers. The first layer is her unusual everyday family background in the transition from Jewish tradition to the life of European revolutionaries in the 1840s and exile in Britain. The second layer is Blind's mental and moral development under Friederike's care and educational guidance according to the German concept of Bildung. The third layer comes from Mazzini's challenge for Blind to critically evaluate her German cultural heritage and the moral danger in the well-intended German concept of self-cultivation. Blind derives the fourth layer of her autonomous cosmopolitanism from Darwin's theory of evolution and Buckle's argument for a scientific approach to history. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection postulates sexual autonomy of the individual organism as a pre-condition for evolution by natural selection. Buckle's argument for a scientific approach to the study of history extends this concept by observing that the variety of geographical conditions around the globe gives rise to a diversity of cultures. The concept of social evolution is then anchored in the nature of interdependence between the individual and her society as it changes over time. Overall, my argument is that Blind's contribution to Victorian cosmopolitanism is to write about controversial subjects and to transcend ideological polarizations. She does this by transferring socio-political topics from the public domain into the intimacy of making "an immediate sensuous contact" with the individual reader. Her aim is to touch her reader's heart and to trust in her reader's ability and social will to care rather than to teach her about the individual poet's particular ideas of what should be done to solve problems.

L'état de nature de Thomas Hobbes repose sur une étude des limites de la connaissance de l'être humain. Ces limites sont considérables, si bien qu'il est selon Hobbes impossible pour le genre humain de naturellement instaurer un système de vérité commun à l'espèce. L'homme est à l'état de nature dans une situation que nous qualifions « d'anarchie épistémologique » ce qui se traduit dans le Léviathan de Hobbes comme étant une situation de guerre de chacun contre chacun. Ce n'est que par l'institution d'un souverain tout puissant que l'homme peut espérer dépasser la condition de misère qui caractérise sa situation à l'état de nature. Le projet philosophique et politique de Hobbes concerne donc essentiellement l'être humain dans sa situation politique domestique. Hobbes ne consacre effectivement rien de substantiel à l'analyse des relations internationales. Pourtant, le nom de Thomas Hobbes revient souvent à ce niveau d'analyse, particulièrement lorsqu'il s'agit de conceptualiser les rapports interétatiques comme étant analogues à ceux des hommes à l'état de nature. Cette transposition est à notre avis problématique plutôt que constructive puisqu'elle ne reflète en rien les analyses du philosophe. Nous proposons de démontrer ce point par le biais d'une étude exégétique de la pensée de Hobbes. / Hobbes's state of nature rests upon an epistemological study of human nature. It reflects important limits on the human capacity for establishing objective truths. In the state of nature then, mankind will never be able to naturally and collectively institute an epistemological system. Mankind is in the state of nature in a situation that we qualify as an '' epistemological anarchy '', which in Hobbes's Leviathan is a situation of war of all against all. It is only through the institution of a all-powerful sovereign that man can hope to free himself from the dire situation of the state of nature. Hobbes's philosophical and political project then, concerns only human activity on a domestic scale. Indeed, the english philosopher does not provide substantial analytical material concerning international relations. However, the name of Thomas Hobbes is a common one in discussions of international relations, specially when the conceptualisation of interstate relations is understood as being analogous to that of man in the state of nature. We consider that this analogy is not constructive, but problematic since it does not reflect Hobbes's analyses at all. We will show that this is the case through an exegetic study of Hobbes's arguments concerning human nature.

Background – Our digitalized society is constantly increasing, and with the development, the importance of the Internet for political knowledge generation is also increasing. The digital development has caused a series of problems that can disturb the prevailing democracy due to that many individuals create their political identity through social media as a communication channel. In addition to the fact that the majority of the younger generation use social media as their primarily communication channel, there is also cause for concern that individuals tend to avoid news due to current news skepticism. News skepticism has grown as fake news has increased, especially since the US presidential election in 2016, and even though fake news is identified and corrected, it is often the fake information that people tend to remember. Furthermore, it is also important to emphasize that the dissemination of information through digital media is extensive to the extent that individuals cannot be source critical towards it all. Social media has also become a platform that is used to promote hidden intentions, for example, that politicians use bots to generate popularity. Further, today's journalism has been influenced by digital developments and has changed how news are spreading on digital platforms. Finally, many individuals perceive that they no longer need to actively seek out news and to further generate knowledge because they personally stress the fact that important news always finds them, also known as "news-finds-me". Aim -The aim is to create an understanding of the relationship between communication channels and knowledge generation within the context of political involvement, digitalization and news skepticism. Methodology -The empirical material is based on a mixed method research and the empirical data has been collected through a qualitative and a quantitative survey. The qualitative research method consisted of six semi-structured interviews in contrast to the quantitative research methodthat consisted of a survey. Conclusion–An increasing amount of people deselect traditional media and it should therefore be a change in how knowledge generation occurs. Furthermore, there is a distinct relationship between knowledge generation and communication channels. The result shows that digital media are the basis of the change that has taken place in knowledge generation rather than the generation of which you belong. Finally, we believe that a crucial factor for knowledge generation is the desireto actively seek out knowledge and not to wait for news to find you. / Bakgrund –Digitaliseringen ökar ständigt och i och med utvecklingen ökar även internets betydelse för politisk kunskapsgenerering. Den digitala utvecklingen har medfört en mängd problem som kan störa den rådande demokratin då många individer skapar sin politiska identitet genom sociala medier som kommunikationskanal. Utöver att många tillhörande den yngre generationen använder sociala medier som sin främsta kommunikationskanal finns det även oro att individer tenderar att undvika nyheter på grund av rådande skepticism. Skepticismen har växt i takt med att fake news har ökat, främst sedan det amerikanska presidentvalet 2016, och även om falska nyheter identifieras och tillrättagörs är det ofta den falska informationen som blir ihågkommen. Vidare är det även av vikt att belysa att informationsspridningen via digitala medier är så pass omfattande att individer inte hinner vara källkritisk gentemot all rapportering. Sociala medier har även kommit att bli en plattform som utnyttjas för att främja dolda avsikter, exempelvis att politiker använder sig av botar för att generera popularitet. Ytterligare har dagens journalism påverkats av den digitala utvecklingen och har förändrat hur nyheter sprids på digitala forum. Slutligen uppfattar många individer att de inte längre behöver aktivt söka upp nyheter och vidare generera kunskap då de menar att viktiga nyheter alltid når dem, även kallad “news-finds-me”. Syfte -Syftet är att skapa förståelse för relationen mellan kommunikationskanaler och kunskapsgenerering inom kontexten avpolitiskt engagemang, digitalisering och nyhetsskepticism. Metod -Studien genomfördes genom flermetodsforskning då den empiriska datan har samlats in genom en kvalitativ samt kvantitativ undersökning. Den kvalitativa undersökningen bestod av sex semistrukturerade intervjuer medan den kvantitativa undersökningen genomfördes genom en omfattande enkätundersökning. Slutsats -Allt fler väljer bort traditionella medier och därför bör det ske en förändring i hur kunskapsgenerering sker. Det finns en tydlig relation mellan kunskapsgenerering och kommunikationskanaler. Resultatet påvisar att det är de digitala medierna som ligger till grund för den förändring som har skett vid kunskapsgenerering snarare än vilken generation man tillhör. Slutligen menar vi att en avgörande faktor för kunskapsgenerering är viljan att aktivt söka upp kunskap och att inte vänta på att nyheter hittar mig.

The concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way an agent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extent and manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remain unclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into different properties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views. Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independent relation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with a naturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue that such a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibility attributions to an objective relation. Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea that responsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences. I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivism and a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identify with confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable. Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdetermine the effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agency and responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relatively independent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionalist stance towards group agency talk. Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, but only one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete set of consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lack clarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemic argument against consequentialism.

The main purpose of this study is to examine if variations in voter turnout for the European Parliament elections in each member state is affected by the rate of national party polarization on the EU-dimension of party politics. The theoretical background assumes that a high level of polarization generates higher voter turnout since more alternatives are presented to the electorate. This makes it easier for the electorate to find a party that represents their preferences. This will, in turn, increase the likelihood that they will participate in the election.This study uses a research design based on a quantitative analysis with data from each member state, except those with compulsory voting, in the European Parliament elections of 2004 and 2009. The results of the analysis indicate a relationship between high levels of party polarization and lower turnout in the European Parliament election. There seem to be a tendency that in systems where there is greater polarization, the voters tend to participate less in the European Parliament elections.

In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful.

This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.