With the election of President Trump, climate deniers feel emboldened and moved from the fringes to the centre of global policy making. We study how an agnostic approach to policy, based on Pascal's wager and allowing for subjective prior probability beliefs about whether climate deniers are right, prices carbon. Using the DICE integrated assessment model, we find that assigning a 10% chance of climate deniers being correct lowers the global price on carbon in 2020 only marginally: from $21 to $19 per ton of carbon dioxide if policymakers apply "Nordhaus discounting" and from $91 to $84 per ton of carbon dioxide if they apply "Stern discounting". Agnostics' reflection of remaining scientific uncertainty leaves climate policy essentially unchanged. The robustness of an ambitious climate policy also follows from using the max-min or the min-max regret principle. Letting the coefficient of relative ambiguity aversion vary from zero, corresponding to expected utility analysis, to infinity, corresponding to the max-min principle, we show how policy makers deal with fundamental climate model uncertainty if they are prepared to assign prior probabilities to different views of the world being correct. Allowing for an ethical discount rate and a higher market discount rate and for a wide range of sensitivity exercises including damage uncertainty, we show that pricing carbon is the robust response under rising climate scepticism. / Series: Ecological Economic Papers

This thesis was interested in exploring the questions of why individuals typically do not respond strongly to climate change, and how individual motivations to do so might be strengthened. More specifically, this thesis explored two widely cited barriers to climate change action and the solutions commonly suggested to overcome them. The first barrier is the lack of personal experience with climate change, which is believed to inhibit relevant emotional processes. The second, not unrelated, barrier is that people typically perceive climate change as a distant threat, one that is not relevant to them personally, where they live, and in the present time. To test these explanations, two public surveys of residents of both the UK (n = 616) and Switzerland (n = 316) explored the relationships among negative emotions, perceptions of geographically proximal and distant climate change risks, and variables that capture people’s willingness to address climate change. The findings supported the idea that stronger negative emotions were positively related to more readiness to act against climate change. The relationship between spatially close versus distant risk perceptions and measures of different forms of action was, however, more complex. Specifically, the findings revealed a strong association between global risk perceptions and policy support and a strong association between local risk perceptions and personal intentions. One explanation for these (unexpected) associations is that they are due to spontaneous matches with regard to psychological distance: Local risk perceptions are psychologically proximal on the spatial dimension and personal intentions can be regarded as proximal on the social dimension. Likewise, the spatially remote global risk perceptions can be matched to support for policies, which can be regarded as distant on the social dimension. Studies 3 and 4 tried to experimentally untangle the complex relationships between psychological distance and people’s perceptions and actions that were 2 observed in the survey research. Specifically, in both studies participants were manipulated to adopt either a spatially proximal or distant perspective on climate change. Study 3 (n = 80) measured participants emotional responses to climate change and looked at how these predicted different attitudinal and behavioural responses under a proximal or distant framework, whereas Study 4 (n = 330) more directly explored the possible effects of activating negative emotions (i.e., fear) in combination with different distance frames as part of attempts to promote action on climate change. The findings of Studies 3 and 4 suggest that decreasing the psychological distance of climate change and inducing fear can both be potentially useful strategies to promote action on climate change. However, the operation of both these strategies is more complex than is often assumed and these complexities have implications for the effectiveness of each strategy. For one thing, both attempts to reduce distance and increase fear can initiate multiple psychological processes that simultaneously increase and decrease the likelihood of acting on climate change. Because these processes work in opposition, reduced distance and increased fear can have positive effects, negative effects, or no effect at all. Together, the findings across studies highlight that psychological distance is neither an insurmountable obstacle to action against climate change – it depends on what kind of action is being considered (Studies 1 & 2) – and nor is decreasing psychological distance a panacea to motivate action – this can trigger the same kind of defensiveness that have been observed in response to other strategies, such as the use of emotion (Studies 3 & 4). In the general discussion, the theoretical implications of these insights for different theoretical models of distance, emotion, and action are considered, as are the implications for the practice of promoting public engagement with and action on climate change.

Cette thèse vise à mettre en lumière, dans les Essais de Montaigne, un aspect peu connu du débat sur la constance à la fin du seizième siècle. Alors que la vertu de constance devient à cette époque un enjeu philosophique et moral de première importance, servant à la fois des idéaux stoïciens, chrétiens et civils, nous constatons une insistance des Essais à souligner le phénomène contraire, l’inconstance. Il s’agit dans un premier temps de montrer le dialogue que construit l’ouvrage de Montaigne face à la vertu de constance, puis d’établir le statut argumentatif de l’inconstance dans les Essais. Afin de mettre en valeur ce dialogue dissimulé sous les bigarrures des Essais, nous nous proposons de combiner lecture internaliste et intertextualité, afin d’évaluer au mieux les actes d’écrire de cet ouvrage. Dans le but de situer ce débat sur la constance et l’inconstance, nous nous rapportons d’abord à certaines écoles de philosophie hellénistique que pillent les Essais. Nous présentons d’une part l’origine, d’autre part et les déplacements de ce débat. Le scepticisme de Montaigne s’en trouve déstabilisé, le stoïcisme à la fois débattu et repoussé, l’épicurisme instrumentalisé. L’inconstance prend un visage universel qui rend présomptueuse, vaine et même dangereuse toute aspiration à la constance. La deuxième section de la thèse montre la prise en charge méthodologique de l’inconstance dans les Essais, notamment à travers le Distingo, et son effet sur la connaissance historique comme sur les activités prudentielles (politique, jurisprudence, action militaire). Après avoir montré que l’ouvrage de Montaigne présente une critique radicale de la méthode et des objectifs des moralistes, nous posons que la nature de l’essai est de corriger cette erreur et de donner sa juste place à l’inconstance humaine. Nous constatons alors que l’inconstance a le statut d’une condition pré éthique poussant les Essais à déconsidérer toute entreprise humaine dans la sphère publique. Mais ce désaveu jeté sur la sphère publique ne conduit pas à renier toute réflexion éthique. Les Essais n’encouragent pas simplement à se laisser porter par la fortune ou la coutume. Dans la sphère privée, le troisième livre des Essais construit plusieurs règles éthiques étonnantes et hétérodoxes : non repentir, diversion, vanité, expérience…qui toutes prennent pour pierre d’assise le possible (selon qu’on peut) et contribuent à redéfinir la grandeur d’âme (magnitudo animi, megalopsychè), en présentant un nouvel ordre ou une nouvelle conformité de l’action. Par delà l’analyse morale et la peinture du moi, se déploient dans les Essais une éthique qui s’approprie le mouvement imparfait de l’existence, qui s’édifie non plus contre l’inconstance, mais avec elle. Cette « éthique de l’inconstance » ou « éthique de l’indirection » se construit en opposition avec les morales doctrinales avec lesquelles elle discute toutefois sans interruption. / This thesis aims to emphasize in Montaigne’s Essays a little known aspect concerning the debate of constancy towards the end of the 16th. Century. While the virtue of constancy becomes a philosophical and moral issue of great importance, favouring at the same time the stoic, Christian and civil ideals, we observe in Montaigne’s Essays, an insistence to underline a contradictory phenomenon; inconstancy. First, it is essential to demonstrate the dialogue that builds Montaigne’s work concerning the virtue of constancy, to finally establish the proper argumentation on inconstancy in his Essays. In order to highlight this dialogue concealed in the patchwork of the Essays, we are proposing to combine internal and external reading, in order to evaluate thoroughly the act of writing they implicitly propose. With the intent to situate this debate concerning the virtue of constancy and the problem of inconstancy, we will refer primarily to the Hellenistic philosophies plundered by the Essays. We will present in the first part the origin and in the second part, the transfer of the debate. Montaigne’s scepticism happens to be destabilized, his stoicism is at the same time debated and rejected, his Epicureanism becoming a tool determining their truth. The inconstancy as mentioned takes a universal appearance making all references to the virtue of constancy as presumptuous, vain and even dangerous. The second section of the thesis demonstrates that methodology of the Essays takes over the notion of inconstancy, notably through the “Distingo”, and its effects on the historical knowledge relating to prudential activities such as: jurisprudence, political and military life. Now that we have demonstrated that the work of Montaigne presents a radical critic of the method and the objectives of the moralists, we claim that the nature of the essay is to correct this error and thus give the right place to human inconstancy. We acknowledge the fact that inconstancy has a status of a pre-ethic condition which pushes the Essays to disrepute any human enterprise in the public sphere. However, this denial cast upon the public sphere does not lead us to reject any kind of ethical reflection. Therefore, the Essays do not exclusively encourage letting faith or fortune carry us. In the private sphere, the third book of the Essays constructs many ethical regulations that are astonishing and heterodox: non repentance, diversion, vanity, experience...These aspects are all grounded in the ethical mode of the possible, (« Selon qu’on peut ») and at the same time contribute in redefining the magnitude of the soul (magntiudo animi, mégalopsychè) by presenting a new order or a new conformity of action. Beyond the moral analysis and the description of oneself, an ethical process seizes the imperfect movement of existence in the Essays, which erects itself not against inconstancy but in harmony with it. This ethic of inconstancy or ethic of indirection is built in opposition with the moral doctrines even though a constant debate seems to unite them. / Thèse de doctorat effectuée en cotutelle au Département de philosophie Faculté des arts et des sciences de l’Université de Montréal et au département de philosophie école doctorale V de l’Université de la Sorbonne – Paris IV. Soutenue à Paris le 8 avril 2010.

The Anglo-Dutch philosopher Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) was among the most controversial figures writing in English in the eighteenth century. His satirical exploration of the nature of human sociability and economic prosperity infuriated his contemporary critics and deeply influenced the ideas of later Enlightenment philosophes. One of the most persistent questions about Mandeville's work concerns the sincerity of his declarations of Christian piety. Mandeville is commonly identified as a deist. This thesis explores the possibility that he was an atheist. The question is examined through an analysis of Mandeville’s major influences, most notably French Jansenism, Epicureanism, Scepticism, erudite libertinism, and Dutch republicanism. Key figures that Mandeville engaged with in his writings include Pierre Bayle, René Descartes, Shaftesbury, Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Nicole, and Pierre Gassendi. In the process of discussing Mandeville’s putative atheism, the methodological problem of researching and identifying atheism in early-modern Europe is explored. / Graduate

No description available.

Text in German / The present thesis undertakes a comprehensive survey and criticak analysis of the concept of duty and its significance in the prose of Siegfried Lenz (born in 1926). It concentrates on those novels and narratives in which duty is the main motif; these are Schwierige Trauer (1960), Das Feuerschiff (1960), Deutschstunde (1968) and Ein Kriegsende (1984). After an introduction which outlines the development and the influence of the concept of duty in Germany, the thesis deals with Lenz's prose in chronological order. Siegfried Lenz's main motif is the significance of the concept of duty within the moral code of the individual, the specific meaning and influence of which has been developed in Germany. Lenz does not deny that duty is a necessary element of the process of socialization. But he rejects the unreflected and uncritical acceptance of a dubious morality based on a sense of duty, at the expense of individuality and responsibility for oneself. It is a deformed understanding of duty which Lenz exposes and criticizes in his work: a characteristic mark of submissiveness and slavish obedience ("Untertanengeist und Kadavergehorsam"). These distortions are determined by political-historical events, theological dogmas, philosophical theses and an authoritarian upbringing. The reasons for the attitudes and behaviour of Lenz's fictitious characters have their roots in those factors. Lenz always insists on reflection. He refuses the uncritical acceptance of a morality based on duty, which allows a person to avoid his or her responsibility. However, Siegfried Lenz neither attempts to construct a social background nor does he offer recipes for a new social order. Rather he restricts himself to the sceptical questioning of norms and values, which are maintained by authority. The author creates a conflict in a hermetic environment, for example a ship or a small village, in which his fictitious characters have to prove themselves. By confronting his readers with such an extreme situation and the protagonists' questionable decisions, Lenz forces his public to reconsider their own position. The author's aim is to make his readers realize that right and wrong cannot always be distinguished in a clear-cut manner / Linguistics and Modern Languages / D.Litt. et Phil. (German)

Cette thèse est conçue comme un préalable à l’édition critique et à l’interprétation des Dialogues d’Orasius Tubero. Elle consiste en 4 séries de recherches, dont les 3 premières ([I] recherches codicologiques et recherches bibliologiques [II] sur les anciennes éditions des Dialogues et [III] sur les exemplaires des deux premières) visent à reconstituer la genèse de leur texte tandis que la quatrième ([IV] recherches historiques) est consacrée aux modalités concrètes de leur composition, de leur impression, et de leur diffusion immédiate.La première partie présente en premier lieu une étude de l’écriture (graphie) du Philosophe fondée sur le recensement et l’examen de l’ensemble des documents explicitement autographes. L’identification de sa main permet (1) de reconnaître les notes inscrites par Le Vayer dans les volumes de sa bibiothèque mais aussi (2) dans les marges des manuscrits de ses œuvres et surtout (3) de distinguer clairement entre les inscriptions allographes et autographes présentent dans les différents exemplaires des premières éditions des Dialogues. Elle est donc indispensable à l’éditeur de ses œuvres. Ces recherches codicologiques offrent ensuite un essai d’histoire et de classement des trois manuscrits connus des Dialogues – dont deux sont antérieurs à leur première édition. La seconde est dédiée à l’analyse bibliologique et historique des cinq premières éditions du texte : la 1ère partielle de 1631 (A), la 2nde édition complète de 1633 (B), la 1ère réédition partielle de 1671 (C), la 2nde réédition partielle de 1673 (D) et la 1ère réédition complète de 1716 (E). Ces recherches permettent en particulier d’identifier leur lieu et date d’impression respectif, ainsi que l’imprimeur de A et B ; et de préciser les relations génétiques de tous les témoins du texte des Dialogues.La troisième est consacrée au recensement, à l’analyse bibliologique et la collation systématiques des exemplaires connus des premières éditions. Les résultats de ces recherches sont (1) la détermination approximative des tirages de A et B ; (2) la découverte d’annotations autographes dans tous ces exemplaires et la distinction, en ce qui concerne B, de 22 exemplaires ordinaires et de 7 exemplaires spéciaux, ainsi que (3) l’identification d’un exemplaire dans lequel se trouve le plus grand nombre de corrections autographes et qui doit donc servir à ce titre de base à l’édition critique et à l’interprétation des Dialogues.La quatrième a pour objet les conditions historiques de la composition, de l’impression et de la réception immédiate des Dialogues, lesquelles doivent avant tout reposer sur la biographie de leur auteur, c’est-à-dire sur l’interprétation d’un certain nombre de données chronologiques relatives aux principaux événements de sa vie publique et privée. Sur la base de ce cadre biographique on s’est intéressé, pour limiter la subjectivité de l’interprétation du texte, à leur nature (pures fictions, transpositions littéraires ou transcriptions de dialogues réels), à leur objet (philosophie sceptique de l’auteur ou conversations réelles d’un groupe d’amis érudits du philosophe) à leur fin (démonstrative ou mémoriale) ainsi qu’à leur statut. De cette dernière série de recherches il appert que les Dialogues d’Orasius Tubero, loin d’être une publication clandestine subversive, est une impression privée à usage privé qui était destinée aux amis de l’auteur et devait les aider à conserver la mémoire de conversations philosophiques passées. / This thesis is conceived as a preliminary study for the critical edition and interpretation of Dialogues faits à l’imitation des anciens by Orasius Tubero. It consists of four research projects, of which the first three ([I] codicological and bibliological research [II] on early editions of the Dialogues and [III] on copies of the first two editions) aim at reconstructing the genesis of their text, while the fourth ([IV] historical research) is devoted to the practical modalities of their composition, printing, and immediate reception.The first part presents a study of the Philosopher’s handwriting based on an inventory and examination of all the explicitly autograph documents. The identification of his handwriting allows (1) to identify the notes written by Le Vayer in books form his personal library, but also (2) in the margins of the manuscripts of his works and especially (3) to clearly distinguish the allograph and autograph inscriptions featured in the different copies of the first editions of the Dialogues. This identification is therefore essential to any publisher of his works. This codicological research then attempts to tell the history and provide a classification of the three known manuscripts of the Dialogues, two of which predate the first edition.The second part is devoted to the bibliological and historical analysis of the five early editions (1630-1716): the first partial edition of 1631 (A); the complete second edition of 1633 (B); the first partial reissue of 1671 (C); the second partial reissue of 1673 (D); and the first complete reissue of 1716 (E). This research makes it possible in particular to identify their respective place and date of printing, as well as the printer-publisher of A and B; and to clarify the genetic connections between all the witnesses of the text of the Dialogues.The third part is devoted to an inventory, systematic bibliological analysis and collation of known copies of the first editions. The findings of this research are (1) an estimate of the print runs of A and B; (2) the discovery of autograph annotations in all these copies and the distinction between 22 ordinary copies and 7 special copies of B, as well as (3) the identification of a copy in which was found the largest number of autograph corrections, which should therefore serve as a basis for the scholarly edition and interpretation of the Dialogues.The fourth concerns the historical conditions of the composition, printing and immediate reception of the Dialogues, based first of all on their author’s biography, in other words, on the interpretation of a certain number of chronological facts pertaining to the main events of their author’s public and private life. On the basis of this biographical framework, I have sought to limit the subjectivity of interpreting the texts by focusing on their nature (pure fiction, literary transpositions or transcripts of real dialogues), their subject (the author’s philosophical skepticism or real conversations of a group of the Skeptic’s erudite friends) and their purpose (demonstrative or memorial), as well as their status. From this last series of research projects, it appears that the Dialogues of Orasius Tubero, far from being a secret subversive publication, is a private printing meant for private use by the author’s friends, intended to allow them to preserve the memory of past philosophical conversations.

À partir d'une étude philologique attentive de l'Esprit géométrique, je montre l'évolution épistémologique de Pascal qui, découvrant la corruption naturelle d'un langage humain impuissant à assurer ses propres fondements, quitte ses positions cartésiennes. Par contrecoup, la prétention de la raison à formuler des principes universels est anéantie : toute connaissance rationnelle se fonde sur un socle autoritaire. Je souligne alors l'importance actuelle de l'œuvre mathématique pascalienne par sa mise en perspective dans la crise moderne des fondements. En lui appliquant les méthodes de la poétique aristotélicienne, je la caractérise par sa sensibilité figurative, qui s'étend à l'œuvre non scientifique et en révèle l'unité esthétique. Je montre ensuite l'originalité philosophique de Pascal qui sort du scepticisme en recherchant de nouveaux usages de la langue propres à communiquer la certitude. Je reprends le débat sur le chantier des Pensées pour en distinguer les éditions objectives, qui restituent le seul classement dont nous disposons effectivement, des éditions apologétiques qui le recomposent à partir de certaines des indications laissées par l'auteur. La grande originalité des Pensées classées est de proposer une recherche du bonheur sans a priori religieux. Elles établissent les contrariétés de la condition humaine, que philosophies et sciences humaines sont impuissantes à décrire ou résoudre car elles refusent, par principe, la contradiction. L'Écriture chrétienne entre alors en scène pour présenter le seul langage capable de faire aboutir la recherche, parce qu'acceptant et faisant signifier la contradiction. La double nouveauté est ici d'introduire la Bible dans le champ de l'existence par nécessité, et comme un simple livre, dont il s'agit de décrire le pouvoir cognitif. Structuré par la narration et par la figure (typologique), ce modèle biblique élargit la connaissance rationnelle et son référentiel spatio-temporel restreint. Il ouvre ainsi à son lecteur un horizon d'existence et lui montre un chemin pour réparer ses ses contrariétés. On voit là chez Pascal un profond renouveau de la pensée figurative et de l'approche littéraire de la Bible. / A thorough philological study of l'Esprit géométrique shows an evolution in Pascal's epistemology. Discovering a form of natural corruption in the incapacity of self foundation of the human langage, he leaves his former Cartesian positions. As a consequence, Reason's pretention to formulate universal principles is erased : every rational knowledge is based on a form of authority. This reveals the importance of Pascal's scientific work as regards to the crisis of fundation in modern Science. Using Aristotle's Poetic's methods, I show that Augustinian notion of figuration both applies to mathematics and Biblic litterature, and gives the aesthetic unity of the whole Pascal’s work . Its originality in philosophy is to get rid of scepticism by searching new languages capable of certitude. I reopen a long debate on the unaccomplished Pensées. I propose to distinguish between objective and apologetic editions. The latter are based on some of the author's indications on his intentions, the former use the only classification available. The thorough originality of what I call Les Pensées classées is to propose a quest for happiness with no religious a priori. After having established the contrarieties of humain condition which no philosophy or human science can describe or resolve because they reject contradiction, as a principle, this classification introduces the Christian Scripture as it carries the only language capable of accepting contradiction and giving a meaning to it. There are two new approaches here : introducing the Bible in the field of existence by necessity, and as a simple book with cognitive power. Structured by narration and figuration (typology), this Biblical model extends rational knowledge by extending its restricted space-time referential. It enlarges the horizon of existence of the reader and shows a path for repairing their contrarieties. Pascal deeply renews the classic figurative thought and the poetic approach of the Bible.

This diploma thesis is focused on David Hume's analysis of causality. The two major philosophical works about this topic are A Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiries concerning Human Understanding. The first chapter is about intellectual background which Hume came from when he is dealing with cause-effect problem. At that time there were two main epistemological theories: rationalism and empirism. Both will be discuss there. The next chapter is about Hume's way of thinking about human understanding. This chapter is important for us beacuse there are many terms which will be useful for understanding causality. Crucial role plays The Theory of Ideas, according to each content of a mind has a source in experience. The first perceptions are called impresions and their copies are called ideas. Ideas are processed by memory and imagination. There are two categories of contents of human understanding: relations of ideas and matters of facts. We will focus on matters of facts because they are based on causality. Hume as a empirist is searching for a source of idea of causality in our experience. He finds out that we cant find it in objects of our minds themselves, but is based on relations among them. These relations are: contiguity, constant conjunction, priority of time in the cause before the effect and...

Den enskilde revisorn har till uppgift att granska ett företags finansiella rapporter och kommunicera resultatet till företagets intressenter. För att kvalitetssäkra att den finansiella informationen visar på en rättvisande bild av det reviderade företaget krävs det att revisorn är ifrågasättande och uppmärksam i sitt arbete. Denna attityd benämns professionell skepticism och ska återspegla en revisors alla handlingar. Revisionsbranschen står inför många utmaningar där den traditionella rollen kommer att förändras. En bidragande orsak till det är den exponentiella tekniska utvecklingen där automatiska processer i allt större grad tar över och den mänskliga inblandningen minskar. Syftet med studien är att studera huruvida graden av professionell skepticism hos den enskilde revisorn påverkas i takt med den tekniska utvecklingen. För att framställa en teori gällande den aktuella forskningsfrågan har en kvalitativ forskningsmetod med intervjuer varit utgångspunkten. Det skapar en möjlighet att studera den enskilde revisorn i sin naturliga omgivning och öka förståelsen för hur revisorn upplever den rådande situationen. Digitaliseringen har resulterat i att revisorerna numera kan analysera en större mängd data och uppnå en högre träffsäkerhet vilket bidrar till en högre kvalitet på revisionerna. Resultatet visar på attdigitaliseringen kräver en förändring av den enskilde revisorns professionella skepticism för att bibehålla en hög kvalitet. Digitaliseringen medför att det inte längre är tillräckligt att vara skeptisk i revisionen utan det krävs även att revisorn är ifrågasättande till de digitala hjälpmedlen. Det råder en stor ovisshet om revisorerna i framtiden kommer att bli programstyrda och inte utövar en tillräcklig professionell skepticism. För att förebygga detta krävs det att revisorerna besitter nödvändig kunskap för att förstå det bearbetade materialet och för att kunna vara skeptisk till det material som de automatiska processerna levererar. Resultatet visar därmed att kunskap är av stor betydelse för att den enskilde revisorn ska utöva en professionell skepticism. Revisioner kommer fortsatt att vara komplexa och revisionsprocessen går inte att automatisera fullt ut. En mänsklig inblandning och en professionell skepticism kommer därav alltid vara nödvändig och studiens resultat visar på att den enskilde revisorn kommer att behöva anpassa sättet att tänka skeptiskt i en digitaliserad värld. / The individual auditor has a responsibility to review a company's financial reports and communicate the results to the company's stakeholders. In order to assure that the financial information present a true and fair view of the audited company it requires that the auditor is questionable and observant. This attitude is called professional scepticism and should be reflected in all actions performed by the auditor. The auditing industry faces many challenges where the traditional role of the auditor will change. A contributing reason is the exponential technical development where automatic processes increasingly take over human involvement. The purpose of the study is to examine whether the degree of professional scepticism of the individual auditor is affected in line with technical progress. To formulate a theory regarding the current research question, a qualitative research method with interviews has been used. This creates an opportunity to study the individual auditor in his or her natural environment and creates an understanding of how he or she experiences the current situation. The technical development has resulted in auditors being able to analyze a bigger amount of data and therefore achieve a higher accuracy, which contributes to a higher quality in the audits. The result indicate that the technical development requires a change of the auditor´s professional skepticism in order to maintain a high quality. The auditor should not only be skeptical in audits but also have a questioning mind towards digital devices. The present auditors experience a big concern that the future auditors will not have a sufficient professional skepticism and only rely on the digital devices. To prevent this from happening the auditors need to understand the data presented by the digital devices in order to exercise a sufficient level of professional skepticism. Therefore, the result indicate that knowledge is of great importance for the individual auditor´s professional skepticism. Audits will continue to be complex and the audit process cannot be fully automated. A human involvement and a professional skepticism will therefore always be necessary and the result shows that the individual auditor will need to adapt the way of thinking skeptically in a digitalized world.