俄羅斯聯邦是一個多民族國家，共有一百多個不同的民族生活在俄羅斯這塊土地上。這些少數民族有著自己的語言與文化，一有機會即想脫離俄羅斯獨立。尤其是車臣與韃靼斯坦這類文化差異較大的民族，一心渴望擁有自己主權。除了少數民族的獨立要求外，俄羅斯聯邦仍必須應付境內的地方主義聲浪。主要是因為俄羅斯的聯邦體制是由民族聯邦與區域聯邦結合而成的，境內有以民族為基礎的聯邦主體，同時也有以行政區域為劃分基礎的主體。 蘇聯晚期，俄羅斯總統葉爾欽為了與戈巴契夫爭權，喊出「你能夠拿多少主權就拿多少」的口號，各加盟共和國紛紛通過國家主權宣言，俄羅斯聯邦境內亦興起分離獨立氣氛。為了解決問題，葉爾欽於1992年3月與各聯邦主體分別簽署了3個聯邦條約，開始對中央與地方的權利義務關係作了說明。隨著政治情勢的變化，俄羅斯聯邦於1993年12月12日通過新憲法，明確的規範了中央與地方各自的權力，自此權力的行使有了依循的標準；1994年發生車臣戰爭，突顯出憲法無法解決所有問題，於是依據各主體需要簽訂的雙邊條約出現了，首先是俄韃條約，謂之「韃靼模式」。至此俄羅斯的聯邦體制大致完成。 俄羅斯聯邦體制的運作仍然存在許多問題，不論是在政治方面、經濟方面，甚或法律制度方面尚有不夠完善的地方。再加上地方主體的種類繁多，經濟條件、政治情況及文化取向差異甚大，影響著主體對聯邦關係的看法。因此要解決聯邦問題，就必須從制度上的缺陷及地方主體的態度來著手進行。 / Russian federation is a multi-national state, there are more than one hundred kinds of races. These minority races have their own culture and language, they desire to be independent from Russian federation, especially Chechenya and Tarstan. Besides independent demand, there still have localism in Russian federation. In Russian federation, there are two kinds of federal subject. One is ethno subject which based on races different from Russian, the other is territorial subject. Late years in Soviet Union, Russian president Yeltsin in order to struggle with Gorbachev, he said：“swallow what you can get”. Meanwhile, the Union Republics declare their sovereignty. The atmosphere in Russian federation is chaotic. To solve the problem, Yeltsin sighed three federal treaty with all subjects and define the right between center and subjects. Then 1993 passed the Russian Constitution, 1994 Chechen war exploded, that means constitution not suitable for every subject. Yeltsin decided to sign bilateral treaty with subjects, first one is Tartarstan Republic, called “Tartarstan Model”. Russian federal system still has several problems in politic, economic, and law, institution. Besides 89 subjects are so distinguished, their political condition, economic situation, culture are so different, all this affect their perception about federal relation.

By the end of the twentieth century, there were many secessionist groups, but, the move towards Taiwanese secessionism has arguably been the most significant of these. It triggered the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which resulted in a historical military confrontation between Mainland China and the US. As will be shown, from 1988 to 2000, Lee Teng-hui, as president of Taiwan, manipulated the political Cross-Straits relationship to promote what was ultimately a secessionist policy. This caused Mainland China to react strongly and triggered sharp tension between Taiwan and Mainland China. This thesis considers what motivated Lee Teng-hui to implement a secessionist Cross-Straits policy and why he supported unification while adopting a substantive secessionist policy. It looks at how he was able to instigate Taiwanese hostility towards Mainlanders, to transform the hostility into a sense of Taiwanese national identity and ultimately into Taiwanese secessionist ideology. A historical approach was used in exploring the origins of secessionism, and descriptive and analytical methods to review systematically and comprehensively political developments in the ROC and its civil war, and to study Lee Teng-hui’s life; the national identity of Taiwan and Mainland China; the implementation of Lee Teng-hui’s political Cross-Straits policy; and the reaction of Mainland China. The study showed that the main cause of Taiwanese secessionism was ethnic conflict between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. It originated from the 228 Incident of 1947, in which Mainlander-led troops slaughtered many Taiwanese. Soon after, the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan from Mainland China, and many Taiwanese (including Mainlanders) were killed during the State of Emergency in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan in its original central government form, the Mainlander élite occupied key positions in the government during the 1950s and 1960s. It resulted in unfair power-sharing for Taiwanese, and caused the Taiwanese élite to believe that they had to establish their own government (nation). Lee Teng-hui had participated in the CCP and had been under political surveillance by the Mainlander-led government for over twenty years. He weathered these political difficulties, but by reasonable inference, there was a close relationship between the political oppression by the Mainlander-led government and his secessionist political Cross-Straits policy. Because Taiwanese residents were indoctrinated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his father, Chiang Kai-shek’s administration for about 40 years, Chinese ideology was dominant and Lee Teng-hui initially paid lip-service to Cross-Strait unification whilst working towards secessionism as reflected in the Chingdao-Lake Incident (1994); the private dialogue between Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro (1994); the address at Cornell University (1995); and his two-state theory (1999). However, due to strong pressure from Mainland China, he did not reach his secessionist goal during his presidential term (1988-2000). In conclusion, this thesis shows that Taiwan Island’s geopolitical importance is at the heart of the US’ support for Taiwan’s secession from the Mainland. Therefore, Lee’s secessionist Cross-Strait policy aside, US national interests lie in containing Mainland China and it has, therefore, always played an important role in the secessionist issue and always will. From the perspective of Mainland China, either in terms of nationalism or national security, Taiwan’s secession is a life-and-death issue. If Taiwanese authorities were to declare independence, the only option for Mainland China would be to launch a unification war. For the US, Taiwan is only a pawn that it uses to contain Mainland China. Therefore, in the Cross-Strait issue, the US has more options than Mainland China, namely, to use military intervention in the future to deter Chinese unification or to decide to share common peaceful international relations with Mainland China by accepting Cross-Strait unification. / Thesis (DPhil (International Relations))--University of Pretoria, 2004. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

En 2012, en pleine crise économique, le gouvernement autonome de la Catalogne convoque des élections anticipées et demande, pour la première fois depuis le retour de l’Espagne à la démocratie suivant la mort du dictateur Francisco Franco, une forte majorité afin de pouvoir mener la région vers la sécession. Plus ou moins en même temps, le groupe armé sécessionniste basque, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, annonce la fin de sa campagne meurtrière qu’elle mène depuis des décennies et qui fait plus de 800 victimes. Si l’on accusait depuis longtemps les Basques d’être plus séparatistes que les Catalans, ces nouveaux faits suggèrent un renversement des rôles de leurs mouvements sécessionnistes. En s’appuyant sur les littératures sur les mouvements sociaux et la sécession, l’objectif de cette étude est d’expliquer ce phénomène. Nous montrerons d’abord en quoi les structures économiques et institutionnelles encadrant les régions et leurs relations avec l’État central font en sorte que la crise économique espagnole (2008-2014) offre une structure d’opportunité politique pour la réussite du sécessionnisme catalan alors que cela n’a pas été le cas au Pays basque. Ensuite, nous démontrerons que le manque de synchronisme entre les processus basque et catalan de pacification des clivages de la violence politique joue un rôle déterminant sur la capacité de coopération entre nationalistes sur la question nationale durant la crise, ce qui affecte le potentiel de mobilisation sécessionniste. Enfin, nous verrons que grâce aux structures présentées tout au long de cet ouvrage, les cadres sécessionnistes mobilisés par les revendicateurs stratégiques et les fervents champions de la sécession sont plus crédibles et pertinents en Catalogne qu’au Pays basque, ce qui explique les niveaux opposés de résonance transversale du discours sécessionniste. / In 2012, in the midst of an economic crisis, the autonomous government of Catalonia called snap elections, seeking for the first time since Spain’s return to democracy following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco, a strong majority in order to lead the region towards secession. At roughly the same time, the Basque secessionist armed group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, announced the end of its decades-long murderous campaign, which had claimed over 800 lives. If the Basques have long been accused of being more separatist than the Catalans, these new developments suggested a role reversal for both secessionist movements. By drawing from the literature on social movements and secession, the aim of this study is to explain this phenomenon. We will firstly show that the economic and institutional structures framing for the regions and their relations with the central state made it that the Spanish economic crisis (2008-2014) offered a political opportunity structure for the success of Catalan secessionism, whereas this was not the case in the Basque Country. Secondly, we will demonstrate that the lack of synchronicity between both regions’ processes of pacifying their political violence cleavages played a decisive role in determining the capacity for nationalists to cooperation on the national questions, thereby affecting the potential for secessionist mobilization. Finally, we will see that, due to the structures presented throughout this work, the secessionist frames used by the strategic claimants and the consistent champions of secession were more relevant and credible in Catalonia than in the Basque Country, which explains the opposite levels of transversal resonance of the secessionist discourse. / En 2012, en plena crisis económica, el gobierno autónomo de Cataluña convoca elecciones anticipadas y, por primera vez desde el restablecimiento de la democracia española tras la muerte del dictador Francisco Franco, exige una mayoría amplia para llevar a la región hacia la secesión. Más o menos al mismo tiempo, el grupo armado secesionista vasco, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, anuncia el fin de su campaña mortífera de décadas, que ha cobrado más de 800 víctimas. Si los vascos han sido acusados durante mucho tiempo de ser más separatistas que los catalanes, estos nuevos acontecimientos sugieren una inversión de roles de sus movimientos secesionistas. Apoyándonos en la literatura sobre los movimientos sociales y la secesión, el objetivo de este estudio es explicar este fenómeno. En primer lugar, mostraremos que las estructuras económicas e institucionales que enmarcan las regiones y sus relaciones con el Estado central aseguraron que la crisis económica española (2008-2014) proporcionara una estructura de oportunidad política para el éxito del secesionismo catalán, mientras que no fue el caso en el País Vasco. A continuación, demostraremos que la falta de sincronía entre los procesos vasco y catalán de pacificación de los clivajes de la violencia política juega un papel decisivo en determinar la capacidad de cooperación entre nacionalistas sobre la cuestión nacional durante la crisis, lo que afecta al potencial de movilización secesionista. Por último, veremos que, gracias a las estructuras presentadas a lo largo de esta encuesta, los marcos secesionistas movilizados por los reclamantes estratégicos y los fervientes defensores de la secesión han sido más creíbles y relevantes en Cataluña que en el País Vasco, lo que explica los niveles opuestos de resonancia transversal del discurso secesionista. / Al 2012, en plena crisi econòmica, el govern autònom de Catalunya convoca eleccions anticipades, demanant per primera vegada des del retorn d’Espanya a la democràcia després de la mort del dictador Francisco Franco, una majoria àmplia per dirigir la regió cap a la secessió. Més o menys alhora, el grup armat secessionista basc, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, anuncia la fi de la seva campanya mortífera de dècades, que va fer més de 800 víctimes. Si els bascos han estat acusats des de fa temps de ser més separatistes que els catalans, aquests esdeveniments suggereixen una reversió dels papers dels seus moviments secessionistes. Recolzant-nos en les literatures sobre els moviments socials i la secessió, l’objectiu d’aquest estudi és d’explicar aquest fenomen. Primer, mostrarem que les estructures econòmiques i institucionals que emmarquen les regions i les seves relacions amb l’Estat central van assegurar que la crisi econòmica espanyola (2008-2014) proporcionés una estructura d’oportunitat política per a l’èxit del secessionisme català, mentre que això no va ser el cas al País Basc. En segon lloc, demostrarem que la manca de sincronia entre els processos basc i català de pacificació dels clivatges de la violència política juga un paper decisiu en determinar la capacitat de col·laboració entre nacionalistes sobre la qüestió nacional durant la crisi, el que afecta el potencial de mobilització secessionista. Finalment, veurem que, gràcies a les estructures presentades al llarg d’aquest estudi, els marcs secessionistes mobilitzats pels reclamants estratègics i els fervents defensors de la secessió han estat més creïbles i rellevants a Catalunya que al País Basc, el que explica els nivells oposats de ressonància transversal del discurs secessionista.