US economic recession from 2007- 2009, also known as the Great Recession, negatively impacted the financial sector as well as other aspects of society. Researchers have found value-based measures and accounting measures as effective performance measures, but they have found inconclusive results when comparing the strengths of economic value added (EVA) and accounting measures in predicting stock performance. This study used data from the Great Recession to further compare EVA and accounting measures. The purpose of this cross-sectional or correlational study was to determine the relative predictive strength of EVA during the Great Recession to determine whether a model with EVA added to accounting measures did a better job predicting stock returns. Secondary were data collected from a sample of 93 Fortune 500 Companies from 2007-2009 and then analyzed via multivariate regression analysis. The null hypothesis was not rejected. The result showed that EVA was not a useful addition to accounting variables in predicting stock returns during the Great Recession. Although the findings did not support EVA as a better predictor of stock returns during the Great Recession, the study revealed useful information about value-based measures and value-creation, especially how they are impacted by the period of a severe economic downturn. Researchers have indicated that creating value for shareholders enables the funding of positive-net-present-value projects that would result in positive social change. This study revealed that firms are unlikely to create shareholder value through returns on investment for a positive social change in unfavorable economic conditions.

In the first essay titled "Shareholder Coordination, Information Diffusion and Stock Returns", we show that the quality of information sharing networks linking firms' institutional investors has stock return predictability implications. First, we demonstrate that firms with high shareholder coordination experience less local comovement and less post earnings announcement drift, consistent with the notion that coordination improves firms' information environment. We then document that the stock return performance of firms with high shareholder coordination leads that of firms with low shareholder coordination, supporting the view that coordination acts as an information diffusion channel. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that the market does not readily recognize the superior quality of high shareholder coordination firms and prices it gradually through the trading of sophisticated institutional investors, thereby causing future returns to be positively associated with shareholder coordination. In the second essay titled "Shareholder Coordination and Stock Price Informativeness", we find that stock prices of firms with better information sharing networks linking institutional shareholders exhibit higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. This positive relation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness is mainly driven by coordination among dedicated and independent institutions and exists even after accounting for endogeneity. We further show that institutional trading serves as an information diffusion channel that strengthens the relationship of shareholder coordination with price informativeness. Overall, our results indicate that a higher degree of shareholder coordination leads to more informative stock prices by encouraging the collection of and trading on private information.

There is a renewed interest in further exploring the significance of culture to the accounting disclosure model in view of a highly competitive global business environment. To date, there is no empirical research to investigate this issue with respect to a specific industry, namely banking. There are three main reasons for focusing only on the banking industry (Hooi 2004). First, it is considered to be the most important industry for the country’s economic and financial stability. Moreover, the IASB has recognised its significance by issuing unique accounting standards i.e. IAS30, IAS32 and IAS39. Second, Saidenberg and Schuermann (2003) argue that with the scope and complexity of Basel II, it provides opportunities for researching issues through Pillar 3. Third, with national banking systems being non-homogenous, it is important to investigate the effects of national culture because prior research has argued that cultural differences have partly explained international differences in disclosure framework of accounting systems. The purpose of this study is to apply and extend Gray’s (1988) theoretical framework of national culture with respect to four research questions. First, to contribute to Gray’s (1988) theory of cultural influence on international banking disclosures. Second, to investigate the possible significance of investor protection to the banking disclosure model. Third, to explore Gray’s (1988) theory on the relationship of national culture to capital market research using banking returns. Fourth, to investigate the value relevance of investor protection and banking disclosures to the returns model. Seventeen developed and developing countries with a representative sample of 37 listed domestic commercial banks were examined in 2004. For the disclosure model, the study finds that national culture is a significant factor in the banking industry. Individualism has been found as the primary cultural dimension for banking disclosures. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model significantly improves with the legal dimensions of common law and anti-director rights. The positive association between common law and banking disclosures is consistent with La Porta et al. (1998) which argue that common law countries with stronger investor protection are more transparent than civil law countries. However, there is a negative association between investor protection variable of anti-director rights with banking disclosures. This may suggest that investor protection does not encourage minority investors to enter the stock market specifically in the global banking industry. This situation may lead to a lack of demand for transparency through a smaller dispersion of ownership across the domestic banks. For the returns model, the study finds that national culture is value relevant in the banking industry. Collectivism and power distance have been found to be the two primary cultural dimensions for banking returns. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model significantly improves with anti-director rights and banking disclosures. These results are (1) consistent with La Porta et al. (2002) which argue that investor protection increases firm valuation with respect to Tobin’s Q and (2) international investors tend to support the Basel Committee’s commitment in providing a more transparent framework by implementing Pillar 3 in the near future, starting with the Basel member countries. Finally, an interesting finding from the study is that firm size has a negative association with banking returns.

<p>This paper discusses the indicators of financial success for Swedish companies from 1995 until 2005. Quarterly data on 42 Swedish companies were collected from the Datastream data base and analysed by using both portfolio analyses and parametric analysis. In this study, financial success is measured by using the acclaimed concepts of the Sharpe ratio and the Jensen’s Alpha. The Sharpe ratios of the companies are studied between 1995-2005 and this discussion is complemented by analysis of the Jensen’s Alpha in the second half of that time period i.e. 2000-2005. The relationship between these performance metrics and certain company-characteristics such as the book-to-market ratio, the ROA measure and capital structure is studied. The conclusion is that companies that have a high degree of profitability and maintain high book-to-market ratios outperform other companies in terms of generating excess returns to shareholders. Another interesting observation is the fact that company size does not have any significant relationship to company performance.</p>

This study investigates the settlement period, including payment delays and failed deliveries that occur during the processing of U.S. equity transactions, and its effects on observed stock prices. Payment and delivery occur three to six calendar days after the trade date in the standard three business day settlement cycle, referred to as T+3. First, the buyer benefits from a payment delay, during which time he can earn interest on the cash needed to settle the trade. Since the seller has no analogous opportunity, I anticipated that the cost of the payment delay would be reflected in equity prices at a rate equivalent to the risk-free rate over the settlement period in ordinary circumstances and at a higher rate during financial market crises if sellers believe they may not be paid on time. Using CRSP daily market index returns from 1995 through 2009, I measured the cost of this delay to be approximately three to five times the risk-free rate, proxied by the effective Fed funds rate. These results suggest that buyers are forced to compensate sellers at rates greater than I expected during normal conditions. Second, the risk of failed delivery may also affect security prices if market participants expect that sellers will not deliver securities on time. A failed delivery effectively becomes a forward transaction. I predicted that buyers compensate sellers at the risk-free rate over the extended settlement period. This compensation would be in addition to the normal payment delay and directly related to the probability of failed delivery; thus, I added SEC Regulation SHO daily failed deliveries data, available from 2004 through 2009, to the model with payment delays. By constructing a proxy for the change in probability of failure from aggregated fails and market volume, I found that buyers compensate sellers over the lengthened settlement period due to failed deliveries at a rate of approximately 11 basis points daily for an increase in the likelihood of failure of one percentage point.

Persistence of stock returns is an extensively studied and discussed theme in the analysis of financial markets. Antipersistence is usually attributed to volatilities. However, not only volatilities but also stock returns can exhibit antipersistence. Antipersistent noise has a somewhat rougher appearance than Gaussian noise. Heuristically spoken, price movements are more likely followed by movements in the opposite direction than in the same direction. The pertaining integrated process exhibits a smaller range – prices seem to stay in the vicinity of the initial value. We apply a widely used test based upon the modified R/S-Method by Lo [1991] to daily returns of 21 German stocks from 1960 to 2008. Combining this test with the concept of moving windows by Carbone et al. [2004], we are able to determine periods of antipersistence for some of the series under examination. Our results suggest that antipersistence can be found for stocks and periods where extraordinary corporate actions such as mergers & acquisitions or financial distress are present. These effects should be properly accounted for when choosing and designing models for inference.

This paper discusses the indicators of financial success for Swedish companies from 1995 until 2005. Quarterly data on 42 Swedish companies were collected from the Datastream data base and analysed by using both portfolio analyses and parametric analysis. In this study, financial success is measured by using the acclaimed concepts of the Sharpe ratio and the Jensen’s Alpha. The Sharpe ratios of the companies are studied between 1995-2005 and this discussion is complemented by analysis of the Jensen’s Alpha in the second half of that time period i.e. 2000-2005. The relationship between these performance metrics and certain company-characteristics such as the book-to-market ratio, the ROA measure and capital structure is studied. The conclusion is that companies that have a high degree of profitability and maintain high book-to-market ratios outperform other companies in terms of generating excess returns to shareholders. Another interesting observation is the fact that company size does not have any significant relationship to company performance.

This paper will analyze the market reactions to news announcements of a corporate headquarter relocations for 76 firms through the time period of 1984 to 2012. Previous literature has identified that the market interprets capital expenditure decisions and acts on these interpretations, which can be found in the changes of the price of a security. The study uses an event-study methodology as well as a multiple-regression model to examine the contextual factors that play a role in influencing the corporate headquarter relocation decision. For the event-study, the event windows being used are two-day (-1,1), four-day (-2,2), fourteen-day (- 7,7), and two nineteen-day (-14,5 and -5,14) periods. The multiple regression model tests the relationship between the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the event period three days prior to and after the day of the announcement (-3,3) against a number of other contextual variables.

När man väljer att analysera företag, finns det flera olika värderingsmodeller att använda.En av dessa är Piotroskis F-score. Denna modell har mestadels tidigare använts för att analysera företag på den amerikanska marknaden. Nu vill författarna undersöka hur tillämpbar modellen är på den svenska aktiemarknaden och dessutom kombinera denna modell med en Magic Sixes värdering för att öka dess precision. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om F-score i samarbete med Magic Sixes kan generera överavkastning och överträffa den svenska aktiemarknaden. Författarna har genomfört en kvantitativ studie med en deduktiv ansats. Data har samlats in med hjälp av databasen Orbis och Dagens Industri. Författarna har upprättat identiska listor för att beräkna företagens F-score och Magic Sixes. Därefter har en beräkning av portföljernas lönsamhet genomförts. Författarnas studie har visat att F-score i kombination med Magic Sixes lyckas slå marknaden under 3 av de 6 studerade åren. F-score har en träffsäkerhet på 65,15% och Magic Sixes har en träffsäkerhet på 58,82%. Modellerna bör inte användas självständigt eller i kombination med varandra som enda grund för ett beslut, men bör ses mer som ett komplement till andra analysmetoder. Slutsatsen är att modellerna kan ge en god indikation på huruvida investerare bör undersöka investeringsobjektet närmare.

Syfte: Studien undersöker om det finns ett samband mellan ekonomiska indikatorer och den årliga aktieavkastningen ett år framåt på den svenska marknaden för företag som genomfört nyemission och jämförs med en benchmark som består av företag som inte genomfört nyemission. Metod: Uppsatsen utgår från en kvantitativ undersökning där multipel regressionsanalys används för att undersöka sambandet mellan indikatorer och aktieavkastningen vid nyemissioner under tidsperioden 2002 – 2010. Slutsats: Utifrån resultaten kunde vissa signifikanta samband konstateras mellan indikatorerna och totalavkastningen för nyemissionsgruppen. Det visade att totalavkastningen sjunker det året företag genomför nyemission jämfört med totalavkastningen året innan nyemissionen. Det kunde konstateras att marknaden är ineffektiv till en viss utsträckning i samband med nyemissioner. För benchmark kunde resultaten dock inte säkerställas på grund av att statistisk felkälla förekom i regressionsmodellen. / Purpose: The study examines if there is any significant relationship between predictors and the one year ahead stock returns in the Swedish market for company that have issued new equity and it is compared to a benchmark consisting of companies that have not made any new equity issues. Method: The essay is based on a quantitative study where a multiple regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between predictors and stock returns for company that have issued new equity during a time period of 2002 – 2010. Conclusion: Based on the results significant relationship between some predictors and stock returns could be found for the new equity issue group of company. It showed that stock returns decline the same year companies issue new equity compared to the year before new equity is issued. It was noted that the market is inefficient to a certain extent in the new equity issues matter. As for the benchmark the results could not be ensured and interpreted due to statistical errors occurring in the regression model.