Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-10T17:12:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_Chelaineda_M.pdf: 433406 bytes, checksum: 462cd8f90de1cdc4d840ed4cb9a3da8d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: O objetivo desta dissertação é estudar as diferentes interpretações da doutrina do ¿fato da razão¿. Primeiramente iremos apresentar o ¿fato da razão¿ na obra Crítica da Razão Prática de Kant, pois é importante especificar o que levou Kant a lançar mão de tal conceito e quais as lacunas que possibilitaram as divergências entre as interpretações. Em seguida iremos expor as três interpretações e críticas feitas ao conceito do ¿fato da razão¿ na literatura internacional, a saber: Larry Herrera, Henry Alisson, Lewis Beck. Estas que forneceram fundamento à discussão principal do terceiro capítulo. Por fim iremos abordar o objetivo principal da dissertação, a discussão entre as interpretações de: Zeljko Loparic com a interpretação semântica, nomeada por Almeida de ¿Decisionista¿ e Guido de Almeida com a interpretação ¿Cognitivista¿ / Abstract: The objective of this dissertation is to study the different interpretations of the doctrine of the "fact of the reason". First we will go to present the "fact of the reason" in the work ¿Critical of the Practical Reason¿ of Kant, therefore it is important to specify what it took Kant to give hand of such concept and which the gaps that make possible the divergences between the interpretations. After that we will go to expose the three made critical interpretations and to the concept of the "fact of the reason" in international literature, to know: Larry Herrera, Henry Alisson, Lewis Beck. These that had supplied fundament to the main argument of the third chapter. Finally we will go to broach the objective main of the dissertation, the argument between the interpretations of: Zeljko Loparic with the interpretation semantics, nominated for Almeida of "Decisionista" and Guido de Almeida with the interpretation "Cognitivista" / Mestrado / Historia da Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

A central task of contemporary analytic philosophy is to develop an understanding of how our minds are connected to the external (or mind-independent) world. Arising from this task is the need to explain how thoughts represent things in the world. Giving such an explanation is the central endeavor of this dissertation—the aim being to contribute to our understanding of what it is for a subject to be thinking of a particular object. The structure of the dissertation is set, in part, by responding to the commonly held view that a satisfactory explanation of what it is to think of a particular object can be drawn out of, or extended from, an explanation of what it is to be referring to that particular object. Typically, in investigating these matters, it is accepted that there is an explanatory priority of language over thought. This is the Priority Thesis. Some take the Priority Thesis to reflect an appropriate methodological strategy. In this form, it implies the methodological point that the best way to describe thoughts is by describing them as they are expressed in language. Most, however, seem to take the Priority Thesis to be symptomatic of a substantive, metaphysical truth. This, to put it one way, is that the content of a thought is paralleled by the content of the associated linguistic expression. I call this the Assumption of Parallelism. This characterizes what we call Linguistic Turn philosophy (i.e., analytic philosophy). The body of the dissertation arises out of questioning the extent of the application ofthe Priority Thesis in developing theories of reference and thought. I call the move of the partial overturning ofthe Priority Thesis the Linguistic U-Turn. The overall conclusion is that we cannot explain what it is to think of a particular object by extending explanations of what it is to be referring to that particular object. In particular, I reject what I call the Causal Theory of Thought—the view that the representational properties of a thought are explained by the referential properties of the appropriate singular term. My aim, then, is to show that a popular conviction concerning the representational properties of thoughts about things in the world is not warranted. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

This dissertation is on the semantics of modal expressions and attitude verbs like English ‘must,’ ‘may,’ ‘ought,’ and ‘want’ — expressions that allow us to discuss socially important modal facts like obligations, permissions, and desires. When discussing them, we rarely spell out the modal facts with complete specificity. For example, I may say, ‘I want ice cream,’ without specifying that what I desire, in particular, is unmelted, non-toxic, chocolate ice cream. If, in response, someone were to give me melted, toxic, vanilla ice cream, it would be fair for me to reply that what I have been given is not what I wanted. Similarly, I can truly say ‘you must wash the dishes,’ or ‘you may have some wine,’ without specifying that there are exceptions, that is, specific ways of washing the dishes, or of having wine, that are not ways of doing what you must or are allowed. I call modal claims that have such exceptions underspecific. Since avoiding underspecificity may require explicitly ruling out an infinite number of exceptions, most of our ordinary modal claims are underspecific. Our reliance on them is thus crucial to our very capacity to communicate about the modal facts. I argue that modal claims can be true and underspecific by virtue of the meanings of the modal expressions that figure in them, and I defend a general semantic framework for modals that explains how. In the simplest cases, my framework predicts that speakers may describe the contents of desires, permissions, and obligations using conditions that are merely necessary for their fulfillment. Since getting unmelted, non-toxic chocolate ice cream necessitates getting ice cream simpliciter, this explains how I may truly state ‘I want ice cream’ even if the content of my desire is more specific. Generalizing this account, however, poses significant challenges. Indeed, many philosophers and linguists have rejected semantic theories of modals that allow for true, underspecific modal claims for two main reasons. One is that previous accounts give rise to several well-known logical puzzles, including the puzzle of free choice permission, Ross’s puzzle, and the Samaritan paradox. A second reason is that existing accounts generate the wrong truth value judgments in examples involving complex preferences and forms of uncertainty. In response, theorists have offered semantics for modals like ‘ought’ and ‘want’ that rely on the theory of rational choice and the notion of expected utility. Straightforward expected utility analyses succeed in generating the desired truth value judgments, but at the cost of giving up the possibility of underspecifying the modal facts in the ways that we manifestly do. I argue that we can meet both of these challenges, while still allowing for true, underspecific modal claims. In order to do so, I develop new solutions to the puzzle of free choice permission, Ross’s Puzzle, and the Samaritan paradox that improve on the empirical predictions of existing solutions. My framework also generates a methodologically desirable degree of independence between the proper semantics of modal expressions, on the one hand, and the proper analyses of desire or obligation in terms of rational choice, on the other. As a result, the semantic framework I develop in this dissertation can succeed where theorists who have turned to decision-theoretic semantics for ‘want’ and ‘ought’ have thought that existing theories fail. Besides the advantages that my semantic framework gains with respect to these problems in particular, it more generally provides new insights into the rich linguistic capacities and conventions that speakers leverage in order to communicate about the modal facts.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

From the late 1950s to about 1970, philosophers of education began to adopt a mode of philosophizing characterized as "the linguistic turn," after a similar change in general philosophy. This involved a move away from the older "isms" approach rooted in metaphysics towards linguistic and conceptual analysis. The linguistic turn has been attributed to intellectual history--the influence of ideas on a field. The central argument of this study, however, is that during the 1950s, factors external to academia, but acting upon it, interacted with concerns by educational philosophers themselves to create the conditions for the linguistic turn. These factors included the attacks on public schooling and "educationists," the teacher education reform movement, the Ford Foundation funding of liberal arts oriented teacher preparation, and, within the academy, the concern on the part of educational philosophers for the academic legitimacy of their discipline. These factors led philosophers of education to model their discourse more closely on the reigning paradigm in general philosophy, linguistic analysis. The attacks on public schooling were centered on progressivism for its alleged anti-intellectualism and subversive character. Philosophers of education were the particular targets of these critics. Teacher preparation in education schools also came under scrutiny during this period. The Ford Foundation's Fund for the Advancement of Education underwrote major programs that centered teacher preparation in a liberal arts curriculum, with only minimal coursework devoted to professional training. In addition, the National Commission for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) supported such a reorientation, with a concomitant weakening of educational philosophy's place in teacher education programs. Philosophers of education responded by lobbying for the inclusion of their courses in certification requirements, forging an alliance with the American Philosophical Association, reducing the social activism that had characterized earlier educational philosophers' efforts, and adopting the more academically legitimate methods of general philosophy. In the short term these actions assured educational philosophy a place in teacher education programs. In the long run, however, the linguistic turn may have jeopardized the survival of educational philosophy as an academic field by creating a chasm between philosopher and practitioner.

何啟志. / "2004年7月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2004. / 參考文獻(leaves 99-101). / "2004 nian 7 yue". / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / He Qizhi. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2004. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 99-101). / 引言：魏晉玄學的「言意之辨」 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章、 --- 語言哲學硏究角度的檢討 --- p.4 / Chapter 一、 --- 許抗生：借「言意之辨」說明唯物論語言觀 --- p.4 / Chapter 二、 --- 牟宗三：通過兩種真理觀解釋「言意之辨」 --- p.7 / Chapter 三、 --- 檢討 --- p.8 / Chapter 第二章、 --- 學術史硏究角度的檢討 --- p.13 / Chapter 一、 --- 湯用彤：確立「言意之辨」學術史硏究的框架 --- p.13 / Chapter 二、 --- 林麗真、余敦康：通過「言意之辨」探討魏晉人注經之方法 --- p.15 / Chapter 三、 --- 王葆玹：通過「言意之辨」探討魏晉人認識本體的方法 --- p.18 / Chapter 四、 --- 王曉毅：通過「言意之辨」探討魏晉人會通儒道之方法 --- p.20 / Chapter 五、 --- 檢討 --- p.23 / Chapter 第三章、 --- 哲學硏究角度的檢討 --- p.25 / Chapter 一、 --- 湯用彤：「言意之辨」對名士之立身行事亦有影響 --- p.25 / Chapter 二、 --- 近來之轉向：關於魏晉玄學的人生哲學硏究 --- p.27 / Chapter 三、 --- 人生哲學硏究角度的意義和困難 --- p.30 / Chapter 四、 --- 蔡振豐、沈順福與郭其才的嘗試 --- p.32 / Chapter 五、 --- 檢討 --- p.36 / Chapter 第四章、 --- 「言意之辨」與人生哲學的關係 --- p.39 / Chapter 一、 --- 「言意之辨」的討論背景 --- p.39 / Chapter 二、 --- 「言意之辨」的文獻解讀 --- p.45 / Chapter I. --- 「言意之辨」的重要槪念及主要問題 --- p.45 / Chapter II. --- 「言不盡意論」與「言盡意論」 --- p.50 / Chapter III. --- 「得意忘言論」 --- p.53 / Chapter 三、 --- 「言意之辨」與人生哲學的關係 --- p.55 / Chapter I. --- 由「聖人之意」的追尋說明人生哲學的關懷 --- p.55 / Chapter II. --- 魏晉「言意之辨」隱含理想生命的關懷 --- p.57 / Chapter 第五章、 --- 從「自我轉化」說「言意之辨」的人生哲學意義 --- p.60 / Chapter 一、 --- 中國哲學的主題是「自我轉化」 --- p.60 / Chapter 二、 --- 「言意之辨」隱含「自我轉化」的意思：境界的超昇 --- p.62 / Chapter I. --- 「玄遠」的追尋反映理想生命的構想 --- p.63 / Chapter II. --- 「忘言以得意」反映一種境界的超昇 --- p.68 / Chapter III. --- 由境界的超昇說明「自我轉化」的意義 --- p.73 / Chapter 第六章、 --- 從時代背景說「得意忘言」與「自我轉化」的關係 --- p.75 / Chapter 一、 --- 魏晉人所追尋的「自我轉化」及其所面對的困難 --- p.76 / Chapter I. --- 魏晉玄學以道家的理想作爲「自我轉化」的方向 --- p.76 / Chapter II. --- 追尋「道」所面對的困難：「言」與「道」難以相容的關係 --- p.80 / Chapter 二、 --- 「得意忘言」之提出與困難之克服 --- p.84 / Chapter I. --- 確立言說作爲工具的角色 --- p.84 / Chapter II. --- 指出「體悟」才是追尋「道」的途徑 --- p.86 / Chapter 三、 --- 「得意忘言」對魏晉名士的人生觀之影響 --- p.89 / Chapter I. --- 「得意忘言」在人生觀之體現：「得意忘形骸」 --- p.89 / Chapter II. --- 後人的評價及回應 --- p.91 / 餘論：「言意之辨」與佛教的傳入 --- p.96 / 參考書目 --- p.99 / 鳴謝 --- p.102

Linguists and philosophers of language have shown increasing interest in the expressions that refer to quantifiers: determiners like 'every' and 'many', in addition to determiner phrases like 'some king' and 'no cat'. This thesis addresses several puzzles where the way we understand quantifier expressions depends on features that go beyond standard truth conditional semantic meaning. One puzzle concerns the fact that it is often natural to understand 'Every king is in the yard' as being true if (say) all of the kings at the party are in the yard, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be true if and only if every king in the universe is in the yard. Another puzzle emerges from the observation that 'Every American king is in the yard' sounds odd relative to contexts where there are no American kings, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be trivially true. These puzzles have been widely discussed within linguistics and philosophy of language, and have implications for topics as diverse as the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and the ontological commitments of ordinary individuals. Yet few attempts have been made to incorporate discussions from the linguistics literature into the philosophical literature. This thesis argues that attending to the linguistics literature helps to address these puzzles. In particular, my solutions to these puzzles rely on notions from work on information structure, an often overlooked area of linguistics. I will use these notions to develop a new theory of the pragmatics of ordinary discourse, in the process of resolving the puzzles. In the first two chapters, I provide accessible overviews of key notions from the literature on quantifier expressions and information structure. In the third chapter, I discuss the problem of contextual domain restriction. In the fourth chapter, I consider the problems posed by empty restrictors. In the final chapter, I tackle the issue of category mistakes.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Graduate Theological Union, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 269-273). Also available on the Internet.