The question this contribution sets out to address is whether law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone‟s proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow‟s characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature also attempted to define the terms “science” and “research”, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This “test” is then applied to activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practicing “science”. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The question this contribution sets out to address is whether law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone‟s proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow‟s characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature also attempted to define the terms “science” and “research”, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This “test” is then applied to activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practicing “science”. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

L’Afrique subsaharienne se présente, involontairement, comme une région en proie à une succession de crises, de conflits, de guerres civiles. Ces externalités négatives de l’instabilité socio-politique s’appréhendent, souvent, par le truchement du rite jaculatoire causal. D’où, les vocables « ethnies », « identité » – lorsqu’il n’est pas question de sous-développement, ou de l’injection du déficit démocratique –, auprès des commentateurs, sont, de façon cursive, convoqués pour expliquer le désordre perçu. Ainsi, les événements de 1994 au Rwanda sont ramenés à un conflit – « ethnique » – Hutu/Tutsi; négligeant par voie de conséquence l’acuité de la complexité de la réalité, ou à défaut, celle de la convergence de variables. Et pourtant, en descendant dans cette profondeur cognitive, tout observateur constaterait que l’instabilité socio-politique en Afrique subsaharienne reste une construction dans le temps et dans l’espace, optimisée par l’impénitent désir de pouvoir des acteurs politiques. Les structures historiques, loin d’être de véritables déterminants, participent à la construction sociale de la réalité porteuse d’idées, de règles et de pratiques représentationnelles qui érigent la nécessaire grammaire du bouleversement social. Nos présents travaux, non seulement, viennent examiner les causes habituellement avancées, mais s’opposent également aux arguments culturalistes mobilisés pour l’explication ou la compréhension de l’instabilité socio-politique en Afrique subsaharienne. C’est pourquoi, nous retenons que la justesse scientifique afférente à la compréhension du mouvement mécanistique socio-politique en Afrique subsaharienne est fonction du mode de connaissance de la réalité perçue. Par conséquent, nous estimons que l’instabilité socio-politique en Afrique subsaharienne, est un processus dynamique évolutif qui, nonobstant le désordre structurel, tend vers une stationnarité relative, puis absolue avant l’avènement de la stabilité. / Subsaharan Africa presents itself, involuntarily, like an area in the grip of a succession of crises, conflicts, civil wars. These negative externalities of sociopolitical instability are apprehended, often, by the means of the causal ritual. That's why, the terms "ethnic group", "identity" - when it isn't question of underdevelopment, or the injection of democratic deficit - near the commentators, in a cursory mention, are convened to explain the perceived disorder. Thus, the events of 1994 in Rwanda are brought back to a "ethnic" conflict Hutu/Tutsi; negleging consequently the acuity of the complexity of reality or failing this, that of the convergence of variables. And yet, while going down in this cognitive depth, any observer would note that sociopolitical instability in subsaharan Africa remains a construction in time and space, optimized by the unrepentant desire of power of the political actors. The historical structures, far from being true determinants, take part in the social construction of reality carrying ideas, rules, and practices representational which set up the necessary grammar of the social upheaval. Our present work, not only comes to examine the usually advanced causes, but is also opposed to the culturalist arguments mobilized for the explanation or the comprehension of sociopolitical instability in subsaharan Africa. This is why, we retain that the scientific accuracy related with the comprehension of sociopolitical mechanisitc movement in subsaharan Africa is function of the mode of knowledge of perceived reality. Consequently, we estimate that sociopolitical instability in subsaharan Africa, is an evolutionary dynamic process which, notwhithstanding, the strutural disorder, strives for a relative stationnarity, then absolute before the advent of stability.