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This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights' functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents' practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories' in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status' of ‘being in a position' to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.

Orientador: Pedro Geraldo Tosi / Coorientador: Elaine Cristine Sartorelli / Banca: Therese Fuhrer / Banca: Breno Battistin Sebastiani / Banca: Pablo Shwartz Frydman / Banca: Elizabete Sanches Rocha / Resumo: A investigação se propõe analisar as obras De Regno (Ao imperador, sobre a realeza) e De Providentia (Aos egípcios, sobre a providência), ambas de autoria do filósofo norte-africano Sinésio de Cirene, supostamente escritas no momento em que participa da embaixada em Constantinopla, entre 397 e 400 d.C., a serviço de sua cidade nativa, Cirene, na província da Líbia Superior/ Cirenaica, norte da África. No centro de nossa investigação, encontram-se as estratégias discursivas e os topoi retóricos empregados por Sinésio para a construção de um ethos político favorável não só à construção de uma imagem de si que se ajusta ao papel do filósofo na política imperial, mas também à representatividade política de famílias abastadas na administração imperial, haja vista seu envolvimento e o de sua família nos quadros político-administrativos do Império Romano. A proposição de uma análise retórica pelo viés da construção do ethos político pode nos oferecer informações sobre as estratégias empreendidas por aristocratas da África romana tardia para se firmar no cenário político romano / Abstract: The research aims to analyze the works De Regno (To the emperor, on the royalty) and De Providentia (To the Egyptians, on Providence), both written by the North African philosopher Synesius of Cyrene, who wrote them supposedly during his participation in the embassy in Constantinople between 397 and 400 AD serving his native city, Cyrene, in the province of Lybia Superior/Cyrenaica, North Africa. In the center of our research are the discursive strategies and rhetorical topoi used by Synesius to the construction of a political ethos in favor not only of the building of an image of himself that fits the role of the philosopher in imperial policy, but also of the political representation of wealthy families in the imperial administration, considering his involvement and his family's involvement in political and administrative cadres of the Roman Empire. The proposition of a rhetorical analysis by the bias of the construction of political ethos can offer information on the strategies undertaken by aristocrats of the late Roman Africa who sought to establish themselves in the Roman political scene / Doutor

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-27T12:40:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Anderson Alves Esteves.pdf: 2892069 bytes, checksum: 4e5ffd2318a6443fcc8b852b3a3bda57 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-27T12:40:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Anderson Alves Esteves.pdf: 2892069 bytes, checksum: 4e5ffd2318a6443fcc8b852b3a3bda57 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-20 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The thesis deals with the Theory Herbert Marcuse's criticism regarding the limits and the possibility of emancipation [overcoming the principle of performance for the aesthetic ethos] in the context of Monopoly Capitalism of the twentieth century: Chapter I shows the Author's arguments about the new forms of social control [technology, false needs, culture, politics, language, mental structure] which contributed to the company's management; Chapter II is the decades policy object 1960 and 1970 [the Great Refusal and its characters (the intellectual, the student movement, the population of the ghetto and the ethnic question, the movements of national liberation, the liberation movement of women the environmental movement), the role of new awareness and education, the formulation of the concept of Integral Socialism, the New Left and its strategy]; Chapter III deals with how the author thinks aesthetics [aesthetic reduction, aesthetic need, aesthetic ethos, art and engagement, character dialectic so bourgeois art], also among the aforementioned decades, as a way of overcoming the reality principle in effect / A tese trata da Teoria Crítica de Herbert Marcuse no que concerne ao limite e à possibilidade de emancipação [superação do princípio de desempenho pelo ethos estético] sob o contexto do capitalismo monopolista do século XX: o Capítulo I mostra os argumentos do Autor acerca das novas formas de controle social [tecnologia, falsas necessidades, cultura, política, linguagem, estrutura psíquica] que contribuíram para a administração da sociedade; o Capítulo II tem como objeto a política das décadas de 1960 e 1970 [a Grande Recusa e suas personagens (o intelectual, o movimento estudantil, as populações de gueto e a questão étnica, os movimentos de libertação nacional, o movimento de libertação das mulheres, o movimento ecologista), o papel da nova sensibilidade e da educação, a formulação do conceito de socialismo integral, a Nova Esquerda e sua estratégia]; o Capítulo III versa sobre o modo como o Autor pensa a estética [redução estética, necessidade estética, ethos estético, arte e engajamento, dialética do caráter afirmativo da arte burguesa], também entre as décadas supracitadas, como forma de superação do princípio de realidade em vigência

History is descriptive. Epistemology is conceived as normative. It appears, then, that a historical approach to epistemology, like historical epistemology, might not be epistemically normative. In our context here, epistemology is not a systematic theory of knowledge, truth, or justification. In this thesis I approach epistemic justification through the vantage point of practice of science. Practice is about reasoning. Reasoning, conceived as the human propensity to order perceptions, beliefs, memories, etc., in ways that permit us to have understanding, is not only about thinking. Reasoning has to do with our actions, too: In the ordering of reasoning we take into account the desires of ourselves and others. Reasoning has to do with tinkering with stuff, physical or abstract. Practice is primarily about skills. Practices are not mere groping. They have a form. Performing according to a practice is an activity with a lot of plasticity. The skilled performer retains the form of the practice in many different situations. Finally, practices are not static in time. Practices develop. People try new things, some of which may work out, others not. The technology involved in how to go about doing things in a particular practice changes, and the concepts concerning understanding what one is doing also may change. This is the point where history enters the picture. In this thesis I explore the interactions between history, reasoning, and skills from the viewpoint of a particular type of epistemic justification: a priori justification. An a priori justified proposition is a proposition which is evident independent of experience. Such propositions are self-evident. We will make sense of a priori justification in a context of regarding science as practice, so that we will be able to demonstrate that the latter accommodates the normative character of science.

La domanda alla base di questa tesi è semplice: quale tipologia di relazione ci potrebbe essere tra scienza e filosofia in pedagogia dopo le recenti scoperte delle neuroscienze? C’è una contrapposizione o una integrazione reciproca? La tradizionale contrapposizione storica è confermata o si può parlare di complementarità reciproca? Con l’obiettivo di mostrare l’interdipendenza reciproca tra questi campi del sapere, attraverso il metodo fenomenologico, la sezione α fa un’analisi teoretica di alcune teorie estratte dalle ricerche di Antonio Damasio. La sezione β esamina gli stessi problemi ma attraverso la fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty, introducendo alcuni concetti: la “carne” (chair), il “chiasma” e la “reversibilità”, concetti chiave per poter pensare la relazione tra gli le cose, gli enti, le discipline e la pedagogia. I risultati mostrano che non si tratta di sacrificare la pedagogia alla scienza o alla filosofia, né di sacrificare la scienze e la filosofia alla pedagogia, perché questi campi del sapere sono ontologicamente legati tra loro. I risultati aprono a nuove prospettive di ricerca: quali sono le conseguenze di una relazione in chiasma in pedagogia? Possiamo estendere questa particolare relazione alle altre discipline? / The question at the basis of this thesis is simple: which typology of relationship there may be between science and philosophy in education after the most recently neuroscience discoveries? Is there contradiction or an integration? Is the historical and traditional opposition confirmed or we could talk about a possible integration? In order to show the reciprocal interdependence between these fields, using a phenomenological method, the α section does a theoretic analysis of some assertions taken from Antonio Damasio’s researches. The β section looks trough the Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology the same problems and introduces some concepts: the “flesh” (chair), the “chiasma” and “reversibility”, central ideas in order to think the relationship between things, beings, disciplines and education. Results show that it is neither a question of sacrificing education to science and philosophy, nor philosophy and science to education, since these fields are ontologically bound together. In conclusion results open further new questions: what are the consequences of “chiasma” relationship in education? Could we extend this particular relationship to other disciplines?

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The communitarian conception of person is the dominant view of personhood in African philosophy. This view centrally holds that personhood is something that is attained in direct proportion to one's moral worth and one's relations with her surrounding community. This view understands personhood as something that is acquired as one's moral responsibility grows. Essentially personhood is constituted by the community and expressed in relations that one has with her community. Thus the individual and the community are both tied in the same fate. The individual is seen as constituted by the community and as one with the community. Whatever happens to her happens to the whole community. Some leaders of newly independent Africa used this communitarian VIew of personhood to argue for a socialist order. Such an order would have been faithful to the traditional communitarian conception of person and the soc,i al as well as the economic order that proceeds from that conception. In order to develop an authentically African socialist programme these leaders strived to show that the communitarian conception of personhood naturally leads to African socialism. They took African socialism to be a panacea to economic and social ills that had been brought on by colonialism. This thesis seeks to interrogate both the communitarian conception of personhood and the resultant political ideology of African socialism. It is argued that the major driving factor behind the development of the communitarian view and African socialism is an inordinate desire to find and present the African difference. The problem started with Placide Tempels' futile search for an African ontology and has been perpetuated by all communitarians and African socialists. Thus this project is conceived as a philosophical critique of African communitarianism and the resultant socialism. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermariztburg, 2008.