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This thesis examines some epistemic defences of democracy put forward by David Estlund, Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter, as well as a critique of democracy raised by Jason Brennan. It then develops an epistemic defence of a moderately non-egalitarian system, which it proposes to call liberal trusteeship. According to the proposed theory, the power to draft laws ought to be separated from the power to enact those drafts into law. The former power ought to be vested in trustees, who are essentially specialists that have inquired extensively into a given matter, and the latter power ought to be vested in a democratically elected parliament. Subsequently, this thesis argues that parliament should nevertheless have the prerogative to ultimately override trustees on ethics and pass its own legislation regulating moral matters; that the criteria for selecting trustees should be determined by jury courts; and that parliament and jury courts should be given some powers to influence the composition of trustee committees, so that the political process can guard against the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt. The above proposal is grounded on three principal claims. Firstly, this thesis argues that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best balance between competence and equality. Secondly, it argues that liberal trusteeship is more likely than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Thirdly, and as a result, it argues that liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power sufficiently more competently than democracy, such that its moderate deviation from political equality will be justified. In the light of this, the thesis concludes that liberal trusteeship would strike a better balance between competence and equality than democracy.

This thesis defends an ontological and epistemological account of Michel Foucault's post-structuralist philosophy, to argue that political philosophy needs to take into account the historical and political contingency of subjectivity and discourse. I show that by addressing the historical and political contingency of knowledge, Foucault's work overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political philosophy, which treats true discourse as universal and disinterested. In doing so I hope to have to refuted the mainly positivistic and humanist schools of thought that lay claim to universal and foundationalist notions, by demonstrating the extent to which their misgivings about Foucault's work are informed by and founded upon an unjustified a-historicism. The thesis is composed of three chapters, the first of which deals with an ontology of the subject, the second, with an ontology of social relations, and the last with epistemology. In each chapter I use dialectical analysis to reveal how interests necessarily mediate subjectivity, social relations, and knowledge. The first two chapters defend Foucault's conception of power, by way of an analysis of the relations between Foucault's work and Sartre's existential phenomenology. I show how both Foucault and Sartre successfully address the problem of historicism for political philosophy with their respective conceptions of human freedom. The final chapter defends Foucault's conception of the relations between power and discourse, to show how it overcomes the a-historicism of universal, foundational epistemology. These three chapters demonstrate the importance of accounting for historicism in political philosophy. Claims to universal interest, because knowledge is conditioned by conflicts of interest, often mask political domination. It is important, then, to remember, in political philosophy, that knowledge is evaluative and interested, reflecting historically and politically mediated evaluations. One should be suspicious of ' natural facts' , used to justify actions or beliefs, thereby masking the choices that inform them. I have used the work of Michel Foucault to motivate this claim.

This study critically and systematically analyses the purported democratic values of freedom and equality with a view to clarifying the meaning of the concepts of democracy, freedom and equality; and examining the nature of the relations between kinds of freedom and kinds of equality, their association with democracy, and assessing their reconcilability within the two broad schools of democratic theory, namely, Anglo American democratic theory and Continental democratic theory. Put slightly differently, the issue is whether freedom and equality are mutually compatible or incompatible within democratic contexts. The analysis necessitates exploring the possible reason or reasons for the reconcilability or incompatibility of freedom and equality. Hence, the arguments in democratic literature relevant to the meanings of freedom and equality, and the relations between them will be examined. The first set of arguments concern the question of whether kinds of freedom endanger kinds of equality, and conversely, whether kinds of equality erode or hamper kinds of freedom. The relation existing between freedom and equality, and equality and freedom, in both instances purport to demonstrate the tension existing between them in theory as well as in practice. The second set of arguments concern the question of whether kinds of freedom promote kinds of equality, and conversely, whether kinds of equality further kinds of freedom. The relation in both instances is deemed to demonstrate the affinity between freedom and equality, and equality and freedom. An attempt will thus be made to address the issue of the seemingly confusing array of meanings of democracy, freedom and equality, and the potentially problematic relations between them, and particularly those between freedom and equality as represented by the two sets of arguments within appropriate democratic contexts. The study will endeavour to examine the analytic and synthetic interplay of meanings and relations, their nature and compatibility or incompatibility, and the possible reasons for this state of affairs, in an attempt to identify and address the perceived misapprehensions concerning their meanings and relations in democratic literature. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective. Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects. In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.

Orientador: Jose Carlos Pinto de Oliveira / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T02:48:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Penna-Forte_MarcelodoAmaral_D.pdf: 33078007 bytes, checksum: d5814e0c2de9c5cefde73b485db17b1e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: A presente tese elabora um quadro geral para o estudo das representações visuais, tal como são utilizadas na atividade científica, na perspectiva de uma filosofia naturalista da ciência. Para tanto, é encaminhado um questionamento acerca das funções das representações visuais que passa pela consideração, orientada para este fim, da pertinência das análises funcionais, de uma noção adequada de representação e da caracterização da ciência como um sistema de representações. Conclui-se, finalmente, que as funções das representações visuais concernem à elaboração, ao desenvolvimento e, por vezes, à modificação da rede de similaridades que constitui a ciência / Abstract: This dissertation is concerned with the exposition of a naturalistic general framework for the study of visual representations as they are used in the scientific activity. It raises the question ci the role played by the visual representations in science. In order to do so, it argues for a functional analysis as a philosophical approach, suggests a suitable notion of representation, and describes science as a representational system. Finally, it concludes that visual representations can contribUte to the establishment, to the improvement, and to the revision of the network of similarities that constitutes science / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientadores: Zeljko Loparic, Volker Gerhardt / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T03:13:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Scherer_FabioCesar_D.pdf: 1353056 bytes, checksum: 49c64c6dc8be5d97af6df5b999f353ae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: O presente trabalho sobre a filosofia kantiana objetiva demonstrar a exequibilidade de juízos jurídico-políticos a priori em geral, o que acarreta o problema de provar a realizabilidade do fomento universal e contínuo da paz. É através de regras e mecanismos de aplicação dados na política em geral (política a priori e política empírica), assim como pela sensificação do conceito de vontade universal coletiva a priori, no âmbito da filosofia da história, que são validadas as leis a priori da doutrina do direito. Tais leis são formuladas em virtude do dever - imposto pela razão prático-jurídico a priori - de aceitar a máxima de agir continuamente na direção da execução do fim último do direito e da política. Desta forma, se demonstra que a paz perpétua, ainda seja que irrealizável, não é uma mera quimera, porém, que contém realidade objetiva prática e efetividade. Descrita enquanto exercício da doutrina do direito, a política como "ciência crítica" requer o estudo dos princípios puros deduzidos do conceito de direito e, consequentemente, da derivada teoria dos juízos a priori sobre o meu e o teu no plano do direito privado e do direito público em geral. A construção de tal teoria jurídico-política a priori é somente possível graças ao acréscimo do domínio de ações executáveis pelo agente humano livre aos objetos possíveis, uma das principais inovações em Die Metaphysik der Sitten. De acordo com as exigências do projeto crítico kantiano, determinadas no âmbito da razão especulativa, e os resultados obtidos em Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, a pesquisa de conceitos e juízos práticos requer a demonstração de sua possibilidade lógica e de sua aplicação nesse novo domínio prático, bem como a prova dessa teoria dos juízos. Mediante esta chave de leitura analítico-lógica, que contém como procedimento de prova o método de análise e síntese, é que apresento uma reconstrução da teoria kantiana jurídico-política a priori, exposta em Rechtslehre. Pretendo, desta forma, oferecer uma interpretação diferenciada sobre a doutrina do direito e da política do Kant tardio, em que seja possível, entre outras coisas, responder a algumas questões abertas na pesquisa kantiana sobre a construção e a aplicabilidade dos juízos a priori desses subcampos práticos. / Abstract: The present study about Kantian philosophy aims to demonstrate the feasibility of a priori juridical-political judgments in general, which results in the problem of proving the achievability of universal and continuous peace fomentation. It is through rules and application mechanisms given on politics in general (a priori politics and empirical politics), as well as the sensification of the concept of a priori universal collective will in the history philosophy extent that the a priori laws of the Law doctrine are validated. Those laws are formulated due to duties - imposed by the a priori practical-juridical reason - of accepting the maxim of acting continuously towards the execution of the ultimate of law and politics. Thus, it is demonstrated that perpetual peace, even if it is non-achievable, it is not a mere chimera, however which contains practical objective reality and effectiveness. Described as exercise of the law doctrine, the politics as "critical science" requires the study of pure principles deducted from the law concepts and, consequently, from the a priori judgment theory derivative about "mine and yours" private and public law fields in general. The construction of this a priori juridical-political theory is only possible due to the increase of the domain of executable actions by the human agent free to the possible objects, one of the main innovations in Die Metaphysik der Sitten. According to the Kantian critical project demands, determined in the speculative reason extent, and the results obtained in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, the research of practical concepts and judgments requires the demonstration of its logical possibility and its application in this new practical domain, as well as the proof of the judgment theory. Through this analytical-logical reading key, which contains as proof procedure the analysis and synthesis method, it is presented a reconstruction of a priori juridical-political Kantian theory, exposed in Rechtslehre. It is intended, thus, to offer a differentiated interpretation about late Kant's law and politics doctrine, in which it is possible, among other things, to answer some open questions in the Kantian research about the construction and applicability of the a priori judgments of these practical subfields. / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T18:25:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_PaulaFreitasde_M.pdf: 1819275 bytes, checksum: 50cd1fce20bb98ac3fcc4351132c41c3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A pesquisa teve como objeto o estudo a noção de autoridade presente na filosofia política de Nicole Oresme, a partir dos diferentes usos dados à moeda no reino, em especial aqueles que conduzem o reino à autossuficiência (autarkéia). Por meio da análise das relações estabelecidas entre o príncipe e os seus súditos no processo de fabrico, cunhagem e circulação da moeda, se buscou demonstrar que a realização do fim natural da moeda como instrumento artificial usado no sistema de trocas justas pode fomentar a riqueza do reino e a felicidade dos súditos pela circulação de riquezas que permite a diversidade de bens e serviços disponíveis no reino para os residentes e súditos. Para tanto, a pesquisa se dividiu em três capítulos que abordaram a noção de autoridade política na Realeza, os limites da autoridade do príncipe no reino e a tirania como causa da sedição. Para tanto, foi realizada a leitura do Traité sur la Monnaie e dos textos complementares Comentários à Política e Comentários à Ética, estes últimos correspondentes às traduções e glosas francesas de Oresme aos textos aristotélicos da Política e da Ética, respectivamente. Concluiu-se que a realeza e a tirania são formas distintas de ordenação das relações humanas. A realeza possui boas constituições e o governo é exercido pelo príncipe e é reto porque busca o bem e o interesse público. Na questão monetária, isso resulta na preservação da qualidade da moeda e na promoção de meios que a faz circular por entre seus súditos e por entre reinos de modo justo. Ao contrário, na tirania, o uso da moeda torna-se injusto por satisfazer a interesses particulares e servir de instrumento para a tirania monetária, de modo que quem reina afasta-se da sua constituição verdadeira, que é a realeza / Abstract: The research had as its object of study the notion of authority present in the political philosophy Nicole Oresme, from the different uses of the currency in the kingdom, in particular those who lead the kingdom to self-sufficiency (autarkéia). Through the analysis of the relationship between the prince and his subjects in the manufacturing process, minting and circulation of money, it sought to demonstrate the performance of the natural end of the currency as a tool used in an artificial system fair exchanges can foster,in the kingdom, wealth and happiness for its subjects by the circulation of wealth that allows the diversity of goods and services available to residents in the kingdom and subjects. Therefore, the research is divided into three chapters that addressed the notion of political authority in the Royalty, the limits of authority of the prince in the kingdom and tyranny as the cause of sedition. In order to do it, it was read the Traité sur la Monnaie and the supplementary texts and comments to the Political Commentary on Ethics, the latter corresponds to the translations and glosses of French Oresme to Aristotelian texts of Politics and Ethics, respectively. It was concluded that the kingship and tyranny are different ways of ordering human relationships. The royals have good constitutions and the government is exercised by the prince and it is straight because it seeks for wellness and the public interest. On the monetary issue, this results in the preservation of the quality of the coin and the promotion means that it circulates among his subjects and between realms fairly. On the other hand, the use of money by the tyranny becomes unjust to satisfy particular interests and serves as a tool for monetary tyranny, so whoever reigns deviates from its real constitution, which is royalty / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestra em Filosofia

Orientador: Roberto Romano / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T07:16:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bianchini_FernandoNovelli_M.pdf: 1389137 bytes, checksum: 00828ecf31df4523661005da345ea174 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: O presente trabalho objetiva analisar, por um lado, as críticas desenvolvidas pelo jurista e filósofo Carl Schmitt à democracia parlamentar representativa, expostas em suas obras publicadas no período compreendido entre as duas guerras mundiais, bem como tenciona elucidar a proposição, pelo autor, de resposta ao problema político e jurídico que é levantado, mediante a construção de um Estado totalitário. Debate o retorno de tais críticas no atual contexto brasileiro e global e introduz os princípios e os instrumentos da democracia participativa, por outro lado, como possível solução para a problemática que hoje é reavivada, sem sugerir, entretanto, a obliteração da democracia representativa. Analisa os fundamentos e mecanismos da democracia participativa, baseada historicamente na liberdade comunal, invocando as lições do jurista e filósofo Alexis de Tocqueville, especialmente quanto à distribuição de poder político. Debate a justiça coletiva e a importância para o pacto federativo nesse contexto, finalizando, assim, a dissertação / Abstract: The following work intends to analyze, in one hand, the criticisms developed by the jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt to the parliamentary representative democracy, exposed in his works published in the period between the two world wars, and aims to clarify the proposal, made by the author, in response to the political and legal problem that is exposed, by building a totalitarian state. Discusses the return of such criticism in the current brazilian and global contexts and introduces the principles and instruments of the participatory democracy, on the other hand, as a possible solution to the problem which is now revived, without suggesting, however, the obliteration of representative democracy. After that, analyses the foundations and mechanisms of participatory democracy, historically based on communal freedom, invoking the lessons of the jurist and philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville, especially concerning to the distribution of political power. Debate the importance of the collective justice and the federative pact in this context, ending, after that, the dissertation / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished