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In this dissertation I provide an ethnographic account of the testimony of four expert witnesses who appeared before the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada (the Krever Inquiry) as they described the production of scientific knowledge and the role that knowledge played in the struggle to protect the blood supply from being contaminated by AIDS during the early 1980's. In doing so, I bring together the experts' testimony with contemporary documents gathered by the Commission and interviews I conducted with participants in the proceedings. Using insights drawn from the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, and history, I explore what the witnesses' accounts reveal about their understandings of their professional world and its relationships with other worlds, especially that of public health policy making. The Krever Inquiry offered a valuable opportunity for carrying out such an investigation. It provided a site where science was not only used, it was talked about. The Inquiry invited those involved in the blood system in the early 1980's to reflect upon and explain the beliefs and actions which surrounded one of the worst public health disasters in Canadian history and it asked the witnesses how similar catastrophes could be avoided in the future. As a result, many of the issues addressed at the hearings reflect matters of current concern in public health and medicine. The Inquiry addressed difficult issues surrounding the nature of scientific knowledge and its application in health decision-making and policy formulation. This study, therefore, may be of interest to those dealing with the problems surrounding uncertainty and the management of public health crises. It may also be of interest to those dealing with conflicts rising out of the intersection of different worlds of experience and practice, as well as to those involved in the current initiatives to both make medical and public health institutions more proactive, and inclusive, and public health decision-making more transparent.

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:25:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1769.pdf: 580406 bytes, checksum: bafd439f46fd28dbb1dd4c574890c10b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-27 / Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos / The ground of Social Science, in the nineteenth century, is an attempt to establish an independent field of knowledge from discussions with the Modern Philosophy. This autonomy appears in the design of social reality on the one hand and the configuration of a new epistemological model on the other. In view of this, this work suggests discussing the prospect of Karl Mannheim as an assessment of previous proposals (Positivism and Marxism) and therefore being able to open a new model of Social Sciences by redefining both the design of social reality on the modern epistemology. Therefore, the bias to this approach is the notion of ideology, used by Mannheim to support as a social ontology that prints the determination in social science, where to find the basis of Social Sciences. In this way for it will redeem the originality of the questions and answers presented by the author for the formation of Social Sciences / A fundamentação das Ciências Sociais no século XIX corresponde a uma tentativa de estabelecer um campo de saber autônomo a partir do debate com a Filosofia Moderna. Tal autonomia aparece na concepção de realidade social, por um lado, e na configuração de um novo modelo epistemológico, por outro. Em vista disso, este trabalho propõe discutir a perspectiva de Karl Mannheim como uma avaliação das propostas anteriores (positivismo e marxismo) e, por conseguinte, sendo capaz de abrir um novo modelo de construção das Ciências Sociais através da redefinição tanto da concepção de realidade social quanto da epistemologia moderna. Para tanto, o viés para fazer esta abordagem será a noção de ideologia, utilizada por Mannheim como suporte de uma ontologia social que imprime a determinação social na ciência, onde se pode encontrar a base das Ciências Sociais. Neste percurso, procurarse- á resgatar a originalidade das questões e respostas apresentas pelo autor para a constituição das Ciências Sociais

Dans notre thèse de doctorat, nous avons cherché à tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’enjeu européen constituerait, en France, l’épicentre d’une "actualisation" — pour partie assumée, pour partie occultée — de la pensée du juriste allemand Carl Schmitt. Les réflexions politico-philosophiques de Schmitt représentent en soi un assemblage rhétorique et systématique puissant, aisément mobilisable dans le cadre des débats théoriques sur la construction européenne, afin de battre en brèche les affirmations néo-cosmopolitiques, que l’on soit de droite ou de gauche. Il s’est agi, pour nous, de vérifier jusqu’à quel point la pensée politique du juriste se retrouvait "recyclée" dans le débat français contemporain relatif à l’idée d’Europe. Était ainsi ouverte l’opportunité d’évaluer, de manière systématique, la facticité ou la pertinence d’une antinomie :une Europe schmittienne contre une Europe kantienne. Dans un premier temps, nous avons tâché de reconstruire ce que fut la position schmittienne concernant la gestion de l’espace européen, avant d’évaluer, dans un second temps, l’impact causé par une telle pensée sur les réflexions qui animent le débat français contemporain.<p>La première partie de la thèse visait à rendre compte de la vision schmittienne de l’Europe. Schmitt a pensé la décision politique en des termes statonationaux :l’ordre juridique étatique serait modelé sur la base de la nature axiologique et culturelle de l’amitié politique, de la communauté des citoyens soudés par un seul et même critère d’appartenance, souvent religieux ;critère qui précéderait la nationalité et la réalisation "politique". Il s’ensuit que l’ordre mondial ne peut se présenter que sous la forme d’un pluriversum d’États, animés dans leurs relations mutuelles par la dynamique de l’ami et de l’ennemi. Le libéralisme et le pluralisme provoqueraient des regroupements fonctionnels, dont le pan-européisme serait l’une des manifestations les plus visibles, à l’origine d’un sapement du politique et de l’unité souveraine de l’État. Quatre points analytiques permettent d’expliquer l’appréhension schmittienne de la gestion juridico-politique du Vieux Continent :l’indissociabilité du couple conceptuel État-politique, l’idée que la nation demeure l’horizon indépassable de la démocratie, la critique de la notion d’humanité et de toute morale universelle, et l’idée que le droit serait nécessairement d’origine politique, donc particulariste.<p>En France, l’intérêt pour l’œuvre de Schmitt s’est largement accru ces dernières années. Le débat théorique actuel autour du problème de la construction européenne offre d’ailleurs une place particulière à la réactivation de l’argumentaire schmittien statocentré, antilibéral et culturaliste. À gauche comme à droite de l’échiquier politique, intellectuels et philosophes mobilisent raisonnements et schémas discursifs, tantôt réclamés de Schmitt, tantôt très proches des arguments du juriste de Plettenberg. En passant en revue les réflexions d’auteurs aussi différents qu’Étienne Balibar et Pierre Manent, Alain de Benoist et Marcel Gauchet, Daniel Bensaïd et Pierre-André Taguieff, nous avons tenté d’approcher et de rendre compte de la pluralité des emprunts à la pensée de Schmitt et à son appréhension de l’ordre européen, dans le cadre des discussions françaises relatives à l’intégration régionale européenne. Chez certains de ces auteurs, la construction européenne apparaît comme la manifestation avancée d’un phénomène général de dilution du politique. Autrement dit, elle incarnerait un idéal de société qui ramène le politique au niveau du marché. Pour d’autres, Carl Schmitt aurait diagnostiqué mieux que quiconque la mort du droit des gens européen et les travers de l’universalisme abstrait que brandirait l’Union européenne en expansion. Par ailleurs, la théorisation schmittienne de la souveraineté constituerait une référence incontournable pour éclairer les thématiques actuelles relatives à une mutation des niveaux de pouvoir.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Recherche sur l'imaginaire de la société comme corps. Le point de départ est la théologie politique médiévale. Malgré les différences de fondation (non plus religieuse mais séculière), l'imaginaire théologique médiéval de la société comme corps s'est retrouvé dans la pensée politique moderne, à travers notamment les doctrines de la souveraineté et de la représentations (J. Bodin, J.-J. Rousseau, T. Hobbes). Qu’implique sur le plan de la représentation politique la métaphore corporelle ?Cette représentation implique notamment la difficulté à penser la supranationalité (la métaphore corporelle a servi – et sert encore – à penser les Etats dans le cadre de la Nation). Quelles sont les conditions de la dilution de l'hypostase de la société comme corps ?La nécessité est posée de passer à un paradigme de l'intersubjectivité et de la communication. Une attention particulière est accordée à une approche sémiotique de la communication à travers les icônes et les indices (et non uniquement les symboles). / Doctorat en sciences sociales, Orientation sociologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished