Nesta dissertação, procura-se analisar se o naturalismo biológico de John Searle se apresenta como uma alternativa mais viável que as correntes fisicalistas e funcionalistas nas pesquisas que tratam da questão do livre-arbítrio. Sendo assim, toma-se, como estratégia de pesquisa, identificar os pressupostos destas linhas de pensamento da filosofia da mente, bem como as consequências filosóficas da adesão a cada uma delas. Para seguir tal caminho, toma-se como fio condutor o conceito de intencionalidade intrínseca. Entretanto, primeiramente define-se o que se entende por livre-arbítrio para então caracterizar de forma geral os posicionamentos fisicalistas e funcionalistas na filosofia da mente e tratar de como a questão do livre-arbítrio surge e pode ser crucial para tais correntes de pensamento. Posteriormente o naturalismo biológico é sintetizado (sobretudo no que tange à ontologia da consciência e à questão da intencionalidade) e contraposto ao fisicalismo e ao funcionalismo para, então, examinar a possibilidade do livre-arbítrio. Em tal contraposição, cada teoria é decomposta em seus enunciados para que os mesmos possam ser analisados criticamente. Nesta análise, verificase que o livre-arbítrio parece não encontrar espaço no cenário apresentado pelo fisicalismo e pelo funcionalismo. Defende-se que o naturalismo biológico searleano consegue esclarecer mais do que as outras duas correntes filosóficas como pode a ação livre ter a origem da sua motivação no que é externo ao estado mental que a faz ser realizada. A partir de tais constatações, avalia-se suas implicações éticas articulando as questões da intencionalidade intrínseca, do livre-arbítrio, da inteligência artificial forte e da responsabilidade moral a fim de concluir que às máquinas atuais não se pode atribuir responsabilidade moral por não serem capazes de intencionalidade intrínseca. Em seguida, argumenta-se pela origem evolutiva da intencionalidade e, por conseguinte, da moralidade. Neste sentido, defende-se também que a neurociência não elimina a responsabilização moral pois não prova que o livre-arbítrio é uma ilusão, ou seja, que tal ramo da ciência não contradiz o naturalismo biológico de John Searle. / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior. / This dissertation aims to examine whether John Searle’s biological naturalism is a more viable alternative to current physicalist and functionalist positions in dealing with the issue of free will. Thus, my strategy is to identify the assumptions of these lines of thought and their philosophical consequences. In order to accomplish this goal the concept of intrinsic intentionality is taken as a guide. I begin by defining what is meant by free will and go on to broadly characterize physicalist and functionalist positions in philosophy of mind. Then, I go on to show how the question of free will arises and can be crucial to such currents of thought. Subsequently, I summarize the biological naturalist position (especially regarding the ontology of consciousness and the question of intentionality) and oppose it to physicalism and functionalism in order to examine the possibility of free will. In this opposition, each theory is decomposed into its main tenets so that they can be critically analyzed. In this analysis, it appears that free will does not seem to find any room in the scenario presented by physicalism and functionalism. It is argued that Searlean biological naturalism is able to explain – better than the other two positions – how free action can be motivated by something that is external to the mental state which is itself performing the action. I then evaluate the ethical implications of these findings, articulating the issues of intrinsic intentionality, free will, strong artificial intelligence in order to conclude that current machines cannot be assigned moral responsibility, since they are not capable of intrinsic intentionality. Then, I argue for the evolutionary origin of intentionality and therefore morality. Finally, I argue that neuroscience does not eliminate moral responsibility since it does not prove that free will is an illusion, i.e., that this branch of science does not contradict John Searle’s biological naturalism.

Orientador: Marcos Nobre / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T10:25:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lubenow_JorgeAdriano_D.pdf: 982441 bytes, checksum: c6e39ae7d4c0d50cc729999285fe30d3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Resumo: A presente tese tem o objetivo de fazer uma leitura reconstrutiva de um tema fundamental explorado por Jürgen Habermas: a categoria de ?esfera pública?. Este tema da esfera pública é examinado no contexto da passagem entre o universo teórico de Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962) e Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) em relação àquele de Faktizität und Geltung (1992). Nesta transição, Habermas reformula uma série de questões introduzidas nas suas investigações anteriores sobre o tema da esfera pública e configura uma perspectiva teórica modificada. O momento-chave desta transição é o prefácio à nova edição de Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, publicada em 1990. Esta retomada pode ser desdobrada em dois eixos que se correlacionam: a) A reformulação do conteúdo da esfera pública (limitações e deficiências), a ampliação da categoria e o alargamento da infra-estrutura da esfera pública, agora com novas características e novos papéis; b) O reposicionamento da esfera pública por um rearranjo interno num contexto teórico mais amplo da teoria da ação comunicativa e da reformulação da relação sistema-mundo da vida da teoria da sociedade. O exame a ser realizado neste trabalho será temático, não cronológico. Isto nos permite mostrar melhor que há dois momentos que podem ser distinguidos analiticamente, e que a autocrítica é dupla, tanto da noção mesma de esfera pública quanto da posição dessa categoria no quadro da teoria social comunicativa, e que andam paralelamente. / Abstract: The present thesis has the objective to do a reconstructive reading of a fundamental theme explored by Jürgen Habermas: the category of ?public sphere?. It is examined in context of the passage between the theoretical universe of Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962) and Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) in relation to that one of Faktizität und Geltung (1992). In this transition, Habermas reformulating a series of questions introduced in its previous inquiries on the theme of public sphere, and formulating a modified theoretical perspective. The key moment of this transition is the preface to the new edition of Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, published in 1990. This retaken can be unfolded in two axles that if correlate: a) A reformularization of the category (its limitations and deficiencies), the extending of the content and enlarge of the infrastructure of the public sphere, now with new characteristics and new functions; b) The new position of the public sphere through an internal rearrangement in the extended theoretical context of the communicative action and in the reformularization of the relation system-lifeworld of the theory of society. This examination will be thematic, and not chronological. This allows showing better that it has two moments that can be analytically distinguished, and showing that the self-critique is twofold, of the public sphere as well as the communicative social theory, and that walking parallel. / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia Contemporanea / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T16:36:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vento_MarisaAlves_D.pdf: 3867247 bytes, checksum: 77416f80be30279f0a2a755a9792c709 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A pesquisa apresentada compreende a antropologia rousseauniana, abrangendo desde as investigações sobre o homem e a sua natureza originária até a idealização, no campo político, de uma sociedade fundada sobre a vontade legítima de cada cidadão que a compõe. O objetivo que se impôs alcançar está ancorado no pressuposto de que os princípios antropológicos estabelecidos por Rousseau no Segundo Discurso norteiam o seu pensamento político. Assim, busca-se demonstrar que uma das noções cruciais da sua filosofia política, a vontade geral, tem como fundamento o princípio antropológico do amor de si. Entretanto, para derivar a vontade geral do amor de si, interpretando-a como a vontade que o indivíduo tem pelo todo porque o considera como a si mesmo, é importante compreender como Rousseau justifica e relaciona a existência e a prevalência desse sentimento de preferência por si mesmo com a extrema exigência ética, expressa pela conformação da vontade particular do indivíduo à vontade geral do Estado. A compreensão desse componente primordial da natureza individual exige examinar, mais profundamente, a concepção de indivíduo e o papel específico que o princípio do amor de si desempenha na estruturação da identidade individual. Isto permitirá considerar a pertinência de, por um lado, apontar o amor de si como o vetor do desenvolvimento do indivíduo, e de outro, admitir a possibilidade de que ele constitua o liame social da ordem política legítima, uma vez que permite ao indivíduo buscar seu bem-estar sem se opor a outrem. Em decorrência da primazia desse princípio, a noção de interesse se mostra nuclear no pensamento de Rousseau, pois se apresenta como único objeto possível da vontade. Pretende-se mostrar como a temática do interesse, resultante dos desdobramentos das noções de amor de si e amor próprio, é retomada por Rousseau, que dá a ela uma nova direção e a requalifica segundo uma lógica própria, a lógica de imanência. Nessa perspectiva, a noção de interesse, vista por Rousseau como o bem do ser que deseja, passa a ser uma relação que ganha sua força no ser do indivíduo que, a partir da sua relação consigo mesmo, estabelece a relação com outro e com o mundo. Desse modo, acredita-se que a articulação entre as noções de indivíduo (movido pelo amor de si), interesse (de ser) e vontade geral possa dar conta da possível unidade de interesse do corpo político com o interesse particular de cada indivíduo, o que forma o corolário da vontade geral / Abstract: The present research comprises Rousseau's anthropology, ranging from investigations about man and his original nature to an idealization, in the political field, of a society founded on the legitimate will of every citizen who composes it. The goal proposed is based on the assumption that the anthropological principles established by Rousseau in his Second Discourse guided his political thought. Thus, we seek to demonstrate that the crucial notion to his politics, the notion of general will, is based on the anthropological principle of amour de soi. However, in order to derive the general will from this love by interpreting it as the will that the individual has towards the whole because he feels it as himself, it is important to understand how Rousseau justifies and relates the existence and prevalence of this feeling of preference for itself to the extreme ethical requirement expressed by the particular conformation of the will of the individual to the general will of the State. Understanding this primary componentof the nature of the individual requires a deep look into the concept of the individual and the specific role that the principle of amour de soi plays in the structuring of individual identity. This will permit to consider the relevance, on the one hand, of pointing the amour de soi as the vector of development of the individual, and on the other, of admitting the possibility that it constitutes the social bond of the legitimate political order. Because of the primacy of this principle, the notion of interest appears as the core of Rousseau's thought, because it presents itself as the only possible object of desire. I intended to show how the topic of interest follows the developments of the amour de soi and amour-propre notion's and how Rousseau covers this notion requalifying and redirecting it according to its own logic, the logic of immanence. In this perspective, the notion of interest, that Rousseau sees as the good of the being who desires, becomes a relationship which gains its strength in the being of the individual who, from his relationship with himself, establishes a relationship with others and with the world. In this way, by articulating the notions of individual, amour de soi (interest) and general will, I intended to account for the possible unity of interest of the body political with the private interest of every individual, which forms the corollary of general wil / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutora em Filosofia

Orientador: Fatima Regina Rodrigues Evora / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Huimanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T20:51:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ramos_JosePortugaldosSantos_D.pdf: 2384313 bytes, checksum: e2f5697953843c457eadf3019953438a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: O propósito desta tese é explicar o método cartesiano por meio da lógica matemática que opera a sua constituição. Defende-se nesta pesquisa que, a partir dessa explicação do método, Descartes encontram meios que viabilizam a orientação de suas experimentações científicas. As experimentações científicas são iniciadas, então, quando Descartes encontra previamente uma determinada demonstração geométrica e visa, a partir desta, justificar os resultados da reconstrução de um fenômeno físico. No entanto, tal reconstrução requer outros meios da aplicação do método, pois neste momento trata-se da investigação de objetos que compõem um fenômeno físico. Nesta perspectiva, a aplicação do método de Descartes prescreve dois procedimentos de investigação científica, a saber, os procedimentos de redução e reconstrução. Sustenta-se nesta pesquisa que esses procedimentos requerem objetos manipuláveis que possibilitem, por meio do uso de suposições e analogias, a justificação experimental dos efeitos observados nos objetos físicos (ou seja, do fenômeno físico investigado). As obras de Descartes utilizadas nesta pesquisa são o Discurso do método e Ensaios complementares: A Geometria, a Dióptrica, os Meteoros, e ainda as Regras para orientação do espírito / Abstract: This thesis aims to explain the cartesian method through the mathematical logic which operates its constitution. It is defended in this thesis that, in this explanation of the method, Descartes finds geometric demonstrations that can guide his scientific experimentations. The scientific experimentations are started, so, when Descartes previously finds a particular geometrical demonstration and aims, through such demonstration, to justify the results of the reconstruction of physical phenomenon. However, such a reconstruction requires other means of the method's application, because in this moment it treats on the investigation of objects which compose a physical phenomenon. At this prospect, the application of Descartes' method prescribes two procedures of scientific enquiry, to wit, the ones of reduction and reconstruction. It is maintained in this thesis that such procedures require controllable objects which make possible, through suppositions and analogies, the experimental justification of the effects observed in the physics objects (i. e., as an investigated physical phenomenon). The works of Descartes used here are the Discourse on the Method and Complementary Essays: Geometry, Dioptrics, Meteors, and also Rules for the Direction of the Mind / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This study attempts to make a contribution to the critique of contemporary capitalism. This has been conceptualised through a Foucauldian critique of neo-liberalism, that is, Foucault’s concepts of power and governmentality have been used to criticise neo-liberalism. The study argues that neo-liberalism is a hegemonic and oppressive politico-economic social system. This has occurred in two ways; firstly, neo-liberalism came to dominate the global economy and, secondly, neo-liberalism has become the dominant politico-economic discourse. An attempt is made to expose the discourses and institutions that buttress the neo-liberal project by undertaking a Foucauldian critique. According to Foucault, knowledge shapes the social space through its ‘mechanisms’, discourses and institutions. In order to critique neo-liberalism, it is necessary to expose its power-knowledge base, which is what gives it legitimacy. By analysing and exposing neo-liberalism’s power-knowledge base, its oppression becomes clear through an observation of the material effects of neo-liberal ideology and policy. This study also evaluates to what extent Marxism is a viable alternative to neo-liberalism, in order to ascertain what Foucault adds to already existing critiques of capitalism, and neo-liberalism, in particular. It concludes by arguing that even though Marxism provides a useful framework in which to understand neo-liberal domination, its labour based social theory is somewhat outdated in our contemporary age of the information society. Therefore, it is Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge that is most pertinent in providing an effective critical theory of neo-liberalism in the age of the information society, as it focuses on the primacy of power-knowledge in matters of domination.

In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.

The aim of this dissertation is to explore the nature of scientific progress and to broaden existing theories of what constitutes progress in science. I do this by means of a close analysis of the main post-Kuhnian philosophical accounts of scientific progress, namely those put forward by Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan and Philip Kitcher. I test these three accounts by reconstructing a series of scientific episodes in evolutionary ecology in terms of each account and then assessing the degree to which each account incorporates what is progressive. The episodes I have selected concern the resource competition research of Dolph Schluter on Galapagos finches and related work leading up to it. After distinguishing between macroscopic and microscopic levels in science, I attend carefully to the microscopic level of each episode as it relates to epistemic progress. This investigation demonstrates that some important aspects of scientific progress have been overlooked. I conclude that there are three main ways in which the philosophies of science surveyed do not adequately represent instances of scientific progress. First, the accumulation of factual knowledge is not well accommodated. Second, the role of evidence and argument in scientific theories is not adequately captured. Third, the fine-grained level at which much important epistemic progress in science occurs is often not accounted for. These criticisms relate to a more general tendency of contemporary philosophical accounts to emphasize the macroscopic level of entire research programmes and traditions while failing to attend to the microscopic level of progress inherent in a detailed case study. I end by offering a positive account of scientific progress in light of these criticisms. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

The nature of existence, which science seeks to investigate, is dynamic as novel discoveries are constantly presented. To explain such a dynamic existence, science itself needs to be dynamic. Methodological differentiation is one way in which science expresses dynamism. Such differentiation led to the theological and the natural sciences, and conflicting views regarding the nature of existence: the theological worldview versus the natural worldview. This study is a comparison of the conflicting worldviews of the theological and cosmological (natural worldview) theories of the beginning of existence. The study compares them in an attempt to redress the conflict and encourage dialogue between the two methods for a better representation of existence. The study exposes the limits of the theological and the natural worldviews. It proposes a relationship of dialogue between them so that they transcend their individual limits and are able to grow. Dialogue involves the interchange of ideas to broaden perspectives, which leads to growth. A relationship of dialogue emphasises similarities in presuppositions, methodology and content, and exploits these to attain a greater degree of certitude. Theology and natural science can be viewed analogically as two sides of the same coin, two aspects to one reality, that can collaborate, albeit independently, to reveal a broader view of reality. They can converse through dialogue, exchange ideas and share views, even though they remain methodologically exclusive, independent worldviews. Finally, dialogue involves a transformation of reason in that it expects theologians and natural scientists to change the way they view reality. If we were to transform our reasoning into something more complete, our worldview should represent a more complete representation of existence. This means that the theologian and the scientist can, occasionally, go beyond their scope and method and push their knowledge towards progress through dialogue. This makes “transformed reason” the method of dialogue, which redresses the conflict between theology and natural science and encourages interchange between them. / Inhlobo yobukhona, isayense edinga ukuphenyisisa ngakho, kuyashintshashintsha njengokutholwayo okusha okuhlala njalo kwethulwa. Ukuchaza lokhu kushintshashintsha okukhona, isayense ngokwayo idinga ukushintshashintsha ngokuhambisana nesimo. Umehluko wezindlela zokwenza ngenye yendlela lapho isayense ekhombisa khona ukushintshashintsha ngokuhambisana nesimo. Lo mehluko uholele abaholi bezenkolo kanye nabesayense yemvelo, kanye nemibono engqubuzanayo maqondana nenhlobo yobukhona; umbono ngezenkolo uma kuqhathaniswa nombono ngezemvelo. Lolu cwaningo luqhathanisa umbono ongqubuzanayo ngomhlaba ngenkolo kanye nekhosmoloji (indlela yokubuka izinto yemvelo), amathiyori okuqala kobukhona. Ucwaningo luqhathanisa lezi zinto ngemizamo yokubhekana nokungqubuzana kanye nokukhuthaza idayalogu phakathi kwezindlela ezimbili ukuze kube nokumeleka kahle kobukhona. Lolu cwaningo luveza izihibe ezikhona kwindlela yokubuka izinto yezenkolo kanye nezemvelo. Luphakamisa ubudlelwane bedayalogu phakathi kwazo, ukuze kweqiwe imingcele yazo zombili ngayinye kanye nokukhula. Idayalogu ibandakanya ukushintshana ngemibono ukunabisa indlela yokubuka izinto, okuholela ekukhuleni. Ubudlelwane bedayalogu bugcizelela ukufana kwezilinganiso (presuppositions), izindlela zokwenza kanye nengqikithi, kanye nokucwaninga lezi zinto ukufinyelela ezingeni elikhulu lokuqiniseka ngendlela izinto eziyikho. Imfundo ngenkolo kanye nesayense yemvelo kungabonwa njengokulandelanayo kwezinhlangothi ezimbili kwikhoyini eyodwa, izinto ezimbili kwimvelo eyodwa, kungahambisana,ngisho noma okunye kuzimele ngokwehlukile kokunye, kuveza umbono obanzi walokho isimo esiyikho. Kungakhulumisana ngedayalogu, ukushintshana ngemibono kanye nokwabelana ngemibono, ngisho noma izindlela zakho zokwenza zehlukile, imibono ngomhlaba kwehlujkile nokuzimela. Okokugcina, idayalogu ibandakanya ushintsho lwembangela ngoba kulindele ukuthi abezenkolo kanye nososayense bashintshe izindlela ababona ngaso lokho isimo esiyikho. Uma bekufanele siguqule indlela esibona ngayo iziimbangela ukuya kwinto ethile ephelele, indlela esibona ngayo umhlaba nayo kumele imele umfanekiso ophelele kakhulu ngobukhona. Lokhu kusho ukuthi abaholi bezenkolo kanye nososayense, bangathi ngezinye izikhathi, babuke ngaphezulu kwendlela abobona ngayo kanye nezindlela zokwenza, kanye nokududula ulwazi lwabo ukuthi luthuthuke ngedayalogu. Lokhu kwenza "imbangela eguqukile" ibe yindlela yokwenza idayalogu, okubhekana nokungqubuzana phakathi kwezenkolo kanye nesayense yemvelo kanye nokukhuthaza ukuxhumana phakathi kwazo. / Sebopeho sa boteng, seo mahlale a batlang ho se batlisisa, se ba matla ha ditshibollo tse ntjha di nehelanwa kgafetsa. Ho hlalosa boteng bo matla jwalo, mahlale ka boona a hloka ho ba matla. Phapang ya mekgwa ke tsela e nngwe eo mahlale a hlalosang matla ka yona. Phapang e jwalo e lebisitse ho thuto ya bodumedi le mahlale a tlhaho, le maikutlo a hanyetsanang mabapi le sebopeho sa boteng: dipono tsa lefatshe tsa thuto ya bodumedi kgahlanong le pono e akaretsang ya tlhaho. Phuputso ena ke papiso ya maikutlo a akaretsang a lwantshanang a dikgopolo tsa thuto ya bodumedi le dikgopolo tsa tshimoloho le ntlafatso ya bokahohle (pono e akaretsang ya tlhaho) tsa qaleho ya boteng. Phuputso ena e di bapisa ho leka ho lokisa kgohlano le ho kgothaletsa puisano dipakeng tsa mekgwa e mmedi bakeng sa boemedi bo betere ba boteng. Phuputso ena e pepesa ditekanyetso tsa maikutlo a akaretsang a thuto ya bodumedi le tlhaho. E kgothaletsa kamano ya puisano dipakeng tsa tsona e le hore di fete ditekanyetso tsa tsona ka bomong mme di tsebe ho hola. Puisano e kenyeletsa phapanyetsano ya mehopolo ho hodisa maikutlo, e leng se lebisang ho kgolo. Kamano ya puisano e totobatsa ho tshwana dikgakanyong, mokgweng le ho dikateng, mme e sebedisa tsena ho fihlella tekanyetso e kgolo ya ho nepahala. Thuto ya bodumedi le mahlale a tlhaho di ka tadingwa ka mokgwa o tshwanang e le mahlakore a mabedi a tjhelete e le nngwe ya tshepe, dikarolo tse pedi ho nnete e le nngwe, tse ka sebedisanang, leha di ikemetse, ho senola pono e pharalletseng ya nnete. Di ka sebedisana ka dipuisano, tsa fapanyetsana maikutlo le ho arolelana dipono, leha e le hore di dula e le dipono tse akaretsang tse ikemetseng, tse ikgethang mokgweng. Qetellong, puisano e kenyeletsa phetoho ya mabaka ka hore e lebelletse ditsebi tsa thuto ya bodumedi le boramahlale ba tlhaho ho fetola tsela eo ba tadimang nnete ka yona. Haeba re ne re ka fetola monahano wa rona hore e be ntho e nngwe e felletseng, pono ya rona e akaretsang e lokela ho emela setshwantsho se felletseng sa boteng. Sena se bolela hore setsebi sa thuto ya bodumedi le ramahlale, ka dinako tse ding, ba ka feta maemo le mokgwa wa bona mme ba sutumeletsa tsebo ya bona tswelopeleng ka puisano. Sena se etsa "lebaka le fetotsweng" mokgwa wa puisano, o rarollang kgohlano dipakeng tsa thuto ya bodumedi le mahlale a tlhaho le ho kgothaletsa phapanyetsano dipakeng tsa tsona. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX provide A philosophic examination of friendship. While these Books initially appear to be non sequiturs in the inquiry, a closer examination of the questions raised by the preceding Books and consideration of the discussion of friendship's position between two accounts of pleasure in Books VII and X indicate friendship's central role in the Ethics. In friendship, Aristotle finds a uniquely human capacity that helps readers understand the good is distinct from pleasure by leading them to think seriously about what they can hold in common with their friends throughout their lives without changing who they are. What emerges from Aristotle's account of friendship is a nuanced portrait of human nature that recognizes the authoritative place of the intellect in human beings and how its ability to think about an end and hold its thinking in relation to that end depends upon whether it orders or is ordered by pleasures and pains. Aristotle lays the groundwork for this conclusion throughout the Ethics by gradually disclosing pleasures and pains are not caused solely by things we feel through the senses, but by reasoned arguments and ideas as well. Through this insight, we can begin to understand how Aristotle's Ethics is a work of political philosophy; to fully appreciate the significance of his approach, however, we must contrast his work with that of Thomas Hobbes, his harshest Modern critic. Unlike Aristotle, Hobbes is nearly silent on friendship in his political philosophy, and examining his political works especially Leviathan reveals the absence of friendship is part of his deliberate attempt to advance a politics founded on the moral teaching that pleasure is the good. Aristotle's political philosophy, by way of contrast, aims to preserve the good, and through friendship, he not only disentangles the good from pleasure, but shows a level of human community more suitable for preserving the good than political regimes because these communities have more natural bonds than any regime can hope to create between its citizens.