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David Hume argues that reflections upon public utility explain the psychological foundations of justice and the moral feelings attendant on it. Adam Smith objects that Hume’s theory of justice is psychologically implausible. A just punishment attracts the approval of every citizen on Hume’s alleged view. Not every citizen can consider the abstract public interest every time, Smith observes, so Hume can’t have explained all of justice. I argue, in response, that Smith’s objection has not accounted for all of the causal processes that Hume draws upon in support of reflections upon public utility. Conventions establish the very possibility of public interest, and socializing processes lend the public interest its moral salience. Human nature includes a species-general passion for acquiring property for the sake of family. The motivational centrality and universal scope of this passion, coupled with the dramatic psychological power of sympathy, generates the first moral feelings. Social conditioning develops those feelings into attitudes about reward and punishment. Hume’s theory of justice, with his conjectures about sociocultural processes, is both psychologically plausible and more complex than commentators tend to appreciate.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-10-16T14:04:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MATHEUS DE MESQUITA SILVEIRA_.pdf: 3195256 bytes, checksum: 93215bf3d853defd937188616055e161 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-10-16T14:04:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MATHEUS DE MESQUITA SILVEIRA_.pdf: 3195256 bytes, checksum: 93215bf3d853defd937188616055e161 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-28 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / Esta tese visa apresentar uma visão “sentimentalista-evolucionista” do comportamento moral, a fim de defender que os vínculos emocionais propiciados pela empatia constituem a base da moralidade. O argumento parte do conceito de moral adotado por Adriano Naves de Brito, a partir do trabalho de Ernst Tugendhat, para quem a moral é uma relação de exigências recíprocas presente em pequenos grupos. Minha proposta é alargar essa concepção de modo a abarcar não só seres humanos, mas também mamíferos de vida social complexa. A investigação do fundamento motivacional da moralidade será feita a partir dos escritos de David Hume, para quem as emoções representam, em última instância, a fonte que inclina os indivíduos a aprovar e censurar ações. Uma tese de proposta naturalista precisa compatibilizar sua base teórica com conceitos centrais do evolucionismo. Por esse motivo, a leitura desses autores e os argumentos desenvolvidos no decorrer dessa investigação estarão enraizados em conceitos centrais da teoria evolucionista, conforme proposta por Charles Darwin. Considerando a importância que as emoções e a empatia possuem na discussão metaética sobre o comportamento moral, é necessário explicá-las a partir de uma conceptualização naturalista. A discussão entre o construtivismo social e a psicologia evolucionista é relevante a essa questão. Utilizarei estudos sobre a fisiologia das emoções socialmente relevantes da culpa, vergonha e raiva, para defender um fundamento biológico para as mesmas. Considerando que um efeito não possui uma natureza diferente de sua causa, demonstrar que elas são expressas e reconhecidas de maneira inata é um forte argumento em favor da defesa de sua origem natural. Contudo, ainda que sejam expressas e reconhecidas de maneira inata, é preciso que os indivíduos não sejam indiferentes à sua manifestação. Mecanismos psicobiológicos de sociabilidade consistem nos candidatos ideais para explicar a vinculação emocional inerente a pequenos grupo e central a moralidade explicada em bases naturais compatíveis com a teoria evolucionista. Caso seja possível explicar os elementos constituintes dos comportamentos normativos em moldes “sentimentalista-evolucionista”, então se obterá um real avanço no projeto mais amplo de naturalização da moral. / This dissertation aims to present a “sentimentalist-evolutionist” view of moral behavior, in order to argue that the emotional bonds elicited by empathy constitute the ground of morality. The argument starts from the concept of morals adopted by Adriano Naves de Brito, from Ernst Tugendhat's work, for whom morality is a relation of reciprocal demands presents in small groups. My proposal is to extend this concept in order to include not only human beings, but also mammals with complex social lives. The investigation of the motivational foundation of morality will be done from the writings of David Hume, for whom emotions ultimately represent the bases that lean individuals to approve or censor actions. A dissertation with a naturalistic proposal needs compatibilize its theoretical base with central concepts of evolutionism. Therefore, the reading of these authors and the arguments developed in the course of this investigation will be rooted in central concepts of the evolutionist theory, as proposed by Charles Darwin. Considering the importance that emotions and empathy have in the metaethical discussions about moral behavior, it is necessary to explain them from a naturalistic conceptualization. The debate between social constructivism and evolutionist psychology is relevant to this question. I will use studies on the physiology of socially relevant emotions of guilt, shame and anger, in order to defend its biological bases. Considering that an effect does not have a different nature of its cause, to show that emotions are expressed and recognized innately is a strong argument in the defense of its natural origin. However, even if emotions are expressed and recognized innately, it is important that individuals do not be indifferent toward its manifestation. Mechanisms psychobiological of sociability consists in an ideal candidate to explain the emotional bond inherent to small groups and central to a morality, explained in natural bases and compatible with evolutionist’s theories. In case one can explain the elements of normative behaviors in the ways of a “sentimentalist-evolutionist” approach, then it will obtain a real advance in the wider project of naturalization of morality.

Perhaps no melody in the country music canon has been as widely recognized and borrowed from as that of the song “The Great Speckled Bird.” This significant song has become resonant and representative of both country music culture and religious culture of the Protestant South. Through this historiographical study, I have traced the influences that helped shape “The Great Speckled Bird” and in so doing have illustrated distinct movements that led to popularizing the non-secular song through commercial country music. The composer’s use of sentimentality, neo- traditionalism, and religious ideas made it appealing to a rural southern culture struggling with the social, racial, and economic changes of the early twentieth century. As I develop and explore the diverse influences that helped to shape “The Great Speckled Bird,” I will illustrate the interconnectedness of country music culture and the wider popular and religious cultures of the white Protestant South.

This thesis approaches Thomas Pynchon's novel, Mason & Dixon, in terms of its narrative structure and sentimental content. Pynchon is generally regarded as a challenging and innovative writer, so narrative is an unsurprising subject for a study of his most recent work; sentimentalism, on the other hand, is a far cry from traditional approaches to his writing. Despite this, however, as I outline in my introduction, sentimentalism has long hovered around the edges of Pynchon's work. In Mason & Dixon it takes a privileged role as the dominating mood of the novel's final section, "Last Transit." This sentimentalism, far from being the retrogressive move that the term might imply, is bound up in a radically reconceived approach to the narrating voice of novelistic discourse, whence comes the unifying feature of my study. In Mason & Dixon, I identify this unity in the novel's referencing of film, long-established as one of Pynchon's major cultural influences. In my first chapter, I outline my approach to sentimentalism and narrative-in the modern and, specifically, modernist novel, as well as in contemporary film. In chapter two I outline my conception of Mason & Dixon's narrator as emulating film's visual representations; in chapter three, I explore this narrator as a "radically underdetermined" identity, who represents, not a linguistically embodied subjectivity, but rather representation as its own agent, as representation itself. In my fourth and final chapter, I examine how this narrator manages the sentimental content of the novel, concentrating on the character of Mason.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 196-210).

Inaug. Diss.--Heidelberg. / Bibliography: p. 132-136.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 16, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 302-329).

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta dissertação objetiva descrever e analisar criticamente o conceito de justiça no contexto da filosofia moral de David Hume. Com o propósito de fornecer uma explicação completa e consistente de sua teoria da justiça, pretende-se, em primeiro lugar, apresentar a teoria moral sentimentalista de Hume e explicar de que forma sua concepção de justiça se associa com os princípios fundamentais da moralidade. O primeiro capítulo da dissertação consiste, primeiramente, em uma breve exposição do problema do livre-arbítrio e do determinismo e, em segundo lugar, na apresentação da alternativa compatibilista de Hume. Conforme se pretende demonstrar ao longo deste capítulo, a estratégia da solução compatibilista de Hume deve necessariamente envolver a noção de sentimento moral, cujo conceito é central em seu sistema moral. Em seguida, no segundo capítulo, será examinada a teoria moral de Hume, a qual se estrutura em duas hipóteses principais: a tese negativa que contesta a ideia de que o fundamento da moralidade se baseie exclusivamente nas operações da razão (relações de ideias e questões de fato); e a tese positiva que afirma que a fonte da moralidade reside em nossas paixões, sentimentos e afetos de prazer e dor ao contemplarmos caracteres virtuosos e viciosos. O terceiro capítulo visa apresentar a teoria da justiça de Hume, objeto principal desta dissertação. A hipótese central que Hume sugere é que a virtude da justiça não é instintiva ou natural nos seres humanos. Ela é possível unicamente por intermédio de acordos, convenções e artifícios humanos motivados pelo auto-interesse. A tese de Hume é exatamente que a origem da justiça, enquanto uma convenção social, só pode ser explicada com base em dois fatores: a atuação dos sentimentos de nossa disposição interna e a circunstância externa caracterizada pela escassez relativa de bens materiais. Finalmente, o último capítulo desta dissertação visa discutir a teoria política de Hume com o propósito de complementar sua teoria da justiça. Hume defende que a justificação da instituição da autoridade soberana e dos deveres civis se funda nos mesmos princípios da convenção de justiça: eles também são artifícios criados exclusivamente para servir ao nosso próprio interesse. / This dissertation aims to describe and critically analyze the concept of justice in the context of David Humes moral philosophy. In order to provide a complete and consistent account of his theory of justice, I intend to present Humes sentimentalist moral theory and explain how his conception of justice relates with the fundamental principles of morality. The first chapter of the dissertation consists, in first place, in a short exposition of the problem of free-will and determinism and, in second place, in a presentation of Humes compatibilist alternative. As I intend to show throughout the chapter, the strategy of Humes compatibilist solution should necessarily involve the notion of moral sentiment, whose concept is central in his moral system. Then, in the second chapter it will be examined Humes moral theory, which is structured in two main hypotheses: the negative thesis that rejects the idea that the foundation of morality is based exclusively on the operations of reason (relations of ideas and matters of facts); and the positive thesis that affirms that the source of morality lies in our passions, sentiments and affections of pleasure and pain when we contemplate virtuous and vicious characters. The third chapter aims to present Humes theory of justice, the main subject of this dissertation. The central hypothesis advanced by Hume is that the virtue of justice is not instinctive or natural in the human beings. It is only possible through human agreements, conventions and artifices motivated by self-interest. Humes thesis is precisely that the origin of justice, as a social convention, can be only explained based on two factors: the operation of the sentiments of our internal disposition and the external circumstances of relative scarcity of material goods. Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation aims to discuss Humes political theory in order to supplement his theory of justice. Hume claims that the justification of the institution of the sovereign authority and the civil obligations are grounded in the same principles held in the convention of justice: they are also artifices created solely to serve our own interests.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta dissertação objetiva descrever e analisar criticamente o conceito de justiça no contexto da filosofia moral de David Hume. Com o propósito de fornecer uma explicação completa e consistente de sua teoria da justiça, pretende-se, em primeiro lugar, apresentar a teoria moral sentimentalista de Hume e explicar de que forma sua concepção de justiça se associa com os princípios fundamentais da moralidade. O primeiro capítulo da dissertação consiste, primeiramente, em uma breve exposição do problema do livre-arbítrio e do determinismo e, em segundo lugar, na apresentação da alternativa compatibilista de Hume. Conforme se pretende demonstrar ao longo deste capítulo, a estratégia da solução compatibilista de Hume deve necessariamente envolver a noção de sentimento moral, cujo conceito é central em seu sistema moral. Em seguida, no segundo capítulo, será examinada a teoria moral de Hume, a qual se estrutura em duas hipóteses principais: a tese negativa que contesta a ideia de que o fundamento da moralidade se baseie exclusivamente nas operações da razão (relações de ideias e questões de fato); e a tese positiva que afirma que a fonte da moralidade reside em nossas paixões, sentimentos e afetos de prazer e dor ao contemplarmos caracteres virtuosos e viciosos. O terceiro capítulo visa apresentar a teoria da justiça de Hume, objeto principal desta dissertação. A hipótese central que Hume sugere é que a virtude da justiça não é instintiva ou natural nos seres humanos. Ela é possível unicamente por intermédio de acordos, convenções e artifícios humanos motivados pelo auto-interesse. A tese de Hume é exatamente que a origem da justiça, enquanto uma convenção social, só pode ser explicada com base em dois fatores: a atuação dos sentimentos de nossa disposição interna e a circunstância externa caracterizada pela escassez relativa de bens materiais. Finalmente, o último capítulo desta dissertação visa discutir a teoria política de Hume com o propósito de complementar sua teoria da justiça. Hume defende que a justificação da instituição da autoridade soberana e dos deveres civis se funda nos mesmos princípios da convenção de justiça: eles também são artifícios criados exclusivamente para servir ao nosso próprio interesse. / This dissertation aims to describe and critically analyze the concept of justice in the context of David Humes moral philosophy. In order to provide a complete and consistent account of his theory of justice, I intend to present Humes sentimentalist moral theory and explain how his conception of justice relates with the fundamental principles of morality. The first chapter of the dissertation consists, in first place, in a short exposition of the problem of free-will and determinism and, in second place, in a presentation of Humes compatibilist alternative. As I intend to show throughout the chapter, the strategy of Humes compatibilist solution should necessarily involve the notion of moral sentiment, whose concept is central in his moral system. Then, in the second chapter it will be examined Humes moral theory, which is structured in two main hypotheses: the negative thesis that rejects the idea that the foundation of morality is based exclusively on the operations of reason (relations of ideas and matters of facts); and the positive thesis that affirms that the source of morality lies in our passions, sentiments and affections of pleasure and pain when we contemplate virtuous and vicious characters. The third chapter aims to present Humes theory of justice, the main subject of this dissertation. The central hypothesis advanced by Hume is that the virtue of justice is not instinctive or natural in the human beings. It is only possible through human agreements, conventions and artifices motivated by self-interest. Humes thesis is precisely that the origin of justice, as a social convention, can be only explained based on two factors: the operation of the sentiments of our internal disposition and the external circumstances of relative scarcity of material goods. Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation aims to discuss Humes political theory in order to supplement his theory of justice. Hume claims that the justification of the institution of the sovereign authority and the civil obligations are grounded in the same principles held in the convention of justice: they are also artifices created solely to serve our own interests.