Following the publication of the European Union Global Strategy in 2016 where the EU officially announced its quest for European Strategic Autonomy (ESA), a policy initiative toenable EU’s capacity to act autonomously in the realm of security and defence, this study poses the following research question: What type of foreign policy behaviour does the EU exhibit in security and defence through its quest for strategic autonomy? Broadly based in realism, the study is designed as a single case-study of EU foreign policy behaviour in relation to Russia and analyses whether the pursuit of ESA entails a balancing or hedging EU foreign policy behaviour. By doing so, the study contributes theoretically, by disentangling and operationalising these two concepts analytically, and empirically, by applying them to an EU context and investigating their presence. The results show that the EU does not exhibit a hedging behaviour towards Russia, and whether the EU exhibits a balancing behaviour remains inconclusive as the empirical material provided insufficient evidence to conclude so.

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By adopting a multilevel approach to understanding decisions taken in security and defence policies by European member states, the paper argues that the development of the European Security and Defence Policy, the proliferation of ad-hoc coalitions of the willing, and the subcontracting of security tasks from the UN has worsened the challenge of parliamentary accountability in foreign, security and defence policies. The paper evaluates how the European Convention has sought to bridge the parliamentary accountability gap in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The outcomes of the Convention on the future of Europe are not meeting its initial ambition to put foreign, security and defence policy among the priorities for the European Union¿s constitutional design. CFSP will become more integrated, on an intergovernmental rather than supranational model and under the large states¿ control. The major innovation is the creation of the position of Foreign Affairs Minister whose autonomy remains still uncertain, especially in his/her relationship with the President of the European Council. ESDP¿s operational capabilities and scope are both extended while coalitions of the willing are institutionalised and a defence core group could emerge. The contrast remains between a slower integration of CFSP and a faster progress of ESDP. Given the significance of proposals in ESDP, the new powers proposed by the European Convention to be given to national parliaments and the European Parliament in this policy area are too weak to close the existing parliamentary accountability gap.

One of the major analytical shortcomings regularly made by EU and NATO experts today lies with exclusively seeing the European defence project as a post-World War II (WWII) phenomenon and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as mainly a post-Cold War product. No analyst has so far seriously explored the idea of European defence predating WWII and the 20th century. Instead, since 1999 one frequently reads and hears about the ‘anomalous,’ ‘elusive’ CSDP suddenly complicating transatlantic relations. But the CSDP is hardly an oddity or aberration, and it is certainly not as mysterious as some might suggest. Drawing extensively from primary sources and predicated on an overarching evolutionist approach, this thesis shows that the present CSDP is an ephemeral security and defence concept, only the latest of its kind and full of potential. Drawing its deepest ideational roots from the (pre-)Enlightenment era, the CSDP leads to a pan-European defence almost irreversibly. A common defence for Europe is quite possible and, due to the growing impact of the exogenous (multipolar) momentum, can be realized sooner rather than later even without a full-fledged European federation. / May 2016

The thesis results from a research project, combining elements of European law and public international law. The project focuses on the different forms of the use of force by the European Union in the sphere of the Common Security and Defence Policy as an integral part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. It examines the conditions under which the European Union can engage in military crisis management missions from the perspective of European Union law as well as from the perspective of public international law. The main emphasis of the thesis is put on the former, analysing the EU’s ambitions to become an international security actor from an inside-out perspective. When addressing the vertical dimension of the EU and the use of force in more detail, the thesis analyses the extent to which the Member States are constrained in the conduct of their national foreign and security policy through decisions by the European Union in the sphere of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. With regards to the EU’s legal relationship with the United Nations, the thesis examines whether and if so to what extent the European Union, although not a member of the United Nations, is bound by UN Security Council resolutions in respect of the use of force. Based on the assumption that the EU is bound by UN Security Council resolutions imposing economic sanctions, the thesis uses a comparative method in order to show that the EU as an international organisation is bound by decisions of the UN Security Council in the sense that the EU is obliged to respect the wording and limits of a UN Security Council mandate to use force once it decides to contribute with an EU mission. If the EU decides not to accept a UN Security Council mandate, the thesis argues that the EU is under the obligation not to undermine the success of a UN authorised military intervention, in the spirit of a loyalty obligation. Apart from analyzing the interaction of the EU and the international legal framework, the thesis also uses a speculative approach in order to examine the implications of silence in the context of the use of force.

La crise des euromissiles trouve son origine en octobre 1977, lorsque le chancelier allemand Helmut Schmidt exprime son inquiétude face à l’aggravation du déséquilibre militaire en Europe, consécutive au déploiement des missiles soviétiques de moyenne portée SS-20. Plus précis que les systèmes qu’ils remplacent et dotés de têtes nucléaires multiples, les SS-20 pourraient neutraliser la mise en œuvre de l’escalade nucléaire de l’OTAN. Qui plus est, les armes de moyenne portée de l’organisation militaire intégrée versent dans un état d’obsolescence. La question qui se pose est de ce fait celle de savoir quelles sont les garanties sécuritaires que les Américains offrent à l’Europe, alors que la parité stratégique, bientôt consacrée par le traité SALT II, rend improbable l’engagement de la dissuasion centrale américaine en faveur du Vieux Continent. La montée de la menace soviétique et la méfiance européenne vis-à-vis de la protection militaire américaine sont alors les deux éléments au centre du débat atlantique qui caractérise la décennie 1977-1987 et qui se conclut par le traité de Washington, sanctionnant l’élimination de toutes les armes nucléaires soviétiques et américaines de moyenne portée d’Europe.Cette situation risque d’affecter la France pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, l’aggravation du déséquilibre militaire engendré par les SS-20 confèrerait à Moscou un droit de véto sur toute évolution politique future du continent, que cela ait trait à la construction européenne ou à la résolution de la question allemande. Deux dossiers sur lesquels Paris n’accepte pas d’être marginalisé. Ensuite, la manifestation d’une méfiance européenne vis-à-vis de l’engagement américain en Europe semble amener certains alliés, la RFA au premier chef, à chercher un équilibre militaire propre au continent européen. Or, loin de garantir plus de sécurité, un équilibre « eurostratégique » n’aurait pour conséquence que d’éloigner la dissuasion américaine d’Europe ; en outre, il finirait par imposer des limitations aux forces nucléaires des puissances nucléaires tierces comme la France. Dès lors, la crise des euromissiles concerne la France dans la mesure où sa politique d’indépendance et sa politique de défense risquent d’être mises à mal par les évolutions du débat atlantique à propos de la sécurité de l’Europe, qui constitue l’environnement stratégique dans lequel Paris inscrit sa propre sécurité. / The origins of the Euromissile crisis date back to October 1977, when Helmut Schmidt publicly expressed his anxieties about the nuclear imbalance in Europe, following the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. The new Soviet system was more accurate than its predecessors and equipped with three nuclear warheads. NATO’s aging nuclear medium-range missiles could not match the Soviet technology and NATO’s nuclear escalation strategy proved weakened. At a time when SALT II fixed a rough strategic nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, Europe wondered whether the American extended deterrence was still reliable. The increasing Soviet threat and the deepening European defiance vis-à-vis the American military protection were the two central elements of the Euromissile crisis, which lasted until 1987, when the Washington treaty sanctioned the elimination of all Soviet and American medium-range nuclear forces in Europe.The French concern about the Euromissile crisis was twofold. Firstly, Moscow might profit from its military superiority in Europe in order to extend its influence over the Western part of the continent. As a consequence, the Soviet Union might acquire a veto over any European political development, for example as regards the European integration process or the resolution of the German question, issues on which France was eager to play a major role. Secondly, the European distrust towards the American military protection could lead to the establishment of a “eurostrategic” balance, or a balance between the Soviet and the American nuclear weapons in Europe. This would definitely have weakened the value of the American extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, but also in due course included third country nuclear forces into the military European balance as a part of the Western military effort. In this case, France would be deprived of a major element of her defense policy. As a consequence, France got involved in the Euromissiles crisis to preserve her strategic environment from any Soviet European ambition and to defend her policy of national independence from any attempt to diminish her military force at a time of increased East-West confrontation.

<p>This dissertations aims to examine the EU Foreign Policy, and more precisely map the High Representative (HR) and his impact on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU. Using two theoretical frameworks, leadership theory and institutional theory, the study tests the explanatory power of these theories to explain the HR and his impact on the CFSP. The study is limited to a period of time, from November 2002 until December 2003, when several different events took place within the framework of the CFSP. The conclusion indicates that both leadership theory and institutional theory can help explain the development and outcomes of the CFSP.</p><p>Keywords: EU foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, High Representative of the CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy, Iraq war, European Security Strategy</p>

This dissertations aims to examine the EU Foreign Policy, and more precisely map the High Representative (HR) and his impact on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU. Using two theoretical frameworks, leadership theory and institutional theory, the study tests the explanatory power of these theories to explain the HR and his impact on the CFSP. The study is limited to a period of time, from November 2002 until December 2003, when several different events took place within the framework of the CFSP. The conclusion indicates that both leadership theory and institutional theory can help explain the development and outcomes of the CFSP. Keywords: EU foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, High Representative of the CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy, Iraq war, European Security Strategy

This study examines the evolution of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the European Union before and after the Saint Malo Declaration of December 1998. The co-operation in foreign policy and security matters has always been a corollary element to the economic co-operation since the beginning of the European Integration process. Within this context this study argues that the conducting of co-operation in this field within the framework of European Community/European Union (EC/EU) was dependent on the national actors, the internal community/union factors, and the external dynamics. It is also asserted that, the European political co-operation is based on, on the one hand, the intergovernmentalist method of decision-making and implementation process, and on the other to the incrementalism through which the Member States could reconcile their diverging interests, which represent continuity within the EC/EU. The Saint Malo constitutes one of the momentous events in the trajectory of European foreign policy, security and defence co-operation, which launched the essentials of the CESDP. Within this framework, this study will analyse how a legally unbinding document has been incorporated into the legal framework of the European Union and consequently became the part of the acquis. Furthermore, the policies of France, Britain, and the United States within the process of establishment of the CESDP will be examined. Then, this thesis argues that, Saint Malo has initiated a ground for renegotiation of the terms of transatlantic relationship, which culminated in the redefinition of global roles and responsibilities of Americans and Europeans.

This paper examines the relationship between Europeanisation and the recent changes of the Norwegian and Swedish security identities. Since the mid-1990s, these two countries have gone different ways, the former as an active non-member with no decision-making powers and the latter as an active participant in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Concerning Norway and Sweden’s security identity, both have changed exceedingly over the years. Norway, which has valued the US and the transatlantic partnership through NATO, namely being an ‘Atlanticist’, seeks a deeper connection to the EU as a security actor over the last fifteen years, despite the authorities emphasizing that NATO remains the cornerstone for Norwegian security policy. Sweden, which maintained strongly neutral and non-aligned throughout the 20th century, was initially sceptic to partaking in the security and defence dimension of the Union. Nonetheless, Sweden, as a member, managed to change its perception of EU’s security policy through highlighting crisis management and turned out to become one of EU’s most active contributors in shaping the ESDP. This paper concludes that Norway and Sweden have seen similar outcomes concerning Europeanisation, despite holding different positions in relation to the EU. Norway has not been able to hold an influential role respecting its European integration process, even though the authorities seek to gain as much input as possible into the ESDP through associate membership. Sweden, in contrast, entered the Union with an initial negative attitude concerning the security and defence policy but has changed its perception and chosen to play an active part in the policy making process through influencing and deepening its cooperation.