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A number of studies have explored the impact of multitasking on specific cognitive skills, primarily with regard to non-media multitasking activities. While briefly addressing technology, its use in the modern era regarding media multitasking and its associated cognitive declines has not been extensively examined. Forty-nine participants were required to complete a series of cognitive tasks including the Stroop Color and Word Test and the Trail Making Test. Data were also collected for how often participants media multitask, the amount of technology they use, as well as other demographic variables. The goal of this study was to empirically examine the role of technology use and media multitasking on cognitive processes such as selective attention and task switching. It was hypothesized that those grouped as high media-multitaskers would predict a faster reaction time on the Stroop task, in line with previous literature by Cain & Mitroff (2011). Results showed a significant relationship exhibiting a negative correlation between the two factors, thereby accepting the hypothesis. Findings conclude with considerations for both the use and design of technological interfaces and devices as they apply to a variety of operational settings and high-tech environments.

Prior research shows that adult children of divorce (ACD) exhibit higher levels of perceived stress than adult children of marriage (ACM), and thus, potentially lower tolerance to stress. The comparison of ACD/ACM in Sweden has not been sufficiently studied. Hence, the present study aims to examine stress management among ACD and ACM, in terms of cognitive performance under different levels of induced stress, and how it correlates to self-ratings of stress. The final sample consisted of 101 adult participants (39 ACD and 62 ACM), and the mean age was 28 years old (41 males and 60 females). The result showed no difference in stress management between ACD and ACM, and their cognitive performance was not positively correlated with self-ratings of stress. However, ACD had a faster response time (RT) in all tests, even though this difference was not significant. At this time, ACD and ACM experience equally high levels of stress, as the Covid-19 pandemic might have influenced the outcome. Future research should collect more data of ACD in Sweden of other measurements of stress. / Tidigare forskning visar att vuxna skilsmässobarn (ACD) uppvisar högre nivåer av upplevd stress än vuxna med gifta föräldrar (ACM), och skulle därför potentiellt ha lägre stresstolerans. Jämförelsen mellan ACD/ACM i Sverige har inte blivit tillräckligt studerad. Därför har denna studie som mål att undersöka stresshantering bland ACD/ACM, i form av kognitiv prestanda under olika nivåer av inducerad stress, och hur det korrelerar till självskattningar av stress. Det slutgiltiga deltagarurvalet bestod av 101 myndiga deltagare (39 ACD och 62 ACM), varav medelåldern var 28 år, (41 män och 60 kvinnor). Resultatet visar att det inte var några signifikanta skillnader i stresshantering mellan ACD och ACM, och var inte positivt korreleradtill självskattningar av stress. Men, ACD hade en snabbare responstid (RT) i samtliga tester trots att resultatet inte var signifikant. Just nu, upplever ACD och ACM lika höga nivåer av stress, då Covid-19 pandemin kan ha influerat resultatet. Framtida forskning borde samla in mer data kring ACD i Sverige från andra mätningar av stress.

This thesis explores the behaviour of participants taking an associative approach to a task-cueing paradigm. Task-cueing is usually intended to explore controlled processing of task-sets. But small stimulus sets plausibly afford associative learning via simple and conditional discriminations. In six experiments participants were presented with typical task-cueing trials: a cue (coloured shape) followed by a digit (or in Experiment 5 a symbol) requiring one of two responses. In the standard Tasks condition (Monsell Experiment and Experiments 1-3), the participant was instructed to perform either an odd/even or a high/low task dependent on the cue. The second condition was intended to induce associative learning of cue + stimulus-response mappings. In general, the Tasks condition showed a large switch cost that reduced with preparation time, a small, constant congruency effect and a small perturbation when new stimuli were introduced. By contrast the CSR condition showed a small, reliable switch cost that did not reduce with preparation time, a large congruency effect that changed over time and a large perturbation when new stimuli were introduced. These differences may indicate automatic associative processing in the CSR condition and rule-based classification in the Tasks condition. Furthermore, an associative model based on the APECS learning algorithm (McLaren, 1993) provided an account of the CSR data. Experiment 3 showed that participants were able to deliberately change their approach to the experiment from using CSR instructions to using Tasks instructions, and to some extent vice versa. Experiments 4 & 5 explored the cause of the small switch cost in the CSR condition. Consideration of the aspects of the paradigm that produced the switch cost in the APECS model produced predictions, which were tested against behavioural data. Experiment 4 found that the resulting manipulation made participants more likely to induce task-sets. Experiment 5 used random symbols instead of numbers, removing the underlying task-sets. The results of this experiment broadly agreed with the predictions made using APECS. Chapter 6 considers an initial attempt to create a real-time version of APECS. It also finds that an associative model of a different class (AMAN, Harris & Livesey, 2010) can provide an account of some, but not all, of the phenomena found in the CSR condition. This thesis concludes that performance in the Tasks condition is suggestive of the use of cognitive control processes, whilst associatively based responding is available as a basis for performance in the CSR condition.

Recent evidence suggests that when performing reach-and-grasp actions on day-to-day objects, lift-actions are faster to execute relative to use-actions, and that a “use-on-lift” interference occurs and produces switch costs when changing actions from using to then lifting (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; Osiurak & Badets, 2016). Such findings result from paradigms that include the sudden appearance of objects, requiring participants to react quickly to the features of the object, independent of the functionality of the objects. Because of the importance this topic has to day-to-day interactions with objects, the following four experiments were executed with objects continuously visible to participants. When imitating images of hand actions on objects, participants showed no differences in the initiation time of use- and lift-actions, suggesting that no systematic differences exist between these two actions. Using this as a baseline, we compared a more generative approach, as when actions are instructed by auditory sentences. In this case, we see that switching actions is difficult, switching objects is even more difficult, and that use-actions are modestly faster than lift-actions; the reverse of what previous research shows. In a third experiment modelled after the paradigm used in studies producing rapid lift- and slowed use-actions, we showed that use-actions are actually facilitating lift-actions. Further, we demonstrate that having a use-action goal in mind provides the knowledge required to perform a lift-action, and that use-actions are again faster than lift-actions. These results are a critical addition to the task-switching literature on the cognitive control of motor processes associated with hand actions as distinctions are made between non-naturalistic and realistic settings relevant to day-to-day interactions with objects. We show that use-actions facilitate lift-actions and that, in realistic settings, both use- and lift-actions require access to stored knowledge. / Graduate / 0633 / hvanmook@uvic.ca

The growing use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in college campuses has dramatically increased the potential for multitasking among students who have to juggle classes, school assignments, work, and recreational activities. These students believe that they have become more efficient by performing two or more tasks simultaneously. The use of technology, however, has changed the student’s ability to focus and attend to what they need to learn. Research has shown that multitasking divides students’ attention, which could have a negative impact on their cognition and learning. The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of distractive multitasking on students’ attention and academic performance in a classroom setting. Several studies in cognitive psychology have focused on individuals’ divided attention between simultaneously occurring tasks. Such research has found that, because human attention and capacity to process information are selective and limited, a performance decrement often results when task performance requires divided attention. Distractive tasks are defined as tasks or activities for which cognitive resources are used to process information that is not related to the course material. Multitasking is defined as the engagement in individual tasks that are performed in succession through a process of context switching. Using a non-experimental, correlational research design, the researcher examined the effects of distractive multitasking, with computer devices, during classroom lectures, on students’ academic performance. This study used a monitoring system to capture data that reflected actual multitasking behaviors from students who used computers while attending real-time classroom lectures. The findings showed that there was no statistically significant relationship between the frequency of distractive multitasking (predictor variable) and academic performance (criterion variable), as measured by the midterm and final evaluation scores. The results did not support the hypothesis that distractive computer-based multitasking could have a negative impact on academic performance.

Heavy episodic drinking is linked with poorer academic performance, injury, and risk behaviors among college students. Understanding the cognitive and motivational factors that influence self-control of alcohol use is critical to identifying students' risk factors and developing interventions. Dual process models characterize alcohol use patterns as a function of automatic appetitive responses to alcohol-related stimuli and executive control functions. These processes may be influenced by contextual cues such as mood. The present research sought to better understand the cognitive-motivational mechanisms through which an established contextual cue for drinking - positive mood - influences alcohol use. Two studies examined the influence of positive mood induction on undergraduate drinkers' approach biases for alcohol cues and executive functioning using established and modified Stimulus Response Compatibility Tasks (SRC). Undergraduates who used alcohol at least once in the past month were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool and randomized to positive or neutral mood induction conditions to determine whether positive mood: (1) increased approach bias or (2) impaired efforts to control alcohol cue responses. Prior to mood induction, participants completed individual difference measures related to alcohol use to evaluate potential moderators. Experiment 1 (N=93) examined post-induction alcohol approach bias and approach response inhibition using a stop-signal task within SRCs. Those in the positive mood condition did not exhibit greater approach bias or less inhibition, and mood effects were not moderated by individual differences as hypothesized. Experiment 2 (N=141) examined the influence of mood on approach bias and the ability to reverse established SRC responses to alcohol cues, with a pre-induction SRC to control for baseline approach biases. Again, positive mood did not significantly influence alcohol approach bias or executive control. Discussion: Results did not support positive mood influences on cognitive-motivational processes associated with drinking. The absence of mood effects may be a function of the type of positive mood induced or sensitivity of the SRC to detect alcohol-specific approach bias in this population. Future studies should explore these processes using alternate measures of alcohol-specific approach bias, response inhibition, and mood states that may be more specific to drinking.

The overall goal of this dissertation is to elucidate the cellular and circuit mechanisms underlying flexible behavior in the prefrontal cortex. We are often faced with situations in which the appropriate behavior in one context is inappropriate in others. If these situations are familiar, we can perform the appropriate behavior without relearning how the context relates to the behavior — an important hallmark of intelligence. Neuroimaging and lesion studies have shown that this dynamic, flexible process of remapping context to behavior (task switching) is dependent on prefrontal cortex, but the precise contributions and interactions of prefrontal subdivisions are still unknown. This dissertation investigates two prefrontal areas that are thought to be involved in distinct, but complementary executive roles in task switching — the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Using electrophysiological recordings from macaque monkeys, I show that synchronous network oscillations in the dlPFC provide a mechanism to flexibly coordinate context representations (rules) between groups of neurons during task switching. Then, I show that, wheras the ACC neurons can represent rules at the cellular level, they do not play a significant role in switching between contexts — rather they seem to be more related to errors and motivational drive. Finally, I develop a set of web-enabled interactive visualization tools designed to provide a multi-dimensional integrated view of electrophysiological datasets. Taken together, these results contribute to our understanding of task switching by investigating new mechanisms for coordination of neurons in prefrontal cortex, clarifying the roles of prefrontal subdivisions during task switching, and providing visualization tools that enhance exploration and understanding of large, complex and multi-scale electrophysiological data.

Die zentrale Frage der Arbeit „Wie beeinflussen Emotionen kognitive Prozesse?“ wurde in den letzten Jahrzehnten intensiv erforscht. Dabei stellte sich heraus, dass entgegen der alltagspsychologischen Annahme, Emotionen nicht ausschließlich negative Effekte auf die kognitiven Leistungen haben. So fand zum Beispiel Bower (1981) sehr spezifische Einflüsse von Stimmungen auf das Gedächtnis und Isen (1999) berichtete Verbesserungen der kognitiven Leistungsfähigkeit unter positivem Gefühlseinfluss in unterschiedlichen Aufgaben. Fasst man die aktuelle Befundlage insgesamt zusammen, so ist es jedoch unmöglich ein eindeutiges Fazit zu ziehen, so heterogen sind die Ergebnisse der unterschiedlichen Studien (Rusting, 1998). Zunächst werden in dieser Arbeit daher zwei mögliche Ursachen für das heterogene Befundmuster diskutiert. Zum einen führt die Dominanz des dimensionalen Ansatzes (Russell, 2003; Bradley und Lang, 2000; Davidson et al., 2003) in der Emotionspsychologie dazu, dass spezifische Basisemotionen mit derselben Valenz und Erregung nicht unterschieden werden (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1962). Zum anderen werden Emotion und Kognition meist als separate Prozesse betrachtet (Lazarus, 1984; Zajonc, 1980). In letzter Zeit mehren sich jedoch die Stimmen, die sich für eine integrative Perspektive auf die Interaktion von Emotion und Kognition aussprechen (Gray, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Scherer, 2000). Daher wird in dieser Arbeit vorgeschlagen, Emotionen nicht als separaten Elemente der menschlichen Psyche zu betrachten, sondern als spezifische Muster, die sich aus verschiedenen Komponenten zusammen setzen: u.a. Physiologie, Kognition, Motivation. Entsprechen einige dieser Komponenten einem bestimmten Emotionsmuster, so können in der Folge die übrigen Komponenten durch das Muster selbst angeregt werden und zur vollen Entfaltung des Emotionsmusters führen. Um dieses Modell zu testen, sollte in dieser Arbeit die Hypothese geprüft werden, ob für spezifische Emotionen spezifische Muster der Ausprägung kognitiver Parameter existieren. Die empirischen Untersuchungen dieser Arbeit konzentrierten sich dabei auf drei spezifische Basisemotionen (Angst, Ärger, Traurigkeit) und auf zwei ausgewählte kognitive Parameter, die an Arbeiten von Dörner (1999, Dörner und Bartl-Storck, 2002) angelehnt sind: Wechselbereitschaft (Flexibilität) und Assoziationsbreite (Kreativität). Die Stimmungsinduktion erfolgte neben dem Lesen von Geschichten vorwiegend mittels der Methode der Imagination eigener Erlebnisse. Um die beiden kognitiven Parameter Wechselbereitschaft und Assoziationsbreite zu messen, wurden zwei Paradigmen eingesetzt. Bei dem ersten handelte es sich um ein Aufgaben-Wechsel-Paradigma nach Dreisbach und Goschke (2004). Ärgerliche Probanden zeigten darin Schwierigkeiten beim Aufgabenwechsel, was auf eine verringerte Wechselbereitschaft schließen lässt. Das zweite Paradigma war ein Assoziations-Erkennungs-Paradigma, das in dieser Arbeit neu entwickelt wurde, um beide Parameter innerhalb ein und desselben Paradigmas zu messen. Es fand sich darin konsistent eine Erhöhung der Assoziationsbreite in ängstlicher Stimmung. Die Stimmungen zeigten im Gegensatz zum ersten Paradigma keine Unterschiede in ihrer Auswirkung auf die Wechselbereitschaft. Zusammenfassend geht aus der Arbeit hervor, dass es spezifische Effekte spezifischer Stimmungen gibt, es also nicht genügt, Valenz und Arousal zu unterscheiden. Allerdings sind auch die in dieser Arbeit gefundenen Effekte nicht immer stabil. Dies wird zum Teil auf zu schwache Stimmungsveränderungen, zu geringe Stichprobengröße und Stimmungsregulationsprozesse zurückgeführt. Bezogen auf die allgemeine Frage nach dem Einfluss von Emotionen auf kognitive Prozesse präsentiert diese Arbeit einen neuen Forschungsansatz, der sowohl eine theoretische Präzisierung der abstrakten Konzepte als auch eine methodische Integration der vielfältigen Befunde erlaubt. Dies geschieht mittels der Idee von einer Emotion als einen das gesamte System Mensch erfassenden Prozess. Damit legt diese Arbeit eine Basis, auf der sich zukünftige Forschungsarbeiten weiter der Frage annähern können, ob und wie unsere Gefühle zu unseren oft so beeindruckenden Verstandesleistungen beitragen.

The experiments reported in this thesis were conducted to examine the effects of executive-control and associative-learning processes on performance in conventional executive-control paradigms. For this purpose, I developed comparative task-switching and response-inhibition paradigms, which were used to assess the performance of pigeons, whose behaviour is presumably based purely on associative processes, and of humans, whose behaviour may be guided by executive control and by associative processes. Pigeons were able to perform accurately in the comparative paradigms; hence, associative-learning processes are sufficient to account for successful performance. However, some task-specific effects that can be attributed to executive-control processes, and which were found in humans applying executive control, were absent or greatly reduced in pigeons. Those effects either reflect the mental operations that are performed to ensure that a specific set of stimulus-response-contingencies is applied and any contingencies belonging to a different set are suppressed, or reflect mental preparations for the possibility that the requirement to execute a certain response suddenly changes. In particular, in Chapter 3, it is shown that the benefits of repeatedly applying the same set of stimulus-response contingencies (or, in reverse, the costs of switching from one set to another) do not apply when Pavlovian processes dominate learning, which is likely the case for pigeons. Furthermore, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the behavioural effects of preparing for an unpredicted change in response requirements appeared to be absent when behaviour was based purely on associative processes. Instead, associatively mediated performance was primarily influenced by the stimulus-response contingencies that were effective in each paradigm. Repeating the same response in consecutive trials facilitated the performance of pigeons and associatively learning human participants in the task-switching paradigms, and performing a particular Go response increased the pigeons' likelihood of executing that response in the following trial in two response-inhibition paradigms. In summary, any behavioural effects that can be observed at the level of abstract task requirements reflect the influence of executive-control processes, both in task-switching paradigms and in response-inhibition paradigms.