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No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - Humberto Gallucci Netto.pdf: 1119149 bytes, checksum: 8b79fe7fd5ee44160a2d7b7b97075abc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-23 / This thesis analyzes the differences between venture capital (VC) funds managed by banks and funds managed by independent institutions. Banks as VC fund managers (or bank affiliates funds) contact companies that commonly require banking services such as loans, underwriting and M & A advisory. Fang et al. (2013) and Hellman et al. (2008) explore the possibility that bank affiliates seek to invest in companies that may in the future be clients of the bank to which they are associated. In this case, banks sponsor VC funds to strengthen their commercial area. In addition, bank affiliates have access to the same flow of opportunities as independent funds. This thesis explores another possibility: independent funds seek co-investment with bank affiliates to facilitate the access of their investees to advantages such as greater capital volume and obtaining credit. In this case, the flow of opportunities of bank affiliates is differentiated because they are easier to participate in co-investments. Thus, the first objective of this thesis is to seek evidence that bank affiliates have a different flow of opportunities and that they are easier to co-invest. The second objective is to investigate whether the reinterpretation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (or GSA) that occurred in 1989 affected the structuring of the investments of affiliated funds of banks. The GSA has in many ways limited the performance of commercial banks. Section 20 prohibited commercial banks and their subsidiaries from being the underwriters in corporate bond issues. Over the years, there have been some attempts by Congress to soften or remove the GSA, but with little success. Regulators and banks were able to effectively soften the GSA through successive reinterpretations of their content. In 1989, the Federal Reserve (Fed) allowed some financial institutions to underwrite corporate assets (including IPOs). This permission created, exogenously, two groups of financial institutions: those that could and could not do underwriting (we call the commercial banks that obtained this authorization as subsidiaries Section 20 or SS20). This constituted an exogenous shock that affected only a portion of commercial banks and thus allows us to identify whether underwriting activity affects the behavior of banks as VC fund managers. A change in the investment style after 1989 that occurs only for the SS20 would be indicative that bank affiliates adjust their investment style in function of the activities and interests of the holding company. This also suggests the conflict of interest between these two activities. Regarding the first objective, we find that the model of VC investment of affiliates of commercial banks is dependent on the round of entry into the company. When they invest in the first round, commercial bank affiliates enter rounds up to four times larger in investments with fewer co-investors and investment rounds than independent funds. Investments of bank affiliates in companies in the first round of financing are made in sectors other than the investments of independent funds and 35% of the companies invested by banks acquire a bank loan. Co-investment in companies that have passed the first round of investment represents most of investments for VC funds. Bank affiliates make 63% of the investments in this modality (55% for independents) and invest companies 400 miles away. Bank affiliates coincide with a larger number of funds, even with lower ratio numbers. Despite some differences, the sectors invested between affiliated funds and banks are similar. Investment in VC increases the likelihood of selling other banking products such as loans, underwriting and M & A advisory. Finally, companies invested in the first round by bank affiliates seeking loans from the VC bank have a spread of 90 basis points higher than companies seeking loans from other banks. In relation to our second objective, we identified a change in the investment model of funds affiliated with banks that have SS20 as compared to the VC funds of banks without such subsidiaries. There was a drop in the percentage of investments made in the first round of the company's VC by approximately 15%, and the main reason for this decline is the 19% decrease in first-round investments made alone. Early-stage investments fell by approximately 10%, while the co-investment percentage increased by 19%. There was a decrease, both in the percentage of rounds that the bank invested and, in the total, invested in the company by 20%. The distance between bank and company has decreased by 400 miles. These changes in the investment style impacted the percentage of companies that went through IPO by more than 10%. The results suggest a change in the investment model of commercial banks SS20 after 1989. The subsidiaries invested in more mature and closer companies, co-investing in more investments. One possible explanation is the search for more mature companies that can issue debentures, shares or use the new services that SS20 have been authorized. / Esta tese analisa diferenças entre fundos de venture capital (VC) geridos por bancos e os geridos por instituições independentes. Bancos enquanto gestores de fundos de VC (denominamos por afiliados de bancos os fundos geridos por bancos) entram em contato com empresas que comumente necessitam de serviços bancários tais como empréstimos, underwriting e assessoramento em M&A. Fang et al. (2013) e Hellman et al. (2008) exploram a possibilidade que afiliadas de bancos procurem investir em empresas que possam no futuro ser clientes do banco ao qual estão associadas. Nesse caso, os bancos patrocinam fundos de VC para fortalecer sua área comercial. Além do mais, as afiliadas de bancos têm acesso ao mesmo fluxo de oportunidades que os fundos independentes. Essa tese explora outra possibilidade: que fundos independentes busquem o coinvestimento com afiliadas de banco para facilitar o acesso de suas investidas a vantagens tais como maior volume de capital e obtenção de crédito. Nesse caso, o fluxo de oportunidades das afiliadas de bancos é diferenciado porque estas possuem maior facilidade para participar de coinvestimentos. Assim, o primeiro objetivo dessa tese é buscar evidências de que afiliadas de bancos têm um fluxo de oportunidades diferenciado e que têm maior facilidade para coinvestir. O segundo objetivo é investigar se a reinterpretação da Seção 20 do Glass-Steagall Act de 1933 (ou GSA) que ocorreu em 1989 afetou a estruturação dos investimentos de fundos afiliados de bancos. O GSA limitou de vários modos a atuação dos bancos comerciais. Em particular, a Seção 20 proibiu que bancos comerciais e suas subsidiárias e depositárias fossem os underwriters em emissões de títulos corporativos. Ao longo dos anos, houve algumas tentativas do Congresso para amenizar ou remover o GSA, mas com pouco sucesso. Os reguladores e bancos conseguiram amenizar efetivamente o GSA por meio de sucessivas reinterpretações de seu conteúdo. De especial interesse para o nosso tópico, em 1989 o Federal Reserve (FED) permitiu que algumas instituições financeiras fizessem o underwriting de ativos corporativos (inclusive IPOs). Essa permissão criou, de maneira exógena, dois grupos de instituições financeiras: as que podiam e as que não podiam fazer underwriting (denominamos os bancos comerciais que conseguiram esta autorização como subsidiárias Seção 20 ou SS20). Isso constituiu um choque exógeno que afetou apenas uma parcela dos bancos comerciais e, portanto, permite identificar se a atividade de underwrinting afeta o comportamento dos bancos enquanto gestores de fundos de VC. Uma mudança no estilo de investimento após 1989 que ocorra somente para as SS20 seria indicativa de que afiliadas de bancos ajustam seu estilo de investimento em função das atividades e interesses da holding. Isso também sugere o conflito de interesse entre essas duas atividades. Com relação ao primeiro objetivo, encontramos que o modelo de investimento em VC das afiliadas de bancos comerciais é dependente do round de entrada na empresa. Quando investem no primeiro round as afiliadas de bancos comerciais entram em rounds até quatro vezes maiores, em investimentos com menor número de coinvestidores e rounds de investimento do que os fundos independentes. Os investimentos de afiliadas de bancos em empresas no primeiro round de financiamento são feitos em setores distintos aos investimentos de fundos independentes e 35% das empresas investidas por bancos adquirem um empréstimo bancário. O coinvestimento em empresas que passaram do primeiro round de investimento representa a maioria dos investimentos para os fundos de VC. Afiliadas de bancos fazem 63% dos investimentos nesta modalidade (55% para independentes) e investem empresas 400 milhas mais distantes. As afiliadas de bancos coinvestem com um maior número de fundos, mesmo com índices de número de relacionamento mais baixos. Apesar de algumas diferenças, os setores investidos entre fundos afiliados e bancos são similares. O investimento em VC aumenta a probabilidade da venda de outros produtos bancários como: empréstimos, underwriting e assessoramento em M&A. Por fim, empresas investidas no primeiro round por afiliadas de bancos que buscam empréstimo junto ao banco investidor de VC tem um spread de 90 pontos base maior do que as empresas que buscam empréstimo em outros bancos. Com relação ao nosso segundo objetivo, identificamos uma mudança no modelo de investimento dos fundos afiliados a bancos que possuem SS20, quando comparado com os fundos de VC de bancos sem tais subsidiárias. Houve uma queda na porcentagem de investimentos feitos no primeiro round de VC da empresa em aproximadamente 15%, e o principal motivo desta queda é a diminuição em 19% dos investimentos em primeiro round realizados sozinhos. Os investimentos em early-stage caíram aproximadamente 10%, enquanto a porcentagem de coinvestimento aumentou 19%. Houve uma queda, tanto na porcentagem de rounds que o banco investiu quanto no total investido na empresa em 20%. A distância entre a sede do banco e da empresa diminuiu em 400 milhas. Estas mudanças no estilo de investimento impactaram na porcentagem de empresas que saíram por IPO em mais de 10%. Os resultados sugerem uma mudança no modelo de investimento dos bancos comerciais SS20 após 1989. As subsidiárias investiram em empresas mais maduras e mais próximas, coinvestindo em mais investimentos. Uma possível explicação é a busca por empresas mais maduras que podem emitir debêntures, ações ou utilizar os novos serviços que as SS20 foram autorizadas.

The need to transform education from its apartheid past resulted in the introduction of school governing bodies (SGBs). SGBs are democratic structures that allow for stakeholder participation in school matters in line with the demands of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Section 21 of the South African Schools Act (SASA) (84 of 1996) stipulates specific functions for SGBs. These functions are allocated only on the basis of significant growth in the performance of an SGB. SGBs must apply to be allocated these functions, after satisfying themselves first that they can self–manage their school, and after the MEC has certified the said performance. Schools in the Mpumalanga province were all allocated these functions simultaneously without applying for them. One of the functions that SGBs perform is the establishment and administration of school funds. Because schools are state institutions, SGBs are expected by law to be accountable for the funds they manage. They must account to all stakeholders who contribute to the school fund. To be able to administer the funds, as well as to give proper accountability thereof, SGBs need to have particular financial management and accounting skills. The aim of this study was to investigate the extent to which SGBs are able to account to stakeholders for the school funds they manage. The study further investigated whether the kind of accountability given to parents and the state is “hard” or “soft”. A case study involving three schools: a rural school, a semi-urban school and an urban school, was conducted. SGB members of these schools and officials from the department of education were interviewed for information and also to solicit their opinion on current financial accountability processes. An analysis of official SGB documents was also conducted to strengthen the information gathered through interviews. It has emerged from the findings of the study that some SGBs in Mpumalanga are still experiencing difficulties in following the correct procedures in giving a financial account to parents and the state. There is an indication from the study that capacity to handle finances is still a big challenge for schools that are not in the rich quintile. / Dissertation (MEd (Education Management))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Education Management and Policy Studies / MEd / unrestricted

As a company is a juristic person it can only act through human agency. A question that arises because of this fact is under what circumstances a company can be held to a contract by a third party where its representative was unauthorised to enter into such contract. There should be a careful weighing and balancing of the interests of the shareholders and the company on the one hand and the contracting third party on the other. It is further important to have legal certainty on the validity and enforceability of contracts concluded by and with companies as the absence of certainty can hamper business dealings with companies which would have an impact on the economy. The common-law principles of agency form the foundation upon which representation within the context of company law takes place. The law of agency has been adapted in the context of company law to satisfy the unique needs that have originated in this regard. One such adaptation is the creation of the Turquand rule by the English courts which rule was taken over by the South African courts. One of the primary reasons for creating the Turquand rule was due to the harsh effect that the common-law doctrine of constructive notice had on third parties dealing with a company. In this study an examination of the current legal position regarding representation of a company in South Africa was undertaken. The history and development of the common-law principles of agency and doctrines that are unique to representation in a company law context are analysed and the relevant sections of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 are discussed. The integration of the common-law principles with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is considered and recommendations are made in respect thereof. In support of the analysis, a comparative study was undertaken of the history and development of this subject matter in England. It was concluded that South African company law, with all its shortcomings and uncertainties is still to be preferred above the position in England. / Aangesien ‘n maatskappy ‘n regspersoon is, kan dit slegs deur middel van natuurlike persone as agente optree. ‘n Vraag wat as gevolg van hierdie feit ontstaan is onder watter omstandighede ‘n maatskappy deur ‘n derde party gebonde gehou kan word aan ‘n kontrak waar die maatskappy se verteenwoordiger nie gemagtig was om die kontrak aan te gaan nie. Daar behoort ‘n versigtige afweging te wees tussen die belange van die maatskappy en sy aandeelhouers aan die een kant en ‘n derde party wat met die maatskappy kontrakteer aan die ander kant. Dit is verder belangrik om regsekerheid te hê oor die geldigheid en afdwingbaarheid van kontrakte wat met maatskappye aangegaan word aangesien die afwesigheid daarvan besigheidsverkeer met maatskappye kan kortwiek wat ‘n impak op die ekonomie tot gevolg sal hê. Die gemeenregtelike beginsels van verteenwoordiging vorm die basis waarop verteenwoordiging binne die konteks van maatskappyereg plaasvind. Verteenwoordigingsreg is aangepas binne die konteks van maatskappye om voorsiening te maak vir die unieke behoeftes wat in hierdie verband ontstaan het. Een sodanige aanpassing is die skepping van die Turquand reël deur die Engelse howe, welke reël deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe oorgeneem is. Een van die hoofredes vir die skepping van die Turquand reël is die onregverdige uitwerking wat die gemeenregtelike leerstuk van toegerekende kennis op derde partye gehad het wat met ‘n maatskappy onderhandel. ‘n Studie van die huidige regsposisie rakende verteenwoordiging van ‘n maatskappy in Suid-Afrika is hierin gedoen. Die geskiedenis en ontwikkeling van die gemeenregtelike beginsels van verteenwoordiging en leerstukke eie aan verteenwoordiging in die konteks van maatskappyereg is geanaliseer. Die betrokke artikels van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word bespreek. Die integrasie van hierdie gemeenregtelike beginsels met die betrokke bepalings van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 is oorweeg en aanbevelings in verband daarmee gemaak. Ter ondersteuning van die analise is ‘n vergelykende studie van die gekiedenis en ontwikkeling van hierdie onderwerp in Engeland onderneem. Daar is tot die slotsom gekom dat die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg, met al sy tekortkominge en onsekerhede nogsteeds bo die posisie in Engeland te verkies is. / Mercantile Law / LL. M.