The legality of pre-emptive self-defence The Master's thesis deals with one of the key issues of current international law, the right to pre-emptive self-defence. The work is divided into six parts, including introduction, four chapters and conclusion. After an introductory part the first chapter deals with the sources of international laws regulating the right to self-defence, their system and the way in which they interact with each other. This chapter seeks to analyse the impact of those sources on the development of right to pre-emptive self-defence. The main attention is devoted to the primary and secondary sources of international law regulating the right to self-defence, such as the U.N. Charter, customary international law, the judicial decisions of the International Court of Justice and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. The second chapter first focuses on the concept of classical self-defence. It then goes on to examine the two traditional doctrinal approaches to the interpretation of the scope of the right to self-defence, the restrictive school of thoughts and the extensive school of thoughts. The next chapter relates to the prohibition of the use of force under international law. The last chapter first analyses the concept of pre-emptive self-defence from the...

Jus cogens is a mysterious body of international law. It comprises legal standards which are thought to be superior to those in ordinary international law, namely, international treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law. The title of this study 'Conflicts with Jus Cogens in International Lawa' condenses its main aims. The study examines conflict-situations between jus cogens rules and rules of ordinary international law. The study is divided into four Parts. Part I clarifies what jus cogens status means and how jus cogens rules are made. Part II analyses some of the different ways in which legal rules come into conflict with each other. I seek to push the boundaries of our understanding of legal conflict, and I also construct a typology of legal conflict. In Part III, I apply the analysis of conflict in Part II to the jus cogens context by identifying and classifying situations where rules of ordinary international conflict with jus cogens rules. Finally, Part IV explores the consequences of the conflicts with jus cogens which were identified in Part III. What we see is that the consequences of these conflicts are varied. Most strikingly, however, we find that in some cases jus cogens rules are being defeated by rules of ordinary international law. This challenges the orthodox thinking that jus cogens rules are straightforwardly superior to ordinary international law, in the sense that they always prevail in conflict-situations. But while the conclusion of the study may seem radical, it is informed by theoretical writing about law and about how rules conflict. Ultimately, the study seeks to improve our understanding of jus cogens rules in international law, as well as the more general problem of how legal rules conflict with each other.

L'opposabilité est fondée sur le consentement des Etats. Il est le critère essentiel de la notion d'opposabilité définie comme le produit de la mise en œuvre subjective du critère volontariste. Par ailleurs, les sources conventionnelle, coutumière et unilatérale du droit international sont opposables aux Etats en vertu de leur acceptation. Toutefois, sa place varie au sein des diverses sources, ce qui engendre une adaptation de l'opposabilité. L'apparition de concepts tels que communauté internationale, personnalité objective, législation internationale ou succession automatique n'a pas remis en cause le fondement volontariste de l'opposabilité. Il semble néanmoins que ce critère soit concurrencé par des éléments objectifs dans le cas de traités établissant des régimes territoriaux. Il faudrait ainsi imaginer une émergence – très limitée – de l'objectivation de l'opposabilité. L'objectivation, sans être véritablement consacrée, serait peut-être in statu nascendi. / Opposability is based on States' consent. Consent is the essential criterion of opposability which is defined as the result of the subjective implementation of the voluntarist criterion. Moreover, the conventional, customary and unilateral sources of international law are opposable to States by virtue of their acceptance. However, its role changes among the different sources, causing an adaptation of opposability. The appearance of concepts such as international community, objective personality, international legislation or automatic succession hasn't jeopardized the voluntarist basis of opposability. Nevertheless, it seems that consent is challenged by objective foundations in the case where treaties establishing territorial regimes. Thus we should imagine a very limited emergence of opposability's objectivization. That objectivization, without being actually established, would be perhaps in statu nascendi.

Refugiados ambientais são refugiados não convencionais e são migrantes forçados, interna ou internacionalmente, temporária ou permanentemente, em situação de vulnerabilidade e que se veem obrigados a deixar sua morada habitual por motivos ambientais de início lento ou de início rápido, causados por motivos naturais, antropogênicos ou pela combinação de ambos. Embora não existam reconhecimento e proteção específica para esses migrantes no direito internacional em escala global, alguns instrumentos jurídicos regionais e leis nacionais assim o fazem. Argumenta-se, nesta tese de doutorado, que os refugiados ambientais possuem modos de proteção geral em certas áreas do direito internacional e que as possibilidades atuais e futuras de proteção específica podem ser encontradas nas fontes primárias do direito internacional, indicadas no artigo 38(1) do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça. Foram identificadas sete vias de proteção dos refugiados ambientais no direito internacional e no direito interno estatal: (i) a via da ação humanitária, (ii) a via da proteção complementar, (iii) a via da legislação nacional, (iv) a via da justiça climática, (v) a via da responsabilidade compartilhada, (vi) a via da judicialização do refúgio ambiental e (vii) a via do tratado internacional. Sugere-se, ainda, o estabelecimento de uma governança migratória-ambiental global baseada nos regimes internacionais e na ação dos atores nos níveis local, nacional, regional e internacional para a execução das formas de proteção e para o atendimento das necessidades dos refugiados ambientais no mundo. / \"Environmental refugees\" are non-conventional refugees and forced migrants, internally or internationally, temporarily or permanently, in a situation of vulnerability, and that are forced to leave their homes for environmental reasons, of slow or rapid onset, caused by natural or anthropogenic reasons, or a combination of both. Although there is no specific recognition and protection to these migrants under international law on a global scale, some regional legal instruments and national laws recognize and protect them. The main argument of this doctoral thesis is that \"environmental refugees\" are under general protection in certain areas of international law and that the current and future possibilities for specific protection can be found in the primary sources of international law, referred to in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Seven protective pathways for \"environmental refugees\" were identified in international law and in domestic law: by means of (i) humanitarian action, (ii) complementary protection, (iii) national law, (iv) climate justice, (v) shared responsibility, (vi) judicialization of environmental asylum, and (vii) the international treaty. It is also suggested that a comprehensive global environmental migration governance be established, based on international regimes and by action of actors at local, national, regional and international levels, for the implementation of the forms of protection and to meet the needs of \"environmental refugees\" worldwide.

Refugiados ambientais são refugiados não convencionais e são migrantes forçados, interna ou internacionalmente, temporária ou permanentemente, em situação de vulnerabilidade e que se veem obrigados a deixar sua morada habitual por motivos ambientais de início lento ou de início rápido, causados por motivos naturais, antropogênicos ou pela combinação de ambos. Embora não existam reconhecimento e proteção específica para esses migrantes no direito internacional em escala global, alguns instrumentos jurídicos regionais e leis nacionais assim o fazem. Argumenta-se, nesta tese de doutorado, que os refugiados ambientais possuem modos de proteção geral em certas áreas do direito internacional e que as possibilidades atuais e futuras de proteção específica podem ser encontradas nas fontes primárias do direito internacional, indicadas no artigo 38(1) do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça. Foram identificadas sete vias de proteção dos refugiados ambientais no direito internacional e no direito interno estatal: (i) a via da ação humanitária, (ii) a via da proteção complementar, (iii) a via da legislação nacional, (iv) a via da justiça climática, (v) a via da responsabilidade compartilhada, (vi) a via da judicialização do refúgio ambiental e (vii) a via do tratado internacional. Sugere-se, ainda, o estabelecimento de uma governança migratória-ambiental global baseada nos regimes internacionais e na ação dos atores nos níveis local, nacional, regional e internacional para a execução das formas de proteção e para o atendimento das necessidades dos refugiados ambientais no mundo. / \"Environmental refugees\" are non-conventional refugees and forced migrants, internally or internationally, temporarily or permanently, in a situation of vulnerability, and that are forced to leave their homes for environmental reasons, of slow or rapid onset, caused by natural or anthropogenic reasons, or a combination of both. Although there is no specific recognition and protection to these migrants under international law on a global scale, some regional legal instruments and national laws recognize and protect them. The main argument of this doctoral thesis is that \"environmental refugees\" are under general protection in certain areas of international law and that the current and future possibilities for specific protection can be found in the primary sources of international law, referred to in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Seven protective pathways for \"environmental refugees\" were identified in international law and in domestic law: by means of (i) humanitarian action, (ii) complementary protection, (iii) national law, (iv) climate justice, (v) shared responsibility, (vi) judicialization of environmental asylum, and (vii) the international treaty. It is also suggested that a comprehensive global environmental migration governance be established, based on international regimes and by action of actors at local, national, regional and international levels, for the implementation of the forms of protection and to meet the needs of \"environmental refugees\" worldwide.

Lors des travaux de la Commission du droit international relatifs aux actes unilatéraux des États, le rapporteur spécial a nié que le silence puisse être qualifié de manifestation de la volonté étatique. Rien dans la théorie de l’acte juridique ne justifie pourtant cette position. L’étude de la pratique révèle en outre que, selon les cas, le silence étatique peut être qualifié de refus ou d’acquiescement et qu’il joue un rôle fondamental dans la formation, l’interprétation ou la modification des rapports de droit interétatiques. En effet, dans la mesure où, en droit international, il revient aux États d’apprécier le bien-fondé ou la légalité du comportement de leurs pairs, l’objectif de la sécurité juridique impose de retenir la pertinence légale de leur silence. Cet objectif, sous ses diverses facettes, constitue la raison d’être de l’attribution d’un effet légal au silence et permet ainsi une systématisation des hypothèses très variées où il pèse sur les États une « charge de réagir ». Selon la situation face à laquelle il est appréhendé, le silence permet ainsi d’assurer la détermination actuelle ou future des rapports de droit.L’étude des conditions nécessaires à la production de l’effet attribué au silence révèle par ailleurs que le droit positif consacre la possibilité théorique d’y voir un acte juridique. Pour que son silence produise des effets, le droit international exige toujours que l’État ait été libre de réagir et qu’il ait eu connaissance de la situation qui le rendait pertinent. En outre, les régimes de la preuve de la connaissance et de l’existence du silence ne justifient pas nécessairement la dénonciation du caractère honteusement fictif de l’explication volontariste des phénomènes en cause. Il n’y a, en toute hypothèse, aucune fiction juridique à qualifier le silence en tant qu’acte juridique / . During the work of the International Law Commission regarding Unilateral Acts of States, the Special Rapporteur denied that State’s silence could be qualified as a manifestation of its will. Nevertheless,no theoretical reason justifies this position. The study of the practice reveals more over that, as the casemay be, State’s silence can be qualified as refusal or as acquiescence and that it plays a fundamental role in the formation, the interpretation or the modification of legal interstate relations. Indeed, since it is the State’s prerogative to appreciate the legality of the behavior of others States, legal certainty imposes to hold the legal relevance of their silence. Under its diverse facets, this objective constitutes the raison d’être of the effect attributed to silence and thus allows a systematization of the various hypothesis in which it is taken into account. Depending on the situation to which it reacts, silence ensures the current or future determination of legal relations. Furthermore, the study of the conditions necessary for the production of the silence’s effects reveals that positive law consecrates the theoretical possibility of qualifying silence as a legal act. International law requires, in order toattribute an effect to silence, that the silent State was free to react and had knowledge of the situation that made his silence legally relevant. Moreover, the rules governing the proof of the knowledge and of the existence of silence do not necessarily justify the criticism towards the fictive character of the voluntarist explanation of the phenomena. There is, in any event, no legal fiction in qualifying silenceas a legal act.