La thèse montre comment des mécanismes "de second rang" (rigidités des marchés du travail, imperfection des anticipations) et des mécanismes considérés de court-terme(inertie du capital installé, chômage) induisent que (i) les coûts de l'atténuation sont des coûts de transition, si tant est que des politiques de réorientation des investissements sont mises en place de façon précoce pour éviter des lock-ins sur des chemins de développement carbonés ; (ii) ces coûts peuvent être élevés, en particulier pour les pays émergents et en développement. Dès lors, la représentation des rigidités du monde réel dans les modèles des interfaces économie-énergie-environnement a des implications importantes pour l'analyse des politiques climatiques. L'égalisation des prix du carbone n'est plus la politique minimisant les coûts de l'atténuation lorsque l'on se place dans un monde de second-rang. La thèse illustre ainsi que le paquet "prix du carbone mondial plus transferts compensatoires" ne peut conduire, par lui-même, à un accord acceptable pour les pays émergents et en développement. Elle insiste sur la nécessité de concevoir des politiques alternatives ouvrant la palette des variables de contrôle (investissements publics, infrastructures, réformes fiscales) et passant par des politiques spécifiques au niveau local / The thesis shows how second-best mechanisms (labour markets rigidities, imperfect foresight) and mechanisms considered as short-term issues (inertia of productive capital,unemployment) induce that (i) mitigation costs are transition costs insofar as policies to reorient investments to low-carbon infrastructures are implemented early to avoid lock-ins in high-carbon development paths ; (ii) these transition costs can be significant, in particular for emerging and developing countries. Therefore, representing real world rigidities in energy-economy-environment models has important implications for the analysis of climate policies. Equalizing carbon prices is not anymore the policy minizing mitigation costs if a second-best world is considered. The thesis thus illustrates that the package "worldwide carbon price plus compensatory transfers" cannot lead, by itself, to a palatable deal for emerging and developing countries. It insists on the necessity to design alternative policies to open the control variables palette (public investments, infrastructures, fiscal reforms) and allowing specific policies at the local level

VIANA, Luiz Fernando Gonçalves. Proposta de modelo de cobrança de água bruta no estado do Ceará: uma revisão do modelo atual. 2011. 85 f.: Dissertação (mestrado) - Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Centro de Ciência Agrárias, Departamento de Economia Agrícola, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia Rural, Fortaleza-CE, 2011 / Submitted by Kepler Barroso (keplercavalcante@hotmail.com) on 2013-10-24T17:08:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2011_dis_lfgviana.pdf: 779213 bytes, checksum: 496f5b1504de48c5eb8cd1c6f2af5fec (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Margareth Mesquita(margaret@ufc.br) on 2013-11-04T19:24:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2011_dis_lfgviana.pdf: 779213 bytes, checksum: 496f5b1504de48c5eb8cd1c6f2af5fec (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-04T19:24:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2011_dis_lfgviana.pdf: 779213 bytes, checksum: 496f5b1504de48c5eb8cd1c6f2af5fec (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / The aim of this study was to propose a new model of charging for water use which considers the granted rights, the capitation volumes, and the discarded domestic sewage. For this purpose, the main charging models applied in federal river basins, implemented by the ANA, were analyzed: Paraíba do Sul river, Piracicaba, Capivari and Jundiaí rivers, and São Francisco river. After defining the model that better adapts to the reality of Ceará State, considering simplicity and applicability of each model, the valuation of water as an economic good was performed in the Salgado river basin, in Cariri region. Optimal prices for water supply and domestic sewage was calculated based on the economic theory of general equilibrium, known as second best. The results showed that elasticity of demand, for each purpose of use, is inelastic reinforcing the results of other studies on water charging. The calculated optimal prices were R$ 0,0148/m3 for water supply, and R$ 0,1914/kg DBO for domestic sewage. / O objetivo deste estudo é propor um novo modelo de cobrança pelo uso da água que considere volumes outorgados, captados e lançamento de efluentes domésticos. Para tanto, foram analisados os principais modelos de cobrança adotados nas bacias hidrográficas de rios federais, implementados pela Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA): rio Paraíba do Sul, rios Piracicaba, Capivari e Jundiaí, e rio São Francisco. Após a definição do modelo que melhor se adéqua à realidade do Ceará, considerando os aspectos de simplicidade e aplicabilidade, procedeu-se à valoração da água como bem econômico na bacia hidrográfica do rio Salgado, na região do Cariri. A determinação dos preços ótimos pelo uso da água, para os usos de abastecimento público e esgoto doméstico, foi calculada com base na teoria econômica de equilíbrio geral em second best. Os resultados demonstraram que a elasticidade-preço da demanda, em cada um dos usos, é inelástica, reforçando os resultados de outros estudos sobre a cobrança. Os preços ótimos calculados foram de R$ 0,0148/m3 para o abastecimento público, e R$ 0,1914/kg DBO para o lançamento de efluentes domésticos.

abstract: Firms reduce investment when facing downward wage rigidity (DWR), the inability or unwillingness to adjust wages downward. I construct DWR measures and exploit staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as an exogenous variation in DWR to document this fact. Following a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their investment rate by 1.17 percentage points. Surprisingly, this labor market friction enhances firm value and production efficiency when firms are subject to other frictions causing overinvestment, consistent with the theory of second best. Finally, I identify increased operating leverage and aggravation of debt overhang as mechanisms by which DWR impedes investment. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2017

MAAS / Department of Developmental Studies

Climate change must deal with two market failures: global warming and learning by doing in renewable energy production. The first-best policy consists of an aggressive renewables subsidy in the near term and a gradually rising and falling carbon tax. Given that global carbon taxes remain elusive, policy makers might have to rely on a second-best subsidy only. With credible commitment the second-best subsidy is higher than the social benefit of learning to cut the transition time and peak warming close to first-best levels at the cost of higher fossil fuel use in the short run (weak Green Paradox). Without commitment the second-best subsidy is set to the social benefit of learning. It generates smaller weak Green Paradox effects, but the transition to the carbon-free takes longer and cumulative carbon emissions are higher. Under first best and second best with pre-commitment peak warming is 2.1-2.3 °C, under second best without commitment 3.5 °C, and without any policy 5.1 °C above pre-industrial levels. Not being able to commit yields a welfare loss of 95% of initial GDP compared to first best. Being able to commit brings this figure down to 7%.

Dans le cadre de cette thèse, je m'intéresse à la gestion des combustibles fossiles (pétrole, gaz naturel, charbon) en présence d'interactions stratégiques entre diffé­rents types d'agents. Dans un premier temps, j'étudie sous quelles conditions deux firmes asymétriques, exploitant une ressource non renouvelable, peuvent s'entendre autour d'un accord de coopération et ainsi former un cartel. J'analyse en parti­culier l'ensemble des accords possibles ainsi que la possibilité que ceux-ci soient acceptés par toutes les parties prenantes. Dans un second temps, je m'intéresse plus spécifiquement à l'incitation des pays membres du cartel de l'Opep à sures­timer ou sous-estimer leurs réserves de pétrole depuis l'instauration du système des quotas de production en 1982. Enfin, je caractérise la politique optimale d'un gouvernement en faveur du développement des technologies backstop au travers de subventions en R&D afin d'assurer la transition énergétique depuis des énergies fossiles polluantes à des énergies renouvelables non polluantes. Mais, je fais cette analyse dans le contexte où la production est contrôlée par une firme indépendante et lorsque le gouvernement ne peut pas implémenter une taxe sur les émissions. Un point commun de ces trois chapitres est la présence d'agents ayant des intérêts divergents. D'un point de vue méthodologique, j'utilise la théorie des jeux et, en particulier, les jeux différentiels dans les deux premiers chapitres. / This dissertation provides an analysis of the management of fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal) in the presence of strategic interactions between different types of agents. First, I study under which conditions two asymmetric firms, extracting a nonre­newable resource, may agree upon a cooperative agreement and, thus, merge into a cartel. I analyse, in particular, the set of feasible agreements and the possibility that every players accept one of them. Second, I focus more specifically on the incentives for the Opec members to over-report or under-report their oil reserves since the set of production quotas in 1982. Third, I characterize the optimal policy of a government in favor of the developing of backstop technologies through R&D subsidies in order to ensure the ecological transition from polluting fossil fuels to non-polluting renewable energies. However, I conduct this analysis in the context where the supply is controlled by an independent firm and when the government cannot implement a Pigovian tax on emissions. A common theme of these dif­ferent chapters is the presence of agents whose interests are contradictory. From a methodological point of view, I use game theory and, in particular, differential games in the two first chapters.

Cette thèse s'intéresse à la réconciliation entre le défi mondial du changement climatique et les solutions locales et sectorielles qu'il convient de bien articuler pour contribuer, efficacement, équitablement et de la manière la plus acceptable, à la réduction des émissions de CO2. Plus précisément, nous étudions les conditions pour une mise en place réussie de la politique climatique à l'échelle de la mobilité urbaine des personnes. / This PhD thesis deals with the reconciliation of the global challenge that is climate change and the local and sectoral solutions that need to be accurately designed to remedy to it the most efficiently, equitably and acceptably possible. More specifically, we investigate the conditions for a successful implementation of climate policy at the scale of the urban mobility of passengers.

This dissertation details regulation's impact in networked markets, notably in deregulated electricity and internet service markets. These markets represent basic infrastructure in the modern economy; their innate networked structures make for rich fields of economic research on regulatory impact. The first chapter models deregulated electricity industries with a focus on the Texas market. Optimal economic benchmarks are considered for markets with regulated delivery and interrelated network costs. Using a model of regulator, consumer, and firm interaction, I determine the efficiency of the current rate formalization compared to Ramsey-Boiteux prices and two-part tariffs. I find within Texas's market increases to generator surplus up to 55% of subsidies could be achieved under Ramsey-Boiteux pricing or two-part tariffs, respectively. The second chapter presents a framework to analyze dynamic processes and long-run outcomes in two-sided markets, specifically dynamic platform and firm investment incentives within the internet-service platform/content provision market. I use the Ericson-Pakes framework applied within a platform that chooses fees on either side of its two-sided market. This chapter determines the impact of network neutrality on platform investment incentives, specifically whether to improve the platform. I use a parameterized calibration from engineering reports and current ISP literature to determine welfare outcomes and industry behavior under network neutral and non-neutral regimes. My final chapter explores retail firm failure within the deregulated Texas retail electricity market. This chapter investigates determinants of retail electric firm failures using duration analysis frameworks. In particular, this chapter investigates the impact of these determinants on firms with extant experience versus unsophisticated entrants. Understanding these determinants is an important component in evaluating whether deregulation achieves the impetus of competitive electricity market restructuring. Knowing which economic events decrease a market's competitiveness helps regulators to effectively evaluate policy implementations. I find that experience does benefit a firm's duration, but generally that benefit assists firm duration in an adverse macroeconomic environment rather than in response to adverse market conditions such as higher wholesale prices or increased transmission congestion. Additionally, I find evidence that within the Texas market entering earlier results in a longer likelihood of duration. / text