En este trabajo se examina si de las consideraciones que Donald Davidson ha hecho del caso de la interpretación radical se sigue algo así como una refutación del escepticismo. Se argumenta que tal conclusión no se sigue de las posiciones acerca de la naturaleza del pensamiento y del lenguaje mantenidas por este filósofo americano, ni siquiera con la ayuda del así llamado argumento del intérprete omnisciente. También se rechaza la idea de que concebir su argumentación como un argumento trascendental modesto proporcione mejores resultados antiescépticos. Finalmente se defiende que el mejor modo de articular su posición es como un diagnóstico teórico del escepticismo al estilo del defendido por Michael Williams en su libro Unnatural Doubts. Desde este punto de vista lo que la filosofía davidsoniana haría sería reprochar al escéptico su adhesión al representacionismo y mostrar una alternativa al mismo que explique la posibilidad del pensamiento y del lenguaje. Concebida así la filosofía davidsoniana no constituiría una victoria definitiva ante el escepticismo, sino que más bien mostraría que su posición no es obligatoria y, al menos, garantizaría una presunción de inocencia para nuestras creencias ante el reto del escéptico global. / This work examines whether it follows a refutation of scepticism from Donald Davidson's work on radical interpretation. It is argued that such a conclusion does not follow from Donald Davidson's views on thought and language, not even with the help of the so called omniscient interpreter argument. This work also rejects that such views on language and thought lead to a better result against scepticism when interpreted as a modest transcendental argument. Finally it is claimed that the best way of articulating Davidson's antisceptical strategy is as a theoretical diagnosis of scepticism in a similar vein as Michael Williams has developed in his book Unnatural Doubts. From this point of view what Davidson's philosophy would do is, on the one hand, to reproach the sceptic his adherence to representationism and, on the other hand, to defend an alternative to this philosophical view that explains how thought and language are possible. Conceived of in this way, Davidson's philosophy would not constitute a definitive victory against scepticism. However it would show that scepticism is not compulsory and, at the very least, it would guarantee a presumption of innocence for our beliefs when they face the sceptical threat.

Human civilization is failing in the fight to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and limit the impact of anthropogenic climate change. Whilst there are likely numerous reasons for this inertia, societal risk perception plays a fundamental role in influencing the speed and effectiveness of political and social action to address climate change. This study presents the psychological, sociological and cultural reasons for variations in the perceptions of risk amongst a group of climate change sceptics in Sweden. Highlighting cognitive barriers and characteristics associated with different ideological biases and worldviews. The paper concludes that people become more or less sceptical to climate change based on a variety of potentially intersectional issues. Whilst gender, age and wisdom all play a role, the social groups with which people identify, as well as individuals’ values and ideas of what constitutes an ideal society ultimately shape ones perception of risk in relation to climate change. The implications for the communication of climate science are discussed, revealing that any inclusive communication strategy will fail unless it is presented in a way that affirms rather than challenges one’s cultural identity.

The historiography of philosophy presents many difficulties to anybody addressing its more general features. How easy it would be if we had only one skeptic philosopher - who calls himself a skeptic or is believed to be one - and just one "other" philosopher who is not a skeptic or at least does not want be known as such. The third person would be the historian of philosophy who informs us about what befalls the skeptic philosopher and his skepticism. Does be have many followers or many critics or both? Does he stick to his opinions throughout his life or does he change them? ls he ignored by the other philosopher or rather criticized by him? The historian would report all of this to us; we would read his story and be in a position to discuss it, to compare it with the skeptic's own writings and with those of his opponent, and so on. Unfortunately, this ideal constellation does not exist. History is more complex; the historians of philosophy reporting on skepticism have to deal with several skeptical philosophers - self-declared or suspected - from ancient and modern times, and with various theories of skepticism - apologetic and polemic, prompted by religious, scientific or other considerations. Most importantly, historians of philosophy are not a third party. This can be learned from Stäudlin's History of Skepticism.

My argument assesses and reconfigures binary structures in Shakespeare’s plays and in Shakespeare criticism. I contend that ideas in early modern literature often exhibit three aspects, but that critics, who mostly rely upon a binary philosophical vocabulary, tend to notice only two aspects at a time, thereby “digesting” the third. My opening chapter theorizes the superimposition of triadic structures upon dyads, arguing that this new polyrhythmic strategy helps recapture an early modern philosophical perspective by circumventing the entrenched binary categories we have inherited from the Enlightenment. In Chapter Two, I examine the relationship of tyranny and conscience in Tudor politics, Reformed psychology, and Richard III. Early modern political theorists often employ a binary opposition of kingship and tyranny, and historians typically draw a binary distinction between absolutists and resisters. I argue that there were in fact three ideological positions on offer which these binaries misrepresent. As well, Reformed psychology emphasizes the relationship of the individual subject and an objective God, unmediated by community, and I propose that this opposition of subjectivity and objectivity digests the idea of intersubjectivity. In Richard III, Shakespeare interrogates the implausibility of Tudor political binaries and stages a nostalgia for intersubjective community and conscience. In Chapter Three I read the debates on value in Troilus and Cressida alongside contemporary economic writings by Gerard de Malynes on currency reform and “merchandizing exchange.” Our current models of value – intrinsic and extrinsic, use and exchange, worth and price – are emphatically binary, but the mercantile practices that Malynes describes depend upon a triadic conception of value. My contention is that Troilus and Cressida becomes a less problematic problem play when value is conceived as triadic rather than dyadic. In Chapter Four I explore early modern scepticism in connection with Coriolanus. Reading Montaigne and Wittgenstein in parallel, I distinguish between various conceptions of truth that are regularly grouped together under the blanket term “scepticism.” Then I turn to read Coriolanus as an experiment in competing modes of early modern epistemology, arguing that the play ultimately endorses the same sort of polyphonous Pyrrhonian scepticism that we find in Montaigne and Wittgenstein.

This thesis analyzes the relation between Kripke&#039 / s rule-sceptic argument and Wittgenstein&#039 / s paradox. Besides, Kripke&#039 / s claim that the conclusion of Wittgenstein&#039 / s private language argument is stated in PI 202 will be discussed. The thesis will also evaluate the consistency of Kripke&#039 / s rule-sceptic argument independently of Wittgenstein&#039 / s views.

This thesis concerns two main questions: What is intuition? And can it be a source of knowledge or justification? In addressing these questions, it advances several ongoing philosophical debates, and does so in two main ways: firstly, by formulating a general account of the nature of intuitive judgement that establishes common ground amongst the often disparate views of scholars working on intuition (or intuitions) in psychology, linguistics, philosophy and various other disciplines; and, secondly, by developing a new epistemological position that combines scepticism about the evidential value of intuition with a new account of philosophical skill. The general account of the nature of intuitive judgement mainly consists in drawing a distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive appearance which is analogous to a distinction that can be drawn between perceptual judgement and perceptual appearance. It is argued that a common type of paradox entails the distinction for the non-perceptual case; it is then demonstrated how various related notions, such as intuitive belief, intuitive thinking and intuition as a cognitive faculty, can be derived from the notion of intuitive judgement. The epistemological account receives additional support from a new theory regarding the objects of intuition, according to which the analogy between intuition and perception holds specifically for what is sometimes called 'aspect perception': it is argued that some intuitive appearances are partially constituted by an appearance of meaning and that, consequently, the analysis of intuitive judgement must distinguish between two types of object, an intentional object (typically, a thought) and a causal one (typically, an expression of thought). It is further argued that the focus on evidential value that has been prevalent in the philosophical literature is too restrictive. By contrast with the prevalent view, it is demonstrated that intuition plays a significant role in human thinking, including in philosophical and scientific enquiry, independently of whether intuition is of great or only of minimal evidential value.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-28T13:43:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-jefferson-dos-santos-marcondes-leite.pdf: 492521 bytes, checksum: 278028abd222a64bfe011856ac5e9343 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-28T13:44:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-jefferson-dos-santos-marcondes-leite.pdf: 492521 bytes, checksum: 278028abd222a64bfe011856ac5e9343 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-28T13:44:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-jefferson-dos-santos-marcondes-leite.pdf: 492521 bytes, checksum: 278028abd222a64bfe011856ac5e9343 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-11-29 / O presente trabalho pretende explorar o universo ético do ceticismo pirrônico antigo de Sexto Empírico. Para tanto, investigamos o tema nos livros em que Sexto trabalha a questão da ética, a saber, Hipotiposes Pirrônicas, livros I e III, e Contra os Éticos. Sexto apresenta, no livro I das Hipotiposes, a concepção geral do ceticismo. Essa apresentação permite entender como o cético se relaciona com a ética, tanto do ponto de vista da sua reflexão sobre a ética dogmática, como da sua ação ética. Sobre este último ponto, Sexto rejeita as críticas feitas pelos filósofos dogmáticos com relação a impossibilidade da vida prática do cético, indicando qual seria o critério cético de ação. As outras duas obras desenvolvem a reflexão cética sobre a ética. Examinaremos se as duas obras estão de acordo com a apresentação feita no livro I das Hipotiposes, ressaltando a unidade e a autenticidade que o pensamento pirrônico de fato tem. Inicialmente, nos livros sobre ética, Sexto investiga, a respeito das filosofias dogmáticas de sua época, principalmente a dos estoicos, a natureza do bem, do mal e do indiferente, visto que os modelos éticos de sua época consistem numa reflexão sobre esses conceitos. Ao aplicar o seu método filosófico, a argumentação dos dois lados de uma questão, gerando a equipolência, Sexto conclui que a única solução possível para os temas éticos, tal como os dogmáticos a entendem, é suspender o juízo sobre se existe algo que seja o bem, o mal ou o indiferente por natureza. Em segundo lugar, Sexto mostra que toda arte de viver está fadada ao fracasso, visto que estão também vinculadas aos conceitos morais por natureza. Finalmente, voltaremos à questão prática, quando Sexto apresenta o modelo cético de guiar uma vida eticamente, tendo os fenômenos como o critério cético de ação. Desta forma, apresentaremos o pensamento ético pirrônico de Sexto Empírico, com seu estilo próprio e suas características inovadoras e sofisticadas. / This study aims to explore the ethical universe of ancient pyrrhonian scepticism of Sextus Empiricus. We therefore investigated the subject in books where Sextus works the question of ethics, namely Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes, books I and III, and Against the Ethical. Sextus presents, in Book I of Hypotyposes, the general conception of scepticism. This presentation allows to understand how the skeptic it relates to ethics, both from the point of view of its reflection on the ethics dogmatic as their ethical action. On this last point, Sextus rejects the criticisms made by dogmatic philosophers regarding the impossibility of practical life of the skeptic, indicating what would be the criterion for action skeptical. The other two works develop skeptical reflection on ethics. Examine whether the two works are consistent with the presentation of the book I Hypotyposes, emphasizing unity and authenticity that thought has indeed Pyrrhonian. Initially, the books on ethics, Sextus investigates about the dogmatic philosophies of his day, especially the Stoics, the nature of good, bad and indifferent, since the ethical models of his day consists of a reflection on these concepts. By applying his philosophical method, the arguments on both sides of an issue, generating equipollence, Sextus concludes that the only possible solution to the ethical issues, such as the dogmatic understand it, is to suspend judgment about whether there is something that the good, bad or indifferent in nature. Second, Sextus shows that all art of living is doomed to failure, as they are also linked to moral concepts in nature. Finally, back to the practical question, when Sextus presents the model skeptical of guide a life ethically, with phenomena such as skeptical criterion of action. Thus, we present the ethical thinking Pyrrhonian of Sextus Empiricus, with its own style and its innovative features and sophisticated / TEDE

Le mythe de Casanova a longtemps réduit l’individu à un charmeur écervelé. Il a aussi masqué son statut d’écrivain. Afin de poursuivre l’œuvre de dévoilement de ses écrits, cette thèse étudie l’un des paradoxes qui les jalonnent. Imprégné de philosophie éclairée, le chevalier de Seingalt expose son mépris pour les croyances superstitieuses. Toutefois, témoin de la persistance de l’irrationnel au siècle des Lumières, il devient charlatan et met ses talents théâtraux au service de la duperie, développant ainsi une « esthétique de la superstition ». Pourtant, au cours de son existence, en particulier lors de l’expérience des Plombs, l’imposteur devient victime de ses craintes irrationnelles. Incapable de fixer ses convictions, ses postures philosophiques demeurent contradictoires, et marquent son écriture elle-même. Passant des attraits de la raison aux plaisirs de la croyance, l’aventurier s’abandonne donc plaisamment au mouvement, non seulement en matière féminine mais aussi en littérature et philosophie / For a long time, the myth of Casanova has reduced him to a brainless womanizer and has overshadowed his literary work. In order to furtherunveil his writings, this thesis studies one of the paradoxes that are regularly found in them. Steeped with enlightened philosophy, the chevalier de Seingalt shows his despise for superstitious beliefs. However, as he is confronted to irrationality during the Age of Enlightment, he becomes a charlatan and uses his theatrical skills to dupe other people, which makes him develop an « aesthetic of superstition ». Still, at some point of his life – in particular during the Leads episode – the imposter falls victim to his own irrational fears. Unable to decide on his convictions, his philosophical thoughts remain contradictory andaffect his writings. As he switches from the appeal of reason to the pleasures of belief, the adventurer indulges himself in wavering, not only in terms of women, but also in literature and philosophy

Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-22T20:50:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012-01-01. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2015-08-11T03:26:34Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 Publico-JefersondosSantosMarcondesLeite.pdf: 504359 bytes, checksum: 1505996de8d212ead99468e02db2c72e (MD5) / O presente trabalho pretende explorar o universo ético do ceticismo pirrônico antigo de Sexto Empírico. Para tanto, investigamos o tema nos livros em que Sexto trabalha a questão da ética, a saber, Hipotiposes Pirrônicas, livros I e III, e Contra os Éticos. Sexto apresenta, no livro I das Hipotiposes, a concepção geral do ceticismo. Essa apresentação permite entender como o cético se relaciona com a ética, tanto do ponto de vista da sua reflexão sobre a ética dogmática, como da sua ação ética. Sobre este último ponto, Sexto rejeita as críticas feitas pelos filósofos dogmáticos com relação a impossibilidade da vida prática do cético, indicando qual seria o critério cético de ação. As outras duas obras desenvolvem a reflexão cética sobre a ética. Examinaremos se as duas obras estão de acordo com a apresentação feita no livro I das Hipotiposes, ressaltando a unidade e a autenticidade que o pensamento pirrônico de fato tem. Inicialmente, nos livros sobre ética, Sexto investiga, a respeito das filosofias dogmáticas de sua época, principalmente a dos estoicos, a natureza do bem, do mal e do indiferente, visto que os modelos éticos de sua época consistem numa reflexão sobre esses conceitos. Ao aplicar o seu método filosófico, a argumentação dos dois lados de uma questão, gerando a equipolência, Sexto conclui que a única solução possível para os temas éticos, tal como os dogmáticos a entendem, é suspender o juízo sobre se existe algo que seja o bem, o mal ou o indiferente por natureza. Em segundo lugar, Sexto mostra que toda arte de viver está fadada ao fracasso, visto que estão também vinculadas aos conceitos morais por natureza. Finalmente, voltaremos à questão prática, quando Sexto apresenta o modelo cético de guiar uma vida eticamente, tendo os fenômenos como o critério cético de ação. Desta forma, apresentaremos o pensamento ético pirrônico de Sexto Empírico, com seu estilo próprio e suas características inovadoras e sofisticadas. / This study aims to explore the ethical universe of ancient pyrrhonian scepticism of Sextus Empiricus. We therefore investigated the subject in books where Sextus works the question of ethics, namely Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes, books I and III, and Against the Ethical. Sextus presents, in Book I of Hypotyposes, the general conception of scepticism. This presentation allows to understand how the skeptic it relates to ethics, both from the point of view of its reflection on the ethics dogmatic as their ethical action. On this last point, Sextus rejects the criticisms made by dogmatic philosophers regarding the impossibility of practical life of the skeptic, indicating what would be the criterion for action skeptical. The other two works develop skeptical reflection on ethics. Examine whether the two works are consistent with the presentation of the book I Hypotyposes, emphasizing unity and authenticity that thought has indeed Pyrrhonian. Initially, the books on ethics, Sextus investigates about the dogmatic philosophies of his day, especially the Stoics, the nature of good, bad and indifferent, since the ethical models of his day consists of a reflection on these concepts. By applying his philosophical method, the arguments on both sides of an issue, generating equipollence, Sextus concludes that the only possible solution to the ethical issues, such as the dogmatic understand it, is to suspend judgment about whether there is something that the good, bad or indifferent in nature. Second, Sextus shows that all art of living is doomed to failure, as they are also linked to moral concepts in nature. Finally, back to the practical question, when Sextus presents the model skeptical of guide a life ethically, with phenomena such as skeptical criterion of action. Thus, we present the ethical thinking Pyrrhonian of Sextus Empiricus, with its own style and its innovative features and sophisticated. / TEDE

Cette thèse ne propose pas une variation sur la thématique de la mort de Dieu et ses retombées, mais une enquête sur un mode de penser disqualifié, le nihilisme, susceptible de renouveler un diagnostic sur la crise de la modernité. La menace du nihilisme prend consistance dès l'émergence du scepticisme en Grèce ancienne. Passée au crible de l'histoire de la métaphysique et de la prise de pouvoir des mouvements totalitaires, la mise en équivalence nihilisme-scepticisme mérite d'être interrogée. Elle n'est recevable que si les formes anciennes et modernes prises par le scepticisme sont autant de précédents nihilistes et si, inversement, la crise qui scelle la fin de la modernité est interprétable en termes sceptiques. Une approche dynamique de la métaphysique (comme tension et apparentement entre dogmatisme et scepticisme), rend une reconstruction nihiliste du scepticisme sujette à caution. Penser suspensif dans ses formes anciennes, porteur de vacillement à l'époque moderne, le scepticisme se démarque du nihilisme. Ce dernier évide et néantise toutes les différences et consiste, lui, en une négation du fonds commun entre dogmatisme et scepticisme. Quelle que soit la portée créatrice du nihilisme d'un point de vue spéculatif, c'est sa seule dimension destructrice qui s'impose avec l'instauration d'une politique totalitaire. La modernité s'ouvre bien sur un défi de type sceptique : où asseoir sa créance ? Cependant, avec la mort de Dieu, cette question ne se pose plus en termes de vacillement mais de perte définitive de toute assise. S'il en ressort une crise du but dans le cadre métaphysique,l'institutionnalisation du nihilisme donne lieu, quant à elle, à une crise du sens. Le scepticisme contemporain, emporté dans la tourmente, semble disqualifié par sa compromission supposée avec des politiques nihilistes. Forcé d'engager un auto-examen inédit, ne peut-il pas encore être une ressource pour notre temps ? / This thesis does not present a supplementary approach about the death of God and its effects but a study of nihilism, a disqualified way of thought, which could renew a diagnosis on the crisis of modernity. Nihilsm becomes really a threat as soon as scepticism takes shape in Ancient Greece. It is worth questioning stetting nihilism and scepticism as equivalent when considered through the history of metaphysics and rising of totalitarian regimes. This could be accepted only if one considers the ancient and modern forms of scepticism as proceeding from nihilism, and, on the other hand, if the crisis putting an end to modernity can be interpreted from a sceptical point of view. A dynamic approach to metaphysics (as tension and link between dogmatism and scepticism) casts a doubt upon a nihilist interpretation of scepticism. Suspensive thought in its ancient ways, carrying indecision in modern times, scepticism separates from nihilism. The latest eliminates all differences ; by itself, it is the abolition of the common ground between dogmatism and scepticism. Whatever the creative potential of nihilism from a speculative point of view, in the foundation of totalitarian politics, only its destructive aspect stands out. Indeed, modernity opens on a challenge of a sceptic type : which basis for one's belief ? Yet, after the death of God, this question witnesses no longer a state of indecision but truly as the permanent loss of foundation. While it leads to a crisis of the goal from a metaphysical scope, the institutionalization of nihilism provides a crisis of meaning. Contemporary scepticism, caught in the turmoil, appears as discredited because of its presumed involvement with nihilist politics. Could it still be a resource in our time when forced to pratice an original self-examination ?