Thesis (Revise). / Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and physics. I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object' and ‘space'. Part I addresses the object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical concerns, encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction in favour of new classifications. In particular, I use conclusions of relativity theory and the acquisition of mass via the Higgs field as indications of the inadequacy of intrinsicality, concluding that the distinction is more trouble than it is worth. Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise substantivalism and promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and supersubstantivalism. I examine phenomena like spatial expansion and field theory as well as separability issues more generally to emphasise the lack of rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material' and ‘space material'. I also challenge the coherence of substantivalism's ‘occupation relation' and the ease of interpreting mathematical models into physical terms. I conclude that, again, the classical notion of ‘object' and its substantival framework are misplaced and should be put aside in favour of developing monistic ontologies. Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it. I explore issues of separability using key experiments, and what makes spaces ‘physically real', before an extended examination of dimensions and dimensionality, highlighting the confusion physicists express toward such a ubiquitous concept in modern physical theories. I also explore how we use dimensions and reasons for adopting realist or instrumentalist approaches toward them, arguing that much more work should be focused on this area. I conclude with ways in which physics motivates new metaphysical models and suggest improvements for future methodological partnerships.

Texte remanié de : PhD Dissertation : Philosophie ancienne : Pisa, Scuola normale superiore : 2004. / Seule la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage constitue la version remaniée de la thèse de Gabriele Galluzzo. Table des matières. Bibliogr. p. [213]-230.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2006. / Supervisor: John C. Robertson, Jr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 313-323).

Thesis--Cologne. / Bibliography: p. 284-288.

Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Tese (doutorado) ¿ Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-24T03:09:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_ThiagoSilvaFreitas_D.pdf: 1336929 bytes, checksum: 9e6a0d7a9fe1c8d20225c8f994f6de9e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Esta tese pretende demonstrar como Aristóteles lança mão de um projeto ontológico, no livro das Categorias, a partir de uma distinção básica entre quatro tipos de entes e das relações possíveis entre estes de acordo com dois critérios fundamentais, tanto lógicos quanto ontológicos, a saber, predicação e inerência. Nossa proposta é mostrar como esses critérios operam dentro da ontologia exposta nos primeiros capítulos da obra em questão e como eles podem ser entendidos dentro de uma ontologia que, nesta obra, assume a ousía primeira como condição fundamental para todos os outros entes e, respectivamente, para as relações estabelecidas entre estes / Abstract: This thesis aims to demonstrate how Aristotle makes use of an ontological project, in the book of Categories, starting from a basic distinction between four types of entities and the possible relations between them, according to two fundamental criteria, both logical and ontological, namely predication and inherence. Our purpose is to show how these criteria operate within the ontology exposed in the Categories' first chapters and how they can be understood within an ontology that, in this work, assumes the próte ousía as a precondition for all other entities and, respectively, to the relations between these / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

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This thesis is an investigation into the simplest material entities recognised by Aristotle's theory of nature. In general, the position I defend is that the four 'so-called elements' fire, air, water, and earth are, for Aristotle, genuine elements, i.e., the simplest material constituents, of bodies. In particular, I deal with two problems, the first concerning the relationship between the four 'so-called elements' and the primary contraries, hot-cold, dry-wet; and the second concerning the nature of the matter from which the latter come to be. Responses to these problems in the secondary literature tend to conclude that the contraries (usually together with 'prime matter'), are constitutive of the so-called elements. I reject this conclusion. In the first part of this thesis I consider, and dismiss, the alleged evidence that Aristotle denies to fire, air, water, and earth the status of genuine elements, and I argue that the status of the contraries as the differentiae of the elements effectively rules out the possibility that they could be the constituents of the latter. In the second part of this thesis I attempt to unpack Aristotle's assertion at De Gen. et Cor. II. 1 that the matter of the perceptible bodies is that from which the so-called elements come to be. I argue that the matter of the perceptible bodies, although it is that from which the elements come to be, is not the 'matter of the elements', in the sense of a matter that composes the elements. On the contrary, the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', i.e., the constitutive matter of composite bodies, is itself composed of the elements: it is a mixture of the four elements. Thus the latter can be said to come to be 'from' the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', but this must be understood in a non-constitutive sense of 'from'.

Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-10T07:52:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ferreira_MateusRicardoFernandes_M.pdf: 743977 bytes, checksum: 14ea5ca680f81291864123f42bb14c9b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Essa dissertação analisa as discussões de Aristóteles sobre a unidade da substância em Metafísica Z e como essas discussões pressupõem comprometimentos do autor, já enunciados nos Segundos Analíticos, sobre essencialismo, necessidade e unidade dos tipos naturais. Aristóteles não concebe a unidade da substância como um fato elementar, mas julga assegurá-la pela existência de uma causa capaz de unificar os elementos que a constituem. No entanto, para satisfazer o critério (que a própria distinção entre substância e concomitante estabelece) de que entre os constituintes de uma substância não pode haver heterogeneidade, Aristóteles depende fundamentalmente da existência de tipos controversos de causa: as formais e as teleológicas / Abstract: This thesis analyses Aristotle¿s discussion about the unity of substance in Metaphysics Z and how it presupposes his commitments on essentialism, necessity and unity of natural kinds stated in the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle does not consider the unity of substance as a basic fact, but he claims to explain it by means of a cause that unifies the constituent elements of a substance. However, in order to satisfy the criterion that those constituents should not be extrinsic to each other (a criterion which the distinction between substance and accidents establishes), Aristotle critically depends on controversial kinds of cause: the formal and teleological causes / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T07:21:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Santos_EvanielBrasdos_M.pdf: 1468909 bytes, checksum: e86d693216376464f306ca34e7ed2e3e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Esta dissertação tem por escopo expor como Tomás sustenta que a criação é passível de demonstração filosófica na Summa contra gentiles, livro II, capítulos 6; 15-22; 52-55. Para tanto, explicitarei que Tomás procede do seguinte modo: primeiro, estabelece um novo sentido para a noção de substância na SCG, II, 53-55, esta que, por sua vez, difere daquela que Tomás leu nos textos de Aristóteles, qual seja, a substância se constitui de matéria e forma. Nesse sentido, para demonstrar filosoficamente que a substância, além de gerada, também é criada, Tomás estabelece um novo componente na constituição da substância, além dos dois acima mencionados, a saber: o ato de ser. Segundo, analisarei como Tomás postula que esses componentes são realmente distintos na SCG, II, 52. Terceiro, investigarei porque esses componentes por serem distintos, todavia unidos numa relação, devem ser efeitos de uma causa eficiente. A partir desses três modos de investigação, a operação da causa eficiente tratada na SCG, II, 6; 15, e, ademais, o surgimento do efeito sustentado na SCG, II, 16-22, designa-se de criação / Abstract: This dissertation addresses how Thomas Aquinas holds that creation is philosophically demonstrable in his Summa contra gentiles, book II, chapters 6; 15-22; 52-55. In order to do so, it will be argued that Aquinas does it as follows: first, he establishes a new sense to the notion of substance in SCG, II, 53-55, which, in its own turn, differs from the one Aquinas could read in Aristotle's texts, i.e., that substance is composed by form and matter. In this sense, in order to philosophically demonstrate that the substance, besides being generated, is also created, Aquinas assumes a new feature in substance constitution, which is different from the two previously mentioned, namely, the act of being. Then I shall analyze how Aquinas postulates that those components are really distinct in SCG, II, 52. Third, it will be investigated why those components, for they are distinct although merged in a relation, should be the effect of an efficient cause. Having accomplished these three modes of inquiry, the operation of the efficient cause addressed at SCG, II, 6; 15, and also, the appearance of effect held in SCG, II, 16-22, is named creation / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia