My dissertation focuses on the moral philosophy of Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza in the context of the revival of Stoicism within the seventeenth century. There are many misinterpretations about early modern ethical theories due to a lack of proper awareness of Stoicism in the early modern period. My project rectifies this by highlighting understated Stoic themes in these early modern texts that offer new clarity to their morality. Although these three philosophers hold very different metaphysical commitments, each embraces a different aspect of Stoicism, letting it influence but not define his work. By addressing the Stoic themes on the morality of these three authors, I also hope to help better capture the intellectual climate of the time by bringing Stoic themes into the foreground. Stoicism is a Hellenistic philosophy that considered the passions a sickness of the intellect and the source of all human suffering; they believed the cure was virtue, which was obtained through replacing irrational passions with rational beliefs. Stoicism had a revival in the Renaissance ushering in a wave of Neostoic authors who play an important role in shaping the intellectual landscape of the following centuries. My first two chapters discuss Descartes, who wrote a “provisional morality” early in his public life, only (as I show) to ignore the subject of ethics until near his death. In my first chapter I argue that, though many present-day scholars misread Descartes’ first ethics as part of his final ethics, this earliest “provisional morality” mimics Neostoic Skeptics such as Montaigne and is provisional because his method of doubt is also provisional. In my second chapter I show that Descartes’ late, and more developed, moral theory attempts to synthesize a variety of ancient, and seemingly contradictory, ethical traditions: Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism. In many ways Descartes embraces Stoic morality, but as a mechanist he does not view passions as an intellectual sickness; rather they are a physiological event, an amoral instrument that can be used to help control one’s irrational desires. I further defend my thesis externally by showing that this is the reading supported by Descartes’ contemporaries including critics such as Leibniz and early Cartesians such as Antoine Le Grand and Pierre-Sylvain Régis My third chapter discusses Pascal, who embraces Stoicism differently. Pascal offers Stoicism as the first tier of a binary ethics: modeled after Augustine’s city of God and city of man, it is an alternative moral code for those who are ignorant of the good and true happiness. Finally, in my fourth chapter, I discuss two common misinterpretations of Spinoza’s ethics: one of them neglects the Stoic influence on his thought while the other embraces it too strongly, portraying him as an unadulterated Stoic. Although there are ways that he is more Stoic than Descartes and Pascal, such as in his panpsychism and monism, this does not extend to his morality. Rather than accepting either of the two readings, I highlight anti- Stoic themes that are also present. I conclude that if the discussion is contained to his morality, Spinoza is no more Stoic than the other Neostoics I discuss in previous chapters.

Thèse de doctorat effectuée en cotutelle au Département de philosophie Faculté des arts et des sciences de l’Université de Montréal et au département de philosophie école doctorale V de l’Université de la Sorbonne – Paris IV. Soutenue à Paris le 8 avril 2010. / Cette thèse vise à mettre en lumière, dans les Essais de Montaigne, un aspect peu connu du débat sur la constance à la fin du seizième siècle. Alors que la vertu de constance devient à cette époque un enjeu philosophique et moral de première importance, servant à la fois des idéaux stoïciens, chrétiens et civils, nous constatons une insistance des Essais à souligner le phénomène contraire, l’inconstance. Il s’agit dans un premier temps de montrer le dialogue que construit l’ouvrage de Montaigne face à la vertu de constance, puis d’établir le statut argumentatif de l’inconstance dans les Essais. Afin de mettre en valeur ce dialogue dissimulé sous les bigarrures des Essais, nous nous proposons de combiner lecture internaliste et intertextualité, afin d’évaluer au mieux les actes d’écrire de cet ouvrage. Dans le but de situer ce débat sur la constance et l’inconstance, nous nous rapportons d’abord à certaines écoles de philosophie hellénistique que pillent les Essais. Nous présentons d’une part l’origine, d’autre part et les déplacements de ce débat. Le scepticisme de Montaigne s’en trouve déstabilisé, le stoïcisme à la fois débattu et repoussé, l’épicurisme instrumentalisé. L’inconstance prend un visage universel qui rend présomptueuse, vaine et même dangereuse toute aspiration à la constance. La deuxième section de la thèse montre la prise en charge méthodologique de l’inconstance dans les Essais, notamment à travers le Distingo, et son effet sur la connaissance historique comme sur les activités prudentielles (politique, jurisprudence, action militaire). Après avoir montré que l’ouvrage de Montaigne présente une critique radicale de la méthode et des objectifs des moralistes, nous posons que la nature de l’essai est de corriger cette erreur et de donner sa juste place à l’inconstance humaine. Nous constatons alors que l’inconstance a le statut d’une condition pré éthique poussant les Essais à déconsidérer toute entreprise humaine dans la sphère publique. Mais ce désaveu jeté sur la sphère publique ne conduit pas à renier toute réflexion éthique. Les Essais n’encouragent pas simplement à se laisser porter par la fortune ou la coutume. Dans la sphère privée, le troisième livre des Essais construit plusieurs règles éthiques étonnantes et hétérodoxes : non repentir, diversion, vanité, expérience…qui toutes prennent pour pierre d’assise le possible (selon qu’on peut) et contribuent à redéfinir la grandeur d’âme (magnitudo animi, megalopsychè), en présentant un nouvel ordre ou une nouvelle conformité de l’action. Par delà l’analyse morale et la peinture du moi, se déploient dans les Essais une éthique qui s’approprie le mouvement imparfait de l’existence, qui s’édifie non plus contre l’inconstance, mais avec elle. Cette « éthique de l’inconstance » ou « éthique de l’indirection » se construit en opposition avec les morales doctrinales avec lesquelles elle discute toutefois sans interruption. / This thesis aims to emphasize in Montaigne’s Essays a little known aspect concerning the debate of constancy towards the end of the 16th. Century. While the virtue of constancy becomes a philosophical and moral issue of great importance, favouring at the same time the stoic, Christian and civil ideals, we observe in Montaigne’s Essays, an insistence to underline a contradictory phenomenon; inconstancy. First, it is essential to demonstrate the dialogue that builds Montaigne’s work concerning the virtue of constancy, to finally establish the proper argumentation on inconstancy in his Essays. In order to highlight this dialogue concealed in the patchwork of the Essays, we are proposing to combine internal and external reading, in order to evaluate thoroughly the act of writing they implicitly propose. With the intent to situate this debate concerning the virtue of constancy and the problem of inconstancy, we will refer primarily to the Hellenistic philosophies plundered by the Essays. We will present in the first part the origin and in the second part, the transfer of the debate. Montaigne’s scepticism happens to be destabilized, his stoicism is at the same time debated and rejected, his Epicureanism becoming a tool determining their truth. The inconstancy as mentioned takes a universal appearance making all references to the virtue of constancy as presumptuous, vain and even dangerous. The second section of the thesis demonstrates that methodology of the Essays takes over the notion of inconstancy, notably through the “Distingo”, and its effects on the historical knowledge relating to prudential activities such as: jurisprudence, political and military life. Now that we have demonstrated that the work of Montaigne presents a radical critic of the method and the objectives of the moralists, we claim that the nature of the essay is to correct this error and thus give the right place to human inconstancy. We acknowledge the fact that inconstancy has a status of a pre-ethic condition which pushes the Essays to disrepute any human enterprise in the public sphere. However, this denial cast upon the public sphere does not lead us to reject any kind of ethical reflection. Therefore, the Essays do not exclusively encourage letting faith or fortune carry us. In the private sphere, the third book of the Essays constructs many ethical regulations that are astonishing and heterodox: non repentance, diversion, vanity, experience...These aspects are all grounded in the ethical mode of the possible, (« Selon qu’on peut ») and at the same time contribute in redefining the magnitude of the soul (magntiudo animi, mégalopsychè) by presenting a new order or a new conformity of action. Beyond the moral analysis and the description of oneself, an ethical process seizes the imperfect movement of existence in the Essays, which erects itself not against inconstancy but in harmony with it. This ethic of inconstancy or ethic of indirection is built in opposition with the moral doctrines even though a constant debate seems to unite them.

Cette thèse vise à mettre en lumière, dans les Essais de Montaigne, un aspect peu connu du débat sur la constance à la fin du seizième siècle. Alors que la vertu de constance devient à cette époque un enjeu philosophique et moral de première importance, servant à la fois des idéaux stoïciens, chrétiens et civils, nous constatons une insistance des Essais à souligner le phénomène contraire, l’inconstance. Il s’agit dans un premier temps de montrer le dialogue que construit l’ouvrage de Montaigne face à la vertu de constance, puis d’établir le statut argumentatif de l’inconstance dans les Essais. Afin de mettre en valeur ce dialogue dissimulé sous les bigarrures des Essais, nous nous proposons de combiner lecture internaliste et intertextualité, afin d’évaluer au mieux les actes d’écrire de cet ouvrage. Dans le but de situer ce débat sur la constance et l’inconstance, nous nous rapportons d’abord à certaines écoles de philosophie hellénistique que pillent les Essais. Nous présentons d’une part l’origine, d’autre part et les déplacements de ce débat. Le scepticisme de Montaigne s’en trouve déstabilisé, le stoïcisme à la fois débattu et repoussé, l’épicurisme instrumentalisé. L’inconstance prend un visage universel qui rend présomptueuse, vaine et même dangereuse toute aspiration à la constance. La deuxième section de la thèse montre la prise en charge méthodologique de l’inconstance dans les Essais, notamment à travers le Distingo, et son effet sur la connaissance historique comme sur les activités prudentielles (politique, jurisprudence, action militaire). Après avoir montré que l’ouvrage de Montaigne présente une critique radicale de la méthode et des objectifs des moralistes, nous posons que la nature de l’essai est de corriger cette erreur et de donner sa juste place à l’inconstance humaine. Nous constatons alors que l’inconstance a le statut d’une condition pré éthique poussant les Essais à déconsidérer toute entreprise humaine dans la sphère publique. Mais ce désaveu jeté sur la sphère publique ne conduit pas à renier toute réflexion éthique. Les Essais n’encouragent pas simplement à se laisser porter par la fortune ou la coutume. Dans la sphère privée, le troisième livre des Essais construit plusieurs règles éthiques étonnantes et hétérodoxes : non repentir, diversion, vanité, expérience…qui toutes prennent pour pierre d’assise le possible (selon qu’on peut) et contribuent à redéfinir la grandeur d’âme (magnitudo animi, megalopsychè), en présentant un nouvel ordre ou une nouvelle conformité de l’action. Par delà l’analyse morale et la peinture du moi, se déploient dans les Essais une éthique qui s’approprie le mouvement imparfait de l’existence, qui s’édifie non plus contre l’inconstance, mais avec elle. Cette « éthique de l’inconstance » ou « éthique de l’indirection » se construit en opposition avec les morales doctrinales avec lesquelles elle discute toutefois sans interruption. / This thesis aims to emphasize in Montaigne’s Essays a little known aspect concerning the debate of constancy towards the end of the 16th. Century. While the virtue of constancy becomes a philosophical and moral issue of great importance, favouring at the same time the stoic, Christian and civil ideals, we observe in Montaigne’s Essays, an insistence to underline a contradictory phenomenon; inconstancy. First, it is essential to demonstrate the dialogue that builds Montaigne’s work concerning the virtue of constancy, to finally establish the proper argumentation on inconstancy in his Essays. In order to highlight this dialogue concealed in the patchwork of the Essays, we are proposing to combine internal and external reading, in order to evaluate thoroughly the act of writing they implicitly propose. With the intent to situate this debate concerning the virtue of constancy and the problem of inconstancy, we will refer primarily to the Hellenistic philosophies plundered by the Essays. We will present in the first part the origin and in the second part, the transfer of the debate. Montaigne’s scepticism happens to be destabilized, his stoicism is at the same time debated and rejected, his Epicureanism becoming a tool determining their truth. The inconstancy as mentioned takes a universal appearance making all references to the virtue of constancy as presumptuous, vain and even dangerous. The second section of the thesis demonstrates that methodology of the Essays takes over the notion of inconstancy, notably through the “Distingo”, and its effects on the historical knowledge relating to prudential activities such as: jurisprudence, political and military life. Now that we have demonstrated that the work of Montaigne presents a radical critic of the method and the objectives of the moralists, we claim that the nature of the essay is to correct this error and thus give the right place to human inconstancy. We acknowledge the fact that inconstancy has a status of a pre-ethic condition which pushes the Essays to disrepute any human enterprise in the public sphere. However, this denial cast upon the public sphere does not lead us to reject any kind of ethical reflection. Therefore, the Essays do not exclusively encourage letting faith or fortune carry us. In the private sphere, the third book of the Essays constructs many ethical regulations that are astonishing and heterodox: non repentance, diversion, vanity, experience...These aspects are all grounded in the ethical mode of the possible, (« Selon qu’on peut ») and at the same time contribute in redefining the magnitude of the soul (magntiudo animi, mégalopsychè) by presenting a new order or a new conformity of action. Beyond the moral analysis and the description of oneself, an ethical process seizes the imperfect movement of existence in the Essays, which erects itself not against inconstancy but in harmony with it. This ethic of inconstancy or ethic of indirection is built in opposition with the moral doctrines even though a constant debate seems to unite them. / Thèse de doctorat effectuée en cotutelle au Département de philosophie Faculté des arts et des sciences de l’Université de Montréal et au département de philosophie école doctorale V de l’Université de la Sorbonne – Paris IV. Soutenue à Paris le 8 avril 2010.

Rubens is known as a painter; he should also be defined as an art theorist. Following Robert Williams’ theory that Early Modern art became philosophical, I believe that style can connote art theoretical interests and philosophical models, and that in Rubens’s case, these included the classical Stoic. While it would be possible to trace Rubens’s commitment to Stoicism in his subject matter, I investigate it in his style, taking a Baxandalian approach to inferential criticism. I focus on Rubens’s formal choices, his varied brushwork, and his ability to create a vibrant picture plane. My study is divided into chapters on Ethics, Logic, and Physics. In Chapter One I treat Stoic moral philosophy as an influence in the design of Rubens’s paintings, consider similarities between classical and Early Modern interest in viewer/reader response, and argue that Baroque artists could use style to avoid dogma while targeting viewers’ personal transformation. In Chapter Two I focus on Rhetoric, a section of the Stoic philosophy of Logic. Stoic Logic privileged truth: that is, it centred on investigating existing reality. As such, Stoic rhetorical theory and the classical literature influenced by it promoted a style that is complex and nuanced. I relate this to the Early Modern interest in copia, arguing that this includes Rubens’s painterly style which, apropos copia, should be better termed the Abundant Style. In Chapter Three I explore similarities between Stoic Natural Philosophy and the Early Modern artistic interest in the unified visual field. The Stoics defined the natural world as eternally moving and mixing; with force fields, energy, and elements in constant relationships of cause/effect. The Stoic concept of natural sympathy was a notion of material/energetic interrelatedness in which the world was seen as a living body, and the divine inhered in matter. I consider ways that these classical Stoic concepts of transformation, realism, and vivified matter might be discerned in Rubens’s style. / Graduate / 2023-12-14