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La question centrale de cette étude est celle de savoir si les expériences perceptives peuvent être conçues comme des manières d’être réellement en contact avec le monde et si elles peuvent nous fournir des raisons d’entretenir certaines propositions à propos du monde, voire nous permettre d’acquérir des connaissances à son sujet. Cette compréhension intuitive de la perception est aujourd’hui comme hier largement combattue. Ce rejet passe généralement par l’adoption d’une forme ou d’une autre d’internalisme (de la perception et/ou de la justification et de la connaissance perceptive). Percevoir serait un phénomène purement ou essentiellement interne aux sujets dotés de capacités perceptives dont on pourrait douter qu’il puisse nous permettre de croire de manière justifiée ou de connaître quoi que ce soit. Peut-on éviter cette conclusion ? Peut-on apaiser les angoisses philosophiques qu’elle fait apparaître (sans pourtant affirmer y mettre fin ou encore qu’elles n’ont aucun sens) ? Tel est le but de cette étude. L’enquête philosophique proposée ici prend essentiellement trois formes: métaphysique, ontologique et épistémologique. Une investigation de la nature métaphysique de l’expérience perceptive est ensuite mise en œuvre. L’enjeu est alors de soutenir une forme assez robuste d’externalisme de la perception (Disjonctivisme métaphysique). De la nature de la perception, nous en venons dans une seconde partie à une réflexion ontologique sur la nature des propriétés avec lesquelles l’expérience perceptive nous met semble-t-il en contact. Le réalisme de la couleur est défendu contre diverses attaques antiréalistes. Les couleurs sont des propriétés réelles des choses auxquelles on les attribue correctement. Une ontologie réaliste, non réductive et non relationnelle des propriétés chromatiques est esquissée (Primitivisme de la couleur). Enfin, les enjeux épistémologiques de la perception sont mis en lumière et discutés. Nous défendons l’idée que l’expérience perceptive, en tant qu’elle nous met véritablement en contact avec le monde (objets, propriétés, faits, etc.), est un moyen par lequel certains êtres peuvent entretenir des croyances justifiées quoique cette justification soit non réflexive et prima facie. Différentes réponses aux attaques sceptiques contre la possibilité de connaître perceptivement certaines propositions sont enfin envisagées et rejetées. Une autre stratégie anti-sceptique est proposée (une défense néo-mooréenne de la possibilité de la connaissance perceptive, et une remise en cause du défi sceptique lui-même). Finalement, à la question philosophique classique « L’esprit peut-il réellement être en contact perceptif et cognitif avec le monde ? », rien ne nous force à répondre par la négative, que cette question soit abordée du point de vue de la métaphysique de la perception, d’un point de vue ontologique ou épistémologique. Du moins, c’est ce que notre étude cherche à montrer en soulignant à la fois qu’une réponse positive à cette question est parfaitement viable, voire correcte, et que la réponse négative a, quant à elle, toutes les chances d’être passablement erronée / The main topic of this study is to discuss the idea according to which perceptual experiences sould be conceive as ways of being in contact with the world and perceptual experiences can give reasons for believing some propositions about the world and can give rise to knowledge. Lots of philosophers countervail this intuitive and naive conception of perception. This rejection is linked to the fact that they adopt an internalist conception of perception and/or justication and/or perceptual knowledge. Perceiving sould be conceive as an purely internal event of subjects which possess perceptual capacities. And so, one may doubt that they can have justifications for their beliefs or that they can know anything. Is it possible to avoid this conclusion ? How to alleviate philosophical fear that this conclusion gives rise ? That is the aim of this study. The proposed philosophical inquiry comes in three forms. In the first place, indirect conception of perception is examined and criticized. Afterwards, an inquiry about the nature of perceptual experience is pursued. The stake for us is to defend a strong form of externalism about perception (metaphysical disjunctivism). Then, in the second part of this work, we get into an ontological reflexion about the nature of properties that perceptual experience seems to acquaintance us with. Color Realism is defended against various antirealist objections. Colors are or can be real properties of things. A realist, non redutive and non relationnal ontology for chromatic properties is sketched (color Primitivism). Lastly, the epistemological stakes of perception are underlined and examined. We defend the idea that perceptual experience is a mean by which certain beings can have justified beliefs although this justification is not reflexive and prima facie. It can be so if it's true that perceptual experience puts us in contact with the world (objects, properties, facts, etc.). We examine and reject different replies to skeptical attacks against the possibility of knowing anything. Then, another strategy is proposed (a morean defense of perceptual knowledge and the questioning of skeptical challenge itself). In fact, from an metaphysical, ontological or epistemological point of view, we don't have to give a negative reponse to the classical and philosophical question "Can mind be really in perceptual and cognitive contact with the world ?" or so we think. Indeed, our study underlines that a positive reply to this question is sustainable, not to say correct, and that the negative reponse is probably wrong

In this thesis I scavenge the history of philosophy for answers to the question ‘How are claims to knowledge justified?’. I argue that Plato’s psychological doctrine of knowledge marks the starting point of a philosophical inquiry motivated by the possibility to discover foundations of knowledge through investigating the nature of mind. At the core of this inquiry lies the hypothesis that if the psychological mechanisms that govern the capacity for knowledge acquisition is fully understood, then answers will follow about why judgements are true or false. The prospective result of the inquiry is a theory of universal epistemic justification which demarcates epistemically warranted beliefs from unwarranted beliefs. I suggest that there is a historically persistent case of cognitive dissonance within the epistemological enterprise — a tension between two of its central theses — which is caused by the persistence of the of the hitherto unsuccessful but ongoing quest for universal epistemic justification, and its inciting promises. The contradicting theses are those of certain justification (that one is justified in believing that p only if p is entailed by evidence) and proportional justification (that one is proportionally justified in believing that p to the extent that evidence makes p credible). I discuss the consequences of giving up one of the respective theses. I conclude that the thesis of certain justification cannot be given up unless an adequate theory of proportional justification is proposed, and that the legacy of searching for universal epistemic justification will continue unless epistemologists are able to construct one.

From 1947 to 1959 the late Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin lectured on several of the main philosophical problems of sense-perception. After his death, his former student, Mr. G.J. Warnock, working from Austin's lecture notes, published Austin's views on the philosophy of perception in a book entitled Sense and Sensibilia. Austin's purposes in lecturing on the philosophical problems of perception were entirely negative; his aim was to undermine a whole tradition in the philosophy of perception, namely that of sense-datum analysis. His method was that of careful and detailed piecemeal analysis of what he regarded as the chief doctrines, methods, assumptions, and implications inherent in and necessary to any sense-datum analysis. He is widely reputed to have succeeded in his aims, and his analysis of particular aspects of sense datum philosophy are highly regarded as models of philosophical analysis. The purpose of this thesis is to examine critically several of the most important parts of Austin's critique of sense-datum philosophy, especially his analysis of the sense-datist use of the Argument from Illusion, his analysis of perceptual locutions such as "looks," "seems," and "appears," and his analysis of the meaning of "real'' Austin's work is examined in the light of three critical questions, viz. (l) When it looks as if Austin is engaged in careful exposition of an opponent's position, is he fair to his opponent or does he distort it?, (2) Are the assumptions and implications of sense-datum theory which Austin tries to expose really what he says they are?, and (3) Even if Austin's analysis against a particular opponent is sound, is it relevant against sense-datum theory in general? The argument of the thesis seeks to establish four main points: (1) Many of Austin's criticisms of the sense-datist use of the Argument from Illusion rest upon misstatements of the sense-datist position, and thus miss their mark. Morover, even when Austin's criticisms have considerable merit, they are not decisive, but merely require some revision or reformulation of the sense-datists' arguments. (2) Austin's analysis of "looked," "seems," and "appears," while correct as far as it goes, is incomplete; it fails to tell the whole story as regards the uses of these locutions. Supplemented and completed, it is consistent with the sense-datum analysis of the meanings of these expressions. (3) Austin's analysis of "real" is partly correct and partly incorrect. Where correct, it is consistent with a sense-datum analysis of "real." Where wrong, Austin's analysis can be corrected in a manner which is consistent both with the correct parts of Austin's analysis of "real" and the sense-datum analysis. (4) Austin's analysis of "looks," "seems," and "appears" and of "real" are inconsistent with each other as they stand in the text. Supplemented and corrected, they are consistent with each other and with sense-datum theory. In the interstices of criticisms of Austin, many positive suggestions are made pointing to further development of sense-datum theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

The diploma thesis focuses on the usage of Business Intelligence for the analysis of the provided employee data. It describes the process of creating dashboards in the chosen Business Intelligence tools, compares them based on the defined criteria and chooses the most suitable tool. The diploma thesis also contains a description of an implementation process of the created solution and an economic evaluation including costs and benefits.

This thesis is an examination and evaluation of the development of Russell's theory of perception and its relation to the external world from 1905 to 1919. During this period Russell attempted a reductionist analysis of empirical knowledge, the foundations of which are sense-data with which we have direct acquaintance in perception. In the course of its development, Russell's theory of perception underwent considerable changes and modifications. I show that these changes and modifications do not seriously alter his main epistemological position which I identify as realism. The explicit treatment of Russell's realist theory of perception during the stipulated period had two clearly distinguishable subsidiary stages. The first stage, replacing his pre-"On Denoting" absolute realism, was between 1905 and 1912. Immediately after the publication of The Problems of Philosophy in 1912 there was a transitional period of scepticism which ultimately gave rise to the theory of logical construction. This period was between 1912 and 1919. These two stages represent what I take to be the periods of significant change and modification within Russell's realism. However, only during the first stage can Russell properly be called a committed representative realist. The first chapter introduces the issues to be addressed in this thesis. Chapters two and three cover the foundational aspects of Russell's theory of perception. In chapter two Russell's theory of acquaintance is thoroughly examined. The items discussed are the nature, objects and principle of acquaintance. I show that it is with regard to the objects of acquaintance that Russell's theory of acquaintance underwent considerable changes and revisions. I also present a detailed discussion of the principle of acquaintance and its role in Russell's epistemology, and suggest that it performs two important functions, one epistemological and the other semantical. Both of them are seen to run hand in hand. Chapter three is devoted to the doctrine of sense-data which, according to Russell, is the foundation of empirical knowledge during the stipulated period. Some obvious difficulties in interpreting sense-data are seen to disappear on closer inspection. I defend Russell from a certain arrount of misunderstanding regarding the sensibilia theory. I also trace and present the justification for a major modification of his notion of the judgment of perception from Principia Mathematica volume I to The Problems of Philosophy and from The Problems of Philosophy to subsequent works. It is suggested that such a modification is required for the internal consistency of Russell's theory of perception. Chapters four and five are devoted to the relation of perception to our knowledge of the external world. In chapter four the Problems of Philosophy view of the existence and nature of physical objects is investigated. I explain why Russell was right to hold that the naive realist's view is contradictory. I also show that after rejecting naive realism Russell explicitly coornitted himself to representative realism by holding a causal theory of perception. It is also shown that the episterrological dimension of the theory of descriptions allows him to overcome restrictions arising from the principle of acquaintance. The last part of this chapter explains the transition between Russell's preconstructionist and constructionist approaches to the relation of perception to physical objects. I show conclusively that Russell became a constructionist as early as 1912. In chapter five the construction of physical objects is discussed. The emphasis is placed on Russell's episte11Dlo:;ical motivation for such construction. I defend much of what Russell says about sensibilia and argue that the inclusion of unsensed sensibilia in construction violates neither the spirit of logical construction nor Occam's razor. I also defend Russell from the charge of phenomenalism. I argue that his constructionism does not comnit him to phenomenalism and that he always remained a realist. Chapter six examines the construction of space and time. I concede that Russell's attempt to construct a six-dimensional space is a failure but suggest that he does not need a six-dimensional space to give an account to the problem of perception. Regarding the construction of time, I show that Russell is for the most part correct in his construction of instants out of experienced events. In chapter seven I evaluate Russell's theory of perception. I show that Russell is neither completely consistent nor successful in his construction of physical objects. At the same time, I show that there is a consistency of purpose and direction which motivated Russell to introduce logical constructions. The purpose was to secure empirical knowledge from possible sceptical attack and to strike a compromise between his realism and his empiricism. The direction is towards the goal of establishing a bridge between perception and physics. I suggest that the constructionist view is a better approach towards, and a viable solution to, the problem of perception. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This dissertation concerns the location and nature of phenomenal qualities. Arguably, these qualities naively seem to belong to perceived external objects. However, we also seem to experience phenomenal qualities in hallucinations, and in hallucinations we do not perceive any external objects. I present and argue for a theory of the phenomenal qualities, "brain theory", which claims that all phenomenal qualities we experience are physical properties instantiated in the brain, regardless of whether they are experienced in veridical perceptions or in hallucinations. I begin by more carefully identifying the phenomenal qualities, discussing how they are related to "qualia" and "phenomenal character". Then I present brain theory, and investigate its implications for the perceptual relations we stand in to external objects, noting that it is mostly neutral. I also compare brain theory to a similar theory of perception advocated by Bertrand Russell. Next, I provide an overview over the competing theories of phenomenal qualities, and relate them to theories of perception, such as representationalism, qualia theory, sense data theory and disjunctivism. The majority of my argumentation for brain theory focuses on arguing that the phenomenal qualities are instantiated in the brain, rather than on arguing that they are physical properties. Instead, I largely assume physicalism. However, even independently of the physicalism assumption, I show that we have reason to believe that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations, and that qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects, such as our brains or sense data. In the first step towards this conclusion I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations face serious problems. In the next step I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects face serious problems. Finally, an important part of the argumentation is my replies to objections against brain theory, including common sense objections and the "observation objection". From these conclusions, together with the physicalism assumption, I infer that we have reason to believe that brain theory is true about hallucinations. On this basis, I then argue, through a generalizing argument, that the same is the case for veridical perceptions.