This investigation constitutes an attempt towards(1) understanding issues and problems relating to the notions of one, many, part and whole in Parmenides and Plato; (2) extracting conditions for a successful account of multiplicity and parthood;(3) surveying Deleuzian conceptions and uses of these notions; (4) appraising the extent to which Deleuze’s metaphysics can answer some of these ancient problems concerning the status of multiplicity and the nature of mereological composition, that is, of the relations that pertain between parts and the wholes that they compose.

Carlo Michelstaedter's Persuasion and Rhetoric (1910) is one of best examples of what Massimo Cacciari calls the early twentieth century "metaphysics of youth." Persuasion and Rhetoric is the result of Michelstaedter's academic investigation on the concepts of "persuasion" and "rhetoric" in Plato and Aristotle. Michelstaedter saw in Plato's corpus the gradual abandonment of Parmenidean "being" and Socrates' dialogical philosophy. He reinterpreted the notions of "persuasion" and "rhetoric" terms of a radical dichotomy, using them to represent two opposed ontological modalities, two epistemological attitudes, and two existential alternatives. If "rhetoric" comprehends language, institutional knowledge, and all manifestations of empirical life, then "persuasion" is defined as the unity of the individual with Parmenidean being. Persuasion is an impossible choice: "lifeless life." Being a decisive alternative to rhetoric, persuasion - much like Platonic mania - can neither be articulated nor communicated. Nevertheless, Michelstaedter speaks, aware of his inevitable failure: he will not persuade anyone.

Thesis--Heidelberg. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 133-142).

Thesis (Inaugural-Dissertation)--Universität Heidelburg, Fakultät der Philosophisch-Historischen. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 260-273).

The purpose of this paper is to offer a general view of the philosophical affinities between Plato and Hegel through the analysis of the Hegelian interpretation of the Parmenides. We will show how the Hegelian approach to Plato, and his understanding of idealism and dialectics, is determined by Hegel’s debate with the philosophy of Kant. A brief exposé of the differences between Kantian transcendental idealism and Hegelian absolute idealism will be needed. Then, we will show some traits of the Hegelian hermeneutics of Plato in order to understand how the first part of the Parmenides admits parallelisms with certain excerpts of Hegel’s work, both regarding its philosophical purpose as well as stylistically. Finally, the Author expounds the Hegelian evaluation of the dialectical exercise from the second part of the Parmenides. There, Platonic Dialectic fails and does not accomplish its philosophical purpose, and becomes a valuable skepticism consubstantial to philosophical thought. / El propósito del presente trabajo es ofrecer un panorama de las afinidades filosóficas entre Platón y Hegel a partir del análisis de la interpretación hegeliana del Parménides. Se mostrará cómo la aproximación hegeliana a Platón y su comprensión del idealismo y la dialéctica están marcadas por el debate con la filosofía kantiana. Esto exige una breve exposición del idealismo trascendental kantiano frente al idealismo absoluto hegeliano, así como de la lógica trascendental kantiana frente a la lógica especulativa hegeliana. Se señalarán luego algunos rasgos hermenéuticos de la interpretación hegeliana de Platón para poder exponer después cómo la primera parte del Parménides admite paralelismos de intención filosófica y hasta narrativos con pasajes de obras de Hegel. Finalmente, se expondrá la evaluación hegeliana del ejercicio dialéctico de la segunda parte del Parménides. Esto exige indicar por qué la dialéctica platónica no logra su cometido filosófico del todo y queda “reducida” a un escepticismo, no desprovisto de valor sino consustancial a toda labor filosófica.

For some of Plato’s commentators some passages of the Republic and the Parmenides provide a clear guideline regarding the extension of the noetic “world”, namely, a criterion that allows us to know what kind of Platonic forms there are, and which there are not. There are forms only for a pair of opposite properties such as “big” and “small”; indeed, smallness itself is not what appears to the senses, since each sensible instance of smallness appears “mixed” with its opposite, bigness. On the contrary, things that are perceived by the senses such as fingers, do not have an eidos. However, a more careful reading of the relevant passages, taking into account what Socrates says in 476a about the unity and multiplicity of the forms, will show us the incorrectness of this interpretation. / Algunos intérpretes de Platón consideran que algunos pasajes de la República y el Parménides nos proveen de un criterio para delimitar la extensión del ámbito ediético, es decir, para saber qué tipos de Ideas hay y qué tipos no. Hay ideas solo para pares de propiedades opuestas, como “grande” y “pequeño”, ya que la pequeñez no es lo que aparece a los sentidos, pues en cada instancia sensible suya la encontramos mezclada con su opuesto, la grandeza. Contrariamente, aquellas cosas que son tal como aparecen a los sentidos, como los dedos, no tienen un eidos. Sin embargo, una lectura más cuidadosa de los pasajes relevantes, tomando en cuenta lo que Sócrates dice sobre la multiplicidad y unidad de las ideas en República 476a, nos mostrará lo equivocado de esta interpretación.

No description available.

The thesis is based on Heidegger's conception of truth that was forming in his thinking from the beginning of the thirties of 20th Century. We follow the change of the conception of truth in history from Heidegger's perspective, namely on Anaximandros, Parmenides and Plato. We look upon this subject through chosen Heidegger's texts concerning presocratics and truth, along with Plato's dialog Parmenides and an anonymous commentary to it from an unknown author from the late antiquity. For Heidegger the way of Being of a man is changing in history, based on the transformation of mans relation to Being. The relation is linked with a transformation of the conception of truth. The way how we uncover the beings in the world and what does the being mean to us is connected to that too. That is why we can say that in the way how we understand the truth is equally shown how we understand ourselves and the world. We are therefore looking on the conception of truth through Heidegger's concept of history, which is according to him rooted in the transformation of one's relation to Being itself. That affects not only how and from what a man understands himself in the world (and therefore affects the transformation of the conception of truth throughout history), but also whether and how a man asks about the Being...

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Notre thèse consiste en une édition et traduction des témoignages sur le philosophe présocratique Mélissos de Samos dans l’Antiquité, et un commentaire qui se concentre sur l’histoire de l’interprétation de ce penseur. Notre objectif est de montrer comment Mélissos a été compris par les auteurs anciens en fonction de leur perspective et des connaissances dont ils disposaient, et de présenter les grandes orientations de cette lecture à travers l’Antiquité. Une telle étude est particulièrement intéressante pour Mélissos étant donné qu’il est l’objet d’une doxographie certes riche mais qui peut être analysée dans son intégralité. De plus, elle nous offre un éclairage sur la place de l’éléatisme dans l’histoire de la pensée. Nous avons proposé pour chaque témoin une analyse de leur interprétation de Mélissos, mais nous sommes concentréssur trois grandes lectures : celle d’Aristote, de Pseudo-Aristote dans le MXG et la réinterprétation néoplatonicienne par Philopon et Simplicius. Notre édition présente la quasi-intégralité des textes anciens qui mentionnent Mélissos, et est accompagnée d’un apparat critique sélectif composé à partir des éditions déjà existantes, mais modifié en fonction de nos propres choix éditoriaux. Elle est accompagnée d’une traduction annotée en français. / My dissertation contains an edition and translation of the testimonies on the Presocratic philosopher Melissus of Samos in Antiquity, and a commentary focusing on the history of the way in which he has been interpreted. My aim is to show how he has been understood by ancient writers according to their own agenda and to the knowledge available to them, and to present the main lines of the reception of Melissus throughout Antiquity. A study of this kind is of particular interest in the case of Melissus since he offers a rich material that can be nonetheless analysed in its entirety. Moreover, it provides us with some insights on the place occupied by Eleatism in the intellectual history. For each witness I gave an analysis of theirinterpretation of Melissus, but I concentrated on four main authors: Aristotle, the MXG’s Pseudo-Aristotle and the Neoplatonists Philoponus and Simplicius. My edition includes almost every ancient text that mentions Melissus with a selective critical apparatus, based on the already existing editions, but modified in accordance with my own editorial choices. The edition is accompanied by a French translation with notes.