This thesis analyzes and documents the splint armor material from Valsgärde 8 and Vendel I,X, and XI. This armor is then contextualized in the warrior institutions, weapon-systems, and fighting techniques of warbands from Central Sweden. Analogies for the splint armor are sought after with the closest parallels being found around the Black Sea area, associated with Byzantine, Sassanid, and Steppe-Nomadic martial cultures. The systems of exchange between these two regions are then analyzed in order to inform as to where this armor came from, whyit is there in Central Sweden, and what this can tell us about the development of military contacts between Central Sweden and the Black Sea area during the Vendel Period. / Denna uppsats berör analysen och dokumentationen av det Vendeltida skenpansarmaterialet från Valsgärde 8 och Vendel I, X och XI, där skenpansarna sätts i kontext med krigarinstitutioner, vapensystem och stridstekniker från krigsband i Centrala Sverige. Analogier för dessa skenpansar med närmaste paralleller har påträffats i Svartahavsområdet och associeras med Bysantinska, Sasanidiska och stäppnomadiska krigarkulturer. Utbytessystem mellan dessa två regioner analyseras för att få förståelse för var denna typ av rustning härrör ifrån, varför den har hamnat i Centrala Sverige och vad de kan säga om utvecklingen av militära kontakter mellan Centrala Sverige och Svartahavsområdet under Vendeltiden.

Deception has long been a central component of Russian warfare, a fact that has become evident in modern conflicts where the state has been involved, not least during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. After the armed conflict, an unstable period unfolded in several Ukrainian regions, as well as in the adjacent maritime areas of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Russia’s aggressive behavior in the sea regions was driven by a goal of dominance, manifested through multifaceted actions that included both conventional and unconventional methods. A gray zone conflict was launched in the maritime domains. Existing research studying Russia’s naval warfare has paid only limited attention to use of deception, which means it misses a key aspect of its on-sea activity. With the aim to contribute more broadly to research on Russian naval warfare, this study has used a theory of deception to describe how and when the state has employed methods related to the phenomenon in the gray zone conflict. The result of the analysis shows that Russia, in its multidimensional conduct across the broad spectrum between war and peace, has utilized deception methods in various instances, with an increased intensity in the year preceding to the conflict’s escalation into full-scale war.